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Abstract
This thesis examines the conduct of economic policy from the moment 
Hugh Gaitskell joined the Treasury in 1950 as Stafford Cripps’ deputy to Rab 
Butler’s departure in December 1955. It shows that, contrary to the prevailing view 
of this period, there was no consensus about the ways in which the economy 
should be managed. There was a sustained argument over the use of physical 
controls, monetary policy and direct taxation. This thesis examines Gaitskell’s 
economic thought and the underlying economic and political rationales for the 
positions taken by the Labour and Conservative Parties.
In examining the structure of economic policy-making, this thesis 
demonstrates that ministerial determination of policy is far more important than 
previous authors have assumed and that this is why a developing consensus 
among civil servants about the conduct of economic policy is not reflected in 
outputs. ‘Set the People Free’ was more than a political soundbite.
This thesis is based on extensive research in the Public Record Office, but 
it also makes use of private and Parliamentary papers as well as elite interviews 
to illuminate the various inputs into policy-making and the way policy developed 
over the period.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Birth of Mr Butskell
November 13 1954 witnessed the birth of a new political figure. His arrival 
was heralded by Norman Macrae in The Economist. In an article entitled ‘Mr 
Butskell’s Dilemma.’ Macrae wrote that ‘Mr Butskell is already a well-known figure 
in dinner table conversations in both Westminister and Whitehall, and the time has 
come to introduce him to a wider audience. He is a composite of the present 
Chancellor and the previous one... Whenever there is a tendency to excess 
Conservatism within the Conservative party - such as a clamour for too much 
imperial preference, for a wild dash to convertibility, or even for a little more 
unemployment to teach the workers a lesson - Mr Butskell speaks up for the cause 
of moderation from the Government side of the House; when there is a clamour 
for even graver irresponsibilities from the Labour benches, Mr Butskell has hitherto 
spoken up from the other.’1
Mr Butskell was an amalgam of the names of Hugh Gaitskell, the Labour 
Chancellor of the Exchequer from October 1950 to October 1951 and his 
Conservative successor R.A.(commonly called Rab) Butler who was Chancellor 
until December 1955. The point of Macrae’s article was to demonstrate the tactics 
the Labour front bench should use to oppose Churchill’s Conservative 
Government.2 Although Macrae under-estimated the differences between Gaitskell 
and Butler, particularly on convertibility policy where Butler had, in fact, favoured 
a ‘wild dash to convertibility’, it was not his intention to suggest that there were no 
policy differences. Macrae was conscious of the fact that ‘they were not the same 
man’ and wrote at length about some of the crucial differences in Sunshades in 
October published in 1963.3 Mr Butskell might have become one of the forgotten 
men of British politics had he not been resurrected by historians and political 
scientists who used the character to personify a consensus over economic policy 
they argue persisted until the 1970s.
This thesis will show that rather than personifying consensus, Gaitskell and 
Butler held beliefs and followed polices that amounted to a fundamentally different
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approach to economic management. The disagreement centred on the use of 
economic controls on the economy. Gaitskell argued that physical controls such 
as building licencing and import controls were central to economic planning; to the 
maintenance of full employment; and to the fulfilment of the policy of providing ‘fair 
shares’ of what he classified as ‘essential’ goods. Gaitskell’s belief in a controlled 
economy lead him to reject the idea that the establishment of convertibility of the 
pound and of a ‘one-world’ trading system should be the goals of British policy. He 
believed that such objectives would be incompatible with a continuation of a 
socialist economic policy at home.
Although Butler did not share Gaitskell’s training as an economist, he also 
had a set of beliefs that supported a clear economic strategy. He believed that 
controls constrained economic activity and created artificial shortages which 
justified the imposition of even greater restrictions. He believed that if the realities 
of the world economy were not brought to bear on the British economy then 
economic policy would amount to little more than constant crisis management. He 
therefore favoured a policy of decontrol, the immediate restoration of convertibility 
at a floating rate and movement towards a ‘one-world’ economy. Butler believed 
that economic management should centre on indirect methods, in particular fiscal 
and interest rate policy. The divergence between the policies pursued by Gaitskell 
and Butler reflected differences between political as well as economic doctrines. 
In particular, it reflected a fundamentally different approach to the relationship 
between the individual and the state and to what constitutes individual freedom. 
This was not an esoteric debate confined to academic literature but an important 
part of political discourse at the time.
Given the fundamental differences that this thesis will argue existed in 
economic policy between 1950 and 1955 it is necessary to investigate how it is 
that the idea of consensus has come to dominate the historiography of the period 
and how the overwhelming evidence that no consensus existed has come to be 
ignored.
The Consensualists
The origins of the postwar consensus school of history lie in the second 
volume of Alan Bullock’s biography of Ernest Bevin and Arthur Marwick’s book 
Britain in the Century of Total War, both of which were published in the late 
1960s.4 Bullock and Marwick argue that what they saw as a continuing political 
consensus had its roots in the work of the wartime coalition government. The 
greatest landmark in the development of the postwar consensus thesis was the 
publication of Paul Addison’s book The Road to 1945 in 1975; this greatly 
expanded upon Bullock’s and Marwick’s arguments.5
The central argument of Anthony Seldon’s book on the postwar Churchill 
administration, published in 1981, is that the Conservatives programme 
represented continuity in policy. He concludes that ‘one of the most remarkable 
features of the Government was the extent that Conservative policy followed on 
logically from Labour policy in the preceding six years.’6 Seldon’s account of the 
Churchill administration has yet to be challenged. Henry Pelling’s book on 
Churchill’s peacetime ministry complements Seldon’s account with additional 
information from the Public Record Office and other archives that were previously 
unavailable but does not challenge his conclusions.7 As a former participant in 
economic policy-making, Alec Cairncross has played a crucial role in providing the 
evidence that points to the existence of a consensus.
That the view of consensualist historians came to dominate the literature in 
the 1980s is best explained by the prevailing political conditions of the time. It was 
in the interest of those on both sides of the political divide to accept a framework 
that emphasised the radicalism of the Thatcher government and therefore 
highlighted either its success or failure.
In the atmosphere of the 1980s it was difficult for voices dissenting from the 
consensus line to be heard. It is only recently that the arguments of the revisionists 
have found their way from the lecture theatres and into the literature. The case 
against consensus has tended to concentrate on a more detailed appraisal of 
specific policy areas. In the sphere of economic policy Neil Rollings has so far 
provided the most extensive argument against the existence of a consensus 
although Jim Tomlinson’s studies have provided much evidence that points in the
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same direction.8
Although consensualist historians do not all agree about what exactly 
constituted the postwar consensus they all see economic policy as part of it. In his 
discussion of The Post-War Settlement’ in Ruling Performance Paul Addison 
adopted the definition of consensus provided by Alan Bullock in the wartime 
volume of his life of Ernest Bevin. On the subject of economic policy Bullock 
defines the consensus as a commitment to ‘First, a mixed economy, partly in 
public, partly in private ownership, with both sectors subject to constant 
intervention by Government, a managed as well as a mixed economy. Second, a 
commitment by all parties to the maintenance of full employment.’9
Like most definitions of consensus, Bullock’s is more notable for what it 
does not include than for what it does. His principal object is to show the 
connection between Bevin’s own beliefs and the features of the postwar settlement 
which he argues was still in place at the time of writing. However, there are several 
important items that Bullock himself lists as being central to Bevin’s beliefs which 
he omits from his definition of the postwar settlement. Firstly, Bullock argues that 
Bevin believed in the maintenance of full employment, not only by the use of 
Keynesian economic policy and nationalisation, but also by ‘control over the 
location of industry.’10 He also includes amongst Bevin’s core values the belief in 
‘action by the state to maintain the wartime policy of “Fair shares” wherever 
anything was in short supply - including physical controls (e.g. over building), 
rationing, food and housing subsidies.’11 Therefore, although Bullock accepts that 
the use of physical controls to maintain full employment and ‘fair shares’ was 
central to the economic beliefs of senior Labour figures, this element has 
somehow been lost on the way to defining the postwar settlement.
More recently consensualist historians have qualified their definition of the 
postwar consensus in response to attacks by revisionist historians. In an article 
published in 1994 Seldon argues that the consensus over economic policy was 
that both main parties ‘put the maintenance of a high and stable level of 
employment as their primary aim of economic policy, in marked contrast to the 
position before 1939.112 There are a number of problems with Seldon’s definition, 
not least that is too broad to be of much use. He deals only with the ends of
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economic policy, not the means and does not say how the policy objective of full, 
or high and stable employment, was to be achieved. Clearly, Seldon views this as 
a detail of policy and not relevant to his definition. It is difficult to see how he can 
justify this omission. Government policy is, by definition, a means to an end. One 
cannot claim that a consensus exists between the leadership of two parties if they 
agree about final objectives when policy solutions are different.
A further problem with Seldon’s omission of means from his definition is that 
the goals and means of economic policy are inextricably linked. It will be shown 
below, for example, that the 1945-51 Labour Government was committed to 
economic planning by the use of economic controls. This commitment says a lot 
about Labour ministers attitude towards the relationship between the individual and 
the state and the role that the state should play in the economy, as does the 
Conservative’s counter-commitment to decontrol and the return to free markets. 
The willingness of ministers to use different policy devices has a fundamental 
effect on outcomes. For example, as will be shown below, Hugh Gaitskell’s 
willingness to use price controls allowed him to avoid a trade off between inflation 
and unemployment and therefore run the economy with greater pressure of 
demand than would otherwise have been possible. Butler’s rejection of price 
controls meant that he had to establish a balance between these factors.
Another problem with Seldon’s definition is that full employment was 
virtually guaranteed in the 1950s by external factors. Global expansion meant that 
governments had to do little to maintain full employment. Given the favourable 
economic climate it becomes difficult to judge exactly how important full 
employment was in Conservative thinking.
It will be argued in this thesis that there was no agreement between the 
leadership of the two main parties, while in office, that high and stable employment 
should be the primary objective of economic policy between 1950-55. Although 
employment levels remained a major concern there is no evidence that it remained 
the primary concern of policy other than the fact that full employment continued to 
be maintained. That Butler gave greater priority to convertibility of the pound and 
decontrol can be seen in his advocacy of the ROBOT plan to make the pound 
convertible at a floating rate, which he supported in spite of the fact that greater
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fluctuations in employment levels were a recognised consequence of the 
proposals. The plan would have been adopted by the Conservative Cabinet if the 
Foreign Secretary, Anthony-Eden, had not come out against it precisely because 
he accorded greater political priority to employment.13 Further, it will be shown that 
even after the ROBOT plan was blocked its ideas continued to form the basis of 
the Government’s external economic policy. It will also be seen that during the 
Butler Chancellorship the agenda of fiscal policy shifted from concern about 
employment to concern about the level of productive investment and economic 
growth. In fact, increasing economic growth became the primary objective of 
economic policy during the Butler Chancellorship.
The Whig View of History
It is necessary to look in greater detail at why Seldon and Addison think a 
consensus existed on economic policy and how they think it was constituted if a 
considered challenge is to be mounted. It is clear that they believe that by the time 
of the Gaitskell Chancellorship the Government had been converted to the use of 
Keynesian demand management to maintain a high level of employment. Addison 
describes this consensus in the revised edition of The Road to 1945 as ‘a 
Whitehall consensus’. It did not mean that there was no divergence in the political 
rhetoric of the two parties.14 What mattered was that policy continued to centre on 
Keynesian techniques to maintain high levels of employment whichever party was 
in power. Seldon shares this view and has written that ‘by consensus is meant a 
broad parameter of agreement on many key areas of policy between the 
leaderships of both main parties when they are in office. Total agreement on all 
aspects of policy, ideological agreement, rhetorical agreement, agreement on 
detail, agreement between Government and Opposition front-benches, agreement 
between party activists or ideologies, and all the other straw men erected by the 
anti-consensualists, are all ruled out by this definition.’15
Addison’s explanation is that, ‘whichever party was in office, the Whigs were 
in power. Party conflicts were compromised, and ideology relegated to the margins 
of government by countervailing factors which impelled all administrations towards 
the middle ground. Among these factors were the influence of the civil service, the
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electoral imperatives of a party system in which the two parties were evenly 
balanced, the pragmatism of party leaders, and the practical value of maintaining 
a large measure of continuity between one administration and the next.’16
Addison argues that in the specific context created by the war years, these 
countervailing factors operated with even greater force ‘because of the existence 
of a Coalition Government and the prominence in postwar planning of two great 
Whitehall mandarins, Beveridge and Keynes. Beveridge was the founding father 
of the welfare state, and Keynes of the managed economy. Their, philosophies, 
significantly were neither conservative nor socialist, but liberal... Consensus, 
therefore, was an exercise in containment with an agenda derived in part from 
sources outside the two-party system... The Labour Left and the Conservative 
Right were excluded.’17
The conversion of British economic policy to Keynesian principles was 
therefore a central element of the ‘Whig Ascendancy’. Although Addison has 
continued to argue that ‘it may well be that in the long run the triumph of some 
form of Keynesian doctrine was indeed inevitable’ in the epilogue to the revised 
edition of The Road to 1945. he accepts that the Labour Party’s continued 
adherence to Socialist ideas of planning meant that it was not fully converted to 
Keynesianism by 1945.18 Addison asserts ‘that it was only after 1947, during the 
period described by Kenneth Morgan as “the retreat from collectivism” that Cripps 
and the Treasury led the Government towards Keynesianism.’19
Elsewhere, Addison has argued that by the time Gaitskell was promoted to 
the Chancellorship in 1950 the Labour leadership had been convinced that 
economic management should centre on Keynesian methods. He quotes Donald 
Winch’s assessment that Dalton was the last ‘pre-Keynesian Chancellor of the 
Exchequer’, Cripps “‘was more at home with Keynesian terminology and 
methods,’” while Gaitskell “‘was perhaps the first entirely self-conscious Keynesian 
to occupy the chancellorship.’’The commitment to centralised economic planning 
had gradually faded away.’20
In his study of the 1951-55 Churchill Government, Seldon argues that Butler 
took over where Gaitskell left off and followed the policy lines indicated by 
Addison. He writes that ‘Gaitskell was to the “right” of his Party, Butler to the “left”
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of his; both men believed in full employment and the necessity of managing the 
economy to secure this end.’21
Among the many questions raised by Addison’s analysis two stand out and 
will be dealt with in detail. First, was the Treasury really converted to Keynesianism 
by the experience of the war years? Second, did the Gaitskell Chancellorship mark 
the end of the process by which the Labour Party moved from a policy of central 
planning to one of Keynesian demand management? The evidence suggests that 
Addison is mistaken in both propositions. It will be shown below that the Treasury 
incorporated the use of Keynesian methods of economic management only insofar 
as they did not contradict the primacy of financial control. In particular, the 
Treasury as a whole was not converted to the use of deficit financing as a 
legitimate economic weapon in peacetime. The Treasury’s stance did not change 
in the years covered by the Gaitskell and Butler Chancellorships. Addison is also 
wrong to characterise Gaitskell as a Keynesian with a Socialist slant. This thesis 
will show that he was a Socialist economist with a Keynesian slant. This is an 
important distinction. Gaitskell believed that Keynesian methods could only be 
useful within a framework of physical controls. Indeed, during his Chancellorship 
Gaitskell reaffirmed the commitment of the Labour Party to physical planning of the 
economy. Seldon is wrong therefore to conclude that as Chancellor Butler picked 
up where Gaitskell had left off. The significance of the decontrol programme 
pursued by Butler becomes apparent when examined in the light of the Labour 
party’s continued advocacy of physical planning.
Seldon stresses the importance of official opinion as part of the ‘Whig 
Ascendency’. He argues that the longevity of the careers of civil servants, 
especially when compared with those of ministers, leads to continuity of 
government policy: ‘Governments came and went. So do ministers, even more 
quickly. Individual civil servants provide continuity, and civil service culture, 
traditions and favoured policies endure long after individual civil servants move on. 
If one considers who have been the individuals who have shaped British policy 
since 1940, the names of Sir Edward Bridges, Sir Norman Brook, Sir Frank Lee, 
Sir Robert Hall, Sir Burke Trend and Sir William Armstrong bear comparison with 
the weight carried by most departmental ministers. The civil service dislikes
14
change. It favours continuity of policy, advises against and tries to block 
radicalism, whether from left or right. The civil service was content to enact the 
Keynes-Beveridge inspired policies in the 1940s and cheerfully supported their 
continuation until the 1970s.’22
Seldon’s emphasis on the importance of the civil service justifies his 
contention that what parties say in Opposition is irrelevant to the consensus 
debate. Politicians may say all sorts of things while out of office but once in 
government they come under the sway of experienced civil servants and continuity 
is assured. Seldon argues that ‘differences in rhetoric have indeed been far more 
marked in the postwar period than differences in policy.’23 Seldon’s argument rests 
on unsustainable assumptions about the relationship between ministers and civil 
servants that will be examined more closely below. However, there is an obvious 
defect in his argument when applied to the immediate postwar period. Ministers 
in this period were nearly all very experienced, most had served in government 
under the pressure of war and many Labour ministers served an almost 
uninterrupted term in government from 1940 to 1951. Most of the minsters 
Churchill included in the Cabinet he formed in 1951 had also served long periods 
in government, Butler had already spent 13 years in office. Even Gaitskell who, 
comparatively speaking, had less experience than most of his senior colleagues, 
had been a temporary civil servant during the war and a minister since 1946. The 
argument that civil servants have an advantage over ministers in the policy-making 
process because of the longevity of their appointments and traditions is at its 
weakest when applied to the postwar period.
Another factor identified by Seldon that inclined policy towards consensus 
was the ‘climate of ideas’. He argues that ‘in the 1940s the intellectual and indeed 
popular mood favoured the innovations of the postwar settlement. The press also, 
including the right-wing variants, was largely benign.’24 However the intellectual 
mood of the postwar period was far from being as benign as Seldon argues. 
Indeed, Seldon’s argument that the ‘climate of ideas’ of the time was a constraint 
would appear to contradict his previous argument that differences of rhetoric were 
greater than differences in policy. If press and public favoured consensus as 
Seldon argues why did the parties exaggerate their differences? Real
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disagreements did exist about important issues and Butskellite historiography has 
failed to register the fact. Concentrating on the climate of ideas also encourages 
historians to write in vague terms about an intellectual climate which is unspecified 
rather than look in detail at what important participants in policy-making were 
saying on these subjects.
The Whig viewpoint of the consensualists is evident in much of literature 
dealing with the economic history of the postwar period. In particular, Alec 
Cairncross has emphasised the importance of civil servants and advisers in the 
economic policy-making process. This emphasis is reflected in the conclusions he 
draws about the direction economic policy was taking. For example, on economic 
controls he writes: The various ‘bonfires’ of controls that began in 1948 made it 
clear that the continuous use of controls after 1945 was essentially a transitional 
strategy. It was not intended to maintain controls indefinitely or to perpetuate the 
shortages with which they dealt. On the contrary, most of the controls would 
disappear as supply recovered to a more normal level without any change in price.’ 
[emphasis in original]25. It is no coincidence that what Cairncross sees as 
inevitable processes was viewed as such by official opinion. The official Treasury 
did not like economic controls and saw their abolition as desirable. However, that 
controls were abolished as the civil servants wished does not in itself indicate that 
the process was inevitable. In fact it took a change of government and therefore 
of party ideology. As will be shown, not only has the extent of decontrol during the 
Labour government been exaggerated but there is clear evidence that ministers 
intended to perpetuate many controls as part of their Full Employment Bill.
Cairncross’ writing can be characterised as the Treasury view’ of history 
because policy is always seen as gravitating towards an end goal which the official 
Treasury favoured. Cairncross himself was Economic Adviser to the Board of 
Trade and subsequently Chief Economic Adviser to the Government and his 
writing often reflects his official background.
The impact of the institutional perspective on Cairncross can be seen more 
clearly if his writing is compared with that of John Fforde, whose official history of 
the Bank of England is written from the viewpoint of the Bank.26 It is significant that 
the one area in which Cairncross concedes there was a discontinuity of policy,
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namely monetary policy, is an area in which Fforde argues the contrary. Fforde 
sees the restoration of a flexible monetary policy when Butler became Chancellor 
in October 1951 as ‘the overdue removal of an absurd anomaly within the existing 
framework of monetary policy rather than as the inauguration of an entirely new 
approach.' 27 The reason for their disagreement is clear. The Treasury had not 
been convinced by the case for the abandonment of a cheap money policy until 
1950. On the other hand, the Bank had been pushing for the restoration of a 
flexible Bank Rate policy since the end of the war and had blocked Gaitskell’s 
plans for the extension of monetary controls. When Bank Rate flexibility was 
restored the Bank of England saw it as an inevitable outcome. The Treasury did 
not. Hence, according to the Bank of England view of history this change did not 
mark a significant change in policy while for the Treasury view of history it did.
Another example of the impact of the institutional perspective on Cairncross’ 
work is the account he gives of the ROBOT crisis.28 He credits officials with the key 
actions, both in initiating the project and in providing the arguments for Cherwell, 
the Paymaster General, to stifle the plan. The role of ministers is seen as primarily 
reactive. This view has been challenged in part by Edmund Dell in The 
Chancellors.29 Arguably their different perspectives have been shaped by their 
experience of government. Dell was Paymaster General in the Treasury from 1974 
to 1976 and afterwards was briefly in the Cabinet as Secretary of State for Trade. 
Cairncross puts much more stress than Dell on the importance of officials in the 
crisis, more particularly Robert Hall, in the campaign to block the scheme. Dell 
places more emphasis on the motivation of ministers even though his assessment 
of Butler’s part in the episode is badly mistaken.
Some of the fallacies of the Butskellite approach to history are most glaring 
in Susan Howson’s otherwise excellent study of British Monetary Policy 1945-51. 
In order to support her proposition that the return to a flexible monetary policy 
would have occurred whichever party had won the 1951 election, she writes that 
'by the time Gaitskell became Chancellor of the Exchequer outside opinion on the 
utility of monetary policy in Britain as in many other countries on both sides of the 
Atlantic, had swung away from the attachment to cheap money of the immediate 
postwar years. Several other countries made major changes in the conduct of
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monetary policy at the beginning of the 1950s. Gaitskell was a professional 
economist... One wonders whether and to what extent his views on 
macroeconomic policy in an inflationary world would have changed in the same 
direction as those of other British economists including his friends and colleagues 
in the Labour party. Since the return to a “flexible” monetary policy took place 
immediately after the 1951 general election would it have taken place anyway if 
Labour had been re-elected?30
Detailed analysis of Gaitskeil’s views indicates that the clear answer to this 
question is no. All the evidence suggests that he did not change his mind on 
monetary policy during his time as Chancellor. In fact, he carried his arguments 
against a flexible monetary policy into Opposition. This fact is clear from his 
speeches recorded in Hansard and it is a pity that few historians of economic 
policy look on Hansard as a useful source for research.31 To argue, as Howson 
does, that in general the intellectual climate over monetary policy had changed 
says nothing about Gaitskell in particular. In this instance and in all others it is far 
more appropriate to examine Gaitskell’s own views and proposals.
A Keynesian Revolution?
In the last few years the critique of consensus has developed and it is 
necessary to indicate where this overlaps or anticipates what is argued below. The 
main challenge to the consensualist approach over economic policy comes from 
economic historians who have studied the Treasury after the War looking to 
discover whether or not a Keynesian revolution took place in economic policy­
making. By this they mean the conversion of the Treasury to what Booth has called 
‘liberal Keynesianism’, a commitment to deficit financing to combat a recession.32 
In particular Tomlinson questions the extent to which the Treasury had really been 
converted to Keynesianism even as late as the 1950s. He argues that the Second 
World War did not legitimate budget deficits in times of recession. It was accepted 
that fighting wars justified large-scale borrowing, but that did not mean that it had 
been accepted as normal. In fact, postwar, the Treasury still viewed economic 
management as being subordinate to the traditional role of Budgetary policy.33
Tomlinson also challenges the view that the emergency Budget of
18
November 1947 was a ‘turning point in postwar fiscal policy’ as Cairncross has 
argued, or ‘a major milestone when the Treasury finally turned in peacetime and 
out of choice to Keynesian analysis to help control inflation’ as Booth has 
claimed.34 Tomlinson points out that Treasury officials turned to the policy solutions 
offered by the Keynesian Economic Section, situated in the Cabinet Office, in the 
summer of 1947 because the political context changed. Because the Government 
wanted to demonstrate its financial responsibility, cuts in the cost-of-living 
subsidies advocated by the Economic Section to tackle inflation suddenly became 
a plausible option. As Tomlinson rightly notes, ‘civil servants are above all gaugers 
of the politically possible, and this is paramount in the shift in policies pressed on 
the Chancellor between the two Budgets of 1947.’35
Tomlinson also shows that the Treasury’s concern about inflation and the 
level of cost-of-living subsidies is explicable in terms of its preexisting concern 
about the level of public expenditure. The Treasury wanted to avoid having to 
impose higher interest rates in order to deal with inflation because this would have 
meant higher government debt payments. He echoes Rollings’ argument that ‘the 
pursuit of surpluses especially via cuts in food subsidies, chimed in with the 
traditional Treasury concern to control public expenditure.’36
It will be shown below that agreement between the official Treasury and the 
Economic Section is best explained in terms of the Treasury’s traditional concern 
with the control of public expenditure in the period 1950-55. In particular, the 
Treasury continued its attack on cost-of-living subsidies and tried, unsuccessfully, 
to persuade Gaitskell to cut food subsidies during discussion of the 1951 Budget.
More recently, Tomlinson has followed Rollings in focussing attention on the 
exaggeration historians have perpetuated about the scale of the decontrol pursued 
by the Labour Government. He is able to show that the importance assigned to the 
various bonfires of controls that Harold Wilson conducted while President of the 
Board of Trade has been blown out of proportion to their actual affect on the 
structure of the controlled economy.37
Rollings has drawn on his own and Tomlinson’s research to question the 
existence of a consensus between the Conservative and Labour parties in the 
postwar period over economic policy. The main basis of his argument is that the
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Labour Party continued to advocate the use of physical controls on the economy 
and that the Conservative Party continued to advocate a return to financial 
orthodoxy. Rollings also agrees with the point made above that a consensus over 
the maintenance of full employment cannot be inferred simply because it 
continued. The Conservative Government was never forced to make a choice 
between full employment and other objectives such as decontrol and convertibility 
of sterling: The argument that had there been mass unemployment in the 1950s 
then the Conservative Government would undoubtedly have taken steps to reduce 
it is the sort of counterfactual statement of which historians are usually so critical. 
Conservatives in this period were never faced with that dilemma: it is uncertain 
how they would have reacted if placed in this situation.’38
Unlike the consensualists, Rollings and above all Tomlinson have a firm 
grasp of the complexity of institutional influences on policy-making and provide a 
good deal of evidence about the thinking of the civil service in the economic policy 
sector. They are not without appreciation of the fact that ministers are also actors 
and that ideas matter. But their central concern is with the Treasury mind and they 
are not particularly concerned with the way in which political ideas develop and 
impact on policy. Rollings, for example, when looking at Operation ROBOT notes 
that Oliver Lyttelton had proposed a very similar scheme as early as 1947. But it 
does not seem to occur to him that this may have more to do with the genesis of 
ROBOT than his observation that ‘officials in the Overseas Finance Division of the 
Treasury and the Bank of England made the running.’39 Clearly, much more 
consideration needs to be given to what Conservatives were saying in Opposition 
about convertibility policy and how that impacted on what they did in Government. 
Rollings appears not to have taken this apparent connection between Government 
policy and Conservative thinking as the cue for further investigation.40
Another problem with Rollings’ and Tomlinson’s work is that their analysis 
of economic policy in the postwar period is confined by a framework as artificial as 
consensus. Policy is always looked at in terms of its approximation to liberal 
Keynesianism. Indeed, Rolling’s definition of Butskellism is of a ‘similarity in policy 
and beliefs based around the use of Keynesian demand management to maintain 
full employment.’ One result of this definition is that policy is never understood in
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its own terms. Gaitskell developed the basic structure of his economic ideas before 
the publication of Keynes’ General Theory in 1936. However, the framework of 
Rolling’s article ‘Poor Mr Butskell’ leads him to view Gaitskell’s support for 
permanent economic controls as a supplement to Keynesian demand 
management. Although he quotes with approval Stephen Brooke’s conclusion that 
during the war Keynesian techniques ‘were perceived simply as adjuncts to 
physical planning’41 by Gaitskell and others, he still argues that ‘the Labour 
Governments did try to manage the economy, but remained wedded to the 
permanent use of direct controls to complement budgetary policy.’42 This is almost 
the reverse of the truth. The problem with Rollings’ analysis is that he is looking at 
economic policy from a perspective in which Keynesian policy would be the norm. 
This leads him to underestimate the impact of physical controls on the thinking of 
Labour minsters and Hayekian ideas on that of Conservative ministers, these 
ideas are of interest to Rollings only as deviations from the Keynesian paradigm 
and are consequently undervalued.
Ministers Matter
The above discussion has shown that there are many problems with the 
way the existing literature looks at economic policy in the period under discussion 
which this thesis .will address. The principal fault is that the role of ministers in 
policy-making is under-estimated. In his conclusion to Churchill’s Indian Summer 
Seldon writes that ‘most books about the political history of this century... consign 
civil servants to a mere passing reference, if they are mentioned at all. This 
omission appears all the odder when one considers ... that senior officials are 
often far more capable and even more creative than the Ministers they served,... 
Can one fairly assess the performance of Rab Butler at the Treasury without 
looking at the influence on him of Sir Leslie Rowan, Sir Robert Hall or Lord 
Plowden?’43 Seldon was writing before the official documents for this period were 
open to the public. The role officials played was easily overlooked by historians. 
However, now that most of these documents are open historians are in danger of 
making the opposite mistake. Reliance on Government records can lead historians 
to over-estimate the importance of officials in policy making. Most of the files in the
Public Record Offices are full of papers written by and passed between officials. 
They are far more likely to have recorded their views in detail than ministers. 
However, the role that officials and advisers play can only be properly understood 
if it is put into the wider context of what was required from them by their political 
masters and how they used this advice. To respond to Seldon’s point, can we 
really understand the influence of Rowan, Hall or Plowden unless we have an 
understanding of how Rab Butler used their advice and incorporated it into his own 
thinking on economic policy? If we do not have this knowledge we will fail to 
understand the true nature of the relationship between ministers and their officials 
and how the policy-making process really works in practice.
One resource that could be utilised more effectively by historians is 
Hansard. Not only can examining parliamentary speeches help redress some of 
the problems of the relative paucity of information about ministers available from 
the Public Record Office but it can also throw new light on ministerial actions. For 
example, an examination of what Conservatives were saying in Opposition on the 
issue of convertibility policy throws new light on the role of Conservative ideas in 
the development of Operation ROBOT.
Another reason why the existing literature has underestimated the 
importance of ministers in policy-making is that it is based on an inadequate 
understanding of the relationship between ministers and civil servants. In the end 
it is the ministers who are the final decision-makers in the policy process. The role 
of civil servants and advisers can only be properly understood if what they say is 
looked at in the context of their desire to retain their influence with ministers.
A more sophisticated approach to how the policy-making process works is 
required if a greater understanding of economic policy is to be achieved. British 
political scientists have tended to confine their analysis to institutions in their 
present form. American political scientists have been more willing to examine the 
impact of institutional structure on historical development. Indeed, there is no good 
reason why a line should be drawn between political history and political science, 
both disciplines are essentially dealing with the same thing albeit within different 
time frames. Institutional theorists such as Peter Hall, Graham Allison and John 
Steinbruner provide the tools with which historical events can be analysed. An
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understanding of how institutions develop and operate is just as relevant to a study 
of the Treasury in the 1950s as it is to one of the Treasury in the 1990s.
The other major deficiency of the existing literature which this thesis will 
address is that the economic policies of Hugh Gaitskell and Rab Butler have only 
ever been examined within a framework which assumes the primacy of Keynesian 
policy. As a result our appreciation of postwar economic policy has been 
impoverished by the disregard of anything that does not fit this artificial 
perspective. The real scale of the division between Gaitskell and Butler can only 
be appreciated if one looks at how they understood and explained their own 
policies, and how they fitted them into a wider ideological perspective. Both 
consensualist and Keynesian historians have underestimated the importance of 
ideology in the postwar period. Addison has written that ‘Mrs Thatcher has taught 
us to think of government as an instrument of party, and party as an instrument of 
ideology.’44 However, ideology played an important part in the politics of the 
postwar period also and to ignore it is to ignore an important factor in the 
development of policy. This thesis will show that if the policies of Gaitskell and 
Butler are understood in their own terms it becomes clear that Mr Butskell is a 
character of political myth rather than historical fact.
Objectives of Study
To sum up, the aim of this thesis is two-fold:
a) To demonstrate that no consensus existed on the aims and methods of 
economic policy in the period covered by the Gaitskell and Butler Chancellorships.
b) To show that ministers played a more important role in the policy-making 
process than previous authors have assumed.
It is not the objective of this thesis to analyse the actual impact of policy on 
the British economy or to draw conclusions about the success or failure of policy. 
Rather it is the object to look at policy in terms of continuity and its approximation 
to a coherent programme and ideology.
The thesis is divided into nine substantive chapters. The next chapter 
examines the organisation of economic-policy making within the Treasury while 
chapter three examines the development of the values held by the Treasury and
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how they impacted upon policy advice. The fourth chapter examines the wider 
context of economic policy-making. The role of the Bank of England, the Board of 
Trade and the Ministry of Supply is examined, particularly in providing the Treasury 
with information about the external environment. Taken together these three 
chapters reveal that the framework of policy advice was less Keynesian and more 
pluralistic than has previously been argued although it still provided a major 
constraint on the ability of ministers to initiate policy. The fifth chapter examines 
how Gaitskell and Butler were both able to operate effectively as policy initiators 
within this framework. It is shown that while Gaitskell’s views were so divergent 
from those of his advisors he had to impose his own framework of values and 
objectives; Butler was able to take the lead by manipulating the existing 
framework.
The next five chapters deal in turn with the main areas of economic policy. 
Each reveals the enormous divergence that existed between the methods and 
objectives of the Gaitskell and Butler Chancellorships. The sixth chapter looks at 
general controls policy. It is shown that Gaitskell was the leading intellectual force 
behind the Full Employment Bill which would have put those physical controls the 
Labour government considered essential to economic planning and to maintaining 
full employment on the statute book on the permanent basis. In contrast Butler is 
shown to have been the driving force behind the decontrol programme which was 
central to the agenda of the Churchill administration. The divergence in Labour 
and Conservative views had its basis in political as well as economic beliefs. 
Hayekian ideas about the relationship between the individual and the state 
informed the Conservatives critique of Labour’s controls policy.
Chapters seven and eight deal with the two main aspects of external 
economic policy: convertibility of the pound and international trade. Gaitskell and 
his colleagues in the Labour Government came to reject the establishment of a 
‘one world’ economy based on free trade and convertibility as fundamental policy 
objectives. Gaitskell saw these objectives as incompatible with the maintenance 
of a socialist economy at home and thought that policy should concentrate on 
strengthening the sterling area through bilateral trade agreements and import 
controls. While Gaitskell favoured moves to cement a ‘two world’ economy Butler
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and Peter Thorneycroft with the support of Churchill transformed the 
Conservatives into the party of free trade by committing the Government to the 
objectives of the GATT agreement. It is also shown that Butler played a far more 
prominent role in the ROBOT plan to make the pound convertible at a floating rate 
than has previously been argued and that Butler remained committed to the 
objectives of the plan throughout his Chancellorship.
Chapter nine examines the development of fiscal policy. It is shown that the 
Budget played a smaller role in general economic policy under Gaitskell than has 
been previously suggested. Indeed, Gaitskell emphasised the limited role of 
Budgetary policy during his Chancellorship. Under Butler the process of decontrol 
meant that Budgetary policy came to play a central role. Butler’s most important 
Budgetary policy objectives were to reduce the burden of taxation on the economy 
and to encourage economic growth. The increasing importance of Budgetary 
policy also highlighted the divisions between his principal advisers concerning the 
role of the Budget.
Finally, chapter ten is concerned with the content of monetary policy. 
Butler’s decision to reactivate the Bank Rate represented a fundamental change 
in the direction of policy. Not only did Gaitskell remain committed to a policy of 
cheap money, he also fought to impose direct forms of credit control against the 
resistance of the Bank of England. Butler’s decision to conduct an active monetary 
policy exposed great uncertainty amongst his advisers over its likely effects.
Some of the aforementioned chapters deal with episodes that have already 
been extensively covered in the literature, such as Operation ROBOT and the 
reactivation of the Bank Rate. Other chapters deal with policy areas that have 
been previously neglected, such as trade policy after 1951 and policy towards 
agricultural pricing. Regardless of the state of the existing literature all of these 
areas are looked at in detail so that the central hypothesises of this thesis, that 
ministerial involvement was central to policy formulation and lead to a fundamental 
discontinuity in policy, can be elucidated.
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Chapter 2 
The Changing Structure of Economic 
Policy-Making
Although ministers matter in the making of economic policy, they operate 
within an institutional framework and to some extent, like the civil servants who 
serve them, they take their cue from the economic, political and intellectual climate 
in which they operate. However they have more marked ideological 
preconceptions and in the case of powerful ministers some ability at least to 
impose their own framework of ideas. The conventions of the British system place 
the entire responsibility for policy on ministers and more particularly upon the 
minister who heads the department concerned. In practice it cannot be so. To 
paraphrase Simon James’s graphic analogy, minister’s are ‘parachuted’ into the 
summit of these organisations, often ‘largely unversed’ in their subject matter, but 
given ultimate command and responsibility for an important slice of public policy.1 
In the case of the Chancellor as the 1940s turned into the 1950s, that included 
responsibility for not merely managing the economy but planning its overall shape 
and development, controlling both public and private investment, and setting limits 
to public expenditure department by department.
To help him the Chancellor had a small ministerial team. Gaitskell ‘managed 
to delegate a very substantial amount of work on to the two junior ministers.’2 
Douglas Jay has provided an instructive review of his own role, not least in relation 
to the Central Economic Planning Staff (C.E.P.S.), which fell within his remit as 
Economic Secretary. When Butler took over, he was given, as his deputy, Arthur 
Salter, who had turned down the chance of a separate Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, but was given the title Minister of State for Economic affairs. Although he 
wrote later of their happy relationship, in practice Butler found working with Salter 
‘very trying, because he didn’t really agree with very much I did.’3 When after a 
year Salter was moved to the Ministry of Materials, Reginald Maudling replaced 
him, but at the rank of Economic Secretary. John Boyd-Carpenter and, from 1954,
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Henry Brooke served as Financial Secretary, a job with a major part to play in the 
control of public expenditure.
If the ministerial team was small, the Treasury itself was not a large 
department, just over 1,200 persons in all, a great many of whom were located in 
the joint Supply and Establishment Divisions. The Chancellor also took ministerial 
responsibility for the Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise and in addition to 
their normal duties, they also had some part to play when the Chancellor was 
considering his tax proposals. However, the number of officials with whom the 
Chancellor would have to deal when making economic policy was very small 
indeed. In his memoirs, Butler mentions eight only by name, while the only names 
that recur in Gaitskell’s admittedly sporadic diary are those of the Permanent 
Secretary, Sir Edward Bridges, and Edwin Plowden, who headed the CEPS. 
Gaitskell was conscious, however, of what he characterised as Treasury officials’ 
‘keen sense of their own independent, departmental positions as apart from 
serving me... they are continually using phrases, “It is the Treasury view”, or “We 
think” etc. This is' buttressed up by such institutions as the Budget Committee, 
which is purely official and on its status they lay much emphasis; the Second 
Secretaries’ meetings which Bridges runs, and various other similar bodies.’4
The sectorial fragmentation of policy-making has often been noted and in 
terms of economic policy it would be possible to speak of a policy network linking 
a number of actors, which would include government departments like to Board of 
Trade, the Ministry of Supply and the Bank of England with its key links with the 
City. Other departments also had their part to play and inside the government 
machine they would be represented on the Economic Policy Committee of the 
Cabinet and the maze of interdepartmental committees, which, particularly under 
the Labour Government, had the task of delivering its economic programme. Jay 
describes the structure as it functioned under Gaitskell’s predecessor Stafford 
Cripps, but the key committees identified operated also in Gaitskell’s time and 
themselves provide an interesting commentary on the change of approach which 
took place in 1951.5 Leslie Rowan presided over the Overseas Negotiations 
Committee, Plowden presided over the Investments Programme Committee, ‘Otto’ 
Clarke the Import Programme Committee and Jay himself the Raw Materials
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Committee until relieved of that duty by transfer to the Financial Secretaryship in 
February 1951.
But at the heart of the Treasury itself there were a series of policy networks, 
better characterised perhaps through their relationships of mutual dependence and 
trust as policy communities, which suggest the very considerable fragmentation of 
policy that existed-in this period. Although there was some overlap between these 
policy communities, particularly in the making of Budgetary policy, which brought 
all of the important figures in the Treasury together, they can clearly be delineated 
as the paths by which information and policy advice reached the Chancellor. The 
most important of these so far as economic policy-making is concerned were the 
communities dealing with economic planning, Budgetary policy, external economic 
policy and monetary policy.
The Principal Private Secretary (PPS)
The Permanent Secretary to the Treasury is to be found at the apex of 
these economic policy communities, assisted, from 1953, by the Deputy 
Permanent Secretary, Sir Bernard Gilbert. But the Chancellor is linked to them also 
through a small private office, managing the flow of paper and meetings, and the 
head of the private office, although relatively junior, is likely to exercise 
considerable influence and is often on surprisingly intimate terms with the 
Permanent Secretary. The latter is likely to have held the job himself, recognises 
in his junior a man likely to follow him to the top, and knows that if he is doing his 
job, he will be privy to the Chancellors’ mind.
The Principal Private Secretary, although the most junior official to play a 
significant role in policy-making, is also potentially one of the most influential. As 
one of his counterparts in the Foreign Office, Nicholas Henderson, noted, ‘His 
sheer physical proximity will ensure his influence provided he is a paragon of tact. 
He must not excite envy, nor must he appear to usurp the authority of the 
Permanent Under Secretary in giving advice on policy or appointments.’6 Although 
Henderson vividly describes the role as one ‘of the impresarios of Whitehall; and 
in their Private Offices the drama and friction between politics and the machine are 
theatrically audible’, their exceptional influence derives from their role as double
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agent, loyal to both the department and minister.7 He ‘represents to the minister 
the opinion of the Office and to the latter the will of the minister. Neither 
commission would carry the same weight if it were not balanced by the other.’8 His 
office is therefore something more than a gateway to the Chancellor and while he 
is the principal gatekeeper, his role goes beyond that to explain to the Chancellor 
what is in the Treasury’s mind and why, and to communicate in turn the 
Chancellor’s thinking to his fellow civil servants. At best he supplies a powerful and 
serviceable bridge over the gap that might otherwise open up between the political 
considerations of his master and the more technical concerns of the Treasury.
William Armstrong played the role to perfection. He held the post from 1949 
to 1953 and went on to exert his mediating influence on the deteriorating 
relationship between Bridges and Sir Norman Brook, the Cabinet Secretary.9 
Product of a Salvation Army household, grammar school and Greats at Oxford, he 
had nevertheless a better conceptual grasp of modern economics than most of his 
contemporaries and all his seniors. Clarity of mind and ability to develop his 
arguments lucidly and persuasively, when coupled with very considerable charm, 
made him a formidable operator in the corridors of power.
Armstrong was a more influential figure under Butler than under Gaitskell, 
largely because Gaitskell delegated fewer responsibilities to him and confided in 
him less than Butler did. On one occasion Armstrong spoke to Robert Hall about 
the frustrations he experienced in working for Gaitskell, particularly on the 
preparation of speeches. Armstrong said that Gaitskell could not leave this to 
others, ‘he won’t start until it is too late, and he cannot make it plain what he wants 
done in a draft.’10 By contrast, Butler had great confidence in Armstrong and relied 
on him far more. He delegated the responsibility for drafting of speeches, including 
the Budget speech, to Armstrong and he became an important source of policy 
advice. It is clear from Robert Hall’s diaries that Armstrong became the main 
source through which officials could discover the Chancellor’s state of mind at any 
given time. It is undoubtedly the case that this was a two-way process and that 
Armstrong provided the Chancellor with similar information about the thoughts of 
his officials.11 Armstrong’s influence over Butler had the effect of increasing his 
influence within the Treasury as whole. In particular, his influence on the Budget
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Committee grew. It was Armstrong who first suggested the Committee’s 
recommendation of a small surplus above the line in 1953. Hall described this as 
‘the Armstrong formula.’12
In 1953 Louis Petch replaced Armstrong as Principal Private Secretary. 
Butler did not display the same confidence in Petch as he had in Armstrong. Burke 
Trend became the principal drafter of his Budget speeches. Robert Hall noted that 
Petch was ‘not altogether at one with the Chancellor in his feeling for words, and 
for the balance of emphasis.’13 Armstrong’s replacement by Petch had a negative 
effect on Butler’s relations with his senior advisers and the quality of their advice. 
There are no instances recorded in Robert Hall’s diary of him receiving information 
about Butler’s state of mind via Petch. Without the serves of Armstrong Butler had 
to do more himself to bring harmony to the Treasury. Hall recorded in his diary that 
‘more and more as time went on he [Butler] had big meetings where the need to 
keep the office together tended to blur the issues.’14
The Permanent Secretary to the Treasury
Edward Bridges, who was Permanent Secretary to the Treasury from 1945 
to 1956 and head of the Civil Service, was an old-style mandarin. Ten years older 
than Butler and fourteen years older than Gaitskell, he had served in the trenches 
during the First World War, something that he had in common with Churchill and 
some of the Cabinet, but with neither of the two Chancellors under study. He was 
the son of Robert Bridges, the Poet Laureate, whose poetry he was editing. His 
own degree was in Litterae Humaniores from Oxford. He had spent most of his 
official life in the Treasury, although from 1938-46 he had served as Cabinet 
Secretary, a post relinquished with some reluctance a year after he succeeded 
Hopkins at the Treasury. His reputation had been made during the period of 
rearmament before the war, when he was responsible for controlling defence 
expenditure and ‘showed a pragmatic flexibility of judgement which was to become 
his most outstanding characteristic.’15 During the war years Bridges was close to 
Churchill and he was bitterly disappointed when that closeness was not renewed 
in the 1950s. Brook had replaced him in Churchill’s affections and was far closer 
than he ever managed to be.16
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His experience at the heart of Government as well as service on the Civil 
Service Commission earlier had given him expertise and a close interest in the 
machinery of government. He had taken charge of the Government Organisation 
Committee at the end of 1946 and he set about the task of transforming the 
government machine to cope with the problems of postwar economic planning. He 
was very supportive of Plowden when he was brought in to set up the CEPS in 
1947 and came to accept the permanence of some aspects of physical planning 
in a way that many of his colleagues did not. He sought guarantees from the 
Conservative Opposition that they would not dismantle the new machinery.17 For 
all that he looked to bring the era of controls to an end and at heart shared much 
of the Treasury’s traditional economic liberalism.
First impressions of a shy, rather austere figure would give way when one 
knew him better to a genuine informality and a great sense of fun. Fun was indeed 
a word he used often with fellow civil servants and he had a habit also with those 
whom he knew well of accompanying a remark with a playful punch in the 
stomach.18 Bridge’s extolled the virtues of the intelligent layman both in his lectures 
on the role of the civil service and in his writings on the Treasury.19 No economist 
himself, his heart seems to have been more in the management of the civil service 
than in the task of giving economic advice to the Chancellor. That did not prevent 
him from providing staunch support to Gaitskell in the battle with Bevan over 
funding for the NHS.20 Although he chaired the Budget Committee and organised 
advice to te Chancellor, he left much of the task of providing advice to Second and 
Third Secretaries. Helpfully, as many thought, he encouraged a collegial ethos in 
the Treasury and this suited Butler in particular. Norman Macrae has described the 
advantages of the rather untidy system which resulted. Drawing on ‘a gaggle of co­
equal advisers slightly lower down, he [the Chancellor] could switch away from a 
provenly wrong policy by politely deciding to accept for a time the advice of a co­
equal team (or else at least strike a compromise between the different schools).’21 
Chancellors later in the decade and afterwards found themselves in a more 
hierarchical set-up where they had to explicitly reject the advice of more senior 
figures if they wanted to seek it from other quarters in the Treasury.
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The Deputy to the Permanent Secretary
The first step towards formalising the position came with the appointment 
of Bernard Gilbert as Bridges’ deputy in November 1953.1 Gilbert was ‘a man full 
of ideas, a mathematician with a very keen mind, sceptical of both Keynes and 
controls, and critical of expenditure’, but he was a year older than Bridges and his 
energies had bee.n sapped by the Second World War.22 He had wanted to retire 
in 1952, but had been prevented from doing so by Bridges’ own intervention. 
Butler’s own faith in Gilbert was confirmed by his appointment as deputy to the 
Permanent Secretary. He was made responsible for co-ordinating policy and 
appointed head of the C.E.P.S, although the title of chief planning officer was 
dropped. He continued Plowden’s practice of holding meetings of the C.E.P.S. on 
Wednesdays and instigated a new meeting called Friday Forum with Rowan, 
Brittain, Compton, Crombie, Strath and Hall. This was intended to discuss general 
issues, however, Hall was not that impressed by the early meetings, noting that ‘It 
has not worked very well so far as Leslie Rowan is too jumpy to be able to talk 
calmly about fundamental questions.’23
The Cabinet Secretary
Norman Brook was Secretary to the Cabinet from 1947 and took on the 
additional responsibility of joint Permanent Secretary to the Treasury in 1956.2 As 
the Prime Minister’s main policy adviser Brook gained the confidence of both Attlee 
and Churchill who came to rely on him more and more as his health deteriorated. 
However, as neither Prime Minister took a very active role in economic policy­
making Brook’s main impact on economic policy was through his influence on 
Cabinet agenda and his involvement in questions of Government organisation.
1 Bernard Gilbert: born 1891; educated at Nottingham High School and St John’s 
College Cambridge. He entered the Treasury in 1914 but his career was interrupted by war 
service. In 1934 he became a principal assistant secretary and an undersecretary in 1939. In 
1944 he was promoted to be joint second secretary responsible for supply services. [Anthony 
Seldon: Churchill’s Indian Summer: The Conservative Government. 1951-55. Hodder and 
Stoughton, London, 1981.]
: Norman Brook: born 1902 and educated at Wolverhampton Grammar School and 
Wadham College Oxford, where he obtained a first in honour moderations in 1923 and a 
second in litterae humaniores in 1925. His initial civil service posting was in the Home Office. 
[Burke Trend in E.T. Williams and C.S. Nicholls(eds.): The Dictionary of National Biography 
1961-1970. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981.]
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Brook’s advancement in the service was slow until 1938 when he became 
principal private secretary to Sir John Anderson. The outbreak of war quickened 
his progress and he became one of the deputy secretaries of the Cabinet with 
special responsibility for the co-ordination of the civil aspects of the war effort. In 
1943 he was appointed Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Reconstruction. 
The common thread in each of Brook’s appointments was that they were 
‘essentially regulatory, rather than innovative in character, each entailed the 
reconciliation of multiple and differing views rather than the pursuit of a single, 
undivided purpose. It was in the exercise of a function of this kind that Brook 
excelled. His natural disposition was that of the co-ordinator.’24
As Butler later recalled Brook ‘wasn’t in any sense a minister. He never 
attempted to be. He was essentially a Civil Servant.’25 However, his conception of 
the role of the civil service did have an impact on economic policy. In 1951 he 
advised Attlee against letting work continue on the Full Employment Bill after the 
outbreak of the Korean War.26 He also led the opposition to reorganisation of 
departments long the lines of production authorities.27 Although Bridges shared 
Brook’s opposition to Churchill’s plan for co-ordinating ministers known as 
‘overlords’, in other areas Brook was more of a traditionalist than Bridges, prone 
to scepticism about the power of the state.28 As Middlemas has argued ‘Brook 
represented the liberal belief that pluralism at the centre offered a better chance 
of harmonious government than any logical division of functions on categories that 
Haldane would have recognised.’29
Economic Planning
Over the five years covered by this thesis the structure of economic policy­
making was transformed. Although the Treasury’s determination to get a firm grip 
policy-making does help to explain some of these changes the real explanation 
was the shift in economic policy which accompanied Gaitskell’s replacement by 
Butler as Chancellor. Butler’s policy did allow the Treasury to gain control of the 
network of economic planning and effectively incorporate it in financial control as 
physical controls were dismantled. The charts overleaf show the organisational 
structure of the Treasury in 1950 and 1955. They tell their own story, by 1955 both
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the Planning Division and the Economic Section had been firmly incorporated 
within the organisation of Treasury decision-making. But in monetary policy the 
balance of power actually shifted to the Bank of England as a result of the 
reactivation of the Bank Rate. The effect of all the policy changes was to shift the 
balance of power within the advice structure towards those sources of advice 
which bolstered Butler in the pursuit of his policy objectives.
During the Gaitskell Chancellorship the focus of economic policy remained 
on economic planning through the use of physical controls. Planning was 
conducted via a network of interdepartmental committees (see chart over).30 
Although the Treasury became the preeminent economics Ministry when the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs was incorporated into the Treasury in November 
1947, departments responsible for the administration of controls such as the 
Ministry of Food and the Ministry of Supply retained authority in the making of 
policy. The main function of the interdepartmental committees consisted in the 
drawing up of quantitative budgets. These budgets set out resources and 
requirements of the coming year in terms of different units, such as national 
income and expenditure. This system was developed out of the wartime method 
of planning, the main difference was that the principal shortage around which the 
rest of program revolved changed. During the war the principal problem was either 
shipping or manpower; after 1945 it became foreign exchange, and to a lesser 
extent, savings.31
One important point to note about the planning machinery is that the total 
number of civil servants centrally employed in it was small. Including those in the 
various units inside the Treasury and the Cabinet Office, such as the Central 
Economic Planning Staff, The Economic Section and the Central Statistical Office, 
and those in the ‘economic’ Departments such as the Board of Trade and the 
Ministries of Fuel and Power, Food, and Supply, there were ‘fewer than a hundred 
equivalent in rank to the administrative class, about two per cent of all 
administrative civil servants.’32 Of these one hundred. R.S. Milne estimated that, 
the disregard of rigid organisational arrangements in practice meant that the circle 
of people who really mattered amounted to ‘something under fifty at most.’33
As the system of internal and external controls was dismantled under Butler 
the importance of the network of interdepartmental committees declined and with
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it that of the Departments responsible for the administration of controls. The 
Economic Planning Staff, which had been responsible for the coordination of 
planning, also declined in importance. The Staff eventually became incorporated 
in the Treasury’s organisation for financial control. The role of the Economic 
Section, which had also been involved in the coordination of economic planning, 
also changed and it became primarily concerned with the function of Budget 
forecasting. The decision to move the Section to the Treasury from the Cabinet 
Office in 1954 was an indication of how far the making of economic policy had 
been repatriated by the Treasury.
The initial responsibilities of The Central Economic Planning Staff 
(C.E.P,S.) were outlined by the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, in a statement to 
the Commons in March 1947. He said that the ‘primary task’ of the Staff would be 
‘to develop the long-term plan for, the use of the country’s manpower and 
resources.’ They would also ‘follow through the implications of the survey set out 
in the White Paper, keeping in touch with all Departments so as to correlate their 
action under the plan.’34
In reality the C.E.P.S, lost the role of providing an overall plan after it 
became part of the Treasury at the end of 1947. It became the Treasury division 
responsible for scrutinising the consequences of specific departmental plans for 
the economy as a whole. In this respect its work mirrored that of the Supply 
division. The Staff was small and contained little economic expertise. It studied 
and sought to harmonise economic planning but it had no power of direction.
Sir Edwin Plowden, a successful industrialist who had served in the Ministry 
of Aircraft Production as Chief Executive during the war, was appointed as Chief 
Planning Officer. He was assisted by about forty officials who were seconded from 
various Departments. Only fifteen or twenty of the staff were in the administrative 
class.35 The turnover of staff was fairly high. As Plowden himself recalled, many 
who worked in the C.E.P.S. ‘went on to senior jobs in Whitehall and no less than 
six became Permanent Secretaries.’36
Among the key staff was Douglas Allen, seconded from the Board of Trade, 
who stayed in the Planning Staff from 1947 to 1953, first as Plowden’s Private 
Secretary and then after 1949 as a member of the Staff. He went on to become
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Permanent Secretary of the Treasury and Head of the Home Civil Service. Another 
key member of the Staff was William Strath who joined in 1949 and stayed on until 
1955. He went on to become Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Supply and 
then the Ministry of Aviation.37
Most of the Staffs work was introduced into the system via the network of 
interdepartmental committees and through memoranda to the Chancellor. Plowden 
himself enjoyed easy access to the Chancellor and recalled that ‘on each day I 
would have a number of opportunities to put to him my own personal opinion on 
matters of policy.’38
Early on the Planning Staff appears to have been far more in favour of 
planning in terms of quantitative targets than the Economic Section. Amongst the 
staff was the Cambridge economist Austin Robinson and under him two young 
Cambridge economists Robin Marris and Kenneth Berrill. In 1948 Marris and Berrill 
told Robinson that ‘Fundamentally the difference between the Economic Section 
and ourselves is that as an act of faith, we believe in planning and they do not.’. 
They continued that ‘it is probable that the United Kingdom needs certain radical 
changes in the pattern of its economy and that on balance, the changes will come 
about more quickly if the economists use their judgement and advise on direction, 
quantities and methods than if all sit back and allow the machine to attempt to 
drive around the corner by itself.’39 When Robinson went back to Cambridge Berrill 
left with him. Because of the over-lapping responsibilities of the Economic Section 
and the Planning Staff, Hall ‘more or less begged’ Plowden not to appoint senior 
economists in the planning staff. The Staff became dependent on the Section of 
economic expertise.40
In fact as the Staff developed it became much less about economics and 
more about administration. The Staff began to act in a similar fashion to the 
Supply Divisions of the Treasury, this was hardly surprising as these provided the 
natural template for Treasury interaction with other Departments. Like officials in 
the Supply Divisions the officials in the Planning Staff were administrators rather 
than economists. As R.S. Milne wrote in 1952, ‘the title “Central Economic 
Planning Staff’ is liable to mislead, carrying an implication that it consists of people 
selected for their knowledge of “planning” and that if the staff did not exist the 
planning would not get done at all. Neither of these implications is supported by
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facts. No “planning type” of civil servant has yet evolved; nor are there signs that 
all members of the existing Planning Staff have passed an examination on 
organization of the Russia Gosplan, nor even, that many of them have studied 
economics academically or possess first-hand knowledge of industry. The reason 
is that the type of work which they do is not perceptibly different from that of civil 
servants in other departments.’41 The function of the Staff was not to give expert 
advice but rather ‘to use it in keeping a watch on the present and future economic 
consequences of departmental activities.’42 It did not operate in a pro-active way, 
rather it allowed the various departments to take the initiative in proposing 
projected investment schemes.
The main concern of the Treasury was to relate the work of the C.E.P.S. 
with that of the Supply Divisions, it did so by gradually conditioning the Planning 
Staff into an understanding of the importance of financial control. The Treasury 
Organisation Committee, set up in 1948 under the Chairmanship of Sir John 
Woods, considered the idea that the C.E.P.S., or at least that part of it concerned 
with investment planning, should be brought into closer contact with the Supply 
Divisions, possibly by a partial merger at the highest levels The meetings of the 
Committee were marked by an underlying unease that the Treasury was losing 
control of government spending. Edward Hale, a Treasury Under Secretary on the 
Supply side, told the Committee that ‘As a general point, he thought that the 
Committee should bear in mind the limitations on the powers of the Supply 
Divisions (or the Treasury as a whole) when matters of important Government 
policy were under, consideration. For example he thought that recent experience 
showed that, given a certain combination of Ministerial personalities and a certain 
political atmosphere, no action could be taken either by the Treasury or the 
Department concerned could be certain of preventing a major social service from 
getting virtually out of control. There was no reserve power in the Treasury in such 
cases, which could override decisions taken by the Government of the day.’43
Although Sir Bernard Gilbert, then head of Supply, did not think that a 
merger was necessary he was concerned about the self-contained nature of the 
C.E.P.S. He told the Committee that ‘it was still true that the C.E.P.S. had not been 
fully absorbed into the Treasury proper but was still regarded (and regarded itself) 
as being in some way apart form the Treasury. This was perhaps indicated by the
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fact that files were passed between the Supply and the C.E.P.S. far less often than 
between the Supply and the Establishments or Finance Divisions.’44
The draft report of the Committee on Supply Business reflected the 
Treasury’s concern that greater control was needed of the C.E.P.S. It noted that 
‘Although the C.E.P.S. has now been a part of the Treasury organisation for more 
than two years it is still not regarded (nor does it regard itself) as a branch of the 
Treasury in the same full sense, for example, as the Finance or Establishment 
Divisions. A small but perhaps significant indication of this fact is the extent to 
which reference between the C.E.P.S. and the rest of the Treasury takes the form 
of self-contained letters or minutes rather than the passing of files as is common 
in the rest of the Department... It is important that the C.E.P.S. should never 
become so “independent” as to lose touch with the realities of daily administration 
and that those engaged on both sides of the frontier between economic planning 
and Treasury control should know as much as possible of each others work.’ In 
order to ensure that the C.E.P.S. was kept in line the Committee recommended 
that appointments should continue to be ‘carefully selected’ and be ‘held for a 
relatively short period.’45
Initially shortages of manpower and material had the same effect on 
investment programming as strict financial control but as this situation eased it 
became ever more important to harmonise the control of the Supply Divisions with 
that over capital investment. The easing of shortages allowed the Conservative 
Government to carry out its policy of dismantling the system of physical controls. 
As these controls were lifted the Budget became the principal means of shaping 
investment in the private sector. In the public sector, as Samuel Beer notes ‘the 
issue became one of framing general lines of investment policy rather than of 
criticising and limiting the particular programmes submitted by individual 
departments . In this process the Supply divisions, the Home Finance Division 
(with its connections with the banking system and with the capital financing of 
government activity) the Economic Section, and the C.E.P.S. could all co-operate 
with advantage.’46
Within this changing picture of investment programming the procedure also 
became ‘more closely related to the normal work of financial control. Previously 
investment programmes were based on calendar years; now like estimates of
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expenditure, they were based on financial years, and the forward programming of 
investment over several years ahead came into line with forward estimating of 
expenditure over the same period. In this way the demands of investment and the 
exigencies of finance were related more closely to each other in the final process 
of establishing economic policy which emerges in the Budget.’47
It therefore seems fitting that when Edwin Plowden left the Treasury in 
November 1953 and the position of Chief Planning Officer was allowed to lapse, 
it was Bernard Gilbert, who had previously been in charge of Supply, who was put 
in overall charge of the C.E.P.S.
Edwin Plowden’s working relationship with Gaitskell was particularly close 
and they were friends outside of the Treasury. The closeness of the relationship 
can be illustrated by an episode recorded in Gaitskell’s own diary. Gaitskell was 
upset by a Cabinet decision to vote against an American United Nations resolution 
over China. The next day he sent for both Bridges and Plowden and told them 
what had happened. Finally he told Plowden, ‘though nobody else- that unless this 
decision was altered I would find it difficult to continue in Government.’48 It is clear 
from this example, and from the general tone of Gaitskell’s diary that Plowden was 
closer to him than any other official in the Treasury.
The Conservatives’ hostility towards planning meant that Plowden’s 
reappointment and the maintenance of the C.E.P.S. was not a certainty once the 
Conservatives got back to office. In 1949 and again at the end of 1950, Bridges 
wrote to the Joint Director of the Conservative Research Department, Henry 
Hopkinson, to confirm that if the Conservatives won the next election they would 
want to retain Plowden’s services. Hopkinson found it difficult to give any kind of 
commitment to Bridges. Although he wrote that ‘the Conservative Party have got 
nothing against Plowden personally.’ He went on to write that ‘at the same time his 
name and the organisation of which he is the head have become identified in the 
minds of many of the Conservative rank and file both in Parliament and out, with 
the type of control which our Socialist friends are continually ramming down our 
throats with boasts that they have been responsible for full employment, the 
closing of the dollar gap and heaven knows what else.’ He concluded that he 
would have to consult with Churchill and Eden for a more authoritative answer to 
Bridges question.49
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After consulting Eden, Hopkinson was still unable to give a firm commitment 
even though Bridges told him that the C.E.P.S. was now engaged in the vital 
rearmament programme. Bridges felt that Churchill could at least ‘feel able to say 
that the nonsense in the press, which implied (a) Sir E. Plowden was personally 
persona non grata to the opposition, and (b) the whole of his outfit would be 
scrapped on a change of Government, did not in any way represent the facts.’50 
Bridges received no answer from Hopkinson for a month and then phoned 
him to tell him how ‘very distressed’ he was. Hopkinson replied that Eden had 
undertaken to speak to Churchill but had received no answer despite pressing 
strongly. Bridges said that unless he got an answer soon he would ‘lose my fish.’ 
Hopkinson phoned back a few minutes later with a dictated message from Eden 
that stated ‘we have nothing against Plowden and hear well of him. We cannot 
commit ourselves in advance to such matters as the Economic Planning Staff.’51 
Despite Hopkinson’s assurance that this was a friendly response Bridges 
had failed to get any kind of commitment from the Conservatives about either 
Plowden’s future or that of the C.E.P.S.. There had not even been any real 
distancing by the leadership from the criticisms of the Tory press.
In view of the Conservative Party’s attitude towards planning it is not 
surprising that the relationship between Butler as Chancellor and the C.E.P.S. was 
not an entirely happy one. It was Butler himself who had persuaded Plowden to 
stay on in the Treasury after the Conservatives won the 1951 election, it had been 
his intention to resign. Plowden’s background as a practical man of business rather 
than as an academic economist like Hall made him particularly useful to Butler who 
later wrote that he had ‘depended on Edwin Plowden, as head of the economic 
planning staff, to interpret and give practical edge to the advice generated by the 
less voluble and extrovert Hall, to act as vulgarisateur and publicist for his ideas.’52 
However, there is little doubt that Butler’s support for Plowden waned after 
the ROBOT affair. In March 1952 Plowden was offered a job at N.A.T.O. To his 
surprise he discovered that the Chancellor wanted him to go. Hall recorded in his 
diary that William Armstrong told Plowden ‘that the Chancellor had lost confidence 
in him ‘because he changed his mind so often.’ He was devastated by this as he 
always supposed that R.A.B., like Stafford and Hugh, had more confidence in him 
than anyone else.’53
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When Plowden eventually went in June 1953 Hall noted in his diary that 
much of Plowden’s ‘influence before came from his special relationship both to 
Cripps and to Gaitskell’ and that he had not enjoyed the same kind of relationship 
with Butler. However, although is true that both Hall and Plowden suffered in the 
short term from the division over ROBOT it is also true that Butler controlled his 
advisers in part by making them uncertain about their degree of influence.54
Plowden’s position was probably undermined to a far greater extent by the 
diminishing importance of economic planning during the Butler Chancellorship. 
Butler wanted to reorganise the Treasury to bring it in line with its new 
responsibilities and make the Treasury more of a unity.55 Early on in his tenure as 
Chancellor Butler discussed reorganisation plans with Bridges. He wrote that ‘it will 
take longer to decide on the future of the CEPS.’56 Specifically, Butler no longer 
saw the need to have someone of Plowden’s status in charge of the CEPS and 
wanted to see it better integrated into the Treasury machine. When Hall saw Butler 
about his willingness to let Plowden go to NATO in March 1952 Butler pointed out 
that ‘the Treasury would have to be reorganised anyway and though there would 
be a place for E[dwin] it would not be at the top. In any case he could not see E. 
as a permanent civil servant.’57
Butler wanted to use the opportunity provided by Plowden’s resignation to 
make changes in organisation, specifically the effective abolition of the CEPS. He 
wrote to Bridges suggesting that there would be advantage in reducing ‘the 
number of more or less independent units concerned with economic and financial 
policy, and I should hope, the number of officers. At present there seems to me to 
be too many hounds, some of whom start their own hares.’ Butler’s suggestion 
was that ‘the CEPS should be reduced in size and amalgamated with the 
Economic Section which should be transferred to the Treasury. This would form 
what might be called the Economic Division.’ Robert Hall would head this Division 
and Butler stressed that ‘the people now in the Economic Section should continue 
to be free to do their work in their own way.’ He made no corresponding proposal 
with regard to the staff from the CEPS. It was also part of Butler’s plan that no one 
should take over Plowden’s position in charge of overall economic coordination. 
He wrote that such coordination ‘as is necessary between the new Economic 
Division and the Overseas Finance, Home Finance, Supply Divisions can be done
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by you or in your absence by Sir Bernard Gilbert, as the most senior of the Second 
Secretaries. I can help too, and will be glad to hold a short office meeting every 
Thursday morning.’58
Bridges opposed Butler’s plans for the CEPS, an organisation he had 
helped to set up and strongly supported. He told Butler that ‘the CEPS could not 
be amalgamated with the Economic Section and that the two must run parallel 
[emphasis in original].’ He also said that although Hall could be regarded as the 
Chancellors Chief Economic Adviser he ‘could not ... be in charge of an 
amalgamated Economic and Planning Division [emphasis in original].’ Further 
more he ‘reacted against an arrangement whereby we lost Sir Edwin Plowden and 
no-one was put in specific charge of economic coordination.’59
That changes in Treasury organisation did follow the path outlined by Butler 
reflects the fact that he had a clearer vision than Bridges of how policy changes 
would impact on organisation. In October 1954 the CEPS was renamed the Home 
and Overseas Planning Staff (HOPS) and was made the responsibility of a Third 
Secretary. In December 1958 the Staff was finally dissolved, its work was given to 
an Overseas Coordination Division and two National Resources Divisions.60 In 
1962 the Treasury as a whole was reorganised into five main groups to reflect the 
real division of functions as Butler had envisaged.
Budgetary Policy
Cripps had been moving towards a more Keynesian use of the Budget, a 
process checked when Gaitskell took over since he regarded the Budget as only 
one and probably not the most important of the economic weapons at his 
disposal.61 But the process of Budget making was a central task for the Treasury 
and a good way of organising their thinking which came to its full fruition under 
Butler. At the heart of the process was the Budget Committee described by 
Douglas Jay as being ‘so hallowed and secret’ that ‘like the mysteries of the Vestal 
Virgins in classical Rome, it was not allowed by tradition to be even mentioned to 
the uninitiated.’62
The Budget Committee drew the work of the various policy communities 
within the Treasury together and was very much a top level committee until, at a
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later stage in the proceedings, the Chancellor and other ministers were drawn in. 
The core membership of the committee consisted of the Chancellors principal 
policy advisers. These were the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, who chaired 
the Committee; the heads of the Overseas Finance, Home Finance and Supply 
Divisions; the head of the Economic Section; the head of the Central Economic 
Planning Staff and the Chancellor’s Principal Private Secretary. Also on the 
Committee, but not part of its core membership were the Permanent Secretary of 
the Board of Trade and the Chairmen of the Inland Revenue and the Customs and 
Excise, both of whom brought a deputy to the Committee. Although the other 
members of the Committee were able to select a deputy to attend the Committee 
in their absence, the fact that members often chose the same deputy restricted the 
number of people involved in Budgetary policy to a very small number. Samuel 
Brittan had estimated that the number of people in the know was restricted to no 
more than two dozen.63
The Budget process itself would tend to get going each year in October 
when the Committee would consider the general Budgetary prospect. The period 
in between the consideration of the immediate reaction to the previous Budget in 
April and of the general Budgetary prospect in October was described as ‘a dead 
session’ by Edward Bridges. Until 1954 the Committee did not meet in this 
period.64
The first few meetings of the Budget Committee were concerned with the 
general Budgetary situation. It was not usually until mid-November that the head 
of the Economic Section would present his first assessment of the economic 
outlook for the coming year. As a result the economic outlook would be considered 
by the Committee within the context of the Budgetary position rather than the other 
way round.
Although the Chairmen of Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise played 
little part in the discussion of the general economic outlook they would present 
papers on the state of the taxation system. As they had the authority for the 
administration of the system their views on any changes held great weight, and 
when different from the views of the economists, was more likely to prevail.65
It was not until after the head of the Economic Section gave his first 
assessment that the Chancellor himself would become involved in the Budget
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process and would meet with members of the Committee around the end of 
November. In January the Chancellor would receive the first set of 
recommendations from the Committee. At this point he would usually discuss the 
Budget judgement with the Prime Minister and some other senior colleagues. 
During the 1945-51 Labour Government non-Treasury Ministers played a more 
active part in these discussions than under the Conservatives.66
The main Budget decisions would be made in February. Up until 1952 these 
were usually made during a working weekend at Roffey Park, a home for 
rehabilitating nervous invalids near Horsham in Sussex, attended by members of 
the Budget Committee and Treasury Ministers.
The final three weeks before the presentation of the Budget were spent on 
writing the speech itself. During the Butler Chancellorship and most others this was 
largely the work of the Chancellors Principal Private Secretary with contributions 
from various divisions and departments on their own particular subjects. Butler 
would himself bring out the general themes of his Budget and amend his speech 
to heighten its political impact. By contrast, Gaitskell wrote his own Budget speech 
with the exception of a few technical passages.
Samuel Brittan has written that ‘Informed people in Whitehall believe that 
the personality of the individual Chancellor has a lot to do with the individual tax 
changes chosen, but has less effect on the total Budget judgement; of how much 
to ‘give away’ or to take back in taxation (although the second is usually far and 
away, the most important decision).’67 Brittan’s observation does not hold for the 
period under discussion, during the early 1950s the Budget Committee itself did 
not speak with one voice on the question of the Budget judgement. In particular, 
the dismantling of economic controls exposed the fundamental distinction between 
officials primarily concerned with balancing the Budget and the balance of 
payments and the economists concern with the general economic outlook. The 
plurality of views this conflict engendered amongst his main economic advisers 
gave Butler more leeway in deciding on the Budget judgement than would 
otherwise have been the case.
During the first half of the 1950s the scope and importance of Budgetary 
policy grew considerably, and with it, the importance of the Budget Committee 
itself. During the Gaitskell Chancellorship the role of the Budget in general
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economic policy was limited to the equalisation of private demand for consumption 
goods with the available supply after allowing for investment and export needs. 
There was no thought of using fiscal policy to limit the demand for labour and no 
real concern about any excess demand for investment as this was subject to 
physical control. As controls were dismantled during the Butler Chancellorship the 
scope of Budgetary policy steadily increased, and by 1954, had moved to centre 
stage.
In spite of these important developments the way Budgetary policy was 
made hardly changed. It was not until the summer of 1954 that it was decided that 
an inner group of.the Budget Committee, consisting only of Treasury members, 
should meet during the May to October period to take stock of the effects of the 
previous Budget.68 In addition, the Chancellor had not yet acquired the power, 
known as the Regulator, to vary consumer taxes by a tenth in between Budgets. 
Consequently the making of economic policy remained tied to procedures 
developed when the Budget was solely an instrument of financial policy. Also little 
attempt was made to coordinate fiscal and monetary policy. It was not until 1959 
that a senior official of the Bank of England became a member of the Budget 
Committee.69
Budgetary policy was the main channel by which the advice of The 
Economic Section was incorporated in economic policy-making. The Economic 
Section was formed at the beginning of 1941 out of the Central Economic 
Information Service (CEIS). Its staff numbered approximately 14 who were housed 
in the Cabinet Office until the Autumn of 1953 when the Section moved to the 
Treasury.70
The Economic Section’s role from 1947 onwards was to provide 
professional economic advice to the Chancellor. Among its duties was the drafting 
of the annual Economic Survey, engaging in economic forecasting, and 
representing the Section on various economic committees. By far the most 
important function the Section performed as a whole was the preparation of 
economic assessments for the Budget Committee. These assessments provided 
the economic framework within which Budgetary policy was discussed. In Robert 
Hall’s period of office the Economic Section came to be regarded, in his words, as
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‘almost the responsible authority’, the budget judgement put to the Chancellor was 
‘his more than anyone’s.’71
From 1947 onwards the Section began submitting two economic 
assessments to the Budget Committee during the preparation of the Budget. This 
practice became formalised into a procedure whereby the Section would submit 
a preliminary assessment of the economic prospects for the coming year in 
November and a more definite assessment in late January or early February. 
These assessments ‘usually followed a forecasting exercise of some kind and 
were often lengthy documents ranging over the main issues of policy as seen by 
the Economic Section. They might also include detailed proposals for changes in 
taxation or expenditure in addition to the main recommendation as to the scale on 
which additional tax revenue should be raised or remitted.’72
The form of the Section’s Budget assessment changed significantly as fiscal 
policy became the predominant method of economic management during the 
Butler Chancellorship. As market forces were given greater play in the economy 
the Budget assessment became less dependent on semi-precise mathematical 
processes and became explicitly presented as ‘an act of judgement’ on the part of 
the Section.73
Decontrol and the ending of quantitative economic planning meant that 
providing budget assessments became Section’s primary objective. While under 
Cripps and Gaitskell the Section had prepared papers on the future of planning 
and full employment, under Butler the Section ‘concentrated increasingly on short­
term economic forecasting, the annual Budget and immediate issues. Its horizons 
shrank and less and less was written on long-range, non-quantitative problems.’ 
The number of discussion papers produced also shrunk dramatically from a peak 
of sixty-two in 1950 to forty-two in 1952 and then down to just eighteen in 1954.74
The Head of the Section was able to operate as an economic adviser to the 
Chancellor. Robert Hall found that his work cut him off from his staff, his influence 
depended on his own reputation rather than on his position as Head of the 
Section. In addition to Hall the Section was made up of a Deputy-Director, two 
senior Economic Advisers at Assistant Secretary level, roughly six to eight 
Economic Advisers at the level of principal and two or three juniors. It contained
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no professional statisticians and had to rely on the Central Statistical Office for 
such information.75
The Section was very loosely organised with specialisation occurring as a 
result of individuaf aptitude rather than because of an overall organisational plan. 
The reasons for this were outlined by Robin Marris, formerly of the C.E.P.S., in an 
article published in 1954 in which he compared the Section with the Dutch Central 
Planbureau. He found the Economic Section to be a much smaller operation than 
the Planbureau in spite of the fact that the national income of the United Kingdom 
was roughly ten times that of Holland. The main reason for this was that the 
Economic Section was far less involved in the operation of policy than the 
Planbureau. Although Marris draws attention to the fact that the nature of the 
British Constitution dictated that much of the work conducted by the Planbureau 
in Holland had to be conducted through inter-departmental committees, the main 
source of the weakness of the Section that he identified was the relative strength 
of the Overseas Finance Division within the Treasury: The existence of so large 
and powerful a body, responsible for both general and detailed policy in the most 
important economic policy field, must inevitably have exerted a profound influence 
on the role and organisation of the Economic Section, and, for that matter of the 
Planning Staff.’76 In particular, it meant that ‘the professional economic advisers 
may suggest and criticise, and thereby exert considerable influence, but always as 
it were from the sidelines... the aggregate loss caused by a multitude of 
administrative decisions based on amateur economic reasoning is immeasurable 
and rarely noticed.’77
Another important contrast between the Planbureau and the Economic 
Section identified by Marris was the lack of a division specialising in long-term 
research. He is very critical of the omission of long-term planning from the work of 
the Section. He concluded that ‘In the United Kingdom, if an aspect of economic 
policy requires for its rational implementation that some substantial piece of 
economic research be carried out, the normal procedure, by and large is to drop 
the policy or to implement it irrationally. This state of affairs almost certainly arises 
from the traditional British administrative impatience with anything which is not of 
obvious urgent practical usefulness; in the social sciences, particularly, good men 
and good money cannot be spared for back-room work.’78
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Unlike the Planbureau the Economic Section was not separated from the 
rest of the bureaucratic machine. The staff engaged directly with members of 
Treasury divisions, their influence depended upon their ability to persuade by 
argument. One effect of this was that the Staff adopted the administrative 
viewpoint more readily than would otherwise have been the case. Indeed, as a 
general ethos the Section believed in mild short-term planning. In a paper written 
in April 1949 D.M.B. Butt sought to outline what was meant by this. By ‘mild 
planning’ he meant ‘budgetary policy, general control over the scale of investment 
(mainly by determination of aggregate programmes of big sectors), exhortation, the 
E.I.U. [Economic Information Unit] and so on.’ He rejected ‘fierce’ planning, by 
which he meant the ‘direction of labour, price controls, output, licensing, materials 
allocations, detailed investment licensing and so on.’ He also rejected precise 
long-term planning which he thought was ‘a rather obvious futility to which I will not 
invite my colleagues to proclaim adherence...’79
Robert Hall succeeded James Meade as head of the Economic Section in 
September 1947.3 Hall’s views were essentially those of what Alan Booth has 
characterised as a ‘liberal Keynesian.’ He saw the message of Keynes as 
essentially the use of budgetary and monetary policy as instruments for correcting 
excesses and deficiencies in demand. Hall’s viewpoint had been formed at Oxford 
where he ‘had developed as an applied economist rather than as a theorist. His 
interest was not so much in theories as in the uses to which they could be put.’
Hall’s thinking was most influenced by Keynes’s Treatise on Money which 
was published in 1931. Hall took from the book the message that ‘the automatic 
working of economic forces did not necessarily of itself lead to full employment.’ 
He was less influenced by the General Theory which was published in 1936. Hall 
thought that ‘the practical consequences of the theories would have been clear 
from the Treatise even if there had been no General Theory.’80 In 1937 he 
published The Economic System in a Socialist State which argued that a simple 
form of socialist planning by state direction could not be effective.’Even if a
3 Robert Hall: Born in Queensland 1901. Hall was studying civil engineering at 
Queensland University when he won a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford in 1922. He received a 
first in Modern Greats(P.P.E) in 1926 and was lecturer in Economics at Trinity College Oxford 
from 1926 to 1947. [Alec Cairncross in C.S. Nicholls(ed): The Dictionary of National Biography 
1986-1990. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996.]
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socialist state established a mechanism through which it could ascertain its relative 
errors of overproduction of some goods at the expense of under production of 
others, it might still be unable to enforce productive methods which would give it 
sufficient quantities of all goods, unless it made some use of a price system.’81 
Hall was not an articulate man, he struggled to express himself in Treasury 
meetings.82 However this handicap did not weaken his influence over ministers, 
rather when Hall ‘did manage to verbalise his thoughts, they seemed to have been 
extracted with enormous effort from his innermost being’ by contrast Cairncross, 
his successor, came across ‘more like a clever professor.’83
To a significant degree Hall’s method of operating reflected that of his 
Section as a whole. Robin Marris has written of Hall that ‘he believes strongly in 
trying to see problems from the administrators point of view, in contrast with the 
extreme faults of outlook which many administrator’s complain are often 
associated with academic economists.’84 The price Hall paid for influence was to 
gradually compromise his economic principles. As Booth has argued, although 
Keynesian arithmetic became an accepted part of fiscal policy none of the Supply 
Side aspects of Keynes’s theories were advanced by Hall in the Treasury. In 
particular, wage policy was not integrated into Keynesian demand management. 
‘Under Hall, the Economic Section failed to forge this link.’85 Hall also never forced 
the battle over deficit financing to a head. In 1954 he accepted the Treasury’s case 
against incurring a deficit when only private investment needed to be 
encouraged.86 Although Hall’s methods did gain him credit with both the official 
Treasury and with Butler, it also meant that the actual circumstances under which 
deficit financing was desirable were never settled.
From the beginning of his Chancellorship Butler was unhappy that the 
Economic Section was not housed in the Treasury. He wrote to Bridges that he 
thought it odd ‘that our Economist should be in the Cabinet Office with another 
staff.’87 His dissatisfaction with this arrangement was probably heightened by the 
ROBOT crisis when Robert Hall became involved in the coordination of the 
opposition to the plan. It has been argued that the move of the Section to the 
Treasury and Hall’s promotion to Chief Economic Adviser in 1953 is evidence of 
a change in Butler’s position over ROBOT and represented a victory for Hall 
particularly in relation to the Overseas Planning Division. However, the move is
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better explained by Butler’s evident desire to strengthen his control over the 
machinery of economic policy. When he wrote to Bridges in May 1953 that he 
intended to regard Hall as ‘my Chief Economic Adviser’ the possessive aspect of 
his wording was important. Although the Section was largely incorporated into the 
Treasury structure prior to the move it had continued to be consulted by other 
Ministries, this was allowed to continue under the new arrangement but became 
increasingly rare.
External Economic Policy
One of the most powerful members of the Budget Committee was the head 
of the Overseas Finance Division (O.F.). The influence of the head of O.F. was 
determined by his position at the centre of the network of external economic policy 
making. O.F had control over information regarding Britain’s overseas payments 
position, a close relationship with the Bank of England. The Head of the Division 
operated as the Chancellor’s principal adviser on matters of external policy.
The major objectives of the division were to bring about convertibility of the 
pound and to establish a ‘one-world’ economy based on free trade. This meant 
giving greater priority to questions of external finance. This was, in part, the 
attraction of the ROBOT plan to the Division. Immediate convertibility of the pound 
at a floating rate would have meant that domestic economic policy would have had 
to have been made to fit external conditions. Robert Hall believed that O.F. was 
‘much more powerful than people dealing with domestic side’ and was ‘always 
leaning to austerity’. It was the division ‘least in favour of full employment’ and in 
pursuing its objectives was ‘somewhat fortified by [the] Bank [of England]’88
The relationship between the head of the Overseas Finance Division and 
the Chancellor was an important one. On overseas trips the head of the Division 
would accompany the Chancellor and become in effect his chief adviser.89 
Unfortunately relations between Wilson-Smith, the head of the Division, and 
Gaitskell were not good. As Gaitskell did not share the policy objectives of O.F. its 
influence was limited during his Chancellorship. After one policy meeting where 
Gaitskell had conducted the discussion entirely with junior officials, Lord Croham 
recalls that Wilson-Smith said ‘“I’m not going to stand any of this any bloody
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longer” and he took himself off almost at once to get a job in industry.’90 Gaitskell 
himself had a low opinion of Wilson-Smith. Dalton recorded in his diary that 
Gaitskell was ‘glad that Wilson-Smith is soon leaving the Civil Service. He has 
been obstinate, resistant and disloyal.’91
Leslie Rowan succeeded Wilson-Smith as head of the Division in 1951.4 As 
Churchill’s private secretary during the war Rowan had gained admission to what 
Churchill called ‘The Secret Circle’. Rowan latter recalled that To bring someone 
fully into ‘The Secret Circle’ was a tremendous step for Churchill to take, for once 
you were in you knew and saw everything except the date for military operations 
and the contents of the famous ‘yellow boxes’, the most secret enemy 
intelligence.’92 Rowan’s service with Churchill began what he later described as 
‘the close friendship with him and his family which continued in later years.’ 
Indeed, Rowan’s later advocacy of the ROBOT plan may well have influenced 
Churchill’s initial decision to support it.
In 1947 Rowan was made Permanent Secretary of the new Ministry of 
Economic Affairs. However, the Ministry was quickly abolished when Cripps 
succeeded Dalton as Chancellor in the same year. Rowan accompanied Cripps 
back to the Treasury and was effectively demoted to Second Secretary level. His 
frustrated ambition could be the reason why so many found him to be ‘emotional 
and impossible to work with’ when he returned to the Treasury in 1951 after a spell 
as economic minister at the British embassy in Washington.93
Rowan’s changing policy stance provides a good illustration of Graham 
Allison’s maxim that where you stand on a policy depends to some extent on 
where you sit.94 When the Department for Economic Affairs was merged with the 
Treasury in 1947 Rowan argued that a separate staff should continue under 
himself and that he should continue to chair the Overseas Negotiations Committee 
and London Committee on the basis that the business of these committees should 
be planning.95 When he became head of O.F. in 1951 Rowan became a whole­
4 Leslie Rowan: born 1908 and educated at Tonbridge School and Queen’s College 
Cambridge. He entered the Colonial Office in 1930 and then transferred to the Treasury in 
1933, becoming assistant private secretary to the Chancellor, Neville Chamberlain, shortly 
afterwards. In 1941 Rowan joined the private office of the Prime Minister and in 1945 became 
his principal private secretary. [Paul Gore-Booth in Lord Blake and C.S. Nicholls(eds.): The 
Dictionary of National Biography 1971-1980. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986.]
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hearted supporter of the dismantlement of external controls and the reassertion 
of questions of external finance. In fact, Rowan’s time as head of O.F. was 
marked by sharp divisions within the Treasury which almost amounted to a power 
struggle between internal and external objectives of economic policy.
Rowan formed a close working relationship with Butler during his time as 
Chancellor, Butler regarded him as ‘a very important man.’96 This relationship 
sprang in part from Rowan’s position as the official who accompanied the 
Chancellor on overseas trips. Rowan was also, with William Armstrong, the main 
contributor to Butler’s speeches and the man who would have been in Butler’s 
room more than any other Second Secretary.97
R.W.B. Clarke, known to family and friends as ‘Otto’, was the most 
important Under Secretary within O.F. until he left in 1952.5 Clarke had joined the 
civil service at the outbreak of war, and worked his way through the Ministries of 
Information, Economic Warfare, and Supply, he also spent a year in Washington. 
In 1945 he joined the Treasury and from 1946 to 1952 he was Chairman of the 
Import Programme Committee.
Clarke ‘always took the architectonic rather than the piecemeal approach 
to his responsibilities.’98 His tendency to look for overall solutions to problems 
partly explains why he was one of the main advocates of the ROBOT plan when 
he had previously been against an early return to convertibility. He was capable 
of radical changes of mind when struck by a new vision. His command of figures 
and gift for language made him a persuasive advocate, capable of drafting 
convincing memoranda in next to no time. However, his passionate beliefs 
sometimes made him ‘reluctant to believe things that didn’t support his 
arguments.’99
Although the pairing of Rowan and Clarke at O.F. proved to be powerful, 
from the Treasury point of view, it was also disruptive. When it was suggested that 
Clarke should return to O.F. in the summer of 1955, Bridges advised against it. He
5 ‘Otto’ Clarke: born 1910 and educated at Christ’s Hospital and Clare College, 
Cambridge. There he studied studies mathematics and then switched to economics in his 
fourth year, receiving a second class in part ii of the economics tripos in 1932. He spent six 
years at the Financial News, which was later amalgamated with the Financial Times. His most 
lasting achievement during this time was to create the Ordinary Share Index which later 
became the F.T. Index. [Samuel Goldman in Blake and Nicholls: Op Cit.]
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wrote to Butler that he thought Clarke ‘and Leslie Rowan have some of the same 
defects and should not be brigaded together. You know how certain pairs of dogs, 
when they get togther always forget all their training and go off hunting and get into 
trouble. There is rather the same kind of disruptive magnetism between these two 
and my instinct tells me that if we put them together we shall have trouble both in 
office and outside it.’100
The Overseas Finance Division was set up in 1914 when the outbreak of 
the first world war undermined the previously multilateral system of payments.101 
The Division was concerned almost exclusively with policy concerning Britain’s 
balance of payments position. An important part of its work thus involved keeping 
a close watch on exchange movements. The enormous balance of payments 
problems that dogged British economic policy in the postwar period increased the 
scope and functions of O.F. In July 1938 its staff had numbered only 7, ten years 
latter it this number had increased to 71.102 The organisation of O.F was most 
affected by the measures necessitated by the granting of Marshall Aid in 1947. In 
order to keep Marshall Aid flowing supervision was required of its use. This also 
required better coordination of internal and external policy and the extension of the 
system of interdepartmental committees into the area of overseas finance.103
Among the committees set up by this process the two most important were 
the Overseas Negotiations Committee(O.N.C) and the Committee on European 
Economic Cooperation, usually referred to as the London Committee. The role of 
the former was to advise ministers on ‘the general principle on which to base trade 
and financial negotiations with overseas countries and supervise... the conduct of 
such negotiations with particular countries.’ The role of the later was to supervise 
the detailed allocation of Marshall Aid.104 Another ‘crucial cog’ in the machine was 
the Import Programme Committee, chaired by Otto Clarke, which decided how 
much of each type of import could be allowed into the country. Clarke became the 
‘supreme commander’ of all import policy during the Gaitskell Chancellorship and 
this area of policy became known as ‘”the Ottoman Empire.’”105
When the separate Department for Economic Affairs was merged with the 
Treasury in 1947 Cripps brought Leslie Rowan and his staff with him. Rowan had 
been made chairman of both O.N.C and the London Committee. His independent 
status within the Treasury meant that O.F was initially denied control of the
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coordinating machinery of economic and financial policy.
Sir Henry Wilson-Smith, the head of the O.F. Division, was determined to 
re-establish Treasury control of this area. His memorandum to the Treasury 
Organisation Committee in 1948 argued that the separate staff under Rowan 
should be terminated and that the existing tripartite organisation on question of 
overseas policy should be contracted into a dual organisation of O.F and the 
C.E.P.S. One reason why Wilson-Smith’s memorandum is interesting is because 
it demonstrates the fact that many of the Treasury’s arguments against the 
structure of the economic planning machinery were based on a notion of 
practicality. Wilson-Smith argued that as a result of the existing set up ‘the 
Overseas Finance view (and therefore by definition the Treasury view) on many 
of the issues which come before the Chancellor is determined below Third 
Secretary level, is maintained or modified in interdepartmental discussion, and is 
then submitted to the Chancellor- usually without direct reference to the Second 
or Third Secretaries. This leads to a blurring of responsibility among the 
Chancellor’s principal advisers and indeed a confusion as regards reporting etc.’ 
Therefore, the principal argument against the existing structure was that it when 
against the Treasury’s standard operating procedures. The traditional approach 
was argued for in terms of practicality rather than in terms of an explicit attack on 
planning as a policy objective.
Wilson-Smith was keen to restrict the importance of the C.E.P.S. in external 
policy and thus defined its functions in such terms that it appeared obvious that it 
should not be in charge of these committees. ‘In my view’, he continued, ‘this staff 
must fit together a United Kingdom economic policy in internal and external 
spheres it must draw on the expert executive and planning authorities in particular 
spheres and it must shun all the blandishments and temptations which would 
extend its sphere-of influence beyond the essential minimum. To the maximum 
extent possible it must stand outside the ordinary machine, drawing on the 
resources of that machine, subjecting its view to the criticism of those responsible 
for the framing and execution of policy in particular spheres and, especially in the 
overseas finance sphere, leaving practicability to be tested by those who have to 
carry out actual negotiations [emphasis in original].’
Wilson-Smith’s argument was not only motivated by the logic of a simple
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turf fight between divisions but also by the belief that questions of financial policy 
took precedence over those of economic planning. Re-establishing Treasury 
control of the machinery of external policy also meant re-establishing the primacy 
of questions of overseas finance. Wilson-Smith wrote that he would be ‘most 
strongly opposed to any suggestion that the work of the Programmes Committee 
should focus on the C.E.P.S. and not in “old” Treasury. If the Overseas Finance 
Division loses “the power of the purse” in terms of exchange requirements then we 
should be well on the way to converting the suggested dual organisation into a 
single one.’
Wilson-Smith extended this argument to the other interdepartmental 
committees, arguing that ‘personally I cannot help feeling that it will obscure the 
true functions of the Central Planning Staff, and certainly of the Chief Planner if 
they are made responsible for advice to the Chancellor of the Exchequer on all the 
day to day business of O.N.C and the London Committee. I am afraid I do not 
agree at all with Mr Rowan’s view that this business is “planning.” I regard it as no 
more than the most convenient way to settle a whole host of current financial and 
economic questions affecting a number of Departments, it is just that kind of 
coordination which I have always regarded as the job of the Treasury.’106
The Treasury Organisation Committee agreed with Wilson-Smith’s 
assessment. Their draft interim report concluded that ‘the work of these committee 
is, we suggest, an example of the intermediate stage in the planning process and 
should not be carried out by the central planning staff.’ The Committee 
recommended the amalgamation of Rowan’s Division with O.F and that O.F should 
be put in control of the interdepartmental committee structure.107
The relationship between the O.F. and the Bank of England was at the 
heart of the external economic policy network. On the external side the Bank 
managed the Exchange Equalisation Account (EEA) and on exchange control 
acted as agent for the Treasury. The responsibility for policy lay with the Treasury 
and O.F. therefore had the upper hand in the relationship. The Bank’s influence 
in these matters ‘depended rather more upon the Bank’s managerial, intellectual, 
and technical weight and rather less on such formal independence as remained 
to it.’108 The relationship ‘of agent and principal and the great complexity and range 
of the subject matter produced working relationships between the Bank and the
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Overseas Finance Division of the Treasury - below Governor or even Executive 
Director- within which both debates on policy and discussions ‘at technical level’ 
took place.’109
Monetary Policy
At the centre of the monetary policy network was the relationship between 
the Bank of England and the Treasury’s Home Finance Division, this relationship 
remained, during the early 1950s, a very formal one. Under the 1946 Act the Bank 
retained responsibility for the management of the money market, including the 
fixing of the Bank Rate and the management of Issue Department Securities. In 
their evidence to the Radcliffe Committee the Bank made it clear that under the 
Act ‘this responsibility lies with the Bank unless they are given dictions by the 
Treasury.’110
The position under the 1946 Act ‘together with a strong Governor and the 
administrative (though not intellectual) simplicity of the subject matter, encouraged 
the relative paucity of relationships below Governor level and discouraged debate 
with Whitehall about policy or about the whole subject of monetary policy- how it 
worked and how it should be operated.’111
The lack of communication between the Bank and the Division on matters 
of policy, coupled with the Bank’s tendency to put its case in purely operational 
terms, encouraged disagreements to develop. Disagreement was particularly 
apparent during the Gaitskell Chancellorship when the continued adherence to the 
policy of cheap money meant that the Bank’s formal responsibilities over monetary 
policy counted for very little. The Bank’s determination to reactivate the Bank rate 
at the end of 1950 received a poor response in the Division. In particular, Burke 
Trend, at that time an under secretary in the Division, found the Bank’s 
memorandum on the subject to be a ‘very disappointing document.’112 Eady 
reported to Bridges that the Home Finance Division did not think the move 
worthwhile.113 Once Butler decided to reactive the Bank Rate in October 1951 the 
relationship between the Division and the Bank was radically altered. As the 
responsible agent for the execution of the policy the Bank became the 
Chancellor’s main advisers on interest rate changes, the Home Finance Division
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was effectively sidelined.
Wilfrid Eady was head of the Home Finance Division from 1947 to 1952. 
Unlike the other Treasury Mandarins he had spent most of his career outside the 
Treasury, mainly in the Ministry of Labour. In 1942 Eady was appointed head of 
the Overseas Finance Division where he worked closely with Keynes on the 
construction of postwar international monetary arrangements. This was ‘not an 
easy collaboration: Eady’s mind did not move with the facility of Keynes’s in 
matters of international finance, and though Keynes came to respect Eady’s 
qualities he was sometimes impatient at Eady’s reluctance to follow his own 
darting thought. That reluctance however, was often justifiable: it was that of a 
man determined not to be diverted by intellectual coruscation from satisfying 
himself that the arrangements to be made would be workable and in the country’s 
interests.’114 In 1947 he relinquished responsibility for overseas finance and moved 
to the Home Finance Division where he stayed until his retirement in 1952.
Eady’s successor as head of the Division was Edmund Compton who had 
spent most of his career in the Treasury. Butler had suggested that Eady’s place 
should be taken by someone from the City who understood finance and banking 
but this ‘scandalized’ Norman Brook and Leslie Rowan. Robert Hall recorded in his 
diary that Compton’s appointment was an example of ‘the Trade Union in 
action.’115
Compton was not promoted to the level of second secretary when he 
became head of the Division and he stayed at the rank of third secretary until he 
left the Treasury to become Comptroller and Auditor General in 1958.116 That the 
Home Finance Division was headed by someone below the rank of second 
secretary reflected its loss of influence once the Bank Rate had be reactivated. 
Compton’s failure to gain promotion could also be accounted for by his closeness 
to the three successive Labour Chancellors between 1945-5, which might have led 
to him being treated with some reserve once the Conservatives came back to 
power.117
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Chapter 3 
The Treasury view
The fact that ministers operate within institution’s that have developed 
ingrained patterns of thinking represents an important constraint on their ability to 
initiate policy. While the course of events and the injection of new minds into 
institutions does have the effect of inducing change, this process is incremental 
and institutions always retain elements of their past selves. Edward Bridges 
described the departmental view as the result of ‘a store of knowledge and 
experience in thesubjects handled’ that has been built up in every department.1 
An appreciation of a department’s traditional responsibilities and relationships is 
therefore essential if its reaction to new policies and responsibilities is to be 
understood.
In The Cybernetic Theory of Decision John Steinbruner draws attention to 
the importance of an institutions store of knowledge in the decision-making 
process. According to cybernetic theory decision-makers buffer themselves 
against the complexity of the world by simplifying the decision-making process 
around a series of standard operating procedures drawn from past experience. 
One of the advantages of cybernetic explanations is that they take into account the 
degree of uncertainty with which the decision-maker is faced. The cybernetic 
paradigm is based on the contradictory assumption of uncertainty control. 
According to this assumption, the decision maker - primarily and necessary 
engaged in buffering himself against the overwhelming variety which inheres in his 
world - simply avoids direct outcome calculations. Such a decision-maker 
processes procedures for processing information which in fact generate decisions 
and outcomes, but psychologically he is not engaged in the pursuit of an explicitly 
designed result. The psychological effects of uncertainly are therefore held to a 
minimum.’2
Decision-makers therefore simplify the world according to past experience. 
While an explicitly designed result may be avoided, implicit judgements of value 
are inherent to any form of simplification. These institutional values are crucial to
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the policy-making process because, as Geoffrey Vickers1, has argued, ‘reality 
judgments and value judgments are inseparable constituents of appreciation... for 
facts are relevant only in relation to some judgements of value and judgements of 
value are operative only in relation to some configuration of fact. Judgements of 
value give meaning to judgments of reality as a course gives meaning to a 
compass card. Information is an incomplete concept; for it tells us nothing about 
the organisation of the recipient which alone makes a communication informative.’3
The store of knowledge and experience held in the Treasury was drawn 
primarily from its historic responsibility for public finance and this shaped a view 
of the world that was informed by economically liberal values. While Keynesian 
national income accounting techniques could be incorporated into the Treasury’s 
operating procedures with relative ease the use of physical controls destabilised 
those relationships the Treasury sought to maintain. In particular, the use of 
physical controls threatened to undermine financial control and placed demands 
on those at the centre they felt unable to fulfil. The Treasury’s response to these 
pressures was to try to reestablish what it saw as normality. Psychologically, as the 
cybernetic paradigm suggests, Treasury officials were not engaged in the pursuit 
of an explicitly designed result, for them reductions in public expenditure, the 
dismantling of economic controls, the establishment of convertibility of the pound 
and of a one-world economy were necessary if the Treasury’s relationship with the 
outside world was to be brought back into equilibrium after the exceptional 
conditions of the Second World War. Therefore, in order to properly understand 
the way the Treasury operated in the postwar period, it is necessary to look in 
more detail at the values it held and how they were formed.
Treasury Control and the principle of Balanced Budgets
Britain differs from other countries, in particular France and Germany, in 
having a Finance Ministry which also has responsibility for the control of public 
expenditure. The function of public expenditure control placed the Treasury at the
Geoffrey Vickers: A lawyer by training he was in charge of economic intelligence in the 
Ministry of Economic Warfare. After the war he joined the new National Coal Board and became 
Board member in charge of personnel and training in 1948 [Wayne Parsons: Public Policy: An 
Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 
Aldershot, 1995, p.25].
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centre of the machinery of government. As Roger Middleton has argued The locus 
of Treasury authority within Whitehall was its institutional position at the financial 
and political centre of Government. This position rested on the control of 
expenditure, for it was this which endowed the Treasury with political power and 
made it the most politically conscious of all the departments.’4
In 1954 Sir John Woods referred to Treasury control as ‘that central core’ 
of the Treasury’s work.5 This was certainly true in terms of numbers. By July 1948 
156 officials were working in either the Supply or Establishment divisions of the 
Treasury. This number compares with 27 in the Central Economic Planning Staff 
and 26 in Home Finance in the same period. Most Treasury officials would pass 
through these core divisions at some stage in their career. Of those Treasury 
officials who had reached the level of Second Secretary or above in the period 
under consideration, Bridges, Gilbert, Wilson-Smith, Padmore, Rowan and Brittain 
had all served in the Supply Divisions during their formative years in the Treasury. 
The only exception to this rule was Wilfrid Eady who started his Civil Service 
career in the Ministry of Labour. Indeed, it was viewed as desirable for officials to 
have experience of the various aspects of the Treasury’s work. Sir Henry Wilson- 
Smith told the Select Committee on Estimates in April 1958 that there ‘is a good 
deal of change-round in the Treasury and in the lower levels in particular. I think 
it is probably desirable in terms of giving the maximum experience over a broad 
field to the younger man.’6
Grasping the centrality of Treasury control to the way the Treasury operated 
is essential to understanding the Treasury view. It was this awareness of the 
political and institutional pressures within which the Treasury operated, rather than 
economic doctrine, that made the principle of balanced budgets so central to the 
Treasury’s view. Although officials came to accept that government would play a 
larger role in the economy after the war this was conditioned by an awareness of 
the institutional pressures in which they operated. Officials fitted there new 
responsibilities for economic management within the framework of the existing 
ones of budgetary control. This method of adaptation fits in well with 
Steinbrunner’s notion of uncertainty control. Officials were naturally predisposed 
to methods of economic management which least interfered with their traditional
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ways of doing things and with their existing relationship with the outside world. 
Specifically this meant the rejection of Budget deficits and of physical controls as 
legitimate methods of economic management as both of these methods clashed 
dramatically with how the Treasury comprehended its role. That both these 
methods had been used during the war did not mean that their use had been 
legitimised for peacetime. Wartime practice did legitimise the use of Budgetary 
policy to contain inflation but deficit financing and physical controls were diversions 
from normal practice only tolerated because of the national emergency. This 
became clear after the war when the Treasury assumed that the system of 
physical controls would be dismantled and that Budgetary policy would again take 
precedence.7
The Budget of 1941 is often described as the first Keynesian Budget 
because it was the first in which Keynesian techniques of national income 
accounting were used to manage the total level of spending in the economy. 
However, the reason why it proved possible to convert the Treasury to these 
methods was that the conditions of the time meant they reinforced the Treasury’s 
own case for firmer control of public expenditure. The fact that the Treasury could 
easily adapt its standard operating procedures to this limited use of Keynesian 
methods was made explicit by Bernard Gilbert in 1945. He argued that in an 
inflationary context this use of the Budget would ‘involve keeping the brake on with 
varying degrees of pressure on both capital and consumer expenditure. I see no 
difficulty about that; it is in harmony with all our past training and experience, and 
the constitution of the machinery of government is well fitted for the exercise of 
negative controls.’8
Keynesian Budgetary policy in the postwar period became identified with 
fine-tuning of the economy around a high level of economic activity rather than with 
budget deficits. The process of fine-tuning was attached to a budgetary procedure 
that remained essentially the same as had existed before the War.
One significant item of expenditure in the annual Budget during the Labour 
government was the cost-of-living subsidies. An important reason why the 
Treasury supported the Economic Section’s case for an Autumn Budget in 1947 
was because the opportunity to cut food subsidies appeared to have opened up.
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Throughout the Cripps and Gaitskell Chancellorships officials argued that the 
burden of taxation on the economy was already too great and that the only way to 
deal with inflationary pressure was by cutting subsidies. In February 1950 the 
Budget Committee informed Cripps that ‘the economy is over-loaded. We are 
attempting to do more things than we can do with the resources at our disposal. 
The result is the continuance of inflationary pressure and a rigidity in the whole 
economic structure which makes it extremely difficult if not impossible to have any 
flexibility in planning.’ The Committee recommended that the ‘right way to counter 
the inflationary pressure and to restore a balance to our economy is by a reduction 
in Government expenditure and we recommend that the most strenuous and 
determined efforts should be made to this end.’9
The way in which Treasury control was organised also encouraged a form 
of institutional scepticism in the way the it dealt with outside actors. Sir John 
Woods described the role of the Treasury official in relation to a departmental 
finance officer to be that of a ‘detached outside critic. That is what the Treasury is. 
On the particular matter at issue the department will be expert - the Treasury 
inexpert. But the department man may also be an enthusiast and enthusiasm, 
admirable quality though it is, sometimes runs away with discretion and judgement. 
The good Treasury man, I have always thought, ought to be very like a first-class 
common law barrister, conducting a vigorous but fair, cross-examination of an 
expert witness.’10
It was natural of the Treasury to transfer these operating procedures to the 
machinery of economic planning as this developed after the war. Although the 
Treasury came to play the predominant role in economic planning after Stafford 
Cripps’ staff was incorporated in to the Treasury in 1947 it remained naturally 
inclined against taking an overtly positive role in this process. Planning of both 
internal and external economic policy took place within an interdepartmental 
framework of committees. As Samuel Beer points out ‘as in their relations with 
Supply, it was the departments that took the initiative, they, not the planning staff, 
drawing up and proposing the various projected schemes of investment.’11 These 
plans were then greeted with natural Treasury scepticism.
The pressures encountered in the control of public expenditure created an
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ethos in the Treasury that was essentially sceptical about both the desirability and 
the practicality of the government playing the greater role in the economy that the 
planners wanted. This point comes across clearly in Herman Finer’s recollection 
of the answers Edward Bridges gave about the problems of modem government. 
When asked what was his greatest official anxiety Bridges answered that ‘“It is not 
coordination! We have the machinery and the rules for that. My chief anxiety is that 
so much business must still come across the desk of myself and my thirty 
colleagues at the head of the other departments.”’ When Finer suggested: ‘“Is this 
not a function of number? Say, double the men at the top?’”, Bridges replied “‘No! 
Still too much has been concentrated in the state, to which I must say - and I alone 
- ‘Yes' or ‘No’.’”12
Another consequence of the centrality of Treasury control to its operation 
as an institution was that ‘well-rounded laymen’ rather than economic experts were 
sought after as officials.13 None of the officials at the level of Second Secretary or 
above in the period under consideration had a background in economics. Bridges 
had studied Greats at Oxford; Rowan, modern and medieval languages at 
Cambridge. Experience within the Supply and Establishment Divisions of the 
Treasury gave officials a sense of the way in which they were at the centre of 
unlimited pressure for scarce resources. As the Treasury’s role in economic policy 
was superimposed upon a pre-existing machinery that dealt with financial policy 
it was natural for the Treasury to see economic policy as inseparable from financial 
control and to want as strong a grasp on the machinery of economic policy-making 
as possible. Sir John Woods expressed this Treasury view well in his Political 
Quarterly article of 1954: ‘It is perhaps arguable whether this general co-ordinating 
power, as well as the traditional control of expenditure should be in Treasury 
hands. Certainly it imposes a heavy strain on the Treasury and the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer. Critics may say, and have I think said, that it gives the Treasury too 
much power. For my part I believe the present arrangement to be right... An 
economic co-ordinator outside, and independent of the Treasury, will always be 
falling over the Treasury’s feet, and vice versa. The broad economic view and the 
broad financial view, cannot be disentangled. And I would rather run the risk of an 
over-powerful Treasury than bear the continual pull and counter-pull, of two
overlapping Ministers, each claiming general and co-ordinating authority.’14
The Keynesian economist Thomas Balogh in his essay The Apotheosis of 
the Dilettante’ offers a perceptive critique of the effect that the Treasury’s mode of 
operation had on the making of economic policy. In essence, it was always to put 
financial considerations above those of broader economic significance: The 
importance of economic policy-making is enhanced by the fact that eventually all 
proposals involving spending will come under the baleful eye of the Treasury, 
whose traditional role (as the Department responsible for the preparation of 
estimates of ‘supply’) is to oppose any increase in expenditure. Thus instead of a 
coherent co-ordination of policy there is some danger of a series of partial 
engagements between the Treasury and each separate spending Department. 
This danger is enhanced by the consequences of the system of Cabinet 
responsibility and administrative procedure. In the absence of a considered long­
term plan, coordination must be through ad hoc or permanent inter-departmental 
committees in the first instance on the official level. These committees resemble 
peace conferences between sovereign powers at which representatives of the 
several Departments keep strictly to their briefs which of necessity represent pleas 
for their ‘own’ vested interests, rather than an objective review of the case from a 
national standpoint. In the ensuing bargain there is - again of necessity - no 
guarantee that an ‘impartial’ member with economic competence - will insist on 
due regard to that standpoint. The Treasury will have its own vested interests, i.e. 
a cut in expenditure above all in view, and, among its staff, men with even an 
elementary knowledge of economics are the rare exception rather than the rule. 
Of the top score of officials, only one, the Head of the Economic Section, is an 
economist. Thus technical knowledge, in this supremely important field is not 
unlikely to make its due contribution only by - rare - accident.’15
It was also natural for the well-rounded laymen of the Treasury to think 
about economics in emotive or moralistic terms. The effect of this was to reinforce 
the natural bias of policy advice in favour of laissez-faire and decontrol. Roger 
Opie, who served in the Economic Section between 1958 and 1960 found it ‘quite 
impossible... to explain to a meeting of Assistant Secretaries and above that in the 
then existing state of the balance of payments, a deliberate policy of stimulating
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the production of import substitutes was more efficient, in the economic sense, 
than to pursue a policy of free trade... The argument used against me was simply: 
“I cannot believe that the future of this great country of ours lies in a policy of 
fostering inefficient manufactures.” I admit that the proposition that “the case for 
free trade depends on the maintenance of full employment’ is less glamorous than 
appeals to the future of our great country, but one might have hoped that reason 
would triumph over passion.”16
The kind of decisions required by micro-economic planning did not come 
naturally to Treasury officials. Thomas Balogh explained the Treasury’s dislike of 
physical controls in these terms: ‘In a planned economy the crossword-puzzle 
mind, reared on mathematics and greats at Oxford, has only a limited outlet. They 
must defend themselves against a system in which positive action is in order 
because they can only express themselves by transferring decisions from the 
realm of economic realities into the sphere of pseudo-moral philosophy. This is 
only possible in a “free” economy where the state has no or at most very limited 
functions. Complicated problems are then cheerfully solved by the application of 
so-called “general principles.” Instead of detached thinking we get metaphysical 
sermons on “the need for a collective approach” or “willing the means to NATO” 
(i.e., adopting American policy uncritically).’17
The fact that physical controls were exercised outside the Treasury by 
departments such as the Ministry of Supply weakened the Treasury’s central 
position in econo.mic policy-making. The work of the Treasury’s Organisation 
Committee demonstrated how the Treasury went about regaining control of this 
machinery. The Committee’s investigation became focussed on the relationship 
between the new machinery for the co-ordination of economic policy and the well- 
established Supply and Finance Divisions. For the Treasury the adoption of this 
form of economic planning presented a possible danger to its overall financial 
control. The Committee Chairman, Sir John Woods, was able to see this in its 
historical context: ‘Until the last war Government finance was almost entirely a 
matter of the expenditure of voted money so that the control exercised by the 
Supply Divisions was strictly a control of supply in the parliamentary sense. To-day 
a conscious attempt to plan the national economy together with a great increase
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in the scale of Government expenditure and the nationalisation and other policies, 
resulted in the extension of the Government’s concern in finance far beyond its 
original confines. Moreover, a substantial proportion of Government and 
Government sponsored expenditure off all types to-day represented long-term 
commitments spread over a number of years, which set a pattern for succeeding 
budgets that could not easily be altered. But many of these long-term 
commitments had only a relatively small effect on the budget situation in any 
particular year and, largely for this reason it appeared that they fell only partially 
within the control exercised by the Supply Divisions. He thought that it would be 
generally agreed that the magnitude of the present pull of Government expenditure 
on total resources made it essential that a firm control should be established at 
some point.’18
It was therefore predictable that the Treasury would seek to gain firmer 
control over the machinery of economic planning. It has been shown that the work 
of the Central Economic Planning Staff did become incorporated into the Treasury 
machinery of financial control. However, this transformation was only possible 
because the official Treasury’s views about economic planning chimed with those 
of the Conservative Government.
Neutrality
Another factor that helped to shape the Treasury view was the desire for 
political neutrality. One aspect of this has been identified by Roger Middleton as 
‘the fear, in some Hayekian sense, that since political parties and pressure groups 
always violate general economic rules, acceptance of the policy prescripts of the 
‘new’[i.e. Keynesian] economics would create the opportunity for politicians to 
interfere with the operation of market forces for the benefit of particular groups, 
this development culminating in the situation in which politicians, for electoral 
purposes, would be forced to pursue policies against the long-term public 
interest.’19
The belief in neutrality had even deeper roots than Middleton suggests, 
officials feared that the adoption of a more positive role in the economy would 
serve to undermine the authority of the State. This concern could be seen in the
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official reaction to the use of physical controls which many officials believed would 
weaken the State’.s authority through the weight of administration and the degree 
of discrimination involved in their operation. This was clearly demonstrated by the 
reaction to the idea that certain departments should be seen primarily as 
production authorities with responsibilities to particular industries. This view, held 
in the Machinery of Government Division of the Treasury, was based on the idea 
that physical controls had an important long-term role in economic management. 
However, Norman Brook, at this time Cabinet Secretary, in his response to this 
idea showed the importance of the philosophy of neutrality to the civil service in 
general. He argued that the importance of physical controls was receding and that 
‘we could perhaps get away from the idea that production authorities are to brood 
in a general and aimless way over the activities of the industries for which they are 
“responsible”. He went on that there was too much in the report on production 
authorities that reflected the dictum that ‘“the official in Whitehall knows best” what 
is good for industty.’20
Political neutrality as a mode of operation also helps to explain why 
monetary policy was favoured over Budgetary policy in the Treasury as a method 
of economic management. Monetary policy, especially the use of the Bank Rate, 
was not open to the same degree of political manipulation as Budgetary policy. 
However, the Treasury was originally attracted to the idea of cheap money, 
principally because the Exchequer stood to benefit from it. The collapse of the gold 
standard in 1931 allowed the Chancellor to initiate the period of cheap money in 
1932. At the end of the war the National Debt enquiry, chaired by the outgoing 
Permanent Secretary to the Treasury Sir Richard Hopkins, favoured Keynes’ own 
arguments for the retention of cheap money. The final report argued that in fixing 
nominal interest rates attention should be given ‘perhaps especially to the burden 
of interest charges on the Exchequer and other State funds and on local 
authorities.’21
It was not until 1950 that the Treasury became convinced by the Bank of 
England’s case for the reactivation of the Bank Rate. The use of the Bank Rate 
appealed to the Treasury not only because of its neutrality but also because 
discussion of monetary policy centred on its psychological effect and was therefore
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easily understood by Treasury generalists. Robert Hall wrote in 1959 that amongst 
officials ‘there is still a tendency to speak in magical rather than scientific terms of 
the use of interest rates and monetary controls generally.’22 The use of the Bank 
Rate was also attractive to the Treasury because it represented an alternative to 
the use of direct credit controls and to physical controls in general. Bank Rate 
policy represented a way for the Treasury to play a greater role in the economy 
without radically altering its operating procedures. Given all these considerations 
it is significant that it took the Treasury so long to advocate reactivation of the 
Bank Rate, it suggests that in this as in other areas of policy the Treasury was 
principally guided by the burden on the Exchequer.
Perception of Past Events
The experience of continental inflation in the 1920s helped to create a 
perception within the Treasury that politicians could not be trusted. Also important 
was ‘the experience of inflation during and after the [First World] War, which was 
put down to political chicanery rather than to the war. Out of it arose the moral 
denunciation of the “managed currency” of 1914-25 and the dangerous myth that 
a gold standard like the one of 1925-31 was automatic, and not as it in fact was 
also “managed.”’23 Senior figures in the postwar Treasury spent their formative 
years in a Treasury where these views were prevalent. For officials fixed rate 
convertibility held the promise of an external regulator on the activities of 
politicians. This consideration was behind Lord Bradbury’s recommendation to 
Churchill to return to the Gold-Standard in 1925. He argued that ‘the Gold 
Standard was knave-proof. It could not be rigged for political or even more 
unworthy reasons.’24
After the war senior officials saw the restoration of fixed rate convertibility 
and the establishment of a one-world economy as crucial to bringing what they 
saw as economic reality home to ministers. This official view was brought sharply 
into focus by the devaluation crisis of 1949. For officials devaluation represented 
a soft-option, especially as ministers saw it as an alternative to deflationary 
measures. Although the Americans had urged a realignment of currencies in order 
to encourage more trade in dollar goods, officials feared that it would have the
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opposite effect. Devaluation without deflation would allow ministers to continue 
their polices of high spending and taxation and therefore further postpone the 
fulfilment of the conditions necessary to secure convertibility.25
Ministers were acutely aware of the pressure from officials on convertibility 
and multilateralism. Gaitskell recorded in his diary that Treasury officials ‘use 
phrases like “one-world economy and two-world economy” and imply that the 
choice lies between a kind of “Schachtian autarchy on the one hand and 
beneficent multilateralism on the other.”’26 At a meeting of the Economic Policy 
Committee in July-1948 the Prime Minister took the step of asking officials to leave 
the room. Dalton recorded in his diary that Cripps then told the Committee that ‘he 
did not trust his own officials and advisers. They were all really, by reason of their 
training and their belief in a “free economy” much more in agreement with the 
Americans than with British ministers. They would honestly try to carry out their 
instructions, but they would find it difficult.’27 Attlee shared these doubts and told 
Dalton that he was ‘being served up from the Treasury and the Bank arguments 
which he thinks are fallacious on evil effects of our public expenditure.’28
It is surprising that senior officials were prepared to return to a floating 
pound in 1951 given the Treasury’s preference for fixed rate convertibility. 
However, senior officials such as Edward Bridges, saw the prospect of immediate 
convertibility, even at a floating rate, as a way of shackling ministers into making 
unpopular decisions. This was made clear in the debate surrounding the 
preparation of the Collective Approach in the Autumn of 1952. Bridges wrote to 
Butler that ‘apart altogether from the precise method in which we manage our 
external financial policy there is no chance of our getting affairs of this country on 
an even keel and keeping them there, .unless we adopt a much more stringent 
internal economic policy... Since I feel this so strongly I am naturally reluctant to 
see the issue of a strict internal policy presented to ministers as something which 
they have got to swallow if they are to accept convertibility. I regard it as essential 
to salvation in any case. And I want to see it so presented [emphasis in original].’29 
This quotation reveals Bridges’ distrust of politicians
Their interwar experiences made it difficult for senior Treasury officials to 
adapt to the postwar acceptance of Keynesian economic principles and of
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Government planning. The conversion of almost every economist in the country 
to Keynesian tools of analysis was a process that came to its height during the war 
years. By 1945 even those who had been sworn opponents of Keynes, like Lionel 
Robbins, were convinced for a time by him.30 The Treasury old guard had ‘almost 
been burnt out by the war.’ They were not economists by training and thought that 
‘what planning was doing, particularly the Keynesian approach, was undercutting 
sound Budgetary policy.’31
As a result of this there was a clear generation gap between the pre-1939 
and the post-1945 intake of civil servants. Robert Hall noted that ‘broadly 
speaking, all the top people in the Treasury have been ones who formed their 
ideas in the pre-war period, except Plowden and me. Of course I formed mine then 
but being an economist at Oxford I grew up so to speak in a Keynesian 
atmosphere. Rowan is six years younger than I am but I do not think he is what I 
would call modern in his views... Bridges tried hard to understand and he was in 
many ways a very enlightened man - his main trouble was that he tried to do too 
much and couldn’t really take on new ideas at all when he had so little time to use 
even the ones he started with. Eady was rather mad, B. Gilbert very lazy and didn’t 
care. Brittain was a very nice man in many ways but he was essentially someone 
to carry out other people’s ideas. E. Compton has tried very hard recently but 
never understood monetary theory as was very clear when we were dealing with 
Radcliffe.’32
The Second World War also had a profound effect on shaping the views of 
Treasury officials. One important perception that came out of the War was the 
importance of the relationship with America. Edward Bridges’ experiences as 
Cabinet Secretary during the War, and in particular his role in the negotiation of 
the lend-lease agreements gave him ‘an unrivalled knowledge of the changed 
position which Britain would henceforward occupy in the international community... 
This was particularly true of British relations with the United States. Bridges never 
had any doubt about the primacy of this relationship in any realistic inventory of 
British interests...’33 The granting of the American loan and Marshall Aid after the 
war only helped to reinforce this perception. As a result a view was adopted ‘that 
we must line up with the United States and provided we did that we would prevail
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and if we and the United States took the same line nobody could stop us.’34 
According to Sir Leo Pliatzky this was ‘a pretty conscious philosophy.’ This view 
helps to explain why reaction in the Treasury to the European Payments Union 
was so lukewarm and why the probable destruction of the Union by ROBOT 
caused little negative reaction. Treasury officials in this period did not perceive 
relations with Continental Europe to be important. This perception was tied up with 
those that had developed as a consequence of the instability of the 1930s. It was 
felt that as Britain had in the nineteenth century, America now had to take the lead 
in the international economy so that free convertibility based on a system of 
multilateral payments could be established. Thus domestic economic policy would 
be tied in with external policy and the natural profligacy of politicians would be 
tamed.
The Treasury’s commitment to establishing a one-world economy brought 
it in to conflict with both their Labour and Conservative masters. In 1949 Gaitskell 
had originally doubted the point of devaluation so long as the Treasury ‘cling to 
multilateralism and convertibility as our aim.’35 When Peter Thorneycroft initiated 
a review in to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in March 1952 
the Treasury was keen to quash any suggestion that there was an alternative to 
a policy with the objective of a one world economy. The Overseas Finance Division 
was asked to provide background information ‘illustrating the course of the UK and 
Sterling Area balance of payments since the end of the war.’ for the Ministerial 
Committee carrying out Thorneycroft’s review. ‘Otto’ Clarke of the Division wrote 
to the Division’s head Leslie Rowan that ‘I would suggest that we give them 
background material in a suitable form which would set the stuff out in a way which 
pointed towards “one-world” concepts rather than away from them.’36
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Chapter 4 
The Wider Economic Policy Network
One of the most important characteristics of the Treasury was its 
detachment from the outside world. Its dealings with the external environment 
were normally through other departments which acted as its ‘eyes, ears, and 
arms.’1 Information about financial markets was channelled to the Treasury 
through the Bank of England. Similarly, information about the conditions facing 
industry was collected by the Board of Trade, and information about the workings 
of the tax system by the Inland Revenue. D.N Chester, who was a member of the 
Central Economic Information Service and the Economic Section of the War 
Cabinet Secretariat from 1940-45, was struck by the ‘remoteness of all this policy­
making machinery from the everyday life of the people and therefore from the 
effects of many of its decisions.’2
Even though the Treasury has been relatively isolated from outside 
influences its world view is naturally conditioned by the wider institutional and 
cultural structure of which it is a part. Chester noted that senior civil servants would 
get their information from ‘official minutes and memoranda, reports of committees, 
Hansard and The Times and probably The Economist.’3 Both The Times and The 
Economist were written from a predominantly economically liberal stance. The fact 
that senior civil servants got their information from such sources particularly 
annoyed Labour Ministers. At a discussion at the Economic Policy Committee in 
January 1950 the Committee Secretary noted ‘there was a lot of talk about civil 
servants, reared in poor but honest Liberal homes who gave misguided advice to 
ministers because of their background and upbringing. The Chancellor of the 
Duchy [Dalton] felt strongly on this'point and said that officials were bound to be 
influenced not only by their environment but by the tone of the “Economist” and the 
speeches made by bank chairmen.’4
The last of these influences listed by Dalton was important. Much has been 
written about the separation of financial and industrial capital in the British system.5 
The City of London is primarily orientated towards international rather than
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domestic finance and has been politically and socially more influential than British 
industry. The City exerted a great influence on Treasury via the Bank of England 
which retained formal authority in the area of monetary policy and was responsible 
for day-to-day dealings with financial markets.
The influence of the City was bolstered by the precarious overseas finance 
position which faced British policy-makers after the war. The continuation of 
sterling as an international reserve currency put great pressure on the economy. 
Britain left the war with foreign reserves of only £250 million and overseas liabilities 
over fifteen times that.6 Officials in the Treasury and the Bank of England ‘lived in 
a state of perpetual anxiety about anything that might spark a run on the nation’s 
very limited reserves of foreign exchange.’7 The fact that these reserves were 
mostly held in countries which were part of the Sterling Area added an incentive 
for Treasury officials to see this issue in a moralistic way. Officials were liable to 
see devaluation as a default on Britain’s overseas responsibilities. Edward Bridges 
gave the 1949 devaluation the code name CALIBAN ‘in order to signal his 
detestation of the proposal.’8 The financial markets, with their external dealings, 
were naturally in favour of the defence of sterling. The Treasury was already 
predisposed to deflation in any case because of the primacy of public expenditure 
control in its thinking. As Peter Hall puts it: ‘The organisation of Whitehall was 
conducive to the formation of a consensus on the desirability of deflation over 
devaluation.’9
By contrast, industrial interests had much less influence over macro- 
economic policy. The main channel of business influence was via those 
departments responsible for the administration of economic planning through the 
use of controls. These departments, including the Board of Trade and the Ministry 
of Supply, had little influence in the networks of Budgetary, monetary, or external 
economic policy. In practice this organisational structure meant that the principal 
way in which the influence of industry was felt by administrators was through 
pressure to dismantle the system of direct controls.
The Bank of England
During the Gaitskell and Butler Chancellorships the Bank was, to the
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exclusion of all other issues, concerned by ‘the gnawing problem of sterling’s 
survival, as a reserve and trading currency, in a world that it saw ahead after 
Marshall Aid had ceased and when the commitment to Article VIII of the IMF [to 
establish external convertibility] might have to be honoured.’10 For the Bank the 
only solution to this problem was the restoration of sterling convertibility. In the 
years immediately following the disastrous leap into convertibility in 1947 the Bank 
was willing to agree to a gradual step-by-step approach to this goal. However by 
1950 the Bank began a change of heart which lead to continued demands for 
convertibility as a short-term objective.
This background helps to explain why the Bank was at best lukewarm in its 
enthusiasm for the European Payments Union which did little to solve ‘the 
continuing problem of the sterling balances and the over-extended banking 
position of the U.K.’11 It also shows the motivation behind the Bank’s desire to end 
the policy of cheap money and reactivate short-term interest rate policy. As far as 
domestic economic policy was concerned the Bank felt that it had to be brought 
back into line with external policy objectives, it therefore shared the Overseas 
Finance Division’s concerns about the level of Government spending. The Bank’s 
position was made clear in the report of the Niemeyer Committee in 1949 that 
looked into devaluation. The report concluded that ‘If therefore the time came 
when devaluation had to be considered as a practical move it would be essential, 
we feel, to aim at providing the condition in which we could hope to maintain the 
new sterling rate.’ To this end the report recommended four policy prescriptions: 
‘(a) a balanced Budget at a level which allows for the formation of new capital - in 
other words, at a figure lower than the present.
(b) no increase or a very minor increase in the pre-devaluation wage level.
(c) some reductions in home capital expenditure, particularly where it 
involves substantial demands on materials.
(d) a fairly tight monetary policy (inter alia to press out commodity stocks) 
and certainly no monetary inflation.’12
To fully understand the policy stance of the Bank it is necessary to have 
some understanding of its relationship with the City. Even by the 1950s most 
authority rested on its ‘evolved power as central banker de facto’ and not on legal
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powers granted by statute. Up until 1946 the Bank had remained in private hands, 
the 1946 Bank of England Act essentially nationalised an institution which 
depended for its authority on its prior relationship with the City. The Act ‘contained 
no provision at all for the enforcement of directives, or the punishment of 
offenders.’13
Even in the area of exchange control, where the Bank had enforceable 
statutory powers, it continued to depend on its informal relationships for 
enforcement. It administered this policy ‘often with the help of staff specially 
recruited from the banking system; often too with the active assistance of that 
system to whose members the Bank delegated much of the day-to-day work and 
on whom by virtue of the surrounding self-regulatory ethos, the Bank could rely 
provided the control itself was administered in a flexible and humane way.’14
With regard to credit policy the Bank reserved the power to direct clearing 
banks under the 1946 Act. But the Bank’s authority also continued to depend on 
its self-regulatory .heritage. The nature of this relationship made it difficult for the 
Bank to accept Gaitskell’s requests for more detailed directions to made to the 
clearing banks. As Fforde puts it: ‘Nationalisation increased the power of the 
authorities in the field of credit policy while in practice reducing self-regulatory 
authority that the Bank might otherwise have wielded in that area. The result was 
an unhappy ambiguity, almost a degree of pretence and make-believe, which did 
little to enhance the Bank’s relationship with the banking side of the City or its 
relationship with the Treasury.’15
It can therefore be seen that the Bank favoured certain policy prescriptions 
to protect its relationship with the City and to strengthen its authority which was 
endangered by the amount of leakage encountered under exchange control. The 
Bank feared that more formal enforcement might cause its relationship with the 
City ‘to degenerate into an unimaginative bureaucratic machine beset by rival 
lawyers interpreting the text of innumerable orders in different ways.’16 As 
exchange control over non-resident transactions became increasingly unreliable 
after 1948, despite the tightening of controls, the Bank began to see the 
restoration of convertibility as the only practical solution to the problem.
The nature of the Bank’s relationship with the City also helps to explain why
it wanted to restore flexibility to the Bank Rate. Apart from the progress this would 
represent towards the goal of convertibility, it would also ‘restore the Bank’s control 
over the money market and hence its pre-war position in the British financial 
system.’17
The Governor
Cameron Cobbold succeed Lord Catto as Governor of the Bank in 1949 
and remained Governor until his retirement in 1961.1 Cobbold’s duties as Governor 
meant that he had less time to spend on questions of external finance than he had 
as deputy Governor. However, he played a central role in domestic monetary 
policy. One of the central features here was ‘the continuing primacy of the 
Governor, supported by the Court, as the person through whom policy decisions 
were finally determined between the Bank and the Treasury and through whom 
requests were debated and agreed with the Bank.’18 In this field Cobbold strove to 
defend as much of the Bank’s independence as possible. This stance was 
reflected in his evidence to the Radcliffe Committee, he stated that ‘in matters like 
Bank Rate and Interest Rates and credit policy, the initiative rests with the Bank 
of England, and initiative would normally come from the Bank of England.’19
Monetary Policy
The structure of the machinery in the Bank devoted to domestic monetary 
policy was largely unaffected by the institutional reforms instigated by Norman in 
the second half of his Governorship. Domestic monetary policy ‘had become 
relatively inactive after 1932 and had not required supporting with much new 
organisation in the bank or with additional senior staff.’20 The normal practice within 
the Bank in formulating monetary policy recommendations was for the Governor
1 Cameron Cobbold: born in 1904 and educated at Eton and went to King’s College 
Cambridge in 1923. However ‘academic life did not offer the challenge he was seeking’ and he 
left after only one year. His skill as manager of an insurance company in Milan ‘in unravelling 
the tangled affairs of a failed Italian bank came to the notice of Montagu Norman... At 
Norman’s invitation he joined the Bank in 1933 and rapid advancement followed.’
In 1938 he was made one of the four executive directors appointed to the court. As deputy 
Governor from 1945 he was heavily involved in the negotiations that preceded the 
nationalisation of the Bank in 1946. [Peter Taylor in C.S. Nicholls(ed): The Dictionary of 
National Biography 1986-1990. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, p.79.]
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to call for policy advice from members of the small home finance team. For the 
most part, the Governor adamantly disallowed prior discussion by his officials with 
Treasury officials except ‘at technical level.’ The Governor would argue the Bank’s 
case personally with the Chancellor or the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury 
‘on occasion making what technical milage he could out of the Bank’s formal 
position and his own public status.’21
The leading official on the home side was Kenneth Peppiatt who was Chief 
Cashier until February 1949 and then Home Finance Director. Peppiatt was ‘a man 
of long experience in the gilt-edged and money markets, where his skills and 
judgement were undoubtedly good. He was, in addition, attached to 
straightforward principles of anti-inflationary debt management that were probably 
derived from the experience of European currency disorders following the First 
World War. These principles emphasised the need to avoid undue reliance on 
floating debt, a version of the ‘printing press’, as a source of funds for the 
Exchequer.’ However, although Peppiatt was able to advise on the market 
implications of a change in interest rates he ‘would never have regarded himself 
as capable of arguing out a particular monetary policy in analytic terms with the 
university educated mandarins in the Treasury.’ As a result he disliked attending 
meetings at the Treasury and preferred to ‘deal with his customer by 
correspondence or over lunch in Threadneedle Street.’22
Peppiatt’s working methods reflected the philosophy of the Bank at the time 
that its influence was not dependent on economic expertise. Indeed ‘there were 
those too who felt not only that they could get along quite well without professional 
economic advice but also that preserving the skills and influence of the Bank in the 
post-war era would depend overwhelmingly on market expertise, City intelligence, 
or skill with overseas financial diplomacy rather than an ability in applied 
economics.’23 Although Lucius Thompson-Macausland, Adviser to the Governors, 
was a self-taught economist and Sir Humphrey Mynors, an Executive Director of 
the Bank who became Deputy Governor in 1954, was a professional one, they had 
no fixed role and the Statistics Office was at this time employed on balance of 
payments work. The Bank’s monetary policy recommendations were based 
primarily on financial market conditions rather than on an understanding, in terms
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of monetary economics, of their impact on economic activity.
The Bank’s method of operating had an impact on the reception of its 
advice in the Treasury, especially during the Gaitskell Chancellorship. Although the 
Bank was able to block detailed directions being given to the clearing banks, it was 
unable to persuade Gaitskell to reactivate short-term interest rate policy. It was 
only after Butler became Chancellor and the Bank Rate was reactivated that the 
Bank began to play a greater role again in monetary policy. However, the paucity 
of relationships beneath the Governor level continued and contributed to a lack of 
understanding between the Treasury and the Bank over the uses of Bank Rate 
policy. By 1955 the Treasury and the Bank were at cross purposes with the Bank 
insisting that an increase in the Bank Rate be accompanied by further moves to 
convertibility.24 •
External Economic Policy
The most important official on the external side was George Bolton. 
Although he was not he highest ranking official in this area he acquired ‘a personal 
ascendancy’ due in part to Cobbold’s responsibilities elsewhere and to the fact that 
Siepmann, his senior college had ‘never fully recovered from the ordeal of 1947.’ 
Bolton’s influence was also enhanced by his method of operating. He had ‘little 
taste for operating through working parties and committee. Instead, with his gifted 
turn of phrase, he liked discharging provocative written salvoes in various 
directions, modifying his views only in the light of the rather random responses that 
he got.’25 Bolton was appointed as an Executive Director in March 1948. Robert 
Hall found him to be ‘essentially an operator and one who takes snap decisions by 
instinct and finds any reasons that come into his head to justify them. This makes 
him a baffling opponent as he will reverse his view and apparently his reading of 
history and his logic, in a very short period and seem, and I think be, quite 
unaware that he has done so...’26
The close relationship between the external side of the Bank and the 
Overseas Finance Division of the Treasury, combined with Bolton’s working 
methods and Cobbold’s preoccupation with other matters meant that Bolton’s 
ideas ‘were seldom subject to rigorous or systematic criticism in Threadneedle
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Street.’27 Indeed, Bolton’s involvement in the formulation of the ROBOT plan 
shows that he was prepared to detach himself from the policy goals of the Bank 
as a whole. Cobbold was horrified at the emphasis on floating in the original plan 
which threatened to undermine the international status of sterling.28
Relationship with the Chancellor
Gaitskell did not think highly of the Governor or the Bank of England in 
general.29 His Chancellorship marked a low point in the Bank’s relationship with the 
Treasury. While Gaitskell had tried to impose more direct methods of credit control 
on the Bank it in turn had tried to persuade him to reactive short term interest rate 
policy. The resulting stalemate derived from an oversight in the 1946 Bank of 
England Act that reserved the right to give directions to clearing banks to the Bank 
of England, this had not been the intention at the time of the Act and Dalton 
remained under the impression that the Treasury had the power of direction. 
Curiously, Gaitskell told the Radcliffe committee that this had not been ‘a live 
question’ during his Chancellorship although he did think that the Treasury should 
have this power. Instead Gaitskell saw the problems involved in the relationship 
between the Treasury and the Bank in more general terms than just powers of 
direction.
Gaitskell told the Radcliffe Committee that when he was Chancellor the 
intention of the Act ‘was not entirely carried out.’ Not because of anything wrong 
with the Act itself, ‘but because I do not think the relationship between the Bank 
and the Treasury had settled down.’ What he personally wanted to see, and what 
he believed to be the intention of the Act was ‘that under modern conditions the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer must be supreme,... there can be no question of any 
independent policy of the Bank of England.’30
Gaitskell noted that the Chancellor had not been supreme during his term 
in office. The Bank had regarded itself as ‘a buffer between the Treasury and the 
rest of the City generally and preferred all relationships between the Treasury and 
the City to go through the Bank.’ Gaitskell regarded it ‘as desirable that the 
Chancellor, at any rate on occasions, should have pretty close relations with the 
clearing banks.’ Gaitskell also perceived as a problem the fact that the Bank was
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involved ‘in a number of highly technical operations which most people outside the 
Bank do not begin to understand at all...’ This was a problem because ‘the day to 
day operations of the Bank are often of enormous importance... open market 
policy, for instance, obviously may be very significant for the economy, but you 
would be describing it I think fairly as a day to day matter.’31
Gaitskell wanted the Chancellor to have ‘both expert advice and at the 
same time a relationship of complete confidence between himself and the people 
giving the advice.’ He thought that the relationship between the Chancellor and the 
Bank was too remote, ‘the officials are a long way away... when I was Chancellor 
only the Governor in the ordinary course of events, would see the Chancellor 
himself.’ The formality of the relationship also meant that Treasury officials, with 
some exceptions, perhaps found themselves in difficulties I think in arguing with 
the Bank on the technical field.’ This itself lead to difficulties. ‘Supposing you take 
the decision to support the market for transferable sterling. Here is a matter of 
enormous significance, but it is also a matter on which I think any layman would 
find it extremely hard to make up his mind without hearing the whole thing argued 
out, and without perhaps having people in the Treasury who have sufficient 
experience of the operations in the foreign exchange market to give sufficiently 
expert advice puts the Chancellor in a very difficult position.’32
Gaitskell saw a ‘much greater mixing up of the staffs of the Treasury and 
the Bank’ to be the answer to this problem. He felt the relationship would be 
improved if it were normal for Treasury officials to spend five or even ten years in 
the Bank and for Bank officials to have some experience of the Treasury. Gaitskell 
agreed with Radcliffe’s summation of his ‘general approach’ to the Bank ‘that it 
should be as like a government department as the circumstances which are rather 
peculiar to it permit.’ However, he went further than this and likened the Bank to 
the Inland Revenue. He could not see the Governor acquiring the status of an 
adviser on the Governments general economic policy. Instead he thought of the 
Bank ‘much more as the executor of government policy. Of course any executor 
of this degree of importance is an adviser as well, as the Chairman of the Board 
of Inland Revenue is an adviser on what sort of taxes you should levy and can levy 
and so on, but he'does not determine the policy of the Chancellor; he makes his
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contribution in his own field, so I think the Governor of the Bank would.’33
Butler’s relations with the Bank were rather better than Gaitskell’s. In 
October 1951, when Butler agreed to a V2% rise in interest rates he also discussed 
relations between the Bank and the Treasury with Cobbold. They agreed that they 
should have regular meeting that could be supplemented as required.34 However, 
relations between Butler and the Bank did sour in the summer of 1955 when the 
Bank begun to interfere with the parity of sterling.
The differences between Butler’s and Gaitskell’s understanding of the 
relationship between the Treasury and the Bank of England was clearly 
demonstrated by Butler’s evidence to the Radcliffe Committee. Unlike Gaitskell, 
he had experienced ‘a considerable degree of informality in dealing with those 
representatives of the Bank, chiefly the Governor and the deputy Governor, and 
the head of exchange control, whom I knew quite well.’ He thought that this should 
be the case ‘because you see you are dealing with matters of common concern, 
and it is essential that there should be understanding and agreement before they 
are carried out.’35
He was thoroughly dismissive of Gaitskell’s idea that the Bank should be 
completely subservient to the Treasury. Instead he saw the relationship as ‘a 
partnership because I think there are things that the Bank can do that the Treasury 
cannot, and thing that the Treasury can do that the Bank cannot. The Bank is more 
instinctively intuitive and the Treasury more instinctively deliberative... therefore 
these two partners rather supplement each other and the management of the day 
to day market, which is the fundamental job of the Bank... is a slightly different 
sphere from the more deliberative long-term policy aspect of the Treasury.’36
Butler thought that a change in the relationship would be disastrous 
because ‘no Government and Chancellor of the Exchequer either could or ought 
to think that they could run a thing like the Bank of England. I do not think first of 
all they have the expert knowledge, and above all, which I think is the most 
important in the modern study of Whitehall, have they the time. And as certain of 
the operations of the Bank, especially in dealing with the market, require in my 
opinion a lifelong experience of things with which the heads of Government and 
civil servants are totally unacquainted and totally unsuited to deal with, I think you
94
have got to have a marriage between two different types of institution, and if you 
have made one literally subordinate to the other I think you would lose part of the 
independence that you get from a happy marriage.’37
Sources of Information
The main sources of information for the Bank were the financial markets 
and institutions of the City of London. Most of the senior staff of the Bank were 
drawn from the City and the Bank continued to enjoy a close relationship with it. 
The Bank did not have responsibility for gathering business statistics, this was left 
to the Board of Trade. Cobbold was clearly uncertain of the nature of the 
relationship between the Bank and the Board of Trade when he was asked about 
it by the Radcliffe Committee. He said that ‘I think our economic advisors would be 
in close touch and have full access to the Board of Trade figures. On questions of 
high policy we tend to work with the Treasury, but from the information point of 
view, I think we do get a lot of information from the Board of Trade.’38 During the 
Gaitskell and Butler Chancellorships the information coming from the Board of 
Trade was not as yet detailed enough to have been much help in the making of 
credit policy. When Frank Lee was asked by the Radcliffe Committee, in January 
1958, whether the Bank had shown great curiosity in the results the Board was 
producing on the liquidity of Business, he replied that ‘It really would not be 
possible as yet. We are in our very early stages, as you know, and we published 
our first results of this during this month.’39
The Board of Trade
Keith Middlemas has written that the Board of Trade ‘believed in free trade 
as the ark of covenant since the mid-nineteenth century.’40 In December 1943 the 
Board had routed the bilaterialists in the Cabinet. Representing the Board’s view, 
Richard Law argued that ‘there is no mechanical device by which we can ensure 
that the rest of the world will maintain the population of these islands at a standard 
of living higher than which it is entitled to by its activity. That would depend on the 
energy and skill of its people.’41
The logic behind the Board’s free trade philosophy was expounded by
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Frank Lee, who was Permanent Secretary at the Board between 1951 and 1960, 
in his evidence to the Radcliffe Committee. He told the Committee that The Board 
are of the opinion that, when restrictions of any kind have to be applied in order to 
influence the economy, measures of wide and general application are preferable 
to selective measures of narrow application; the latter, by their nature, discriminate 
sharply against particular kinds of production, and may thereby adversely affect 
the growth and pattern of investment and the channels of trade.’42
Oliver Franks, who had served as Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of 
Supply between 1945 and 1946, asked Lee if he meant by this that ‘the Board of 
Trade were adhering to their traditional attitude and building in natures way or 
“laissez-faire”, or whatever we call it and that if there are particular restrictions 
imposed by government authority, of whatever kind, these obviously point by point 
cut into the ordinary development of things.’ Lee did not dissent from what Franks 
said and added that ‘in my judgement the nearer you can get to that natural 
development of the economy the better.’43
The Board’s view was shaped by practical as well as theoretical 
considerations. It enjoyed a close relationship to industry. In a lecture on the 
subject of the Board of Trade in 1958 Lee said of this relationship that ‘What we 
do, in greater or less degree, is to keep in close touch with the industries 
concerned, to get to know their problems, personalities, structure, likely 
developments, to constitute ourselves their main link with the Government 
machine, and to be prepared to give them advice and help on export issues, tariff 
problems, and the like.’44
Adherence to the administratively neutral doctrine of laissez-faire was in the 
interests of the Board. Discrimination against one industry or another threatened 
to undermine the Board’s authority. This was particularly true of the administration 
of physical controls which involved an army of staff and changed the nature of the 
relationship of the Board with industry from one of facilitation to one of compulsion. 
Producer groups were hostile to extension of state power and lobbied for the 
abolition of controls.45 Frank Lee’s predecessor as Permanent Secretary, John 
Woods ‘gave much thought to the ways of unscrambling the tangle of controls, for 
he greatly feared that public service would be permanently weakened by the
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weight and complexity of the bureaucratic machine.’46
Organisation
The introduction of economic controls during the war and the retention of 
many of them by the postwar Labour Government greatly increased the role of the 
Board of Trade ih the economy. In 1938 the staff of the Board had numbered 
2,400, by the time Stafford Cripps became President of the Board in 1945 this 
number had increased to 15.000.47 Even with the dismantlement of these controls 
the Board still played an important role in domestic credit policy through its 
responsibility for hire-purchase restrictions.
The Board also played the role of production authority for all industries 
which had not been assigned to other departments, among the most important of 
these were textiles, chemicals, rubber and paper.48 The fact that other 
departments, particularly the Ministry of Supply, also had major industrial 
responsibilities diminished the weight given to these interest in government as no 
department spoke for industry as a whole.
In his lecture on the Board of Trade in 1958, Frank Lee divided its work 
under four headings:
‘(a) The Patent Office and the Statistics Division.
(B) the ‘old’ regulatory division, dealing with Company Law, insurance, 
bankruptcy, standards and the like;
(c) the ‘Home Divisions and their activities; and
(d) the ‘Overseas’ Divisions and the Trade Commissioners service...’49
Of these divisions the most important in terms of general economic policy
were those dealing with overseas trade. The overseas side was divided into five 
divisions: There is a small, almost specialist, division which deals with what may 
be called the refinements of commercial policy (the General Agreements on Tariffs 
and Trade, the negotiation of commercial treaties, our policy in regard to 
international commodity and cartel problems and so on)- and four other divisions 
which are concerned, on a ‘country’ basis, with the general work of commercial 
relations overseas.’50
In spite of the clear connection between the issues involved in trade and
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wider questions of external economic policy the overseas side of the Board was 
largely excluded from the network of external economic policy-making by the 
Overseas Finance Division of the Treasury. Although both institutions shared the 
same liberal values, O.F wanted to maintain its control of external policy advice. 
When the President of the Board of Trade Peter Thorneycroft instigated a review 
of Commercial Policy in 1952, Rowan, the Head of O.F, sought to stop the Board 
of Trade looking at wider questions of external economic policy such as 
convertibility. He described these wider questions as 'our business and not theirs'. 
Instead he asked ‘Otto' Clarke to come up with several different hypotheses for the 
review to work from.51
The President of the Board of Trade 
Harold Wilson
Harold Wilson served as President of the Board of Trade from September 
1947 until his resignation from the Government in April 1951. Thirty-one at the time 
of his appointment, Wilson was a decade younger than the rest of the Cabinet.52 
He had already amassed a great deal of experience in government having joined 
the civil service at the outbreak of war; in 1943 he was made director of economics 
and statistics at the Ministry of Fuel and Power.
The similarities in Wilson and Gaitskell’s experience probably account for 
some similarities in how they approached their responsibilities as ministers. Both 
were trained economists who had worked as officials and both had the reputation 
of being overly concerned by detail. Raymond Streat, the Cotton Board Chairman, 
came to the conclusion that Wilson would ‘be all right if he does not entirely forget 
big things by allowing himself to be preoccupied with a million small ones.’53 
However, Wilson appears to have enjoyed a more relaxed relationship with his 
officials at the Board than Gaitskell ever did at the Treasury.54 Wilson concentrated 
on a few important policy areas including regional policy; the creation of the new 
Monopolies Commission; and the negotiations surrounding the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade. He left the day-to-day business of the Department to his 
Permanent Secretary Sir John Woods.55
Peter Thorneycroft
Appointed by Churchill when the Conservative’s returned to power in 
October 1951, Peter Thorneycroft was to serve as President of the Board of Trade 
for over five years. His only previous experience of Government was in Churchill’s 
brief ‘caretaker’ administration of May 1945, in which he served as Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Ministry of War Transport. He did not serve in the leader’s 
committee - the forerunner of the Shadow Cabinet - while the Conservatives were 
in Opposition, probably because of his decision in December 1945 to defy the 
party whip and vote against the American Loan Agreement.56
Thorneycroft himself recalled that ‘the two broad strategic things, to move 
away from imperial preference and the abortive move for Europe were born inside 
the Board of Trade. By that I mean by Sir Frank Lee, myself and the Deputy 
Secretaries who were all first class.’ Thorneycroft regarded the Department ‘as the 
finest I ever served in.’57
In Butler’s opinion ‘Lee really made Thorneycroft. Lee of course was about 
three times the intellectual stature of Thorneycroft.’ However, Thorneycroft was 
able to put a case across, and when he was briefed by Lee it was a case of ‘a 
young advocate being briefed by the best civil servant.’58 But Thorneycroft was 
more than just an advocate for Lee’s ideas. While in Opposition he had taken a 
close interest in trade policy and was the only Conservative member to fully 
welcome the G.A.T.T agreement. Thorneycroft argued that in international trade 
everyone should be bound by ‘the same rules of the game. We ought to lay down 
the rules of the game.'59 Thorneycroft’s policy as President closely corresponded 
with this position.
The Permanent Secretary
Sir John Woods was Permanent Secretary at the Board of Trade from 1943 
to 1951.2 Woods was succeeded as Permanent Secretary by Frank Lee who
2 Sir John Woods: born in 1895 and educated at Christ’s Hospital. He went straight 
from school to the army in 1914. In 1916 he was very severely wounded in the leg. After being 
invalided out of the army in 1918 he attended Balliol College Oxford and then joined the 
Treasury. He served as Principal Private Secretary to both Neville Chamberlain and John 
Simon. In 1943 he was appointed Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Production and in 
1945 moved to the Board of Trade. Wood’s career was hampered by his leg injury, which later
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stayed at the Board of Trade until his appointment as joint Permanent Secretary 
to the Treasury in I960.3 Lee had joined the Supply side of the Treasury in 1940 
and in 1944 he went to Washington as deputy head of the Treasury delegation. He 
became closely associated with Keynes in the negotiations over the end of lend- 
lease and the British loan agreement. He had a good relationship with Keynes and 
‘was able to deal with him on equal terms.’60 Lee’s appointment as Permanent 
Secretary to the Board of trade followed three years as Permanent Secretary a the 
Ministry of Food.
Lee was judged by all those who worked with him to be an outstanding civil 
servant. ‘Apart from an insatiable capacity for work, he was lucid and persuasive 
in argument, and had good personal relations with his staff, his colleagues in other 
departments, and his ministers who were generally disposed to take his advice. 
His understanding of Americans and their ways was profound; in return Americans 
admired and liked him, as did his Commonwealth colleagues, and this was a great 
help in his negotiations.’ His one great fault as an administrator was ‘a 
temperamental inability to delegate; he often drove himself too hard and his staff 
too lightly.’61
Lee was the first senior civil servant to perceive the growing importance to 
Britain of Europe and the declining importance of the Commonwealth. According 
to Sir Leo Pliatzky ‘Frank Lee was responsible for producing a revolution in that 
attitude.’62
The Ministry of Supply
Attlee’s decision of October 1945 to merge the wartime Ministry of Aircraft 
Production with the Ministry of Supply created a leviathan of a department, 
employing over 100,000 people, responsible for the sponsorship of all heavy
required forty-five surgical operations, and later by the loss of an eye due to an accident 
caused by his injuries. In 1951 he made the decision to retire from the service, although he 
was only fifty-six. [Norman Kipping in E.T. Williams and C.S. Nicholls(eds.): The Dictionary of 
National Biography 1961-1970. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981.
3 Frank Lee: born 1903, he won a scholarship to Brentwood School and then another 
to Downing College Cambridge where he read English and History, gaining a first in both. He 
entered the Colonial Office in 1926 and spent two years as district officer in Nyasaland. [Lord 
Sherfield in Lord Blake and C.S. Nicholls(eds.): The Dictionary of National Biography 1971- 
1980. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986.]
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industry. The departmental responsibilities included policy for the aircraft industry; 
atomic energy; the nationalisation and denationalisation of the steel industry; the 
manufacture in Government owned factories of goods for the civil market; 
facilitation of the transition to peacetime export objectives of the entire engineering 
industry and the Korean war rearmament programme.63
Although the Ministry lost some power in July 1951, when responsibility for 
raw materials was transferred to a new Ministry of Materials, it was the 
Conservative’s decontrol programme that led to the systematic removal the 
Ministries responsibilities. In January 1954 responsibility for Atomic Energy passed 
to the Lord President who was given responsibility for the new Atomic Energy 
Authority. In July 1955 responsibility for iron, steel, engineering and non-ferrous 
metal industries were transferred to the Board of Trade. From then until its 
abolition in 1959 the Ministry of Supply was reduced to a department for aircraft, 
electronic and light metal industries in addition to defence provision.64
Although it lacked a minister of Cabinet rank, the Ministry of Supply 
continued to play an important role in economic policy-making until its main 
responsibilities were transferred to other Departments. After the Conservatives 
came to power the Ministry played an important role in finding ways to transfer 
production of metal-using industries to the export market. The Ministry also played 
an important role in cutting defence expenditure.
The policy stance of the Ministry of Supply was informed by the same liberal 
values that were found in the rest of Whitehall. Although the Ministry gained its 
power from its sponsorship of heavy industry this did not prevent it from believing 
that most of these functions would become redundant as the economy returned 
to peacetime conditions. The departmental view was expressed by Sir Archibald 
Rowlands, its Permanent Secretary from 1946 to 1953, in response to the 
suggestion that the Government should be reorganised to reflect the primary 
responsibility of many departments as ‘Production Authorities’ for particular 
industries. Although the power of the Ministry of Supply would have been 
enhanced by this suggestion Rowlands argued that ‘many of the present contacts 
of departments with industry were vestigial - survivals from the wartime system of 
controls. Apart from material shortages, contacts between government [sic] would
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continue only so long as industry was willing to maintain them.’65 Rowlands 
successor as Permanent Secretary, Sir James Helmore, devoted much of his 
energy to the task of transferring the functions of the Ministry to other 
departments.’66
Conclusion
It has been seen that the structure of the wider economic policy network 
helped to shape the Treasury’s economically liberal view of the world. The nature 
of the Treasury’s relationship with the Bank of England and of the Bank with the 
City meant that policy was made predominately within the context of information 
from financial markets. This structure focussed the decision-making process on 
questions of international finance. The focus on financial markets helped to shape 
the Treasury’s view that deflation was preferable to devaluation and that progress 
towards full convertibility of the pound and a multilateral trading system were over­
arching policy objectives.
The impact of the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Supply on economic 
policy-making was marginal when compared to the Bank of England. The nature 
of both of these departments relationship with industry was to increase pressure 
to remove physical controls from the economy and to get as close as possible to 
a policy of laissez faire.
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Chapter 5 
The Chancellors
In an interview given to The Times in 1976, after he had left the civil service, 
William Armstrong suggested that ‘the biggest and most persuasive influence’ of 
the civil service ‘is in setting the framework within which questions of policy are 
raised. We, while I was in the Treasury, had a framework of the economy basically 
neo-Keynesian.’1 It has been shown that the structure of economic advice was 
more pluralistic than Armstrong’s comment indicates. In particular, a neo- 
Keynesian framework had not yet developed in the period covered by the Gaitskell 
and Butler Chancellorships. There existed a sharp division between Treasury 
Mandarins, who still thought primarily in terms of financial control, and the 
economists of the Economic Section, who were far more Keynesian in their 
thinking. The different perspectives of the Chancellor’s main advisers meant that 
they did not all speak with the same voice. Furthermore, the framework within 
which policy advice was given was much less dependent on econometric analysis 
than it was to become. It was easier for a Chancellor with general intellectual 
ability, but without economic expertise, to understand and question economic 
analysis reliant on written argument rather than equations.
However, even if the framework in the early 1950s was not as rigid as it was 
to become, the Treasury’s ability to set it did represent a major constraint on the 
Chancellor’s room for manoeuvre. It has been shown that this framework was 
conditioned by the values that developed in the Treasury as a result of its 
traditional responsibilities; by the structure of the main economic policy 
communities and by their relationship with the wider policy network. What needs 
to be explained is how Gaitskell and Butler were able to produce such a marked 
discontinuity of policy within this framework.
There are aspects of the organisation of policy-making that encourage the 
Chancellor to take an active role. One important factor is the socialisation of civil 
servants into accepting a policy lead from ministers which acts as a countervailing 
force to the institutional view. Treasury civil servants are particularly aware of the
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fact that they needed a strong Chancellor capable of dealing with the enormous 
pressure for resources with which the Treasury has to deal.
The minister’s position is also strengthened by the fact that he is the point 
of overlap between the various institutional policy communities and ministerial 
decision-making. What strengthens the Chancellor’s position even more is the lack 
of formal aggregation of advice. The Treasury, as Kenneth Clarke has stated, is 
a very different institution to other Whitehall departments. It remains relatively 
small and the average ability of officials is high. This encourages an atmosphere 
that reminded him of an Oxbridge college - ‘lively, intellectual, relaxed.’2 Lord 
Croham found the environment in the Treasury to be friendlier than the one he had 
encountered in his previous posting at the Board of Trade, this informality was 
reflected in the fact that ‘most things were on a Christian name basis.’3 The open 
advice structure helps the Chancellor to have a better feel for the subject than he 
would have if everything had been filtered through the Deputy Secretary level with 
the result that the minister often has little idea about what the differences of 
opinion within the department are. As has been seen the policy advice structure 
during the Gaitskell and Butler Chancellorships was particularly informal.
Bruce Headey has provided a typology that can be used to classify Gaitskell 
and Butler’s involvement in policy formation.4 Headey suggests that a minister’s 
involvement falls into one of three categories. The first is the policy legitimator, 
who simply rubber-stamps the suggestions of his officials; the second is the policy 
selector and the third the policy initiator. The latter is a minister who ‘challenges 
the department’s assumptions, imposes other priorities and establishes new policy 
goals.’5
There are various factors that help to determine which of these categories 
a minister is likely to fall into. First, there are questions of policy expertise, 
personality and experience that provide him with the necessary resources to play 
an active role in policy. Second, there is the question of the origins and 
comprehensiveness of his thought; whether or not this amounts to a coherent 
package or is determined primarily by events. Third, the ministers relations with his 
officials and colleagues are important. Particularly important to a Chancellor is his 
relationship with the Prime Minister given the significance of economic policy and
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the fact that the Chancellor’s control of the purse strings is likely to set other 
ministers against him. A minister’s standing with the public and his party are also 
important factors in determining his power within the Government. The use of 
external sources of policy advice can also be important in providing a 
countervailing force to the official view. Matching Gaitskell and Butler to these 
factors allows us to see more clearly how they were both able to play a dominant 
role in the making of economic policy.
Hugh Gaitskell
Gaitskell can undoubtedly be characterised as a policy initiator while he was 
at the Treasury. His background as an economist gave him the confidence to take 
the lead in policy. He wrote his own memoranda and often took suggestions about 
their content only after he had written the first draft. He also wrote his own Budget 
speech with the exception of a few technical passages.
By the time Keynes published his General Theory in 1936, Gaitskell was 
already a long way down the path of developing his own ideas about economic 
policy. The two most important influences upon his development were Evan Durbin 
and Hugh Dalton, both of whom believed that central economic planning was the 
crucial means by which a socialist government could fulfil its economic objectives.
Michael Postan, who was a fellow lecturer of Gaitskell’s at University 
College London in the 1930s, witnessed his intellectual transformation. During his 
earliest discussions with Gaitskell in 1929 and 1930 Postan found Gaitskell’s 
socialist convictions ‘to be of the typical inter-war Oxbridge variety. They were 
couched in a language which was nothing if not radical. The words “class war”, 
“socialist revolution”, and “proletariat” rolled off his tongue easily and “middle- 
class” he used as often as not as terms of opprobrium.’6
In 1930 Evan Durbin, a friend of Gaitskell’s from his Oxford days, joined the 
staff of UCL and joined the conversations Gaitskell was having with Postan on 
economics. Postan later recalled that ‘by 1930 they [Gaitskell and Durbin] had 
already arrived at a mutual understanding which for newcomers like myself was, 
to begin with, almost impenetrable. They were, of course, too different as persons 
to agree on every subject. Evan Durbin was already set in his views, which were
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essentially those he was to hold for the rest of his life, whereas, Hugh Gaitskell 
was still very much on the move. The touch of finality in Durbin’s convictions was 
of immense value to Hugh who came to rely upon the assured, down-to-earth, 
good sense which Evan, appeared to ooze out of every pore.’7
In 1930 Gaitskell and Durbin were first introduced to Hugh Dalton by
Postan’s wife Eileen Power. Postan remembered Power and himself ‘having to 
defend ourselves, after Hugh and Evan had gone, against Dalton’s accusation of 
“hoarding” for our.exclusive use these “charming young socialists.’”8
Under the influence of Durbin and Dalton, Gaitskell moved away from his 
early near Marxist views. He came to believe that to be successful, socialist 
economics had to appeal beyond the industrial working class and to what Marx 
classified as the petit bourgeoisie. He also moved away from thinking common 
ownership held the key to a socialist economic policy to thinking that central 
planning was central. In coming to this conclusion both Gaitskell and Durbin were
influenced by Hayek’s theories on the business cycle.9
In 1930 Professor Hayek, recently appointed to the LSE, gave a series of 
lectures entitled ‘Prices and Production’ on the business cycle. Durbin almost 
certainly attended these lectures, and it is possible that Gaitskell did as well.10 
‘They were both to criticize and adapt Hayek’s analytic techniques in their own 
studies. They wanted to understand the business fluctuation which appeared to 
be endemic to the capitalist system, so that they would know how a socialist 
government could control them.’11
Hayek argued that bank credit boom would only distort the structure of 
production and create inflationary consumer demand. This was the very opposite 
of the monetary theory that Keynes had developed. ‘Hayek stood for deflation 
through automatic market forces, in direct and public opposition to Keynes’s stand 
in favour of expansion through active government intervention.’12
Hayek did not convince Gaitskell and Durbin of the sanctity of market 
forces, rather they used Hayek’s ideas to argue that direct intervention in the 
economy by the Government was the only way to fulfil socialist economic 
objectives. When the General Theory was published in 1936 neither of them was 
convinced by the argument that fiscal and monetary means were sufficient in
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themselves to ensure full employment without creating inflation, or that it could 
deal with the long-term problems of the trade cycle. When he looked back to the 
publication of the General Theory twenty years later Gaitskell recalled doubting 
whether a Keynesian policy ‘could really be made to work in a purely capitalist 
framework. Socialist economists, while avoiding dogmatism, were inclined to argue 
that the Government’s power to influence the level of demand even with full control 
of the banking system, was still too limited, and that it needed in addition to have 
some more direct control over the volume of investment. For the time being, 
however, qualifications of this kind were dwarfed in the general battle to get the 
new rational approach to monetary policy accepted.’13 Gaitskell and Durbin also 
disagreed with Keynes’ defence of private enterprise and envisaged the state 
playing a much greater role in ensuring an equitable society.1
Gaitskell and Durbin envisaged a Supreme Economic Authority (SEA) would 
be need to execute the plan of a future Labour Government. In the notes for his 
unfinished book, The Politics of Democratic Socialism, which was in part the result 
of long discussions with Gaitskell and Postan at UCL, Durbin wrote that the setting 
up of an SEA would have to be a central part of a future Labour Government’s 
programme: ‘It was crucial to prevent nationalized industries from establishing their 
own syndicalist power and to secure the co-ordination of industry and finance 
which was “the greatest advantage of planning.”... The SEA itself would be 
responsible for macroeconomic policy and for co-ordinating the policies of the 
nationalizes industries with the central plan. Its final form would emerge slowly as 
the socialized sector expanded.’14
The circumstances in which Labour formed its first majority government 
were rather different to those Gaitskell and Durbin had foreseen in the 1930s. As 
Gaitskell later recalled: ‘The Second World War... involved the use of an immense
1 Durbin wrote to Keynes to express his disbelief that he could argue ‘that one 
advantage of a laissez faire system is in the freedom it gives to certain privileged persons to 
exercise their sadistic impulses in the control of industrial workers. It is as though you argued 
that it was one advantage of possessing an Empire that we could get rid of our cruellest 
countrymen in Kenya. Free enterprise with the whip. After all, the sufferers are only black! The 
petty tyranny of the employer-employee relationship- irresponsible, hidden; without redress- is 
surely not a lovely thing? As Tawney says, the religion of inequality seems to make it possible 
for men of generous good will to forget that workmen are also men.’ [Elizabeth Durbin: New 
Jerusalems: The Labour Party and the Economics of Democratic Socialism. Routledae and 
Kegan Paul, London, 1985, p. 159.]
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array of “direct” controls on the economic activities in Britain on a far larger scale 
than the 1914-18 war. Indeed it was not just a matter of controls. The Government 
bought on public account a high proportion of all imports-especially raw materials 
and food; it placed orders for a large part of the domestic output of the country and 
though the allocation of raw materials and other controls it was able not merely to 
determine the general pattern of the economy but the details of what was to be 
imported and produced, and how it was to be consumed. For the first time Britain 
had a fully planned economy.
‘Such an immense change was bound to influence the thinking of the 
Labour Party anyhow, but the General Election victory of 1945 meant that the 
thinking had to be accompanied by urgent decisions.
There was, of course, no question of maintaining the whole war-time 
apparatus of controls... But the question remained - what controls should be 
retained, temporarily or permanently?’15 Gaitskell’s thinking on economic policy 
after the War was largely animated by this question.
Although the 1930s witnessed a profound change in Gaitskell’s economic 
ideas, there were certain aspects of his character that did not change and were to 
affect his conduct as a minister. The first of these aspects was his natural 
radicalism. Although he moved away from the near-Marxist convictions of his youth 
he remained more radical than Durbin and than many on the left of the Labour 
party who were to become his opponents. Michael Postan recalled that Gaitskell 
‘was by temperament, or rather by logic, a whole-hogger. This showed itself in his 
policy in MEW (Ministry of Economic Warfare) on blockade and neutral rights; in 
the influences he had on the 1949 devaluation, more drastic than that favoured by 
many of his colleagues; in the manner in which he chose to present his opposition 
to Clause 4; and in his final attitude to the Common Market. On all these occasions 
he was of course concerned with immediate political issues, not with final socialist 
objectives, but those who know him best would probably agree that both before 
and after 1945 the vision of equality which inspired his socialism was more intense 
and far-reaching than that of most Labour politicians.’16
Gaitskell’s tendency to take arguments to their logical conclusion is 
important to understanding his conduct after he joined the Treasury. He was by
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intellectual temperament against compromise and always saw individual policy 
decisions within the framework of his overall economic strategy. This aspect of his 
character can clearly be seen in the way he took control of policy towards 
economic controls, interest rates and convertibility of the pound.
Another important aspect of Gaitskell’s character was the essentially 
English nature of his socialism. Michael Postan recalled a conversation that he and 
Gaitskell had with R.H. Tawney in 1933. Tawney described his social work in the 
slums of pre-1914 Manchester. During the discussion Tawney said that ‘although 
that time he felt humiliated by the sight of “his fellow Englishmen” in their abject 
condition.’ When Postan commented on Tawney’s use of the words ‘fellow 
Englishmen’ rather than fellow human beings Gaitskell ‘confessed that he would 
have used the same words. He had reasoned himself into international socialism, 
but his vision of the future was one of England’s Jerusalem.’17 This aspect of 
Gaitskell’s socialism was later to find its most visible expression in his opposition 
to Britain joining the Common Market, but it found expression also during his time 
at the Treasury. One of his main concerns was that liberalisation of trade and 
movement to convertibility should not take precedence over the maintenance of 
full employment and a planned economy in Britain.
Gaitskell joined the Treasury as Minister of State for Economic Affairs in 
March 1950. His appointment was intended to take some of the strain off of the 
ailing Stafford Cripps. Cripps, however, wanted Gaitskell to ‘alternate for him’ and, 
therefore be in on everything but this would not have eased the burden of his work 
and it shows how difficult Cripps found it to give up responsibilities.18 Treasury 
officials wanted a clear demarcation of responsibility and Gaitskell was assigned 
to overseas finance and planning, two areas which he thought ‘of absorbing 
interest.’19 It had been Gaitskell’s leadership in the devaluation crisis which had 
persuaded Cripps and Attlee that he was the right man for the appointment. 
Douglas Jay later wrote that Gaitskell ‘made up his mind clearly and decisively 
what needed to be done; convinced the doubter... and supervised all the 
arrangements... [persuading] those few who knew the facts that if Cripps’ health 
failed, Hugh Gaitskell was the only possible Chancellor... [and] determining the 
subsequent leadership of the Labour Party and so much else.’20 Gaitskell
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eventually became Chancellor in October on the recommendation of Cripps 
himself and in preference to both Bevan and Wilson.
Gaitskell did not enjoy an easy relationship with his officials during his 
Chancellorship. This tension was the result of a genuine and deep-rooted conflict 
over the content and objectives of economic policy although Gaitskell’s character 
and relative inexperience of high office also had an impact.
The fact that Gaitskell’s own views about economic policy were at variance 
with the Treasury view was evident even before he joined the Treasury. Shortly 
before he was placed in charge of overseas finance Gaitskell had found it 
necessary to lay out in comprehensive terms his own thoughts about external 
financial policy. The paper he co-wrote with Jay, ‘Economic Planning and 
Liberalisation’, was presented to the Economic Policy Committee of the Cabinet. 
Their warnings about the dangers inherent in drifting towards decontrol had two 
distinct targets. They explicitly criticised officials, in particular they targeted a report 
by the Programmes Committee which stated that ‘It should be recognised that in 
the management of our general balance of payments indirect measures of control 
must play an increasing part, by anti-inflationary internal policies and a strict 
external policy.’21 Their criticisms were also implicitly directed at Cripps. Dalton 
noted in his diary that‘S.C.[Cripps] says, with a wan smile, that he supposes this 
is a vote of no confidence in the Chancellor. Of course, we all deny this. It is 
meant, we say, for guidance to official advisers, who keep on giving advice which 
runs contrary to H.M.G’s [the Government’s] view of things.’22 Gaitskell’s ideas 
remained consistent with those he had developed before the War. He told the 
committee that the United States administration might be urging the liberalisation 
of trade but ‘this should not be allowed to prejudice the planned economy of this 
country.’23
Gaitskell’s skill as a policy innovator did have a negative side. In his 
memoirs Edwin Plowden has written of his ‘occasional arrogance, indeed at times 
a pig-headedness, and a tendency to become bogged down in the detail of his 
work’.24 From his diary it is clear that Robert Hall concurred with Plowden’s 
analysis of Gaitskell’s faults. This aspect of Gaitskell’s character as a minister was 
probably the result of two parts of his earlier development. First, Gaitskell’s
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academic background meant that he tended to approach issues as a theoretical 
economist and therefore got more involved in the details of a debate than might 
have been necessary. Michael Postan has argued that Gaitskell’s interrupted 
progress as an economist ‘showed itself most in his undimmed admiration for 
economics and economists, which I suspect reflected his nostalgia for the 
profession he had to abandon. I also suspect that had he continued his progress 
as an economist he might also have developed a more sceptical attitude to 
economic argumentation.’25
Second, Gaitskell’s experience as a temporary wartime official at the 
Ministry of Economic Warfare and the Board of Trade also contributed to his 
interest in detail. During negotiations in Washington in October 1950 Hall noted 
that Gaitskell ‘will talk too much about things beneath his dignity, as if he were an 
Assistant Secretary. Yesterday, for instance, we went to see Foster and Bissell 
[ECA Administrator and Deputy Administrator] and he and Bissell talked for hours 
about the procedure on the Deputies, and the problem of assessing fair shares 
under the Nitze plan. Foster obviously did not feel that he knew, or should know, 
enough about this to be able to join in, so he just sat there bored.’26 Gaitskell’s 
fastidious nature did impair his efficiency and prolonged the decision-making 
process. It also meant that he often kept his officials waiting for long periods of 
time .27
Although Gaitskell was suspicious of his officials he also felt the need to 
impress them with his competence. When he was still Minister of State he had felt 
that as number two, officials treated him differently to the Chancellor. During the 
E.P.U. negotiations he made proposals which Treasury officials viewed as ‘too 
inflationary’ however, after a favourable American reaction he noticed a change 
in attitude. This perception says much about how he viewed his relationship with 
his officials. He noted in his diary that ‘up to then they had been reserved, at times 
resentful - never giving me the reasons for thinking things but just implying that I 
was wrong. Since then although they have not just accepted my views, they have 
been much more open and undoubtedly prepared to follow my lead’.28
Gaitskell was aware of the fact that the Treasury had its own agenda on 
various aspects of economic policy and therefore felt it necessary to set out
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general principles of policy. For example, on the issue of economic controls 
Gaitskell knew that the official view was that decontrol was inevitable. 
Consequently he wanted ‘(a) ministers to lay down the principles to be followed,
(b) an inter-departmental Committee to report on all proposals for de-control.’ Hall 
noted that This is of course part of his general line: he doesn’t want to give up any 
controls he can help and he doesn’t want to give any discretion in this field to 
either other ministers or civil servants.’29
Gaitskell’s uncertainties and suspicions explain the aloofness with which he 
treated officials and the coolness in his relations with them. Hall noted that at a 
Budget policy meeting he ‘could not help feeling that everyone was being called 
up in turn by the Chief Examiner [Gaitskell] and given a mark.’30 His behaviour 
encouraged the development of an ‘us and them’ culture within the Treasury. 
Although Gaitskell was able to play the role of a policy initiator he did so primarily 
by imposing policy from above rather than by taking the lead in policy formation 
and then delegating more detailed work to others. Given the wide divergence of 
policy views this outcome was probably unavoidable but it also meant that there 
was little understanding between Gaitskell and most of his advisers.
While Gaitskell’s performance during the devaluation crisis proved to be his 
making amongst his senior colleagues, the row over health charges in the 1951 
Budget was the greatest test of his standing in the Cabinet and the Labour Party. 
Gaitskell was ‘the junior and far less powerful figure’ in his battle with Bevan and 
it was of great significance that the Cabinet eventually decided to back him.31 
Gaitskell’s biographer, Philip Williams, notes that Gaitskell won his colleagues 
approval ‘by showing loyalty and goodwill,... and promising that if he resigned he 
would make no difficulties for the Government.’32 Whenever Attlee was called upon 
from his hospital bed to make a decision in the crisis he supported Gaitskell 
although the crisis was allowed to drag on until the morning of the Budget itself.33
It was a mark of Gaitskell’s growing confidence and standing that after the 
Budget he wrote in his diary that ‘We both, that is Herbert [Morrison] and I, think 
that the P.M. has taken a very weak line about Bevan. He is very careful not to 
come out fully and firmly in the open against him, nor has he really given in our 
view much lead to the country on rearmament, though it was he and Bevin who
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initiated the new programme.’34
Amongst the Parliamentary Labour Party the April 1951 Budget proved to 
be a great personal triumph for Gaitskell. Dalton noted in his diary that The party 
are very pleased and the Tea Room is full of his [Gaitskell’s] praise... it is 
practically all one way.’35 This reaction was shown in the special meeting of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party held after Bevan and Wilson’s resignations. When 
Gaitskell rose to speak he received what he called ‘a pretty considerable ovation.’ 
There was no doubt in his mind that ‘the Tribune article’ which had attacked his 
Budget ‘had a lot to do with this. But when I sat down they went on clapping for a 
minute or two. Douglas [Jay] said it was the biggest applause that he had ever 
heard at a party meeting. I do not know about this but it was certainly an 
outstanding success.’36
Gaitskell’s growing authority and confidence was reflected in his standing 
within the Treasury. On Budget day Bridges came to see Gaitskell to tell him that 
‘I want you to know that not only all those in the Treasury who know about it 
tremendously admire the stand you have made, but that all the others who do not 
at present know but will know will feel the same way. It is the best day we have 
had in the Treasury for ten years.’37
It is therefore clear that Gaitskell was able to play the role of policy initiator 
while he was at the Treasury not only because of his expertise as an economist 
but also because this expertise supported a comprehensive economic doctrine. 
Gaitskell was able to impose his own framework of policy assumptions and 
objectives onto the Treasury while he was Chancellor. He found that he had to 
impose his own framework as the Treasury’s view diverged so completely from his 
own. The certainty with which Gaitskell held his views also helps to explain how he 
had become the preeminent figure among the younger generation of Labour 
ministers by the summer of 1951. The lead Gaitskell took during the devaluation 
crisis and his stand over prescription charges enhanced his authority and his 
control over economic policy.
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Rab Butler
John Boyd-Carpenter, who was Financial Secretary under Butler until 1954, 
has written that ‘Rab Butler immediately dominated the Treasury. How he did so 
was difficult to see. He listened politely to senior officials and junior Ministers. He 
rarely committed himself to a view. He was meticulously polite to all, senior or 
junior. He appeared to have all the time in the world. He gave no signs of flapping 
or of temper. He was very quick at absorbing the contents of complex documents. 
The Treasury knights were, and are, the pick of the Civil Service... But Rab 
apparently without effort asserted control. We had many meeting round the long 
table in his room in Treasury Chambers. On the walls were four splendid 
Canalettos lent by the Duke of Buccleuch. I sometimes suspected that Rab 
arranged that the only lighting in the room was on these pictures, so distracting 
attention from his proposals!’38
Boyd-Carpenter’s account clearly points to Butler acting as a policy initiator 
while at the Treasury even though he lacked Gaitskell’s background in economics. 
Butler’s lack of economic expertise meant that he had to rely far more on his 
official advisers than Gaitskell had. However, Boyd-Carpenter provides certain 
clues as to how Butler was able to dominate the Treasury. First, his intelligence 
compensated for his lack of specific knowledge and allowed him to quickly pick up 
policy details. Butler had been a gifted academic. After attending Pembroke 
College Cambridge, where he achieved firsts in both modern and medieval 
languages and history, he was awarded a fellowship at Corpus Christi College 
where he lectured on the French Third Republic. Butler’s experience as a don 
probably accounts for his ability to pick out the assumptions and the weak points 
in the arguments of his advisers. Often the most telling comment he made on a 
memorandum was to simply underline a sentence or passage and put a question 
mark in the margin next to it.
A second clue provided by Boyd-Carpenter points to Butler’s ability to 
manipulate his officials. Butler was a politician noted for his evasiveness and 
ambiguity. As Anthony Sampson suggests, this ambiguity was in part a product of 
his background. Butler was also the son of a British Civil Servant in India. His 
father, Sir Montagu Butler, became Governor of the Central Provinces. Coming
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from an academic-administrative family Butler stood ‘between the landed and 
bourgeois strands in his party.’ Although, in marrying the heiress, Sydney 
Coutauld, Butler became a wealthy man, Sampson concluded in 1962 that ‘he has 
not become the complete landed squire, and his self-critical side remains strong. 
This cleavage has heightened his ambiguity. He moves in stately circles: but loves 
to encourage young men to attack “the Establishment”. He is careful in parliament 
about homosexuals and flogging, but privately encourages agitation for reform.’39
Butler’s ambiguity was also a product of his sense of humour. Once, during 
his time at the Treasury, when he received a memorandum discussing the details 
of a government subsidy for the British Lion Film Corporation, Butler put a ring 
round the word ‘lion’ pointing to the word ‘Grrr’ in the margin.40 Butler would also 
draw hearts pieced by cupids arrow in the margins of memorandums which had 
pleased him.41
Butler’s ambiguity led some officials and advisers to underestimate him; this 
helped him to manipulate them. Robert Hall’s diary of the period shows how he 
came to an understanding of the way in which he was being used by the 
Chancellor. His first impression of Butler was of a ‘much pleasanter person than 
Stafford or H.G. [Gaitskell] and conducts business almost facetiously.’42 However 
this enjoyment of a more light-hearted character quickly turned to a fear that he 
was a dangerous light-weight. During discussions about the Collective Approach 
Hall noted that ‘it is impossible to know whether he [Butler] understands anything 
at all about it or not. He has a lot of conversational points which usually counteract 
one another, so that one feels he knows nothing at all about the real arguments.’ 
Even then Hall conceded that ‘this may be going too far.’43
A month later Hall had acquired a better idea of how Butler worked. He 
found that his friend the American political commentator Joseph Alsop concurred 
with William Armstrong in finding Butler ‘not nearly as ignorant as he seems.’ Hall 
came to the conclusion that ‘the Chancellor regarded himself as manipulating 
other people and thinks it easier to do this if they think he is rather a fool - and if 
this were so it would give him a feeling of triumph that others should think him 
stupid. It seems rather a peasant’s outlook, however, and I don’t think he has that 
in other ways!’44 Although there is more than a hint of resentment in these words
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there is still a good deal of truth in them. It is clearly the case that as a more 
experienced minister Butler had none of the worries Gaitskell exhibited about how 
his officials saw him.
Butler was a man of many masks. He was quite capable of saying different 
things to different people to gain the maximum advantage. While Hall might have 
thought Butler did not understand the Collective Approach to convertibility, Frank 
Lee found that he made a favourable impression on the American Administration 
during the negotiations on the Collective Approach in March 1953. This favourable 
impression was not only due to his mastery of the facts but also due to ‘his ability 
to use words like “moral” and “right” which Americans thought quite proper though 
British civil servants could not bring themselves to use in a business deal.’45
One of Butler’s greatest assets as a minister was what Edwin Plowden latter 
described as ‘his acute political judgement, which at times appeared to officials as 
a kind of second sight.’46 He had an ‘appreciation of exactly what the Tory party, 
the House of Commons and the electorate would and would not accept.’ Although 
officials also sometimes thought him indecisive this was a necessary part of his 
political judgement. He would often act as though he had made a decision and 
then live with it for a while to see if he still felt comfortable with the decision the 
next day.47 Butler’s conduct could frustrate his advisors who thought that 
everything had been decided. However, once Butler had actually made a decision 
for real he would stick with it in spite of the sometimes intense pressure to change 
it. Thus, he stuck by his ROBOT decision even after it was postponed by the 
Cabinet. He was still committed to the principle of letting the pound float in 1958, 
when it was finally made convertible.48 Also his wish to live with decisions for a 
while did not stop him from making tough choices, and it certainly was not a way 
of backing out of them. For example, Butler agreed to the unification of non­
resident sterling in March 1953 despite taking an extra day to make up his mind.
Butler’s approach raises the question of whether any great policy objectives 
lay behind his great skill as a manipulator. Edmund Dell has argued that Butler’s 
main strength was as a political survivor and that as Chancellor he was ‘the slave 
of advice.’49 However, Butler’s role cannot be dismissed as lightly as Dell suggests. 
By the time he became Chancellor Butler was already highly experienced at
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ministerial level and was the main architect of the policy Charters that the 
Conservative Party produced in response to the election defeat of 1945.
Butler did have important objectives as Chancellor. The fact that he was not 
an economist did mean that he felt he needed some kind of official support for the 
policy he wanted to follow but there two main reasons why he was nearly always 
able to get this support. First, Butler’s skill as a manipulator meant that he was 
often able to get officials to be far more radical than they originally intended. For 
example, when Butler first arrived at the Treasury Leslie Rowan and the Overseas 
Finance Division did not envisage convertibility as anything other than a long-term 
objective. By manipulating their own arguments Butler was able to get them to 
support immediate convertibility at a floating rate. Second, the separation of the 
policy structure into several communities meant that it was pluralistic enough to 
provide Butler with the options he needed to follow his own strategy. Taken as a 
whole, the economic strategy Butler followed as Chancellor was his alone but it 
involved the careful selection of advice. It is impossible to properly understand 
Butler’s tenure as Chancellor without understanding his policy goals.
One crucial fact to note about Butler’s policy goals is that they were 
inextricably linked to his method of operating. Butler belonged to a tradition of 
Conservative thought which sees Conservatism more as a form of behaviour than 
as a fixed set of beliefs. In this view he was profoundly influenced by his Uncle Sir 
Geoffrey Butler’s book The Tory Tradition. Butler wrote a preface for this book 
when it was republished by the Conservative Political Centre in 1957. He took the 
legacy of the four figures that Geoffrey Butler had studied: Bolingbroke, Burke, 
Disraeli, and Salisbury to be ‘not a collection of causes for which we are obliged 
to die in the last ditch, nor a set of premises by the consistent application of which 
we may infallibly regulate our conduct, but a mature and human tradition of 
political which is neither fixed or finished. Such tradition of behaviour are, as 
Professor Oakeshott has reminded us, tricky things to get to know; they cannot, 
in a Disraelian phrase, be scribbled down in a morning on the envelope of a letter 
by some Charter-concocting politician. Those of us who helped to concoct the 
post-war Charters can testify that this is true. But the tradition can be absorbed by 
close and sympathetic observation of how particular Tory politicians have behaved
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at particular periods of political crisis.
‘From Bolingbroke, for example, in the Jacobite aftermath, we can learn 
how a political Party, without damage to its life and identity, not only may but must 
discard an old-fashioned argument, as a snake sloughs off an outworn skin, no 
matter how beautiful or serviceable it may once have been. (Peel for one 
understood this lesson well.) From Burke’s profound intellect, at work in the 
Jacobin heyday, we learn to distrust political abstractions and panaceas imposed 
on society from above, and derive our preference for seeking a pattern of 
improvement by harmonising or balancing the forces and interests actually at play 
in society. Disraeli, with his romantic and imaginative insight, taught us, during the 
critical transition to democracy, how to bring Tory philosophy down from the ivory 
tower into the market-place, and so enlist “the invigorating energies of an educated 
and enfranchised people.” “Educated" is in my view the key word. A Tory 
Democrat will agree with Dr. Johnson that “about things on which the public thinks 
long it commonly attains to think right”, but is bound to acknowledge that the public 
does not always think long: a study of Salisbury’s foreign policy teaches us this 
lesson. A rock-like figure in an age of volatile emotionalism, Salisbury 
demonstrated how political problems have to be seen in the perspective of history, 
and how policies, if they are to be successful, must be based on intense 
precalculation.’50
This quote is revealing about Butler’s beliefs and about the way he 
operated. It shows that he thought Conservatives should adapt to changing 
circumstances, that they should avoid abstraction and apply their tradition of 
behaviour to whatever views and demands were prevalent at the time. It comes as 
no surprise that he mentions Michael Oakeshott in this passage. Butler’s preface 
was published in 1957, one year after Oakeshott gave his famous lecture ‘On 
being conservative.’ There is much in common between their reflections, both saw 
Conservatism primarily as a tradition of behaviour and both saw the principle 
objective of a Conservative in power to harmonise countervailing forces within 
society and not to impose the beliefs of one part of society upon the rest. In fact, 
there is one passage in ‘On being conservative’ that could almost be taken as a 
description of Butler himself. Oakeshott writes that ‘into the heat of our
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engagements, into the passionate clash of beliefs, into our enthusiasm for saving 
souls of our neighbours or of all mankind,’ a government of a conservative sort 
‘injects an ingredient, not of reason (how should we expect that?) but of the irony 
that is prepared to counteract one vice by another, of the raillery that deflates 
extravagance without itself pretending to wisdom, of the mockery that disperses 
tension, of inertia and of scepticism: indeed, it might be said that we keep a 
government of this sort to do for us the scepticism we have neither the time nor the 
inclination to do for ourselves.’51
From Butler’s Conservatism came his political arguments against Labour’s 
economic policy. Physical planning went against the grain of the Conservative 
tradition, it involved the imposition of the values and beliefs of one part of society 
upon the rest and.it was based on a belief in ‘political abstractions and panaceas’. 
Butler was an eloquent opponent of Labour’s policy of physical controls while the 
Conservatives were in Opposition. In the 1950 Budget debate he recalled 
‘discussing my scholastic reforms with a planner, and he said, “what a pity it is that 
you cannot turn children out of our schools in ready-made groups ready to be 
planned by the society in which they are moving.” That is the exact opposite of the 
philosophy for which we stand. We believe that in creating equality of opportunity 
we should give the maximum rein to individual flexibility and genius. We believe 
that a rigid economy -as the “Economist” said recently, “Our economy is crammed 
right against the ceiling”- and a precariously balanced Budget, without any latitude 
or elasticity, cannot meet the undoubted shocks to which we are heir and which 
are so dramatically described in paragraph 62 of the Economic Survey.’52
The first part of this statement was drawn from Butler’s political case against 
controls, the second from his economic case against them. The fact that he was 
more sure of the former than the latter is revealed perhaps by his use of another 
source, in this case The Economist, to back up his economic argument. But 
although he lacked economic expertise Butler had already developed the idea that 
the reintroduction of the discipline of the market was the only alternative to the 
Labour government’s policy of physical planning.
The basis of Butler’s economic policy has been best described by Norman 
Macrae in his book Sunshades in October. Macrae first met Butler in 1949 when
122
Butler invited him to lunch after having been impressed by his criticisms of 
planning in the Banker. Butler offered Macrae a job in helping to shape Opposition 
policy. Even at this stage Butler was a whole hearted supporter of decontrol and 
his main idea was to ‘get rid of controls and go for devaluation before Labour 
did.’53 Macrae joined The Economist in 1949 but he came back into contact with 
Butler through the lunches hosted by the editor of The Economist, Geoffrey 
Crowther, which Butler attended during his Chancellorship. It was through this 
contact that Macrae was able to gain the picture of Butler’s views that informs 
Sunshades in October. As Ian Bancroft, one of Butler’s private secretaries during 
his last two years at the Treasury, has said, Butler’s economic strategy can best 
be understood in the context of the words he used at the Conservative Party 
Conference in 1954: ‘I give you a slogan: invest in success,’ and in his vision of 
doubling Britain’s standard of living in the next 25 years.54 Butler was essentially 
an expansionist who believed that external and internal controls placed an artificial 
strait jacket on the economy. Not allowing the price mechanism to play its proper 
role in the economy created artificial excesses of demand for controlled goods. In 
a free economy, with these factors brought back into equilibrium and with interest 
rates being allowed to rise to something like there natural level, the Government 
would be able to pursue a more expansionist economic policy that would in turn 
create economic confidence which would stimulate investment and allow further 
economic expansion.
In following his overall strategy Butler can be characterised as a policy 
initiator. Although the official Treasury had been in favour of decontrol and the 
restoration of convertibility, Butler pushed them into moving faster than they 
otherwise would have wished. Officials are naturally cautious and keen to protect 
their ministers from political attacks. Butler’s advocacy of the ROBOT plan to make 
the pound convertible at a floating rate, the restoration of Bank Rate policy and 
the removal internal physical controls showed him to be far less cautious than his 
officials. However, Butler’s own lack of economic expertise meant that on the 
actual details of policy he often had to operate as a policy selector, in so doing he 
manoeuvred between the various sources of advice that were available to him. For 
example, he took the advice of the Economic Section on fiscal policy until 1955
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principally because it recommended an expansionist policy. When the Section 
recommended a deflationary Budget in 1955 Butler looked elsewhere for advice. 
On convertibility policy Butler took his advice from the Overseas Finance Division 
and the Bank of England. However, when O.F. came out against further moves 
towards convertibility after 1952, Butler switched to taking his advice principally 
from the Bank of England.
Butler was also assisted by the availability of external sources of advice, in 
particular the Conservative Research Department. They would provide Butler with 
advice on Budgetary policy every year. In particular, their arguments in favour of 
income tax cuts in the first Budget of 1955 provided Butler with useful ammunition 
for getting his way.55
Although Churchill’s main policy interest by now lay in foreign affairs he was 
supportive of the main thrust of Butler’s economic policy on decontrol and tax cuts. 
This support strengthened Butler’s position in getting his policies through Cabinet 
and Cabinet Committees. Only Churchill’s anxiousness the avoid industrial strife, 
even at the cost of highly inflationary wage settlements, was at odds with the 
general direction of Butler’s policy.56
Butler’s relationship with Churchill was coloured by the fact that he was, as 
Robert Armstrong, who served in Butler’s private office, recalls, ‘quite frightened’ 
of Churchill. This went back to Butler’s association, when he was a junior Minister 
in the Foreign Office, with the policy of appeasement. Armstrong remembers 
accompanying Butler on an official visit to Germany. On a walk Butler pointed to 
the hotel Chamberlain had stayed in 1938, and started talking about the ‘terrible 
time’ he had endured then because he had to defend the policy of appeasement 
in the House of Commons as Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, was in the Lords, 
although he claimed to have played ‘”no part in the formulation of policy’” . After a 
pause ‘he waggled his cane at me and said “since that time I have never carried 
an umbrella”, because an umbrella was the symbol of Mr. Chamberlain. I learnt 
from this that even fifteen years later he was very conscious of the fact that he was 
associated with Chamberlain and I think that he was very conscious of the fact that 
Sir Winston Churchill hadn’t forgotten that. I never saw any signs of it in Churchill 
but there was no doubt that he was still in great awe of Churchill.’57
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Churchill’s initial suspicions of Butler led him to impose what appeared to 
be important constraints on his freedom to act when he appointed him Chancellor. 
The most significant of these was the creation of the Treasury Ministerial Advisory 
Committee, a body consisting of five senior Ministers, Woolton, Swinton, Lyttelton, 
Thorneycroft and Eccles, which was supposed to provide Butler with advice on 
economic policy. Churchill also appointed Sir Arthur Salter as Minister for State for 
Economic Affairs to keep an eye on Butler. In addition he brought Lord Cherwell 
back as Paymaster General and asked him to recreate the statistical branch to 
provide an alternative source of economic policy advice to Butler and the Treasury.
One mark of Butler’s strength as a minister was that it did not take him long 
to establish his preeminence over economic policy. The Treasury Ministerial 
Advisory Committee was quickly sidelined and then absorbed into the Economic 
Policy Committee. Salter proved to be an ineffectual Minister, already seventy at 
the time of his appointment, the weight of parliamentary work was too much for 
him.58 In November 1952 he was replaced by Butler’s own choice Reginald 
Maudling who had the title of Economic Secretary. Cherwell also failed to make 
much impact on economic policy. During the ROBOT crisis the combined 
arguments of Cherwell and Salter failed to convince Churchill of the economic 
case against the ROBOT plan. It was only the intervention of the Foreign 
Secretary, Anthony Eden, that persuaded Churchill to support its postponement.59 
On this issue as on many others Churchill’s instinct proved to be much closer to 
that of Butler and his confidence in Butler grew. In February 1954 Churchill’s 
doctor Lord Moran recorded in his diary that Churchill had remarked ‘“Rab is 
behaving very well...The Party has great confidence in him. He scorns to play for 
popularity, just does what he thinks is right.’”60
The one area of economic policy in which Churchill took an active interest 
was Budgetary policy. Butler himself later recalled ‘spending wonderful afternoons 
at lunch - of course champagne - in the Cabinet room... right up till six or seven 
o’clock and all the time him saying “look here old cock this won’t do at all. You 
must have compassion”, and he would say “my father, though they never followed 
up his initiative in social democracy." Conservatives never followed up Randolph’s 
initiatives, did they. Although Randolph was mad, he was a social democrat.’61
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Churchill’s main concern was to lower the level of taxation and to reduce the size 
of the state. In the early stages of the preparation of the 1953 Budget Churchill told 
Butler that the main problem that had to be addressed was ‘a swollen bureaucracy 
and a level of taxation previously undreamt of in time of peace. It would of course 
have been much easier for us to slash these back immediately the war ended if 
we had been returned to power. It is more difficult now. But the effort, though 
greater, must be made. We cannot afford to let it become accepted, as an 
inevitable feature of the postwar world, that the country must have a non­
productive bureaucracy... and a standard rate of income tax at 9/6 d. in the £.’62
As Churchill and Butler shared the same objectives on fiscal policy the main 
effect of the interest Churchill had in the Budget was to bolster Butler’s own 
position in getting the expenditure cuts necessary to allow for tax cuts. For 
example, Churchill’s intervention in the 1953 Budget opened up the way to tax 
cuts. Churchill argued that the forecast deficit for the year 1952/3 did not justify a 
tax increase and that the way to deal with the problem was to stop a further 
increase in civil expenditure.63
Conclusion
Both Gaitskell and Butler can be clearly identified as a policy initiators 
during their Chancellorships although they achieved preeminence by different 
methods. While Gaitskell imposed his own framework of assumptions and 
objectives from above onto a sceptical Treasury, Butler got his way largely through 
the manipulation of the existing framework. Differences in their personalities do in 
part account for these different operating methods but the most important factor 
was the receptiveness of the Treasury to their different economic ideas. Butler 
found the Treasury view to be largely in tune with his own thinking. The structure 
was pluralistic enough for him to be able to take the lead by choosing between 
different sources of policy advice and by questioning the assumptions of his 
advisers. By doing so he produced an economic strategy that was distinctly his 
own. By contrast, Gaitskell’s views were so much at odds with official opinion that 
no amount of manipulation would have been sufficient for him to get his way. Only 
by imposing his own ideas was Gaitskell able to operate as a policy initiator. The
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lack of official support for his policies meant that his economic training was crucial 
to his ability to take the lead.
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Chapter 6 
The Politics of Economic Controls
The leading historian of economic policy in the postwar period, Alec 
Cairncross, epitomises the view that the removal of the economic controls 
introduced during the Second World War was both a desirable and inevitable 
process that reflected widespread opinion about the direction economic policy 
should be taking. As Cairncross puts it ‘the various “bonfires” of controls that 
began in 1948 made it clear that the continued use of controls after 1945 was 
essentially a transitional strategy. It was not intended to maintain the control 
indefinitely or to perpetuate the shortages with which they dealt. On the contrary, 
most of the controls would disappear as supply recovered to a more normal level 
without any change in price [emphasis in original].’1
Cairncross expresses what was the dominant view in Whitehall at the time. 
However, it was not the view of most Labour ministers including Gaitskell, Bevan, 
Wilson and Jay. In fact, the Government had intended to keep many of these 
physical controls. The Full Employment Bill, which was only held back because of 
the outbreak of the Korean War, would have put wartime controls on the statute 
book on a permanent basis.
The main disagreement amongst ministers concerned whether positive 
powers of control should be included in the Bill. Gaitskell, who was the leading 
intellectual force behind the Bill’s content, believed that it should concentrate on 
existing negative controls such as those over prices, building, imports and exports 
as well as over some consumer goods, which he believed were necessary if the 
Government was to maintain full employment without inflation and a balance of 
payments problem. Gaitskell was also responsible for the Bill title and had a 
clearer understanding of its purpose than his colleagues.
Historians who have followed Cairncross’ line have misunderstood the 
significance of the bonfires of controls that Harold Wilson instigated while 
President of the Board of Trade. Wilson abolished those controls not required by
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the Government for peacetime economic planning. In his announcement in the 
Commons of the first bonfire in November 1948, Wilson made it clear that controls 
would have to be retained for reasons of ‘economic recovery, for industrial 
efficiency or for full employment.’2 The bonfire itself only led to the loss of about 30 
or 40 civil service jobs; and of the 200,000 licences abolished 125,000 had been 
for the production of thermos flasks.3 The fact was that many licences could be 
abolished with little actual effect on the economy. As Jim Tomlinson has 
concluded ‘the controls in existence in early post-war Britain were immensely 
complex and elaborate and many could be abolished with little implication for 
general policy.’4
Labour’s policy on controls was the opposite of that followed by the 
Conservatives after the 1951 election. The Conservatives believed that controls 
were a threat to individual freedom and led to inefficiency in the economy. The 
impact of controls on individual freedom had been the theme of Churchill’s 1945 
election broadcast in which he followed Hayek in arguing that a controlled 
economy would eventually lead to ‘some form of Gestapo’ being imposed because 
the Government would not be able to tolerate dissent.5 Churchill’s broadcast set 
the tone for the Conservatives policy on controls while in Opposition. As controls 
became increasingly unpopular with the public the Conservatives announced that 
to ‘set the people free’ of them would be a major objective of a future Conservative 
government.6
It was Butler who took the lead in the Conservative’s decontrol programme 
once they were in office. His main aim was to restore the flexibility of the price 
mechanism to the economy. In practice this meant the abolition of commodity 
controls, building licensing, rent restriction and fixed agricultural pricing. While 
Butler was at one with Churchill in pushing forward with decontrol, other ministers 
were concerned by the speed at which he proceeded. Although it took longer to 
relax housing controls than Butler would have liked, most controls had been 
abolished by the end of 1954.
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Gaitskell and the Full Employment Bill
In January 1950, Gaitskell and Jay mapped out their thoughts on the future 
of controls in a paper to the Cabinet Economic Policy Committee. They felt they 
had been provoked into writing ‘Economic Planning and Liberalisation’ by official 
pressure on policy, in particular by part of a report by the Programmes Committee 
which stated that ‘It should be recognised that in the management of our general 
balance of payments indirect measures of control must play an increasing part, by 
anti-inflationary internal policies and a strict external policy.’7 The conclusion of the 
Programmes Committee’s report reflected the Treasury view of controls, that their 
use merely disguised balance of payments and inflationary problems and that to 
deal with these problems internal and external economic policy should be brought 
into harmony. Fundamentally, dealing with these problems meant a return to 
primacy of questions of internal and external finance.
Gaitskell and Jay argued that such a policy was incompatible with the 
‘fundamental principles’ of the Government’s economic policy, they listed these 
principles under four headings:
‘(a) Maximum production.
(b) Full employment.
(c) Closing the gap in the dollar and overall balance of payments.
(d) Fair-distribution among the people of available supplies.’8
Gaitskell and Jay argued that inflationary pressure was necessary in the 
economy in order to maintain full employment. The only way to prevent such 
inflationary pressure from having knock-on effects was through controls, 
particularly price controls. Rationing was also needed to ensure a ‘fair-distribution’ 
of goods. Hugh Dalton referred to this part of the memorandum in his diary as ‘an 
admirable statement of economic doctrine. Really, therefore, though this is not the 
way anyone puts it, always have a bit of inflationary pressure, but use physical 
controls to prevent it breaking through.’9
The Economic Policy Committee’s discussion of Gaitskell’s memorandum 
revealed ministers suspicions about the motives of civil servants on controls 
policy.10 Gaitskell shared these suspicions. Jay later recalled that Gaitskell
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'strongly suspected, and indeed probably believed that a lot of people in Whitehall, 
even some ministers were advocating decontrol for ideological reasons and not 
because the merits of an individual trade justified it.'11 Consequently, Gaitskell 
insisted that any proposal to remove a control, however minor, had to be cleared 
with the Treasury.12
For Gaitskell and Jay, the principles of the Treasury view were incompatible 
with those of a socialist economic policy. Gaitskell wrote that ‘the use by the 
Government of direct controls - whether rationing in order to secure fair distribution 
or industrial controls in order to expand exports - has been the distinguishing 
feature of British socialist planning. One by one the non-socialist Governments in 
Europe have abandoned this policy and in consequence have had to put up with 
a certain amount of unemployment, and/or a much less equitable distribution of 
income.' They argued that a policy of decontrol would ‘involve for us two 
alternatives - either to allow prices and incomes to rise in every case where 
controls of any kind were lifted, which in turn would create in due course a balance 
of payments crisis together with the risk of continuing inflation; or to reduce 
demand by deflating incomes which would require far more severe deflationary 
measures than have yet to be contemplated in Britain, and which would bring in 
their train serious unemployment.’13
In the Committee Gaitskell argued that ‘In the UK certain physical controls 
are essential to the effective economic planning of full employment and fair 
distribution of income and for achieving and maintaining a balance with the dollar 
area.’14 He listed the essential controls as being ‘quantitative import controls, 
exchange control, building controls and controls in respect of certain raw 
materials.’15 In the memorandum he also listed price controls as one of the 
methods by which ‘the Government had tried to prevent and on the whole 
succeeded in preventing any serious inflation.’16
In general the Committee welcomed Gaitskell’s memorandum. Both Bevan 
and Wilson agreed that controls played an essential role. In fact, Wilson had been 
the first minister to mention the idea of permanent controls in public. In March 
1949 he stated that ‘Certain controls over the location of industry and other things
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necessary for a policy of full employment and over certain aspects of foreign 
exchange dealings and those controls which are necessary for keeping the 
national economy on an even keel, should be a permanent feature of our 
system.’17 This statement was considered to be important enough by the Labour 
Party for it to be included in the Campaign Quotations reference book issued 
during the 1951 election campaign.18
On the other hand Stafford Cripps, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was 
keen to stress the importance of fiscal and monetary measures. Although he 
admitted that ‘the Government could not rely solely on monetary and budgetary 
means,’ he added ‘that did not mean that full use should not be made of these 
means.’19
The need for physical controls for economic planning had great importance 
for Gaitskell and other Labour ministers who had come under the sway of 
Daltonian economics in the 1930s. Gaitskell had developed his theories of 
planning when he was a member of the New Fabian Research Bureau. Although 
he believed that nationalisation of a limited number of basic industries was 
necessary to the formation of a socialised economy it was only part of the 
equation. Equally important, if not more so, was the use of the appropriate 
economic tools to establish full employment. He wanted ‘planning to improve upon 
capitalism’s economic performance through the control and manipulation of policy 
instruments, rather than through detailed administration of the entire economy.’20 
Through the use of physical controls Gaitskell thought that what he called ‘the 
three major evils of the individualist system - inequality, insecurity, inefficiency’ 
could be eradicated.21
These arguments were to reappear during the battle over Clause Four in 
the late 1950s. Gaitskell again argued that nationalisation was only part of the 
picture. In his conference speech of 1959 he concluded that ‘we should make two 
things clear to the country. First, that we have no intention of abandoning public 
ownership and accepting for all time the present frontiers of the public sector. 
Secondly, that we regard public ownership not as an end in itself but as a means 
- and not necessarily the only or the most important one to certain ends - such as
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full employment, greater equality and higher productivity.’ Gaitskell argued that full 
employment and planning were ‘fundamental aims’ of the Party.22 Bevan’s 
contribution to this debate was interesting because he echoed the sentiments of 
his rival. He stated that ‘I do not believe that public ownership should reach down 
into every piece of economic activity, because that would be asking for a 
monolithic society... What I do insist upon is... a planned economy.’23
The accord between Gaitskell and Bevan on the subject of physical controls 
was not really that surprising. In his 1952 book In Place of Fear Bevan had argued 
that ‘full employment always carries with it the threat of inflation, and that to avoid 
inflation there must be sustained control by the state of the investments 
programme.’ He went on to argue at length that the establishment of full 
employment by its very nature meant the end of competitive society and its 
transformation into a socialist one. Full employment meant that the economy was 
working at full stretch and that the provision of additional goods and services could 
only be achieved at the expense of others, assuming no increase in productivity. 
That means selection between different forms of consumption and that, in turn, 
means arranging consumption in an order of priority. Once this is accepted, bang 
goes at once a whole series of fetishes of the competitive society... Once the 
competitive society is compelled to serve a general social aim the automatism of 
the market is intervened with at every point and we are no longer in the capitalist 
system at all. We shall have abandoned selection by competition for selection by 
deliberation.’ Bevan gave some examples of prioritising through control that 
occurred when Labour were in power: ‘Labour had to insist that homes for workers 
should take precedence over cinemas, hotels and luxury building, and that 
industries producing for the export market along with investment in basic industries 
that had been neglected when the profit motive alone counted, should become top 
priorities.’24 The concurrence of Gaitskell and Bevan’s ideas on economic planning 
suggests that the battle between them that enveloped the Labour Party in the 
1950s was more about personality than the substance of policy.
It was Morrison who got the ball rolling in Whitehall towards making 
economic controls permanent. In a memorandum to the Cabinet Committee on
135
Future Legislation written in March 1949, Morrison proposed legislation ‘putting 
into permanent form the wartime powers which are still required.’ Ideally he wanted 
this legislation to be passed in the 1950 session, before the powers expired on 10 
December, but he conceded that this ‘may prove impracticable.’25 The committee 
agreed to Morrison’s suggestion and approved his recommendation that the 
Emergency Legislation Committee should review the position regarding 
emergency powers.26
In May 1949 the Investment Programmes Committee issued a report on 
capital investment which recommended ‘a comprehensive and early review of the 
powers and administrative machinery required for the control of capital 
investment.’27 A meeting under the Chairmanship of the Cabinet Secretary, Sir 
Norman Brook, was held on 25 May to consider ‘what kind of body was required 
to operate such a review.’ It also discussed ‘whether the time had come to 
undertake a similar enquiry into the powers required to operate other economic 
controls after the expiry of the various emergency powers.’ 28
The meeting decided that the review of investment controls should be 
conducted separately from the other enquiry. Although the Emergency Legislation 
Committee was already looking into the issue of what controls should be kept the 
Investment Committee’s report prompted the notion of looking at the whole area 
in a different way. The meeting concluded that ‘there was a broad field of general 
economic control within which it would be more than profitable to proceed by 
considering what kind of powers were likely to be required over a relatively long 
period rather than by considering whether particular provisions of existing 
regulations should be continued.’ It was agreed that the enquiry should 
concentrate on seven topics: ‘(I) Price Control. (II) Control of Production. (Ill) 
Control of Consumption. (IV) Centralised purchases. (V) Labour Controls. (VI) 
Powers of the Ministry of Food. (VII) Import and export licensing.’29
The committee overseeing this enquiry had representatives of the Treasury, 
the Central Economic Planning Staff, the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Supply, 
the Ministry of Food, the Economic Section and the Emergency Legislation 
Committee which would keep the two enquiries in touch. The committee, formed
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under the Chairmanship of Sir Bernard Gilbert, first met on 20 July 1949.
It was intended that the committee carry out a wide review of controls, but 
when it came to present its report in February 1950 the powers it recommended 
were all drawn from existing legislation. Officials were clearly unable to make the 
imaginative leap from wartime to peacetime planning. For example, with regard to 
controls on consumption and production the committee suggested that ‘these 
powers will have to be similar to those conferred under Section 1 of the Supplies 
and Services Act, 1945, as amended by the Defence Regulations 55 and 55A’, 
even though ‘it will be realised that a permanent statute in the general terms of 
those instruments would, on the face of it, confer on the Government of the day 
powers as sweeping and drastic as those found necessary in war.’30
The report was discussed at a meeting of the Lord President’s Committee 
on 21 April. Morrison drew attention to the fact that the official committee had 
recommended all existing powers, other than the power to direct labour, should be 
retained. In the discussion of the report there was general agreement with this 
conclusion, however it was also noted that the committee did not accept the view 
mentioned in the report that economic controls should be used to direct industry 
in a positive sense. Whether or not positive controls should be included became 
one of the major bones of contention regarding the content of the Bill and 
discussion of this issue delayed its introduction.31
Throughout the rest of 1950 and the beginning of 1951 ministers devoted 
a great deal of time to discussing what was originally known as the Economic 
Powers Bill. An official committee was set up to draft the Bill and a Cabinet 
Committee was set up under Morrison to discuss it. Also on this Committee were 
Gaitskell, now Chancellor; Bevan, the Minister of Health; G.R. Strauss, The 
Minister of Supply; Richard Stokes, The Minister of Works; Viscount Addison, Lord 
Privy Seal; Harold Wilson, President of the Board of Trade; Maurice Webb, 
Minister of Food; and Sir Hartley Shawcross, The Attorney-General. The first draft 
of the Bill contained only negative powers and certain ministers, particularly 
Bevan, fought to widen its scope.
In Cabinet on 27 July 1950 Herbert Morrison argued that it might be
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Gilbert also dismissed positive powers of control. The working party had 
been unable to extrapolate negative controls from their previous incarnation as 
wartime restrictions. His thoughts on positive controls demonstrated that he also 
viewed these as restrictions that were appropriate only in wartime. Apart from 
financial inducements, he wrote that the only other positive power he could 
envisage was ‘to repeat the general power of direction which was in force in 
wartime and to supplement it by the sanctions which we then had, viz. authorised 
controllers, power to appoint directors and ultimately powers to buy up a company 
completely. It was in fact very rarely necessary to enforce the power of direction 
in this way during the war, and I think such powers would be unworkable in 
peace.’35
In a memorandum dated 17 October 1950 Bevan set out the three types of 
positive control his Subcommittee wanted included ‘so as to enable the competent 
Authority (as defined in the Bill) (i) to place orders on a continuing basis for 
products of all types produced by industry (consumer goods, utility goods, capital 
goods and indeed ships), (ii) to undertake the manufacture of any goods when he 
considers it expedient to do so, and (iii) to sell any products obtained in either 
manner.’36 Commenting on the new powers proposed by Bevan, two officials in the 
Central Economic Planning Staff wrote that they would ‘set the pattern of full 
employment policy for a long period ahead. The Bill therefore represents a major 
landmark in the development of modern economic policy.’37
Gilbert attempted to persuade Gaitskell that positive powers of control 
should not be incorporated into the Bill. With regard to the suggestion that the 
Government should have the power to buy, sell and manufacture he argued that 
‘the difficulty here is to know what to do with the goods when you have got them. 
A depression is normally associated with an excess of supply over demand, and 
to increase supply artificially would seem likely to depress markets still further.’38 
As for the suggestion of lending money at uneconomic rates to the private-sector, 
Gilbert was even more scathing. He suggested ‘such powers would involve a real 
danger of leading industry to suppose that it had only to ask the Exchequer for 
help in order to receive it.’39 Gilbert advised that the title of the Bill should be
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changed back to the original and that it should provide only for existing negative 
controls.
Within the Treasury, Jay countered Gilbert’s attack on positive controls. In 
a note to Gaitskell dated 27 October he wrote ‘I am strongly opposed to having a 
merely negative and restrictive [Bill]... This gives the wrong impression that 
planning is a matter of saying “Thou shalt not" etc.’ He went on to list the 
recommendations made by the Minister of Health’s Committee and other 
recommendations made by the Economic Section, the Board of Trade and the 
Ministry of Supply in this area. The first two were the same as those made by 
Bevan but there were two additional powers listed: '(c) Power to lend at 
“uneconomic” rates of interest to stimulate investment by Public Boards and Local 
Authorities, (d) Power to stimulate investment by private industry in this and 
perhaps similar ways...’40
Gaitskell himself did not think that the main focus of the Bill should be on 
positive controls, not because he was persuaded by Gilbert’s case, but because 
he believed the controls necessary to maintain full employment and to fulfil the 
objective of 'fair shares’ were mainly negative in character. He saw it as primarily 
the role of monetary and fiscal policy to keep the economy at full stretch so that 
planning could be carried out. Gaitskell outlined his position in a memorandum the 
Cabinet Committee on the Bill had asked him to submit on the powers the Bill 
should include. He argued that ‘fiscal and monetary measures are of far greater 
importance than anything else for dealing with any general deflationary 
tendencies.’ However, he did agree that the power to stimulate public investment 
would be useful with respect to both local authorities and the boards of 
nationalised industries: ‘As regards the former, the most important practical step 
is to get local authorities to prepare and keep up to date lists of projects which they 
would embark on speedily if told to do so. In the case of the nationalised boards 
the problem is to find some way of overcoming their reluctance because they fear 
that on a particular project they would lose money.’41
Gaitskell saw positive powers to stimulate private investment as being less 
important and feared that private industry would transfer to the Exchequer burdens
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and responsibilities it ought to carry itself. He held a similar opinion about the 
usefulness of powers to manufacture. He argued that they might discourage 
private investment. He also felt there might be a strong reaction against the 
Government having such power. If the Government were to progress with this idea 
much more thought would have to be given to it. Powers of purchase had similar 
implications and Gaitskell argued for more consideration here as well. In both 
cases he feared ‘alarm and nervousness in the private sector’ and ‘political trouble 
which would be quite out of proportion to any advantage there might be for 
maintaining full employment.’42
Gaitskell had been amongst those ministers who called for a clear 
statement by the Government on the necessity of economic controls. His 
memorandum demonstrated the enormous importance he placed on the Bill. He 
argued that the Bill should be focussed on the use of negative controls and that 
it would be ‘best to defend this Bill simply on full employment. And although the 
powers we need for this purpose are very much the same as those required for 
general economic planning, I doubt if we should be wise to place such emphasis 
on the latter. People will support controls because they recognise that they can 
prevent unpleasant things from happening, but I doubt if the term economic 
planning is much understood- or if it is, whether it is a popular concept.’ Therefore, 
he suggested that ‘a popular title would be “Full Employment and Price Control 
Bill.”’43
Gaitskell saw the purpose of the Bill to be twofold. First, it was a medium 
for setting out the physical controls the Government would need to keep in order 
to maintain full employment. Second, he saw it as central to winning popular 
support for controls as part of Labour’s electoral strategy. Controls might be 
unpopular so long as the general public saw them simply as restrictions. If it was 
spelt out that their retention and use was necessary for the maintenance of full 
employment then popular opinion might change. This helps to explain why 
Gaitskell was so keen to get the Bill properly focused. In his memorandum he 
wrote that ‘the political importance of this Bill is so great that we must think out the 
implications very carefully before we decide what to put in it. The first step is to
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agree on the general case that we intend to make in presenting this Bill. The 
content of the Bill should then follow this. We should not put in the Bill powers 
which we do not regard as essential to this purpose. This means, I suggest, that 
the starting point should be not the Supplies and Services Act but our full 
employment policy.’ As a way of neutralising hostility to the Bill Gaitskell suggested 
that some kind of Parliamentary control over the exercising of the Bill’s powers was 
necessary. ‘I cannot help feeling that in view of the political importance of the bill 
we ought to make quite sure of our ground here.’44
Neil Rollings has written with regards to the positive powers that were 
considered for inclusion in the Bill, that ‘there appears to have been no thought 
about whether the use of permanent economic controls was realistic and likely to 
be effective in the long-term.’45 Gaitskell’s memorandum shows Rollings analysis 
to be ill informed. Gaitskell was thinking in terms of the long-term methods and 
objectives of economic policy and had a clearer idea than any other minister about 
what this entailed.
In his memorandum, Gaitskell repeated his argument that controls were 
needed to stop inflation when the economy was operating at the level of full 
employment. He put forward six negative powers that he thought were necessary 
in this situation:
‘(i) Power to control prices.
(ii) Power to ration essential consumer goods.
(iii) Power to allocate material.
(iv) Power to control building.
(v) Power to control imports.
(vi) Power to determine the proportion of output sold at home or exported.’46
Gaitskell’s inclusion of rationing as an essential power was noted in the 
discussion of his paper at the ministerial committee on the Bill. It was concluded 
that ‘fair shares and an equitable distribution of essential consumer goods could 
be regarded as essential features of full employment policy.’47 In an article entitled 
The Economic Aims of the Labour Party published in The Political Quarterly in 
1953 Gaitskell re-emphasised the importance of rationing to Labour policy. He
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argued that Labour’s economic policy would be ‘constrained’ if it were impossible 
to reintroduce rationing because of political considerations. A future Labour 
Government would have ‘to be careful not to create the conditions in which it 
[rationing] becomes necessary.’48
The final draft of the Bill to be completed did include many of the positive 
powers that had been discussed, including the stimulation of investment by public 
authorities; the stimulation of investment in the private sector of industry and for 
the public purchase of capital goods.49 Gaitskell was happier with this draft 
because of its emphasis on full employment. He wrote to Edmund Compton and 
the members of the official committee preparing the Bill to express his thanks and 
added that ‘the draft Bill is now very much closer to what I myself at least had in 
mind.’50
In the Commons the Conservative Opposition reacted with anger to the 
plans for a Full Employment Bill in the Debate on the Address. The King’s Speech 
stated that ‘in order to defend full employment to ensure that the resources of the 
community are used to best advantage and to avoid inflation, legislation will be 
introduced to make available to my ministers on a permanent basis but subject to 
appropriate Parliamentary safeguards, powers to regulate production, distribution 
and consumption and to control prices.’51
Butler led the attack for the Conservatives. He referred to a speech Bevin 
had recently made at the Colchester Oyster Feast ‘in the presence of a number 
of hon. And right hon. Gentlemen opposite and a few oysters’ in which he said that 
productivity increases would help to relieve the burden of the armament 
programme.52 Butler argued that ‘In the face of these problems the Government 
should encourage enterprise wherever it is found, because that is the only way to 
improve productivity - to give incentive wherever possible and to control first and 
foremost its own excessive interference and its own expenditure. If there are to be 
controls, the Government must give a lead by showing some power to control 
themselves and their own expenditure. What is wanted as The Times leading 
article said today, is public economy and private efficiency. In the face of these 
needs to encourage productivity, the Gracious Speech is most disturbing because
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it gives a clear indication that the Government propose to rely on permanent 
physical controls and an intensified planned economy to achieve results such as 
full employment and the avoidance of inflation which we think can far better be 
achieved in the ways I have already indicated.’53
Butler’s case against permanent controls was not confined to economics. 
He also condemned controls in terms of their effect on personal freedom. He 
compared the proposal to the method of governing advocated by Sir Oswald 
Mosley in 100 Questions Asked and Answered.54 In a blistering attack Butler said 
that ‘this is the Reichstag method of governing... whatever hon. Members opposite 
may say; and however sincere they may be in their per sonal objections to 
Fascism, it is leading precisely in that direction and it is something which we on 
this side are not going to have, and we are going to put up a fight if the method of 
governing this country is going to be by order.’55
The ferocity of Butler’s attack on the proposed legislation reflected the 
Conservatives Hayekian argument that controls were a step on the road to 
serfdom. It was a sign of the importance that they attached to this issue that Peter 
Thorneycroft moved an amendment to the Address expressing their opposition to 
the plans for a Full Employment Bill.
Officials used the Conservatives opposition to the Full Employment Bill in 
their attempts to get the legislation put on hold. The Cabinet Secretary, Norman 
Brook argued in a minute to Attlee that proposals for a Full Employment Bill might 
be misguided even if the Government was prepared to make their rejection one 
of the main issues at the next general election. Brook suggested that the 
Conservatives might refrain from a direct attack on the bill and instead set about 
amending it. Given the narrowness of the Government’s majority it would be 
difficult to defeat what would be put forward as reasonable improvements. The 
Government might find itself with ’a permanent Act which gave fewer powers than 
they thought necessary and these hedged about with awkward safeguards.’56 
Brook’s argument would appear to have been based on tactical rather than 
substantive objections. Given the political importance the Government attached 
to the legislation it is difficult to see how they could be defeated in the Commons,
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particularly as they were prepared to make the Bill’s rejection by the House of 
Lords a central issue in a general election. It was the Korean War rather than 
Brook’s objections that persuaded Morrison to put the Bill on hold. The Full 
Employment Bill was to have replaced the emergency powers that were renewed 
every year. The war meant that those emergency powers not included in the bill 
would still have to be renewed to deal with defence needs. Morrison agreed that 
considerable confusion might ensue if the Government was introducing permanent 
powers of economic control while overlapping powers of control were still being 
introduced on a year to year basis. There was also a political consideration, the 
Korean war meant that supplies were having to be diverted from inessential to 
essential work. It would not look good for the Government if the temporary 
unemployment this caused were brought about through the implementation of the 
new Full Employment Act. A further consideration was that the war meant any 
danger to full employment had been relegated to a relatively distant future. The 
relevant problem at that moment was unemployment caused by scarcity of 
supplies. It would be difficult to sell the bill as being relevant to current problems. 
Therefore Morrison recommended, with some reluctance, that the introduction of 
the Bill should be deferred. He also recommended that the Ministerial Committee 
should continue to look into the matter ‘with a view to legislation being framed 
which can be introduced when a suitable time arrived, if necessary later in the 
present session.’57
Brook advised the Prime Minister against letting work continue on the Bill. 
He argued that it went against the Prime Minister’s own suggestion that 
Departments should concentrate as much as possible on defence work.58 The 
Cabinet agreed that it would be inappropriate to proceed with the Bill only 'in 
present circumstances.’59 However, no further work appears to have been done 
on the Bill prior to the election.
Gaitskell had been the minister most acutely aware of the political 
significance of the Full Employment Bill. He was also responsible for giving the Bill 
a title with greater political resonance. Morrison’s decision to defer the legislation 
did not take into account the fact that if the Government did not make the case for
14b
the retention of controls the Conservative calls for decontrol would go unanswered. 
Morrison was not an economist and was not as aware as Gaitskell of the centrality 
of controls to the Government’s full employment policy. Given the significance 
Gaitskell placed on the legislation it is possible that he would not have agreed to 
defer its introduction if the Bill had been his responsibility.
During the 1951 election campaign the Financial Times commented that 
‘the issues of controls has hardly been mentioned... Since controls are an issue 
of such warm dispute between the parties, it is surprising that neither of them, 
during the election campaign, has breathed a whisper about the Supplies and 
Services (Transitional Powers) Act (from which) most of the economic controls 
which affect the daily lives of every business man and private individual 
emanate.’60 A.A. Rogow has used this quotation to support his assertion that there 
was a great deal of agreement between the parties on the controls issue and this 
was reflected by its absence from the 1951 election campaign.61 However, the 
reason why controls were not at the top of the campaign agenda was because of 
the deferral of the Full Employment Bill. The Bill would have provided a focus for 
the debate about the future of controls. Even so, the Financial Times was wrong 
to suggest that neither party breathed a whisper about the issue during the 
campaign. In fact both Churchill and Gaitskell saw controls as a central issue.
Churchill referred to controls in his election broadcast on 8 October. He 
stated that ‘the keeping on of the wartime controls and restrictions has hampered 
our recovery, fettered our enterprise and enormously added to the cost and 
apparatus of government.’ 62 The Labour Party countered this attack in an issue of 
Campaign Notes published two days later. In a direct comment on Churchill’s 
broadcast it argued that ‘controls are all part of Labour’s policy for fair shares, for 
maintaining full employment, and enabling industry to serve the nation instead of 
just the share-holders. To take off these controls would mean abandoning the 
policies they secure.’63 Attlee also reacted to Churchill in his own election 
broadcast on 11 October. He argued that the Conservatives would find it 
impossible to lift them. Necessity had driven the United States to adopt controls 
and other European countries expected Britain to have the power to carry out our
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planes. ‘When the Tories talk about throwing off controls’, he said, ‘they are simply 
talking from the depth of their own inexperience.’64
The issue of controls dominated Gaitskell’s contribution to the election 
campaign. At the beginning of the campaign Jay wrote to him to outline ‘several 
points which would be likely to occur to you anyway but which, I think, in view of 
the Election campaign we have got to put over somehow.’ Controls was one of 
these issues. Jay wrote that 'if, as I hope, we can be very candid in the Election 
about the balance of payments situation, it seems to follow that we should play up 
the obvious inference that in circumstances of difficulty more planning, controls 
etc. are necessary, and that the de-control policy is completely unsuited to the 
times, [emphasis in original] ’65
In speeches at Doncaster, Halifax and Keighley, Gaitskell concentrated on 
the controls issue. He argued that their application was essential if Britain’s 
economic problems were to be solved. He told his audience in Halifax that ‘If we 
are to solve our balance of payments problem we must use controls to restrict 
inessential imports and to direct production where ever possible from producing 
inessentials for the home market to producing for export. Economic planning which 
the Tories are never tired of sneering at involves the use of controls like this. If the 
Tories get in and scrap this we shall have a wild inflationary scramble. Some 
people will do better and get away with it but the national job of building our 
defences and paying our way will not be done.’ 66 Gaitskell told his audience that 
controls were also central to the Labour Party’s policy of ‘fair shares’. He argued 
that the burden could only be shared fairly ‘provided we keep on rationing and food 
subsidies and let the taxes fall where they can best be borne. But the Tories are 
straining to reduce taxation on the very rich.’67
Production Authorities and the future of Economic Controls
Ministerial discussion about the future shape of economic planning was 
mirrored by discussions between officials. These questions came up in the context 
of the Economic Organisation Enquiry initiated by Bridges in 1950 to see if Civil
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Service organisation should be restructured to fit the new functions of 
Government. The enquiry revealed an important disagreement between those civil 
servants who believed that some physical controls would continue to play a role 
in economic planning and that the machinery of government should be adapted 
accordingly and those officials who saw controls as temporary restrictions that 
would be abolished as the economy was restored to peacetime conditions. This 
disagreement became focused on the idea of reorganising departmental 
responsibilities to reflect their role as production authorities for specific industries. 
Edward Bridges, who had both experience of organising the rearmament 
programme and the war effort itself, was the main proponent of this idea. Norman 
Brook expressed the essential liberalism of most senior officials in opposing it. 
Significantly, Sir Archibald Rowlands who, as Permanent Secretary of the Ministry 
of Supply, was the departmental head most concerned with these questions, 
backed Brook. His victory over Bridges reflected the dominance of liberal 
economic values within the civil service.
The Steering Committee of the Economic Organisation Enquiry, chaired by 
Bridges, asked Plowden and the C.E.P.S. to prepare a report on The Essential 
Functions of Government in the Economic Field.’ Plowden and his staff focussed 
on three primary objectives. These were:
‘(A) To foster a steady increase in the real income of the community as a whole 
and to avoid any sudden or significant reduction in real income.
(B) To ensure a fair distribution of all essential goods and services.
(C) To maintain the highest practicable level of employment.’68
The second of these objectives appears a strange choice for a ‘principal 
objective in the long term’ as it reflected the Labour Party’s policy of ‘fair shares’ 
and contradicted the Conservative policy of ‘setting the people free’. However 
Plowden’s report differed from minister’s line on what the future role of physical 
controls was likely to be. He noted that once ‘the supply of investment goods 
available for use at home exceeds substantially the level of investment which is 
economically desirable the efficacy of these controls will be much weakened.’ 
However, he did concede that ‘it seems likely that controls over building must be
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retained so long as inflationary conditions persist.’69
Plowden felt that if Government policy were likely to concentrate more in 
the future on the problem of stimulating investment in the time of recession, this 
would require controls. He thought that this danger could ‘best be guarded against 
by restraining less essential investment and encouraging those concerned to keep 
a sufficient proportion of their future investment work in an advanced state of 
readiness. These projects will then constitute an immediate ‘reserve of woks.’ On 
this point he concluded that ‘when the pressure for Building Investment eases it 
will be necessary to formulate a more precise “reserve of works”, but to do so 
prematurely would only result in the plans being out of date and therefore useless 
at the time when they are required.’70
Plowden saw the main role for physical controls coming under the 
Governments policy of ‘fair shares’. As long as this remained a major aim of 
Government policy ‘it will probably be necessary to take special measures, such 
as rationing, to guard against scarcities which affect the general public, particularly 
scarcities of essential food-stuffs.’ Plowden thought that the continuation of 
physical controls in this field was likely to be ‘considered necessary.’ In general, 
Plowden predicted a lessening of the importance of physical controls and 
concluded that ‘it may be that the operation of the pricing system will in due course 
once again play a more fundamental part in the process of economic adjustment.’71
Although Plowden’s report was sceptical about the long-term future of some 
controls, the Steering Committee, which included Norman Brook and the 
Permanent Secretaries of the Board of Trade, War Office, Ministry of Fuel and 
Power, Supply, Food, and Works, was still critical of the line taken. The Committee 
noted that the report ‘left the reader with the impression that credit manipulation 
and the free operation of the price mechanism as instruments of economic policy 
were declining in importance, whereas many people held that they should have 
greater play.’72
The second aspect of the Economic Organisation Enquiry was an 
investigation of the allocation of responsibility in the economic field and the 
arrangements for securing coordination. Also an investigation of the relationship
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of Departments to industry, business, labour and the general public and also to the 
central organisation. This part of the enquiry was tackled by a working group, 
under the Chairmanship of J.R. Simpson of the Treasury’s Machinery of 
Government Branch and made up of his colleagues at the Machinery of 
Government Branch and representatives from the Departments most concerned.
Their report stated that ‘the view is strongly held’ that a policy of full 
employment implied the indefinite continuation of some economic controls and of 
the departmental sponsorship of industries ‘as part of the process of economic 
planning.’73 Based on these assumptions the working group surmised that a 
number of Government Departments had become specialists in the affairs of 
particular industries, or in other words, they ‘had become what is now usually know 
as the “production authority” for those industries.’ The report included a list of the 
tasks which these production authorities performed with respect to the industries 
within their purview and which were ‘regarded by one or more Departments as an 
essential part of its responsibilities as a production authority.’ These functions 
included:
‘(1) To consider and advise on the place in the economy as a whole of the 
industries for which it is responsible, and the contribution which they should make 
in furtherance of the Government’s economic policies...
(2) To sponsor the needs of its industries...
(3) To operate any special controls (e.g. price controls) which are particularly 
related to its industries.
(4) To collaborate in the application of the general controls so far as its industries 
are concerned, including the “persuasive” controls which obtain in important fields 
such as that of export promotion.’
The authors of the report argued that the traditional assignment of 
departmental responsibilities on a functional basis had been made obsolete by the 
way the relationship between Government and industry worked in reality. In was 
in the interest of the Government to follow through the logic of production 
authorities because it was clear ‘that if the Government is to plan the economy of 
the country effectively, it must work out a policy for all the main industries, it must
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therefore have an adequate knowledge of these industries which have any 
importance in the economic field.’ In this environment functional departments 
would be wasteful and ineffective as they would each have responsibilities in 
various industries, the only satisfactory alternative was to ‘concentrate knowledge 
of about each particular industry in one department and this is achieved in the 
production authority system.’
The report concluded that the production authority system was ‘an 
inescapable development in Government organisation, and that it has come to 
stay.’ Therefore the way forward was to examine further the division of production 
authority responsibilities between departments with the object of eliminating some 
of those only marginally concerned and ensuring that industries were not divided 
between two Departments.
In a covering note to the report the Steering Committee were asked to 
consider giving the report a wide circulation amongst Departments and also the 
possibility of showing the report in confidence to representative of industry ‘such 
as the F.B.I. and the N.U.M.’74 Sir Norman Brook, in his comments on the report, 
wrote that he could not favour either of these options. He could not agree with the 
Working Group’s logic, which had lead to such general conclusions about the 
future role of production authorities. As the ‘sponsorship’ functions of Departments 
were ‘essentially linked with allocations’, Brook argued that ‘with the 
disappearance of allocations, there would be no strict need for a production 
authority system. And, although world shortages of materials and the increased 
defence programme have temporarily reversed the pre-existing tendency towards 
dispensing with allocations, it is not presumably alleged that an extensive system 
of allocations is a permanent feature of our economic organisation, [emphasis in 
original]’
Brook’s comments reflected the prevailing view in Whitehall that the 
interference of Government in industry should be limited. Brook wrote that he 
would prefer studies of the contacts between Government and industry that started 
from ‘the specific duties which Departments have to perform... And we could 
perhaps get away from the idea that production authorities are to brood in a
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general and aimless way over the activities of the industries for which they are 
“responsible”.’ Brook intended it as a general criticism when he wrote that there 
was too much in the report that reflected Douglas Jay’s notorious dictum that l”the 
official in Whitehall knows best.’”75
In the Steering Committee meeting the full extent of Brook's anger was 
clear. He had written another note to Bridges questioning the whole direction of the 
enquiry, arguing that the ‘philosophic approach to its task which the [working] 
group had adopted in the absence of clear direction was unsound.’ However, 
Bridges thought that the kind of guidance Brook wanted to provide was not 
possible in this type of enquiry.76
Simpson, on behalf of the working group, defended the report, arguing that 
it was not philosophical, but rather was concerned with ‘those features of the 
present economy which seemed likely to endure for some years to come, including 
the maintenance- of exports, distribution of industry and land use, and full 
employment.’ Bridges sided with the working group on this fundamental point. He 
thought that ‘the current state of economic affairs would last for many years’ and 
‘that the enquiry ought not to shirk the problem of putting in order defects of 
organisation in the present machinery.’77
However, Brook received strong support from Sir Archibald Rowlands, 
Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Supply. He ‘did not see how anyone could 
say that the production authority system had come to stay without first deciding 
what were the main objectives of Government and what those objectives implied 
as to the role of a “production authority”.’ For his own part he thought that ‘many 
of the present contacts of Departments with industry were vestigial - survivals from 
the wartime system of controls. Apart from material shortages, contacts between 
Government [sic] would continue only so long as industry was willing to maintain 
them.’ In this light, the enquiry should be concerned with ‘the minimum amount of 
economic direction and control’ which government would have to maintain. 
Amongst the functions which he agreed should be included were ‘distribution of 
industry and export promotion, but not full employment.’78
Brook won his battle with Bridges and the working group. The report was
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not circulated or shown to representatives of industry, instead it was referred for 
study to a ‘Group of Three made up of Brook himself, Sir Harold Emmerson, 
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Works, and Sir Frank Lee. They were 
asked to produce ‘a list of specific problems arising in the field of economic 
organisation which required investigation.’ This they did but the enquiry was put 
on hold until after the General Election. A revised report by the group was 
presented in June 1952 with the emphasis on routine questions of organisation 
rather than on production authorities. On the specific issue of production 
authorities the report concluded that it might be worthwhile examining the 
boundaries between them. They had in mind ‘not a general study of the allocation 
of major production responsibilities, but a practical attempt to reduce the number 
of inter-departmental boundaries and eliminate the possibility of 
misunderstandings between Departments.’79
However, by 1953 the nature of economic policy was changing far more 
quickly than Sir Edward Bridges had expected. In March of that year Bridges 
discussed with Sir James Helmore, Rowlands’ successor as head of the Ministry 
of Supply, the question of whether an enquiry into the manner in which 
Departments carried out their production authority responsibilities should be 
instigated. Helmore came out against an enquiry. He thought that ‘it was difficult 
to see how many of the remaining controls were likely to last and the position 
would obviously be radically altered if most of the controls went.’80 Later that month 
Sir Frank Lee outlined the main functions of the Board of Trade to a committee 
looking at the functions of the Board and the Ministries of Supply, Fuel and Power, 
and Materials. He said that the production authority responsibilities of the Board 
were ‘shrinking’ and ‘might be regarded as transferable.’ He thought that the main 
tasks of production authorities ‘after the removal of controls’ would be 'to promote 
full employment’, rather than to ‘maintain’ it as Simpson had put it two years 
earlier, and also ‘to maintain war potential and to stimulate exports.’81
Within two years the relationship between government and industry had 
changed from one based primarily on control to one based on guidance. The 
prevailing view amongst officials, that the use of controls was only a transitional
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strategy, appeared to have been vindicated. But this transformation had occurred 
only because of a change in their political masters. The election of a 
Conservatives led to physical controls being dismantled at a faster rate than even 
Treasury officials had anticipated.
Butler and the politics of decontrol
The Conservatives came to power in October 1951 committed to ‘set the 
people free’ of physical controls.82 The Conservative case against controls was 
based on two central arguments. The first was that controls represented a 
restriction of personal freedom, the second that controls created economic 
inefficiency and discouraged individual enterprise. The first of these arguments 
had been outlined in detail by Churchill in his 1945 election broadcast of June 4. 
Churchill’s argument drew heavily on Fredrick Hayek’s book The Road to Serfdom. 
His contention was that a controlled economy inevitably involved the abrogation 
of personal liberty. He declared that ‘a socialist policy is abhorrent to the British 
ideas of freedom. Although it is now put forward in the main by people who have 
a good grounding in the Liberalism and Radicalism of the early part of this century, 
there can be no doubt that Socialism is inseparably interwoven with Totalitarianism 
and the abject worship of the state. It is not alone that property, in all its forms, is 
struck at, but that liberty, in all its forms, is challenged by the fundamental 
conceptions of Socialism.’ 83
Churchill argued that the kind of controls that were in force at the time of his 
broadcast were only justifiable because of the necessities of war: ‘Look how even 
to-day they [the Labour Party] hunger for controls of every kind, instead of wartime 
inflictions and monstrosities. There is to be one state to which all are to be 
obedient in every act of their lives. This state is to be the arch-administrator and 
ruler, and the arch-caucus boss.’84 Churchill did not deny that controls could 
guarantee full employment, rather he argued that the price that the public would 
have to pay for this guarantee in terms of their freedom was far too high. ‘In fact 
we punish criminals by sending them to Wormwood Scrubs and Dartmoor, where 
they get full employment and what board and lodging is appointed by the Home
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Secretary’85
For Conservatives individual liberty was dependent on a free parliament. 
Butler’s argument that the imposition of permanent economic controls represented 
the ‘Reichstag method of governing’ was drawn from the same logic as Churchill’s 
assertion that ‘a Free Parliament is odious to the Socialist doctrinaire. Have we not 
heard Mr Herbert Morrison descant upon his plans to curtail Parliamentary 
procedure and pass laws simply by resolutions of broad principle in the House of 
Commons afterwards to be left by Parliament to the executive and to the 
bureaucrats to elaborate and enforce by departmental regulations.’86
Richard Law developed Churchill’s Hayekian attack on the planned 
economy in his book Return from Utopia, published in 1950. Law was the son of 
the former Prime Minister Andrew Bonar Law and had been Minister of State at the 
Foreign Office, with Cabinet rank, from 1943 until the end of the wartime 
coalition.87 Law argued that ‘political liberty, which depends upon the widest 
possible diffusion of power and responsibility cannot easily be reconciled with an 
economic system in which both must be centralised in the highest degree. It can 
be agreed, at any rate, that the easy analogy which is often drawn between 
political order and economic planning is a false one. For a planned economy in 
which power is not centralised is clearly impossible. It is the essence of a plan that 
there should be a planner in whom final responsibility is vested. So far is the 
planned economy from promoting freedom by spreading power and responsibility 
that it can only discourage it by concentrating power and by preventing the 
exercise of responsibility except at the centre.’88
Law also outlined the second aspect of the Conservative’s case against 
controls: that they created inefficiency and constrained economic activity. He 
argued that ‘whether it is houses or machine-tools or farm machinery that are 
involved, the effect of planning has invariably been to slow down production by 
creating an artificial time-lag between demand and supply, and by interrupting the 
flow of components between one industry and another. The building of houses, for 
example, has been slowed down because the supply of cement has been out of 
line with the supply of bricks or timber, or because the Ministry of Works had failed
155
to order soil-pipes or bath-taps in sufficient quantities, or because kitchen units 
had arrived on the site before supplies of sand for plastering... There has been a 
great waste of economic effort which would certainly have been avoided if those 
who were planning the building programme had been obliged to stake their 
livelihood on the accuracy of their calculations.'89
Law argued that the market provided a far more efficient system of 
allocation. ‘Here in what is called the price mechanism, or the mechanism of the 
market, we can see a piece of machinery of the greatest complexity, which, 
provided that it is given the right setting provided, I mean, that there is genuine 
freedom of competition and that real incentives are present), is self-energising and 
automatic, and which operates with reasonable degree of smoothness and 
certainty according to laws which are generally predictable. Moreover, since the 
pricing mechanism can only operate effectively in a context of freedom, it tends to 
buttress the-institutions of freedom, not to undermine them.'90
As ChurchHI's election broadcast demonstrated these Hayekian arguments 
were not only the province of academic texts but also of everyday political 
discourse. In a speech delivered at Westcliff-on-Sea almost exactly a year after he 
became Chancellor, Rab Butler outlined the Conservative case against controls, 
clearly indicating that their removal was one of the Government's top priorities. He 
stated that There are gloomy prophets on the left who are saying that the only way 
we can hope to survive as a nation is through rigid direction of all our economic 
activities. They seem to believe that it is possible somehow to command, compel, 
control and exhort the British people into prosperity. This belief, I am told, is called 
“new thinking.” How it belies its own name! It is the oldest and ugliest thinking in 
history. It has been the creed of the tyrant, the pessimist and the materialist in 
every civilisation and every age. We are not used to that sort of thinking in Britain. 
And we do not mean to get used to it... Our policy is to enable and encourage 
everyone in industry, trade and agriculture alike, to give us of his best. We have 
never needed personal enterprise more, or more desperately, then we need it 
today.’91
As Chancellor of the Exchequer, Butler became the driving force behind the
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programme of decontrol carried out by the Churchill administration. In a Cabinet 
memorandum dated May 17 1952, Butler sought to show how his internal 
economic policy would fit in with his overall objectives. He wrote that 'our internal 
financial policy must work in line with and not against the rest of our economic 
policy.' This meant continuing the fight against inflation through the use of credit 
policy. However it also meant a return to what he described as 'a policy of 
economic realism, by which increases in the costs of goods are allowed to work 
through to the consumer' by 'making more use of the price mechanism.' He also 
made it clear that 'we cannot deal with inflation or secure the adjustment of our 
resources to the changes required by events, without some increase in the 
numbers temporary unemployed while changing their jobs.'92
On pricing policy Butler argued that the Conservatives had 'inherited 
measures designed to alleviate the symptoms of inflation rather than to cure the 
disease. These measures involved the use of public funds to subsidise certain 
prices, and the imposition of controls and rationing to prevent prices rising, 
although goods were scarce. Thus shortages were perpetuated, and taxes kept 
high to find money for subsidies. In many cases some goods were taxed and their 
prices raised to provide funds to keep down other prices. The rents of some 
houses are still controlled at such low levels that many owners cannot afford to 
repair them, at a time when we are running great risks to secure sufficient 
resources to build new ones.'93 Butler’s attitude to price controls and subsidies was 
therefore in marked contrast to those of his predecessor.
Butler made it clear that his policy meant 'we must be prepared to accept 
some further rise in the cost of living, including house rents and food prices.' 
However, a rise in the cost of living need not necessarily mean a reduction in the 
standard of living. He argued that the corresponding reduction in taxation would 
mean an ultimate rise in the general standard of living. Besides, past experience 
had shown 'that an improvement in the standard of living was generally associated 
with a rise in prices.' His goal was an expanding economy, which required the 
Government to remove the strait-jacket from the economy. People would be 'made 
better off by the fact that their incomes, as a whole, rise with rising production and
more than compensate for higher prices. A good recent example is the experience 
of the United States since the war. We could look forward to such a process taking 
place here without inflation, if, but only if, production increases fast enough.'94
At ministerial level most of the decontrol work was done by the Economic 
Policy Committee with Butler in the chair. When the Minister of Food, Gwilym Lloyd 
George proposed the removal of certain price controls in December 1951 Butler 
suggested that a working party be set up to provide general rules for the guidance 
of ministers dealing with commodity controls, thus preventing the Committee from 
becoming bogged down by unnecessary work.95 The Working Party was chaired 
by Salter and reported on January 19 1952. It proposed 'two rules of general 
application to all classes of commodities:-
(i) There should be no control in cases in which the control is not and 
cannot be so administered as to be reasonably effective. We consider that all 
existing controls which do not satisfy this condition should be immediately 
removed.
(ii) If an article is subsidised it must also be controlled. The only exception 
to the general rule is where a subsidy is negligible in amount...'96
Apart from these two general rules the working party thought that price 
controls should be divided up in to two separate categories. The first was '(A) Price 
control on the kinds of things which are bought regularly by the public.' These were 
important items in the household budget and an increase in their price was likely 
to have an effect on wage stability. Therefore the Working Party recommended 
'that goods in Category A should be controlled if but only if, they are essential and 
scare.'
The second category was (B) Price control on the kinds of things which are 
not part of the family budget e.g. building materials since such items did not so 
directly effect wage demands. Even though they might be essential their removal 
should be left to the Minister of Works. He had argued that 'none of these controls 
(all of which are non-statutory) is satisfactory, the industries are now seeking 
higher prices and he considers that this provided a good opportunity to bargain 
with them that if controls are removed they will not increase their prices by more
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that they would have had to be increased under control.'97
By February 1953 the speed with which Butler was dismantling the system 
of price controls was worrying at least one member of the Economic Policy 
Committee. The Minister of Labour Walter Monckton feared that removing price 
controls would create an increase in wage inflation. He argued that 'the lessons 
of 1952 are clear enough. Wage stability cannot be maintained in the face of a 
continued rise in prices of basic goods and services.' He argued that 'we have to 
cut our costs and increase productivity. Neither purpose can be achieved if wages 
(as distinct from earnings) are allowed continually to drift upwards.'98 Monckton’s 
claim contradicted the whole thrust of Butler's expansionist policy, as did his 
conclusion that it should 'be a major objective of Government policy to keep the 
level of retail prices as steady as possible and to avoid any measures which would 
cause any marked or prolonged rise in the Index.'99
Butler was sufficiently roused by this challenge to present a memorandum 
of his own. He stated that 'there are some aspects of the Minister of Labour and 
National Service's paper on "wages and prices, the need for stability in 1953" 
which gave me serious concern.' He took the opportunity to restate the position he 
had outlined in his memorandum of May 17 1952, specifically that the level of retail 
prices should not be allowed to dominate economic policy. He even included a dig 
at Woolton's pledge in the 1951 election campaign over food subsidies.100 'No 
doubt the Minister's last conclusion - about keeping the level of retail prices as 
steady as possible and avoiding measures which would cause any marked or 
prolonged rise in the index- is not intended to advocate a return to the policy of 
using the food subsidies so as to stabilise the index - I am sure we should all 
regard a reversal to this policy as disastrous both politically and economically. But 
even if the Ministers conclusion only means that we should avoid measures which 
would put up food prices, it goes further than is, in my view justified.'101
Butler took the view that to look at the problem of wages, prices and 
inflation in abstraction from the rest of the economy would be a mistake and that 
there was a far more positive way to proceed. 'We must consider our economic 
policy as a whole. It is out broad objective to introduce flexibility to our economy
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in place of the rigidity of recent years. Only so can we have the necessary 
adaptability to meet our changing need. We must remove as far as we can artificial 
distortions of demand in relation to supply. We have already made progress in this 
direction. We have removed controls and subsidy from tea. We are in process of 
removing control and general subsidy from eggs and cereal feeding-stuffs. We are 
examining steps to lead to the thawing out of the vast iceberg of rent restriction. 
These are only examples. They are bound to involve some increase in prices to 
the consumer. I do not think we should refrain from these and other similar 
changes as they become possible on the grounds that they carry the risk of 
stimulating demand for wage increases. We must look at the effect on the 
economy as a whole and if on balance we think them advantageous, we must not 
be deterred from adopting them.'102
By the'end of 1953 Butler was arguing that decontrol meant that the 
Ministry of Food, which had been set up at the outbreak of the Second World War, 
was ripe for abolition. On December 8 1953, he wrote to Sir Thomas Dugdale, the 
Minister of Agriculture, on the subject of which Departments should be entrusted 
with the residual functions of the Ministry of Food if it was wound up. Butler argued 
that such a move would 'be a most significant demonstration of the success of our 
efforts to end rationing, to do away with state trading in food, and to reduce the 
size of the civil service.'103
Officials at the Ministries of Food, Agriculture, Health, the Board of Trade 
and the Scottish Office prepared a report on the future of the Ministry. Its 
conclusion was not one with which Butler could agree; the officials recommended 
that the functions of the Ministry were 'sufficient to justify a continuing separate 
Department.' However, retention of the Ministry was not really an option Butler 
thought worth considering. In May 1954 the Conservative Party's Research Study 
Group, which included lain Macleod and Henry Brooke, had brought to Butler's 
attention the fact that the abolition of the Ministry of Food 'was electorally essential' 
and that 'its retention would be unpopular in the party.'104 Butler informed Churchill 
that the civil service report had reviewed two other possibilities: Amalgamation with 
the Ministry of Agriculture, or the distribution of the remaining functions amongst
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various other departments. After consultation with the various Ministers involved 
Butler recommended the first of these two options dismissing fears expressed by 
some officials inside the Ministry of Food that consumers interests would not be 
protected in a merged Ministry.105 Butler argued that the merger would produce 
some worth while economy and added that the ministers involved considered the 
continuation of a. separate Ministry of Food 'to be politically unacceptable.'106 
Churchill agreed with Butler and the Ministry of Food was merged with the Ministry 
of Agriculture.
Butler and Housing controls
The one area where Butler found it impossible to get all his own way was 
housing. The problem stemmed from Lord Woolton's acceptance of the delegates’ 
demand at the 1950 Party conference to build 300,000 houses a year. Woolton's 
advocacy of this target might have contributed to the feeling of antagonism that 
existed between him and Butler. Indeed, Ian Bancroft, who was a member of 
Butler’s Private Office from 1953 has suggested that Butler might have suspected 
Woolton because 'his first taste of government had been in a heavily regulated 
wartime atmosphere.'107 Nevertheless, Woolton's pledge was repeated in the 1951 
Party manifesto.108
This manifesto commitment helped Macmillan, who was appointed Minister 
for Housing and Local Government, to win his battles with Butler in Cabinet. The 
first of these was over the raising of the housing subsidies, which Macmillan 
thought was necessary to meet the increased interest rate. The standard annual 
subsidy was raised from £22 to £35-12s per house, with the Exchequer 
contributing three quarters of the amount. As Macmillan later recorded the 
settlement 'caused one a great effort to achieve', and he was attacked in The 
Times and The Economist over it.109
The decisive battle came in July of that year. Macmillan secured release 
from the Treasury's capital investment programme. He was able to overcome 
Butler's opposition by enlisting the support of the Prime Minister.110 If the ROBOT 
plan, in either of .its two forms, had been adopted then the target of 300,000
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houses a year would have had to have been abandoned. In his memorandum of 
June 28 1952 Butler had made it clear that whether the plan was accepted or not, 
it was 'absolutely necessary to reduce the overload on the economy'. However he 
'could not recommend the Plan unless it accompanied', amongst various cuts 'an 
adaptation of the investment programme, putting more emphasis on productive 
industry and less on social investment, including housing.'111 In any event the 
housing drive was a major drag on the achievement of Butler's external and 
internal policy goals and worked directly against his objective of having internal 
financial policy in line with the rest of the government's economic policy.
With the battle to contain the housing drive lost, Butler concentrated on 
transferring as much of it as possible to the private sector. Macmillan continued to 
fight hard to maintain the local authority sector despite his decision in November 
1951 to raise the ration of licences to private builders from one in ten to one in two. 
This had been primarily about raising the level of building.
In July 1952 Woolton expressed concern in Cabinet about the small 
proportion of owner occupiers. He did not ask for any increase in the total capital 
investment in housing, but he did suggest 'that within that total fewer houses 
should be built for letting by local authorities. Instead of persisting in the Socialist 
policy of herding people in to heavily subsidised council houses, could not the 
Government now remove the restriction on the building of private houses of up to, 
say, 1,000sq, ft.' However he did also ask whether it would be possible to 'pay a 
subsidy to a person buying a single house which he proposed to occupy himself, 
subject to contract over resale or letting for a period of years? '112 Macmillan 
declared himself to be 'generally in sympathy' with this position. He also wanted 
to look at ways to encourage private ownership, through subsidy or other 
means.113
Butler took it upon himself to write to the Prime Minister on the subject in 
October. He stated that 'as part of the campaign for reducing expenditure to which 
our Party and the Country attach so much importance I want to encourage the 
Minister of Housing to transfer some of his drive to the private sector.' He also 
pointed out that here 'housing could be developed... without public subsidy.'114
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Butler was granted Churchill's permission to talk to Macmillan on this subject. In 
December Macmillan made a statement to the effect of suspending the need for 
licences for houses not more than 1,000 square feet. No additional subsidy was 
announced.
Macmillan resisted moves to a greater share of unsubsidised private 
building in other areas. In November 1952 David Eccles, the Minister of Works, 
had proposed that the licence free limit for industrial and agricultural building 
should be raised from £500 to £10,000. Macmillan argued that if the limit was 
raised to, say, ‘£2,000 as a compromise, then 'the free limit for all building work by 
local authorities should be raised correspondingly.' He thought that local 
authorities would be at a disadvantage because 'in the private sector applications 
could be made for licences in respect of work above the free limit, but all work by 
local authorities was subject to the ceilings imposed by the capital investment 
programme.'115 The Economic Policy Committee agreed to raise the licence free 
limit for agricultural and industrial building work from £500 to £2,000 but could not 
endorse Macmillan's proposal for local authority building. He accepted the 
Committee’s decision but reserved the right 'to raise the point again in due 
course.'116
Macmillan was to win a related battle over New Towns policy. In May 1953 
Butler drew the Economic Policy Committee's attention to the conclusion of the 
Home Affairs Committee that 'a prima facie case had been established for a review 
by the ministers concerned of the existing policy for New Towns Development.' 
Butler agreed with this conclusion and added that he was 'disturbed by the heavy 
and increasing burden of the New Towns on the Budget, particularly "below the 
line."' He wondered whether, in such circumstances 'we have no alternative but to 
acquiesce without further examination to policies inherited from our predecessors 
which are already so costly and are only now gathering momentum... The essence 
of the matter, it seems to me, is whether we can in present circumstances afford 
a vast outlay of money and resources on a redistribution of the population which, 
however desirable, cannot be regarded as essential to our national survival.' 
Although he accepted that a sudden halt could not be called to half completed
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building 'other sources of finance must be found.' Here he had 'particularly in mind 
the private developer who may have a substantial role to play in the future as he 
has done in the past.'117 Peter Thorneycroft also expressed a concern that new 
towns were attracting industry and finance away from development areas.118
Macmillan argued that the Government should go ahead 'with ever- 
increasing energy and speed since the quicker we build new houses, factories and 
offices, the quicker we shall get back our money on the development expenses.'119 
It was this position that won the day and measures were passed voting new towns 
more money. These measures did nothing to encourage the New Town 
Corporations to stimulate private house building as Butler wanted or to assuage 
his continued concern about the subsidy of new town residents120
Macmillan also proceeded more cautiously with the removal of rent 
restriction than Butler would have liked. In his memorandum on economic policy 
in May 1952 Butler had argued for reform.121 But it was Macmillan's contention that 
in the first half of 1952 'the time had not yet come to deal with the problem of rents. 
The Houses must go up before the rents.'122 Action was not proposed until 
September 1952 after the Prime Minister had complained in Cabinet about reports 
of 'landlords abandoning their house property because they were unable to keep 
it in repair.' He considered the possibility of the Minister of Housing buying this 
property at a small sum. But in discussion it was pointed out that the problem 
arose from the operation of the Rent Restriction Acts. Macmillan announced that 
he had devised a scheme for dealing with the problem and was invited to circulate 
a memorandum on it.123 Members of the Cabinet, and the Prime Minister in 
particular, were acutely aware of the political difficulties involved in reforming the 
restrictions. Churchill told the Cabinet that 'any legislation amending the Rent 
Restriction Acts must be so designed as to bring no financial benefit to landlords.' 
Macmillan replied that 'the scheme outlined in his memorandum had been framed 
with this in view.'124 Thus the process of reform was constrained from the very 
beginning.
Macmillan gave his plans the title of "Operation Rescue" but they made little 
real impact. In fact 'many in the Ministry [of Housing] felt, with some justice, that
104
Macmillan was to blame for the lameness of ‘what became 'the Housing Repairs 
and Rents Act. They had urged a far higher increase in rents for repair work than 
Macmillan felt politically feasible, and as a consequence, landlords has insufficient 
money to spend.'125 Nevertheless, Butler was keen to proceed as quickly as 
possible even if the proposals only began the thawing out of what he described as 
'the vast ice berg of rent restriction.'126 He saw 'the continual drain on the 
Exchequer in respect of the housing subsidy' as 'one of the most serious 
remaining threats to the stability of sterling' and he accepted that 'some relaxation 
of rent control was an essential preliminary to any reduction of the subsidy.'127 
However, the Housing Repairs and Rents Act was not passed until 1954.
In October 1954 the Economic Policy Committee finally agreed to end 
building licensing. David Eccles had been asked by the Committee to consider the 
future of controls and recommended that licensing be ended. He added that 'this 
will be an important step in the return to a free economy. It would prove that the 
housing expansion is not at the expense of other building. It would save £120,000 
a year on my vote and probably much more in the offices of architects and 
builders.'128
Macmillan approved the move, as did Butler who also welcomed the 'effect that 
this would have in reducing the Ministry of Works vote and in saving man-
1129power.
The Deficiency Payments Scheme
One policy which has been overlooked as an area of controversy between 
the parties, is agricultural pricing. The 1947 Agriculture Act introduced a system 
of fixed prices, set annually by the Ministry of Agriculture in consultation with the 
Treasury and the Ministry of Food.
Considerable work on agricultural marketing arrangements after the 
abolition of the Ministry of Food was done in the Ministry of Agriculture under the 
leadership of Basil Engholm who ran the marketing division. The Ministry faced 
two major problems. The first was to reconcile the proposed deficiency payments 
scheme with the guarantees of the 1947 Act and the second was to sell the
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scheme to a hostile agricultural community.
At the end of 1952 the legal advisers to the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
Ministry of Food and the Secretary of State for Scotland were consulted on the 
compatibility of a deficiency payments scheme with the 1947 Act. Ministers had 
expressed ‘doubts’ on this point at a meeting of the Food and Agriculture 
Committee.130 The legal advisers concluded that such a scheme was compatible 
with the provision of guaranteed prices and that Section 8(2) of the Act ‘specifically 
provides that “guaranteed prices” are to be understood as including the provision 
of payment to producers whether by reference to acreage or otherwise as an 
alternative to the provision of guaranteed prices.’131
Engholm and J.H. Kirk, of the economics and statistics division, informed 
Sir Thomas Dugdale, the Minister of Agriculture, that ministers had every right to 
implement the scheme. At a meeting on December 10 1952, Sir James Turner of 
the National Union of Farmers expressed the view that the guarantees given by 
the 1947 Act were ‘guarantees to the individual farmer.’ This system, he argued 
could not be replaced by a collective guarantee, such as was implied by the 
system of deficiency payments ‘except by agreement.’ Fie continued that ‘A 
deficiency payments system might carry out the Government’s obligation to 
provide a guaranteed price, but it did not provide an assured market since an 
individual producer especially if he were short of credit or storage equipment, 
might have to sell at the bottom of the market but would receive only the same rate 
of deficiency payment as the rest.’ 132
Engholm and Kirk argued that there was nothing in the Act that indicated 
that it ‘must provide a fixed and uniform price for all producers individually.’ In 
addition, The intention underlying Part I’ of the Act ‘was made abundantly clear 
by Mr Tom Williams, the then Minister, in his Second Reading speech. He said: 
“stability is not necessarily synonymous with rigidity. Agriculture is composed of 
many different forms of production... Therefore, no single panacea can provide 
uniformity throughout the industry. The methods of providing stability will vary 
accordingly.’” The brief stated that later in his speech the Minister had said ‘”...no 
single method is laid down in the Bill. The actual provision for any commodity may
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be a guaranteed fixed price, a deficiency payment related to the standard price, 
such as we had in regard to wheat in pre-war days...’’’ Engholm and Kirk briefed 
the Minister that ‘the substantial arguments against support prices and individual 
guarantees are, however, that they are almost incompatible with freedom of the 
market and return of trade to private hands. In one form or another they imply the 
continued operation of the Ministry of Food under another name.’133
The N.F.U’s solution to this dilemma was the establishment of producers’ 
trading boards which would be responsible for operating the individual guarantees. 
Engholm and Kirk felt that ’a producers’ trading board would certainly be free from 
some of the objections to an individual guarantee system. It would for instance 
transfer responsibility, cost and staff from the State to the producers.’ Flowever, 
this solution was ‘still open to the objections of perpetuating the barrier between 
producer and consumer (the one receiving a higher price than the other pays) and 
of necessarily interfering with a large area of private trade.’134
Nevertheless the animosity of the N.F.U. to the scheme was such that the 
minute recommended that ‘the minister might say that he has an open mind on 
producers’ trading boards. If they have a genuine trading function to perform they 
may be appropriate and he will examine each proposal for a new trading board in 
that light...it is suggested that the minister should say that the onus falls on the 
N.F.U. in each case to say why deficiency payments will not work and what 
functions other than disbursing public funds would be carried out by the producers’ 
trading boards.’135
Dugdale went much further than even his own Ministry suggested in 
appeasing the farmers and came out completely in favour of the N.F.U. plan. The 
Government’s pledge to the meat trade to allow a return to private trade as soon 
as possible brought these matters to a head at the end of 1953. The Food and 
Agriculture Committee, chaired by Butler, decided in October 1953 that the 
Minister for Food, Lloyd George, and Dugdale, should submit a joint memorandum 
to the Cabinet on the restoration of private trade in livestock and meat. The 
intention was for them to come to agreement about the form of a deficiency 
payments scheme. In the event, Dugdale would not agree to the scheme and
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submitted his own memoranda to the Cabinet which proposed the producer trading 
board scheme of the N.F.U. Lloyd George submitted a memorandum outlining the 
scheme of deficiency payments that had been agreed to by the Committee.
Dugdale informed the Cabinet that the N.F.U. ‘Had come down strongly 
against any system of deficiency payments and had formulated a scheme for the 
central purchase of livestock by a producers’ marketing board, at pre-determined 
fixed prices, followed by re-sale in a free market.’ Dugdale ‘doubted whether it 
would be possible to restore the farmers’ confidence in the Government’s 
agricultural policy unless some of the principles underlying those proposals were 
accepted.’
Specifically, Dugdale argued for the establishment of producers marketing 
boards ‘which had been a feature of the agricultural policy of the Conservative 
Government before the war. The farmers had now, however, become 
apprehensive that the Government might abandon that principle, and he believed 
that their confidence in the Government would not be restored unless it were 
reaffirmed.’ By allowing for the continuation of ‘the system of an assured market 
at pre-determined prices, it would provide the farmers with the security which they 
required. At the same time, by its provision for the resale of meat in a free market, 
it would redeem the Governments pledges to the meat traders and would restore 
freedom of choice to consumers.’136
In contrast, the Minister of Food proposed the system of deficiency 
payments to which the N.F.U. was so strongly opposed. However, he also 
proposed a system of buttress prices as an additional protection for farmers. This 
meant that ‘the guarantee to farmers would be expressed in a dual form, whereby 
a standard price and a buttress price would be fixed at the annual review... where, 
through mischance or malpractice in the market, a producer has sold below the 
buttress price, he would in addition to receiving a deficiency payment, also receive 
such an amount as would bring his return from that sale up to the level of the 
buttress price [emphasis in original] . ’137
Lloyd George was not against the establishment of a producers’ marketing 
board, and his arrangements would allow them to promote one ‘although not one
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with monopolistic trading powers.’ This Board’s ‘activities should add to healthy 
competition in the trade and besides being if advantage to the producer would 
contribute towards a flourishing and efficient livestock industry. This is just the sort 
of evolutionary process which has always served us best in the end.’138
In Cabinet Lloyd George said that he was ‘strongly opposed’ to Dugdale’s 
plan that the Ministry of Food ‘should continue state trading in meat until such time 
as a producers’ marketing board could be established with monopoly powers.’ 
During this period the Ministry of Food ‘would be required to buy food at fixed 
prices and re-sell it in a free market for what it would fetch.’ Given the amount of 
market freedom traders were to be granted this would be ‘a bad commercial 
proposition for any Government Department to undertake.’ In addition both traders 
and producers would have a positive incentive to increase the Department’s 
losses. The producers marketing board which Dugdale wished to establish could 
only be set up after a ‘long and complicated procedure’ had been completed. 
Therefore, if the Government accepted Dugdale’s plan, ‘it seemed likely that the 
Ministry of Food would still be trading in meat at heavy cost to the exchequer.’ 
Politically, the setting up of a monopolistic trading agency ‘could be represented 
as a stage towards the nationalisation of the meat trade.’139
Dugdale’s plan really had no chance of gaining the approval of Cabinet as 
both the Prime Minister and the Chancellor came out strongly against it. Churchill 
said that he was ‘impressed by the advantages of the plan put forward by the 
Minister of Food. It was in accord with the general theme of the Government’s 
policy for relaxing controls and restoring free markets, and abandoning state 
trading and bulk purchase.’ He added that ‘he himself preferred that the public 
should pay through taxation such sums as were required to ensure the stability of 
British agriculture, and that the prices which, as consumers, they paid for home- 
produced food should be left to be determined by the operation of a free market.’140 
For his part, Butler did not accept Dugdale’s assertion that the present 
government was in any way committed to the principle of compulsory marketing 
boards with powers of monopoly trading. He told the Cabinet that the Agricultural 
Charter of 1948 had stated that ’’’the basis of good marketing in the future should
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be producers’ co-operation both through voluntary organisations and through 
statutory marketing boards.” It had clearly been contemplated that the method 
would vary according to the requirements of the different commodities.’141
Butler also agreed with Lloyd George that ‘it would be highly dangerous to 
establish a single agency responsible for buying at fixed prices all home-produced 
meat, involving an annual turnover of about £300 millions and for selling it for what 
it would fetch on a free market.’ Moreover ‘He could not accept the unlimited 
liability which this would create for the Exchequer. Politically Butler felt that 
Dugdale’s scheme ‘would expose the Government to damaging criticism in later 
years.’142
Although Butler strongly agreed with the deficiency payments scheme he 
was well aware of the problems involved in selling this to the farmers. He 
conceded that they were ‘in a difficult mood and were disposed to reject out of 
hand any scheme based on the principle of deficiency payments.’ However he saw 
the problem as being only one of presentation and felt that further thought should 
be given to this. The Cabinet agreed that the Chancellor should discuss the 
question of presentation with other interested members of the Cabinet.143
The Government’s plans for the Deficiency Payments Scheme were set out 
in a White Paper ‘Decontrol of Food and Marketing of Agricultural Produce’ 
published in November 1953. In the Debate on the Address of the same month, 
Churchill fitted the Scheme in with the Governments decontrol policy in general. 
His speech was worded in such a way that seemed designed to antagonise the 
Opposition. He said that ‘The House knows that it is our policy to reduce control 
and restrictions as much as possible and to reverse if not to abolish the tendency 
to State purchase and marketing which is a characteristic of the socialist 
philosophy. We hope instead to develop individual enterprise founded in the main 
on the laws of supply and demand and to restore to the interchange of goods and 
services that variety, flexibility, ingenuity and incentive... on which we believe the 
fertility and liveliness of economic life depend. We have now reached a point when 
the end of wartime food rationing, with all its rigid costly features and expensive 
staff, is in sight. For our farmers, the abandonment of controls will bring great
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opportunities.’144
Labour’s attack on the proposed scheme concentrated on the proposition 
that even if it did not contravene the letter of the 1947 Act, it certainly contravened 
its spirit. In the third reading of the Agriculture Bill in June 1947 Tom Williams, then 
Minister of Agriculture, had outlined the ‘basic principles of this Bill upon which the 
Government’s agricultural policy is founded. We believe that if agriculture is to play 
its part fully and effectively in the national economy, we much provide for it a 
reasonable sense of stability and prosperity. We on this side and I think there is 
general agreement on this- feel that by far the best method to ensure that stability 
and prosperity is by assured markets and guaranteed prices for its major 
products...’145 In the 1953 Debate on the Address Williams accused the 
Government of undermining these principles. He argued that ‘those farmers who 
remember the ‘20s and ‘30s when there was plenty of liberty, no controls, and few 
forms, are not terribly enthusiastic about another dose of that sort of liberty, even 
if presented free of charge by a Conservative Government.’146
The Government’s method of implementing the Deficiency Payments 
Scheme did succeed in allaying some of the N.F.U.’s criticisms. In particular, the 
opportunity to re-establish marketing boards and the buttress price aspect of the 
scheme were welcomed. However, the Union still opposed the return to the 
auction system and the consequent abandonment of fixed prices known in 
advance which they regarded ‘as fundamental to expanding production.’147
Over the following year the costs of the scheme and the problems involved 
in its implementation created difficulties for the Government. Butler’s response was 
to try and sell the scheme directly to farmers in a series of speeches. Tom Williams 
commented that Butler ‘seems to have appointed himself the Government’s chief 
agricultural propagandist.’148 In his notes for a speech at Gloucester on July 10 
1954, Butler cut out much of his prepared text in order to concentrate on the issue 
of agricultural pricing. He argued that ‘our new schemes for guaranteed prices 
provide farmers with an incentive to quality production and make it possible for the 
preference of the housewife to be passed back to the farmer, who produced the 
food... We must show that the new freedom in food, which the housewife has
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welcomed, is welcomed by the farmer too as providing a healthy stimulus and a 
just reward.’149
The Opposition continued to attack the scheme and raised the matter in the 
Debate on the Address in December 1954. Both Williams and George Brown, the 
Shadow Minister of Agriculture, offered lengthy critiques of the Government’s 
policy but refused to be drawn on an alternative. Although the scheme was 
unpopular with farmers, direct controls were unpopular with the public at large. 
This fact allowed the Conservatives to counter-attack. The new Minister of 
Agriculture, David Heathcoat Amory was able to say of Tom Williams speech in the 
Debate that from it 'we could not get a clue as to what the policy of the right hon. 
Member was. Judging from what he and his right hon. Friends have said from time 
to time about this matter I believe that rationing and allocation must be absolutely 
a central point in their policy.’ In reply George Brown said that this was ‘certainly 
not’ the case but Opposition spokesmen were reluctant to elaborate on what their 
alternative was.150
This kind of schizophrenia on the subject of controls is also evident in Tom 
William’s memoirs Digging for Britain. Although he attacked the Deficiency 
Payments scheme, for which he held Lloyd George responsible, he could not bring 
himself to defend controls as a permanent feature. He argued that ‘Nobody wants 
controls for their own sake, but some caution is needed in removing them as this 
Food Minister [Lloyd George] managed to demonstrate very clearly.’151
In marked contrast, Gaitskell demonstrated no reluctance in defending a 
policy of controls. His overall vision of the economy allowed him to place 
agriculture policy into the broader picture of economic controls in general. In the 
Debate on the Address on December 7 1954 he moved an amendment to the 
Question that added: ‘but humbly regret that the Gracious Speech displays an 
unwarrantable complacency towards the continued existence of social injustice 
and a doctrinaire determination to abandon public enterprise, essential controls 
and other forms of intervention by the community designed to check inflation, 
protect consumers and encourage economic expansion.’152
Gaitskell illustrated his argument by direct reference to agricultural policy:
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‘Here... is one sphere where we believe that the Government’s policy of going 
back to a much greater degree of free enterprise is an especially bad one... 
Experience surely does show that in this field... we really do need to replace the 
free market mechanism with some kind of production guarantee, certainly- call it 
what one likes- to farmers. This is the view of the farming community. We must,
I believe, if we are to get expansion, which we, at any rate, believe vital to this 
country, provide some degree of certainty- a buffer between the uncertainties of 
the market and the ordinary farmer.’153
Gaitskell went on to place agricultural controls in the context of Labour’s 
policy on controls generally: ‘Our view is that to preserve full employment without 
inflation, it is necessary to use both the so-called indirect controls - budgetary and 
credit controls - and direct controls at certain points of shortage- industrial building, 
imports and foreign exchange - and we also believe that the Government have to 
intervene at specific points to stimulate production. Agriculture is one example.’154
The Future of the Defence Regulations
It is interesting to contrast the attitude towards legislation dealing with the 
future of the Defence Regulations shown by the Conservative Government with 
that of the previous Labour one. For the Conservatives the problems were almost 
the opposite to those involved in the preparation of the Full Employment Bill. First, 
there was the issue of permanence, whether it would be necessary to put on the 
statute book provisions for raw material control that would only be needed in the 
event of an economic crisis or to simply draft legislation to be introduced when 
such a crisis occurred. Second, there was the issue of what to do about the 
provisions of the Emergency Powers Act that would still be needed for the time 
being. The question was whether or not to keep renewing the existing defence 
regulations, in particular D.R. 55, which gave general powers of material control, 
or to revoke it and introduce temporary legislation with a much narrower scope. 
Behind both these questions was one over-riding concern: how to prevent a future 
Labour government from reintroducing the economic controls that the 
Conservatives had systematically dismantled.
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Cherwell had expressed concern over where decontrol was leading in a 
memorandum to the Economic Policy Committee in July 1953. He quoted the 
Programmes Committee's conclusion that ‘in the event of a worsening in our 
balance of payments it would be extremely difficult to make any rapid and 
substantial impact on our import expenditure by direct restriction of imports.’ 
Cherwell viewed this as 'an alarming situation', and recommended re-imposition 
of controls to cut imports directly if a crisis should arise. He hoped 'that plans will 
be worked out in detail for rapidly reimposing discriminatory controls should the 
need arise.'155
In November 1953 a Working Party was set up by the Cabinet Emergency 
Legislation Committee to 'consider the extent to which powers to exercise 
economic controls are likely to be required over a period of years and to prepare 
an outline of the legislation which would be necessary to confer these powers in 
substitution for D.R. (55) and other associated or related regulations and 
emergency statutes.'156 Sir James Crombie, the Chairman of the Working Party 
interpreted the phrase ‘over a period of years’ in the terms of reference as 
meaning that the legislation the 'Working Party might wish to outline would be of 
a permanent nature.'157 However, it was pointed out in discussion that ministers 
had recently rejected proposals for permanent legislation for price control powers 
contained in an official report. Indeed, one of the Secretaries of the Working Party, 
A.J. Collier, later informed Crombie that a memorandum Thorneycroft had 
prepared on this official report indicated ‘the President's dislike of any permanent 
legislation of this sort - even when the alternative is a continuation of reliance on 
Defence Regulations.' Collier argued that Thorneycroft’s memorandum 
demonstrated how 'appallingly difficult it would be to suggest this form of 
legislation on any form of economic control in a way which would be acceptable 
to the present Government.'158
Thorneycroft's, position was endorsed by the Home Affairs Committee and 
as a result the Home Secretary had to change his statement to the Commons on 
the subject of the Defence Regulations. This statement had originally read: 'It may 
be that economic strategy will require the holding of a small bridgehead for some
174
time to come to provide, for example, for the control of strategic goods and 
possibly reserve powers of price control for use in economic adversity. In that 
event some permanent powers would be required and we should bring proposals 
before the House.' The final statement excluded any mention of what permanent 
powers might be necessary.159
With the views of ministers in mind, the Working Party decided to divide the 
problem up in to two parts. Introducing legislation to greatly narrow their scope 
could solve the problem of the Defence Regulations. The other problem, identified 
by Cherwell, of economic emergencies could be dealt with by identifying which 
controls would be needed in such a situation. But this left one major issue to 
decide on: 'whether prior legislation would be needed or whether it would be 
sufficient to introduce it at the time.'160 Representatives of the Ministry of Materials 
were in no doubt that 'action would have to be taken in advance of a situation of 
sufficient danger to warrant an approach to Parliament.' The Ministry 'felt that the 
absence of powers would prejudice their chance of being able to act at the right 
time.' The Ministry of Food, on the other hand did not think that advance legislation 
was necessary since 'legislation might itself precipitate a crisis which might 
otherwise have been avoided.'161
Collier was concerned that a situation in which the Government was left 
with reduced Defence Regulations and only draft legislation to be introduced in the 
event of crisis would leave out 'an intermediate type of control which is not really 
covered by either of these decisions, a type for which the arguments have 
nowhere been fully set out... The controls I refer to are those which the Ministry of 
Materials and perhaps other departments concerned with raw materials, feel they 
need to have in case a situation arises in the future where it is necessary to control 
the use of raw materials by allocation etc. Such powers could not usefully be 
contained in any draft legislation which could be introduced in a crisis, because it 
may well be that the shortages which arise may not be connected with an 
Economic Crisis such as would justify the passing of such general legislation. Nor 
could such controls being a future possibility, be included in any temporary 
legislation.'162
E.B. Bowyer, Permanent Secretary at the Minister of Materials, wrote in a 
letter to Brook that he would not 'press for reserve statutory powers for this reason 
alone.' However, he did issue a stiff warning about the dangers of rejecting reserve 
statutory powers if the Government continued to exercise import controls. He wrote 
that 'we could not advise ministers to accept responsibility for the internal 
consequences of severe restrictive import licensing upon any material unless we 
also had reserve power to control its distribution.' He warned that 'if ministers 
continue to regard restriction of imports, possibly rather more severe than that 
which is being exercised at the present time, as necessary for safeguarding our 
balance of payments, we should need to retain some general powers of control 
over distribution to deal with the internal consequences.' For Bowyer this meant 
'reserve statutory powers rather than draft legislation to be introduced in an 
emergency.' He thought it 'essential that a clear decision should be taken by 
ministers on this point before any legislation is drafted.'163 Bowyer’s points were 
outlined to the Cabinet Emergency Legislation Committee when it came to discuss 
the option of permanent reserve powers. In spite of this warning, ministers decided 
against retaining reserve powers and in favour of drafting legislation to be 
introduced at the time of a crisis.164
Ministers were more divided over the question of what to do about the 
Defence Regulations. The Official Committee recorded that the main benefits of 
temporary legislation were three-fold. It '(i) restricted the purposes for which 
emergency powers were available, (ii) Removed the Defence Regulation structure, 
(iii) Denied to a future Government the use of D.R.55 for the purpose of re­
introducing controls which had been relinquished.'165 However, the problem with 
this plan was that if the Supplies and Services Act and the Emergency Powers Act 
were both to be repealed then it would involve vast legislation covering land as 
well as economic controls. The Official Committee suggested the alternative plan 
of 'narrowing and re-defining the purposes for which the Economic Control 
Regulations could in future be used' by means of an Order-ln-Council. The main 
benefit of this plan was that it 'would only be subject to prayer for its annulment.'166
Butler thought this issue important enough to write in detail to Eden about
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the alternatives, noting that Eden appeared to prefer the narrowing of the 
regulations by an Order-ln-Council. Butler warned that this method had the 'one 
possible disadvantage, it would seem to leave D.R.55 in being and therefore 
capable of variation back to its original general form by some future Government 
if they so minded.'167 Butler was certainly well aware of the political dimension to 
this decision. In February 1953 Michael Fraser, a member of the Conservative 
Research Department who had served under Butler, prepared a note for him on 
the special number of The Political Quarterly devoted to the Labour Party which 
included Gaitskell's article on 'The Economic Aims of the Labour Party’. Fraser 
noted that whatever the detailed form of Labour's policy 'it will require a certain 
number of physical controls to apply it. If these are not already in existence when 
Labour next wins power, they must be created.' Gaitskell had recognised that 
when Labour had come in to power in 1945 it had the advantage of the system of 
wartime controls still being in operation. Fraser drew the 'tactical lesson' from this 
that the Conservatives must 'ensure that before the next Election we have swept 
away as much of this structure of controls as possible. The Labour Party will then 
have to face both the difficulty and, in some cases (for example, food rationing), 
the unpopularity of reimposing some of them for planning purposes and as part of 
their doctrine of "fair shares'"168 In the end, the Cabinet decided that these tactical 
considerations were not enough to justify temporary legislation and it was decided 
to proceed with an Order-ln Council.169
Conclusion
Rab Butler looked back at decontrol of the economy as being one of the 
major achievements of his Chancellorship. In his memoirs he described 1954 as 
the ‘year when, for the British trader and the British consumer, the war finally 
ended. In 1951 the law courts were crowded with about 1,700 cases each month 
for offences against controls. By 1954 these were down to about 80 a month. 
Nearly all state trade had been given back to private enterprise... Most price 
controls were abolished. Thousands of controls on the allocation of materials and 
the manufacture and sale of goods were removed. Import controls had been
177
greatly relaxed. The great commodity markets had been reopened. Above all, food 
rationing and other restrictions on consumption had been brought to an end.’170 
The quote is revealing, not only because it shows Butler’s pride in the success of 
the decontrol programme which he had spearheaded, but also because it shows 
that he saw controls as restrictions only acceptable in time of war. Officials shared 
Butler’s view of controls, when the Labour Government had charged an official 
committee with the responsibility of reviewing what kind of controls would be 
needed in the long-term it had only been able to think of controls in terms of their 
wartime application.
Butler’s free market philosophy contrasted sharply with Gaitskell’s belief in 
a controlled economy. While Butler believed that the return of market forces would 
allow for greater economic expansion and prosperity, Gaitskell believed that 
physical planning was necessary for the maintenance of full employment and a fair 
distribution of goods. While Labour ministers generally agreed on the need to 
retain controls no other minister saw the issue as clearly as Gaitskell. He took 
control of deciding the content of what he christened the ‘Full Employment Bill’ and 
selected controls for inclusion on the basis of what he thought was essential to 
planning in the long run.
The issue of controls revealed a difference in the political as well as 
economic philosophy of the two parties. It is usually assumed that the tactic of 
attacking Labour’s programme in terms of its impact on individual freedom, which 
Churchill employed in his election broadcast of 4 June 1945, was abandoned after 
the Conservatives electoral defeat.171 However, it has been shown that the 
Conservatives continued to attack the Labour Government’s use of physical 
planning in Hayekian terms. The Labour government’s commitment to make many 
controls permanent and the Conservatives to abolish them reveals that the 
controls issue was not simply a matter of political propaganda but at the heart of 
the division between the two parties about the role of the Government in the 
economy.
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Chapter 7 
The Politics of External Economic Policy
Policy towards convertibility offers one of the most striking examples of the 
absence of consensus between the parties on economic policy and at the same 
time emphasises the second major theme of this thesis, that it was the view taken 
by ministers that was decisive. Gaitskell, in common with other Labour ministers 
like Douglas Jay and Harold Wilson, doubted if convertibility was desirable, even 
as a long-term objective. Conservatives on the other hand had no doubts about 
the desirability of convertibility but there were divisions over whether convertibility 
should be at a floating rate and also about the timing of the move.
For Gaitskell the question of convertibility was fundamental. How could 
convertibility of the pound be reconciled with the pursuit of socialism in a non­
socialist world? While ready to accept some liberalisation in the context of the non­
dollar world, Gaitskell saw profound incompatibilities between those states which 
did not propose to plan their economies and those like Britain, which saw planning 
as essential, and he feared the pressure that the former would bring to bear on the 
latter if they consented to moves towards convertibility and multilaterism. In this 
context, it comes as a surprise to find Gaitskell agreeing to the creation of the 
European Payments Union. It will be shown below that the episode not only 
illuminates his thinking on convertibility, but that his agreement was conditional on 
the scheme taking a form that he believed compatible with British interests and 
more particularly a socialist approach to the problems of the British economy.
There were Conservatives equally suspicious about the American drive 
towards multilateralism, but they were in no position to influence the debate about 
convertibility, which was confined to the incoming Conservative Cabinet. Within the 
Cabinet there were those like Lyttelton and Butler, who believed that immediate 
convertibility at a floating rate would create the free market conditions that were 
in themselves necessary to bring Britain’s economy back into equilibrium. Churchill 
was supportive of this position, which accorded well with his own thinking over 
almost half a century. Initially the ROBOT plan of February 1952, which embodied
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these ideas, seemed likely to be adopted, although there was a marked division 
of opinion in the Cabinet between its protagonists and those who believed that 
Britain’s balance of payments had to be strong before the objective of convertibility 
could be reached.
Although the plan was postponed, almost entirely for political reasons, 
discussion of it continued for several months and led ultimately to the adoption of 
the Collective Approach to convertibility which embodied the same objectives but 
without the advantage of presenting other countries with a fait accompli. It was this 
difference that ultimately lead to its failure. In spite of this set back convertibility 
had been established as a major goal of government policy in marked contrast to 
Gaitskell’s continuing reservations. Butler’s approach continued to be shaped by 
his free-market beliefs and by February 1955 de facto convertibility had been 
achieved. Speculation against the pound forced Butler to publicly repudiate floating 
in the Summer of 1955 but the evidence suggests that he continued to see this as 
the ultimate objective of his policy.
Gaitskell and Convertibility
Under the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944, which set out the blueprint 
for the postwar world economic system, Britain was committed to making the 
pound convertible after a period of transition. However, the conditions of the 
American loan finally agreed in December 1945 committed the Government to 
making the pound convertible by mid-1947.1 Throughout 1947 the pound became 
increasingly convertible and on 5 July full convertibility was in force, only to be 
suspended five weeks later because of the enormous loss of reserves.
The effect of the 1947 sterling crisis was to sharpen Labour ministers’ 
thinking about whether convertibility was desirable even as a long-term goal of 
economic policy. Hugh Gaitskell became particularly concerned about pressure 
from both the Americans and Treasury officials to make progress towards 
convertibility and multilateralism and feared that this would force Britain to adopt 
a deflationary economic policy. In June 1949, when he was Minister of State for 
Economic Affairs in the Treasury, he wrote in his diary that There can be no doubt 
that the clash between American and British ideas on discrimination and
convertibility is certain to become worse. For my part I see no hope of closer links 
between the dollar and sterling areas. On the contrary the incipient depression in 
the United States with falling prices and incomes makes our dollar problem worse. 
Since we will not deflate or devalue - in my view quite rightly - we must restrict 
dollar imports more and try and develop non-dollar sources of supply. This meant 
bilateral pacts with some form of multilateralism between non-dollar countries. But 
it is all anathema to the Americans.’2
Another consideration in Gaitskell’s mind was pressure from Treasury 
officials in favour of deflation. Gaitskell and Douglas Jay eventually favoured 
devaluation in the summer of 1949 partly to stem this tide. Gaitskell wrote that 
officials in the Treasury ‘favour deflation, but they all seem to want to cling to 
multilateralism and convertibility as our aim. Douglas Jay is opposed to this and 
has a continual struggle inside the Treasury for Stafford’s [Cripps] soul.’3 Gaitskell 
enlisted the support of the Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin against ‘a proposal to 
accept convertibility even in the long-term by referring to this as an “alternative” 
solution to the problem.’4 In fact, Gaitskell said he would ‘resign if we commit 
ourselves again to convertibility.’5
The memorandum Gaitskell and Jay submitted to the Economic Policy 
Committee on ‘Economic Planning and Liberalisation’ in January 1950 outlined 
their objections to liberalisation being the goal of external economic policy. They 
feared that the use of direct controls was under threat from the ‘E.C.A. and the 
OEEC countries which are no longer seriously attempting to plan their own 
economies. One form in which the pressure is especially strong is the so-called 
liberalisation of European trade.’6 Gaitskell told the Committee that the United 
States Administration might be urging the liberalisation of trade to reconcile the 
granting of Marshall Aid with the needs of American industry but ‘this should not 
be allowed to prejudice the planned economy of this country.’7
The memorandum put forward two specific ways in which such liberalisation 
would be damaging. First, the balance of payments would be hit through an influx 
of what Gaitskell and Jay described as ‘inessential goods’ which would prevent the 
buying of essential goods. Also, if inessential goods were granted free entry into 
the British market it would be increasingly difficult to continue the controls that
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prevented British manufactures producing the same goods. These controls, such 
as those over raw materials and building, were essential to the export drive, 
without them incomes would have to be deflated more drastically. Liberalisation 
would also weaken the pound and intensify the cheap sterling problem. The 
second damaging effect of liberalisation would be to hamper progress towards 
dollar viability in Europe. Opening up European markets would discourage exports 
to North America. Greater competition in home markets would lead to firms 
concentrating on the retention of these markets. The resultant greater production 
and consumption of luxuries in Europe would take production away from goods for 
export.
Thus Gaitskell and Jay’s opposition to liberalisation extended beyond dollar 
countries to others that were dismantling economic controls. They concluded their 
paper by arguing that it ‘would be wise-
(1) to recognise that in the UK certain physical controls are essential to the 
effective economic planning of full employment of Income and for achieving and 
maintaining a balance with the dollar area;
(2) to be therefore exceedingly careful before demolishing any more 
important physical controls lest we be driven, as a result, to rely exclusively on 
monetary and budgetary policy;
(3) to appreciate that the policy of liberalisation if extended will probably 
undermine the structure of physical control we have established.’8
In the European Payments Union negotiations of 1949-50 Gaitskell sought 
and won liberal credit facilities limiting the liability for payment in gold and dollars 
and, therefore, limiting the possible pressure for deflation.
Gaitskell and the European Payments Union Negotiations
The proposal for a European Payments Union had first been circulated 
inside the OEEC on 24 November 1949. It had envisaged ‘complete freedom of 
transactions between participants, and transferability of the currencies.’9 The 
scheme attracted immediate hostility from Labour ministers. Douglas Jay wrote to 
Stafford Cripps outlining his opposition. He argued that we were ‘led into the 
difficulties of 1947 partly by an over-eager doctrinaire attachment to
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multilateralism, convertibility etc... Are not these dangers at least to some degree 
again emerging in the present scheme?’ He continued that ‘we cannot in any
circumstances permit free capital movements to countries outside the sterling
_ _ _  110 area.
Cripps was sympathetic to these arguments and in a memorandum to the 
Council of the O.E.E.C. he set out British qualifications and objections. First, a 
system in which the Union was the sole lender could not be accepted. It would 
mean that all existing agreements would be brought under the Union’s control and 
hence move from bilateralism to multilateralism. Essentially, the British 
Government wanted the Union to be the lender of the last resort only. Second, 
Cripps sought to protect Britain’s right to control the imports of any country that 
was responsible for a loss of gold. Third, Cripps stressed that the E.P.U. should 
be largely automatic with the minimum of intervention by its Board. This demand 
was provoked by the fear that the Board would reflect ‘the American insistence on 
the freest possible movement of trade, leaving any fundamental disequilibrium to 
be corrected by domestic deflationary policies.’11 On this issue the British 
government was largely successful in getting its way. The Board’s power were 
vaguely defined and its decisions subject to review by the O.E.E.C. The operation 
of the E.P.U. was mostly automatic.
Gaitskell thought that even Cripps’ position gave too much away. On March 
15 1950 he wrote to Cripps urging ‘that you should play this hand as long a 
possible... It is after all just possible that it might be better for us if the present 
negotiations were to break down... I am sure that it will pay us to gain time and not 
to be rushed.’ He added that Jay agreed with him.12
Gaitskell’s attitude caused considerable consternation within the Treasury 
and brought previously hostile factions together to oppose him. On March 28 1950 
Robert Hall, the head of the Economic Section, recorded that it had become clear 
‘in connection with the E.P.U. discussions, that H.G.[Gaitskell] thought we should 
never return to convertibility and never offer anyone gold points [emphasis in 
original].’ As a consequence of ‘our having to argue with Gaitskell’ Hall began to 
get on much better with Sir Henry Wilson-Smith, the head of the Overseas Finance 
Division and ‘Otto’ Clarke of that Division.13
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Given Gaitskell’s position it is perhaps surprising that it was he who was 
eventually to successfully conclude the E.P.U. negotiations. However, Gaitskell 
was of the opinion that he had won the argument in the Treasury with Wilson- 
Smith.14 The apparent change in his position is probably accounted for by two 
factors, the first being that the Chancellor ruled in favour of Gaitskell and Jay on 
the issue of ‘the fundamentals’. This concerned American pressure for a 
commitment on free trade and convertibility. The Government set out three pre­
conditions for full convertibility. The first pre-condition was that gold and dollar 
reserves had to be higher. Gaitskell told the Americans in 1950 that reserves 
should be double the present levels. The second pre-condition was that there must 
be ‘adequate guarantees that markets would not be closed arbitrarily or suddenly 
against British goods.’ And the third ‘that the balance between the dollar area and 
rest of the world had to be right.’15 Although this decision did not lead anywhere, 
it meant that Gaitskell was able to look at the specific issues raised by the E.P.U. 
negotiations without worrying about the wider perspective.
The second factor that accounted for Gaitskell changed stance was that he 
found an unexpected ally in the Economic Cooperation Administration (E.C.A.), 
which had been established to administer American assistance under the 
European Recovery Programme. Gaitskell wrote in March 1950 that the ‘E.C.A. 
are themselves not so much concerned with getting dollars and gold into the 
multilateral payments scheme and it should not be difficult to bring home to them 
the dangers of this. The pressure no doubt comes from the I.M.F. and the U.S. 
Treasury. But in the battle we shall have to fight with the latter the E.C.A. might 
become our allies.’16
The E.C.A was prepared to assure sterling’s position as an international 
currency. It developed a plan that would provide generous credit margins and 
permit the reintroduction of quantitative import controls if gold and dollar payments 
became a problem. In return, ‘the British would have to bring the sterling area into 
an automatic and multilateral pattern of settlements and surrender the right to 
discriminate in the application of trade restrictions.’17
Gaitskell was willing to agree with the Americans ‘on the technical problem 
of relating sterling to E.P.U.’ as long as he ‘got satisfaction on the gold and credit
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arrangements’, thus limiting the interference of the scheme in domestic economic 
policy. In May, the E.C.A. negotiator Averell Harriman came London with his 
advisors. Harriman and Stafford Cripps handed the negotiations over to Gaitskell 
and the American, Katz. Gaitskell got up on the morning of May 13 at 6 a.m. to 
note down what sort of credit arrangements he wanted. His officials, he noted, 
‘were all quite hprrified and regarded me as much too inflationary’18 but the 
Americans agreed with Gaitskell and said that his suggestions ‘were exactly the 
pattern we had in mind.’19
Gaitskell continued to be concerned about the level of credit until the deal 
was finally struck. After lunch with Katz on 2 June Gaitskell made it clear that ‘he 
and the Cabinet - not the civil servants - would decide the terms of Britain’s 
participation in the E.P.U.’ He was also still mistrustful of the Americans and 
asserted that ‘Britain would not submit to having the US impose the gold standard 
on it.’20 Despite this outburst Gaitskell and Katz were able to reach agreement after 
two more days.
It is clear that the terms of the E.P.U agreement are only explicable if 
Gaitskell’s views on convertibility are taken into account. The agreement would not 
have included liberal credit facilities if the negotiations had been left to officials.
Gaitskell and the Sterling Area
Gaitskell’s public line on convertibility after the 1951 election defeat 
continued to be that it was only possible once the preconditions outlined above 
had been met. He rejected the idea, that was a central aspect of the ROBOT plan, 
that convertibility at a floating rate would in itself help to solve the problem of the 
dollar shortage. However, although Gaitskell’s parliamentary speeches do not 
explicitly rule out convertibility as something acceptable in the long-term, his 
arguments reflected his continued belief that the inadequacies of American 
economic policy meant convertibility was neither a desirable nor a practical policy 
and that full convertibility would limit the scope of a future Labour government to 
implement its policies.
In his contribution to the debate on the Commonwealth Economic 
Conference in February 1954 Gaitskell argued that it would be mistake to think that
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the measures taken by the American Government would do anything to stop a 
severe recession. He thought that ‘we should be making a mistake, however much 
we may hope for it, to expect that counter slump action by the American 
Government will necessarily cause the tide to turn. There is no doubt that in the 
United States there can very quickly be built up an extremely powerful depression 
psychology, and it is too early to say whether or not that will happen... I do not 
doubt the desire or indeed the intention of the American Government to adopt 
counter-measures. What I do doubt is whether they and Congress between them 
will move sufficiently far and sufficiently fast.’ Gaitskell continued that the essential 
thing for the British Government to do was ‘to discriminate’ against dollars and 
‘frankly to discriminate.’21
Given the American position Gaitskell saw closer co-operation with the rest 
of the Sterling Area as the direction in which Britain’s external economic policy 
should be moving. In the Debate on the Address in November 1952 Gaitskell told 
the House that he favoured a policy ‘to make the Sterling Area a more closely co­
ordinated, more unified institution, in which we try with our partners to work out 
common policies - policies of internal finance, of planning our imports from the 
outside world. Of increasing our trade with each other so as to try to maintain the 
highest possible level of employment and production. We should certainly try to 
bring the rest of Europe into such a scheme.’
Such a policy was clearly incompatible with the goal of convertibility. 
Gaitskell effectively conceded this point by acknowledging that convertibility would 
mean ‘the end of the Sterling Area as we have it today. It means the return to the 
sterling bloc as it existed before the war.’22 His own policy would ‘require 
undoubtedly a change in the present machinery... and it will mean a permanent 
body being set up here in London representing the various Governments in order 
to reach these decisions quickly... I have no hesitation in saying that I regret that 
we in the Labour Government did not do that. It would have been a great help in 
1951 if such a body had been in existence.’
It is therefore not surprising that Gaitskell told the Friends of the Atlantic 
Union on a semi-public occasion at the end of 1954 that speaking for himself, and 
not for his party, he could not see the compatibility between convertibility and the
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implementation of Labour policy.23
The logic behind this statement was made more explicit when the E.P.U. 
was wound up at the end of 1958 and the pound was made fully convertible at a 
fixed rate. Gaitskell was highly critical and consulted with only Patrick Gordon- 
Walker, Jay and Wilson before moving an amendment declaring that ‘this House 
declines to give a Second Reading to a Bill designed to implement policies which, 
through the ending of the European Payments Union and the acceptance of the 
Bank of England of the obligation to supply gold or dollars on demand to all foreign 
holders of sterling at a fixed rate of exchange, makes more difficult the 
achievement and maintenance in Great Britain and Western Europe of industrial 
expansion and full employment.’24
Gaitskell, Jay and Wilson all spoke out against the move to full convertibility 
in the debate. Gaitskell argued that fully convertibility opened the pound up to the 
possibility of damaging speculation: ‘[W]e shall increase the risk of and the scope 
for speculation against the pound in time of trouble while throwing away... one 
possible weapon to be used against that speculation.’ Gaitskell’s main point was 
that this speculation would prevent a future Labour government from fulfilling its 
programme: ‘It is not only that the speculative pressure in a difficult situation will 
be greater as a result of this decision. There is something else with which we are 
much concerned. It is that because of this, and in order to prevent what might be 
a run on the £, we shall be told that our internal policies have to be adjusted. We 
know very well what that means. We shall be told that we must cut back; that we 
are trying to do too much; that there is over-full employment. We shall be warned 
that we must delay expansion; not because of anything that is done, but because 
of what might be thought by speculators.’25
Gaitskell quoted to the House from an article in The Economist which 
reported that speculative holders of sterling ‘"believe that if a substantial reduction 
in Income Tax rates were made now, any incoming Labour Government would find 
it politically difficult to raise rates quite back to their old level, so that this would 
remove one of their main weapons through which a Labour Government might 
carry on a form of administration which foreign holders of our currency particularly 
dislike.”
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‘I will only say that we on this side of the House regard that kind of attitude 
as quite intolerable and the policies which put us in that position as unworthy of 
any Government who claim to be a democratic Government.’26
It is therefore clear that Gaitskell opposed convertibility because it 
hampered the fulfilment of a Socialist economic policy. The policy Butler was to 
pursue as Chancellor amounted to the opposite of Gaitskell’s. Butler supported the 
immediate convertibility of sterling at a floating rate precisely because it would 
bring home the realities of the world market to the British economy.
Butler and the ROBOT Plan 1952
Rab Butler became Chancellor in the middle of a foreign exchange crisis in 
October 1951. He started his Treasury life by responding to an invitation to meet 
Edward Bridges and William Armstrong, his principal private secretary, at the 
Athenaeum Club. Butler later recalled that ‘both my singularly able advisers 
stressed the critical state of the economy... Their story was of blood draining from 
the system and a collapse greater than had been foretold in 1931.,27
Given the perilous state of the reserves Butler had little option but to 
approve the plans for import cuts that the Treasury had already prepared. The 
crisis situation meant that the new Government had little room for manouevre. 
Lord Croham, who was at the time a member of the Central Economic Planning 
Staff, has argued that ‘less change occurred in 1951 than at any other changeover 
of Administrations in the thirty years following the end of the Second World War.’28 
One problem with Croham’s analysis is that it fails to take into account the 
importance of Butler’s decision to raise short-term interest rates in November.
Anthony Seldon has used Croham’s remark to support his argument that 
the Churchill administration represented continuity in policy. Seldon writes that ‘the 
new policies that the Government did adopt after the Election were in fact either 
recommended by officials or were forced on the Government by the dire economic 
position.’29 But Seldon is wrong to draw general conclusions about the Churchill 
Government from what happened in the first few months after the Election. Indeed, 
it was not long before Butler was looking to make a radical change in the direction 
of exchange policy. The solution he proposed to Britain’s exchange problem
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acquired the name ‘Operation ROBOT’.30 The essence of Operation ROBOT was 
to make the pound convertible, with certain important conditions, at a floating rate. 
It was first discussed by ministers at the end of February 1952.
The origins of operation ROBOT are usually thought to have been within the 
Bank of England and the Overseas Finance Division.31 Although the details of the 
plan were developed within these institutions, important figures within the 
Conservative Party had been thinking along the same lines before the party was 
returned to power. An examination of the thinking of Conservatives on the question 
of convertibility while in Opposition reveals the true origins of ROBOT. Plans for 
the immediate convertibility of sterling at a floating rate were only brought forward 
by civil servants because of ministerial encouragement.
Oliver Lyttelton led for the Conservatives on economic affairs while they 
were in Opposition. Before the war Lyttelton acquired a reputation as a skilful 
market operator when serving as managing director of the British Metal 
Corporation. In October 1940 he was appointed President of the Board of Trade 
by Churchill who, in recognition of his skills, moved him to the new Ministry of 
Production in March 1942.32 When the Conservatives returned to power in 1951 
it had been expected that Lyttelton would be offered the Chancellorship but given 
the small majority, poor performances in the Commons and his City connections 
told against him.33 In the event Churchill appointed him Colonial Secretary.
Lyttelton became the minister Butler most relied on during his 
Chancellorship. Butler later described Lyttelton as ‘the most intelligent man in 
Cabinet.’ He was a man of great influence who ‘Churchill turned to... for quite a lot 
of my subjects about economics, and I would put him as a very important man. He 
was the only man really who actively supported me in wishing the pound to be 
convertible.’34
By the Spring of 1947 Lyttelton had been spurred by the fuel crisis into 
general attacks on the Labour Government’s planning policy, in particular the 
consequences of cheap money and over-expenditure in creating inflationary 
pressure hidden by physical controls. He told the Commons that ‘One of the 
effects of all this has been a very sharp fall in the value of sterling abroad.’35 He 
argued that the Government should allow the price mechanism to operate. With
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respect to foreign exchange he argued that the wrong way to ration was through 
‘bulk purchase by a central authority and allocation by the Government down to the 
individual buyer and factor.’36 This would only increase the enormous number of 
people in Government service. The right way to deal with the problem was ‘to open 
the commodity exchanges which are now closed and to ration their use of foreign 
exchange... The fact is that the price mechanism, without the help of which no 
speedy distribution can ever be made, begins to operate.’37
In private Lyttelton’s thinking was far more revolutionary. During the 
economic turmoil of 1947 Churchill sent him a memorandum by Lady Rhys 
Williams, a former Liberal Party candidate and prominent member of the United 
Europe Movement, proposing rapid decontrol. Lyttelton responded by telling 
Churchill that ‘Nothing short of a complete reversal of our economic policy is going 
to reverse the-trend in our national fortunes.’ Although Lyttelton felt that the 
memorandum ‘follows the general line of my thought’ he found it ‘striking that the 
memorandum makes no mention of the international value of the £. For that 
matter, one of the most extraordinary things about the arguments and articles 
about convertibility which have appeared all over the country, is the singularly 
small attention which is paid to the rate of exchange between the £ and the $. It 
is quite nonsensical, after all, to discuss convertibility in terms of time only. If I may 
use a reductio ad absurdum, it would be possible to secure convertibility of the 
pound at $1 to the pound now, and clearly impossible to secure convertibility at $6 
by 1955.
‘As a general part of a decontrol policy it would be necessary to unpeg the 
£ in relation to the $... At the same time that the international value of the £ was 
unpegged, I think at one sweep of the pen it would be necessary to abolish most 
of the controls and allow price rises to take place. All the natural equalising and 
stabilising forces are then released. The effect of such action would largely cure 
the bad distribution of Labour from which we now suffer [emphasis in original].’38 
In essence Lyttelton’s plan was the same as Operation ROBOT.
By the autumn of 1949, following sterling devaluation, what Lyttelton was 
saying in public was almost in line with what he said in private. He pointed out in 
the Commons that it was ‘most noticeable that during the three days of this Debate
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no official spokesman that I can remember has mentioned the word 
“Convertibility”. But Convertibility is the essence of all currency. That is what 
currency is for and it shocks me profoundly to hear convertibility talked of as an 
adjunct, even as a desirable adjunct of currency.’39
The ideology behind Lyttelton’s words was expounded by the former 
Conservative minister Richard Law in his book Return from Utopia which took its 
inspiration from Hayek. Law highlighted the connection between exchange control 
and a planned economy. ‘It is hardly surprising,’ he argued, ‘that those who favour 
a planned economy at home should also favour it abroad and that the socialist 
should see in exchange control the reflection of his most cherished prejudices. For 
exchange control gives to governments an instrument of great power for the 
organisation not only of the national economy but of society in general.’ He 
concluded that ‘it is impossible to create a free market in any effective sense while 
exchange controls exist.’ Law also argued That multilateral trade based upon 
freely convertible currencies is the system best suited to the needs of the British 
economy.’40 This reflected what Lyttelton had told the Commons in the Autumn of 
1949, that ‘No country gains more from convertibility than our own.’41
Although Lyttelton took the lead on economic policy while the Conservatives 
were in Opposition, it is clear that Butler was in agreement with him and the 
general line of Law’s book. In a House of Common’s debate on the economic 
situation in July 1949 Butler went into some detail about his economic ideas and 
his speech is worth quoting at length: The broad appeal I want to make to the right 
hon. Gentleman [Bevin] is to take the next stage of our relations with the Dollar 
Area into a more imaginative and fruitful region. We have passed through the 
period of a direct loan; we have gone through part, or a great deal, of Marshall Aid 
to Europe; and we are now apparently approaching this problem from the 
standpoint of the Sterling Area. I have spent a great deal of my life concerned with 
the Indian question, and I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether in 
the imaginative approach which we should like to press on him, as we have done 
in all matters of foreign policy, he is taking into account the need for widening the 
interdependence of the American Continent and the Dollar Area with the Sterling 
Area, thus relieving us of many of our grave problems.
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‘But what is the truth of this matter? We shall never get Congress to help 
us unless we help ourselves... We must prove to the Americans in Congress and 
in the administration that we can compete, that we have a resilient and elastic 
economy, and that we are prepared to lower our costs. Our outlook can be 
summarised - and this comes from a quotation of the 19th Report of the Bank of 
International Settlement - as follows:
‘“If, then, a country is in disequilibrium because its budget expenditure is too 
high, or its investments are too ample, or costs are maintained at an uneconomic 
level, or the exchange rates have got out of line with reality, with the result that an 
untoward deficit has arisen in the balance of payments; if in such a state of affairs, 
the country concerned obstinately refuses to make any alteration either in its 
budget or credit policy, or in its control of prices or exchanges, there is no reason 
to assume that the lack of equilibrium will not continue.’”
When asked by R.R. Stokes ‘What does that mean?’ Butler replied: ‘...What 
it means is, as it says, that despite the obvious difficulties here of a high taxation 
system and an expenditure higher than we have ever known, the Government 
obstinately refuse to remove the rigidity from our economics. We believe that this 
rigid taxation and rigid costs, with rigidity of the bargaining machine for labour 
through the joint negotiating machinery - which is practically not operating owing 
to the extreme rigidity of our economic system - we believe that this rigidity is the 
cause of the troubles affecting the working man and women, the financiers and the 
industrialists.
‘In short, our case is that until we restore to the individual some freedom of 
choice, and until we can restore some elasticity of manoeuvre to our economy, we 
shall not be able to deal with the problem of the balance of payments. The 
inflationary tendencies which we see at home are, we believe, at the basis of many 
of our troubles in foreign fields.’42
Butler clearly acquired a reputation for believing decontrol to be the answer 
to Britain’s economic problems. When he subsequently asked the Chairman of the 
Backbench Finance Committee, Ralph Assheton, in May 1952 what ‘would restore 
the City’s confidence in the Government’, Assheton, unaware of the ROBOT plan 
and its initial postponement, wrote that ‘we can either continue the socialist policy
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and increase controls or we can go for freedom.’ Confident that Butler ‘would not 
consent to remain in office unless the freedom policy is accepted’ he wrote that 
this would involve ‘pretty fundamental changes including a big cut in expenditure, 
moving towards convertibility as soon as possible, followed by a substantial cut in 
income tax and the ending of food rationing.’43
In favouring immediate moves towards convertibility Butler was ahead of his 
officials. In the first few months of his Chancellorship Butler received a 
memorandum from Rowan dealing with the question of convertibility policy with 
regard to the Commonwealth Finance Minister’s meeting which was being held in 
London at the time. Although the memorandum argued that ‘convertibility must 
remain our aim’ it also stated that at the present time ‘the dangers of any major 
move towards convertibility are unacceptable.’ Butler underlined all the phrases in 
this memorandum that pointed towards convertibility as the aim, he also underlined 
the ‘un’ part of the word ‘unacceptable’ and put a question-mark next to it.44
The detailed ROBOT proposal may have originated with civil servants, but 
they clearly anticipated that it would be viewed favourably by the new Government. 
Of course this may be mere coincidence, but it is more plausible to believe that 
Butler’s marginalia generated some enquiry. The Private Office has the role of 
transmitting a minister’s thoughts and preferences to the relevant officials. This is 
not to say that Butler commanded the paper, but it is to say that officials would not 
have put it up unless they had some reason to believe that it would be looked at. 
Herbert Andrew, Second Secretary at the Board of Trade under Frank Lee once 
said of Lee that ‘he rarely wasted his energies on things that ministers were not 
interested in! [emphasis in original]’45 Andrew’s comment is true of civil servants 
in general, they are too snowed under to contemplate proposals that are going to 
come to nothing. It is impossible to imagine that such a scheme could have been 
presented to Gaitskell if he had remained Chancellor.
Basically, the ROBOT proposal was in three parts. First, 'to allow the 
exchange rate to float and find its own level as determined by the London Foreign 
Exchange Market; the London Gold Market would also be reopened.' Second, full 
convertibility on a free market of what was described as "overseas Sterling".46 And, 
third, funding in to long-term bonds of 80% of sterling balances held in the sterling
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area countries and the blocking of nearly all balances held by non-members 
outside the dollar area. 10% of these would be released as overseas sterling.
When Robert Hall first heard of the plan on February 16 his reaction was 
positive, he recorded that 'it sounds wonderful' but the variations in employment 
involved meant 'no Government would accept this at present.'47 By February 20 he 
had became enthusiastic, noting that 'it certainly looks a great deal better when 
one thinks of the alternatives.'48 That evening the plan changed from being a 
theoretical possibility to a favoured course of action. Cobbold, the Governor of the 
Bank of England, proposed the scheme to Churchill at a dinner also attended by 
Butler and the Minister of Health Harry Crookshank. They agreed that action was 
necessary. It was also agreed that the plan should be introduced at the time of the 
Budget, as part of a comprehensive solution to the sterling problem. Hall was 
taken aback when he heard this, recording that he had 'never supposed that there 
would not be time to have a good look at so revolutionary a scheme.149 The sudden 
reality of the scheme turned him against it.
Early ministerial reaction to the plan was mostly favourable. Butler 
presented a memorandum entitled 'External Action', drafted by 'Otto' Clark of the 
Overseas Finance Division, to a meeting on February 22 attended by Churchill; the 
Paymaster General, Lord Cherwell; the President of the Council, Lord Woolton; the 
Home Secretary, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe and the Secretary of State for Scotland, 
James Stuart. The memorandum argued 'that we must set a completely new 
course, stop the drain on the reserves immediately, stop the markets in "cheap 
sterling", rehabilitate sterling as an international currency', and significantly 'take 
the external pressures on the internal economy instead of the reserves.’50
Officials were divided over the plan. Not only were there important 
opponents including Robert Hall, the head of the Economic Section, and Edwin 
Plowden, the Chief Planner, but there was also important divisions amongst its 
proponents. For the authors of the scheme in the Overseas Finance Division the 
attraction of the plan was not only as a method of taking the strain off of the 
reserves but also, as Donald MacDougall, Cherwell’s adviser, noted in his diary 
covering the crisis, as a way ‘of substituting the “price mechanism" for direct 
ministerial decisions. They had become sceptical of the ability of ministers of either
party to take unpopular decisions.’51
‘Otto’ Clarke’s original memorandum outlining the plan argued that the 
floating rate would set up ‘forces which tend to bring the economy into balance.’ 
In a section entitled ‘Internal Policy’ Clarke argued that the plan would require ‘a 
complete rethinking of the whole of the economic policy which has been in 
operation... during the last few years.’ Specifically ‘the basic idea of stability which 
has dominated economic policy for so long will not be maintainable. There will be 
a continuous process of change and readjustment and much of this will be 
painful.’52
Others in the Treasury were more sceptical about the force of the price 
mechanism as an automatic regulator. Senior officials saw a floating rate as the 
price that had to be paid for immediate convertibility rather than as one of its 
benefits. Throughout the Gaitskell Chancellorship officials had tried to make 
ministers pursue the long-term goal of fixed rate convertibility. However, the 
political window presented by the election of a Conservative Government and the 
continued fragility of the pound persuaded senior officials that convertibility was 
essential in the short-run. Edward Bridges, the Permanent Secretary to the 
Treasury, was not a trained economist. He saw convertibility as a way of making 
ministers take unpopular decisions, rather than an answer in itself. He made his 
position clear in a letter to Butler written during the preparation of the Collective 
Approach in the autumn of 1952: ‘Apart altogether from the precise method in 
which we manage our external financial policy there is no chance of our getting 
affairs of this country on an even keel and keeping them there, unless we adapt 
a much more stringent internal economic policy... Since I feel this so strongly I am 
naturally reluctant to see the issue of a strict internal policy presented to ministers 
as something which they have got to swallow if they are to accept convertibility. I 
regard it as essential to salvation in any case. And I want to see it so presented 
[emphasis in original].’ If ROBOT had been accepted Bridges would have expected 
the same sort of stringent internal policy to have been adopted.53
MacDougall noted that for the Bank of England the benefits of the scheme 
were that convertibility would ‘make things easier for the City, to get rid of cheap 
sterling transactions, to prevent the steady decline in the acceptability of sterling,
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etc.’54 The advocacy of the wider virtues of a floating rate certainly alarmed 
Cobbold who had not accepted the argument put forward in the Bank by Lucius 
Thompson-McCausland that a floating rate would act as a benign equilibrating 
force. Cobbold wrote on his own copy of the memorandum: 'I told the Chancellor 
that I thought the argumentation good, but that there was too much "floating". We 
must have a high degree of stability.’55 On February 24 he wrote to Butler and 
Bridges outlining the Bank’s position. The wider limits (2.80-3.20, but not publicly 
announced) must be supported by every possible measure to strengthen the real 
and psychological position of the currency. If not so regarded and supported a 
"floating rate" is a polite name for progressive devaluation to a new fixed rate... an 
international economy must have a high degree of stability. Unless we make this 
objective clear, we are wasting our time in trying to make sterling acceptable 
internationally by giving it a degree of convertibility...’56
Butler and Lyttelton’s thinking on ROBOT was much closer to that of the 
Overseas Finance Division than to that of Bridges or the Bank. For them the 
scheme had the attraction of de-politicizing economic management and avoiding 
the inflexibility of a controlled economy. Butler and Lyttelton argued in Cabinet that 
‘there was something to be said, politically, for moving towards the system by 
which individuals were influenced by the operation of the price mechanism to the 
changing economic circumstances. This latter system had the further advantage 
that it enabled people to adjust themselves more gradually to changing 
circumstances and avoid the violent upheavals which seemed inseparable from 
Government planning.’57
Butler repeated these arguments in two draft letters to Churchill which he 
wrote in August 1952.The first of these, which he labelled ‘unfinished fugue’, was 
the more forthright in its language and indicated what Butler’s thinking had been 
throughout the period in question: ‘Following upon the drastic steps announced 
eleven days after taking office and the meeting of the Finance Ministers, which you 
were obliged to miss owing to your U.S. visit, I had before me the given question 
as to whether our rapidly falling reserves would enable the £1 Sterling to be held 
at $2.00 without a Devaluation.
The decision to advance the Budget was taken in order that some
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psychological move could be made calculated to restore confidence before the first 
quarterly announcement of the rate of the Reserves on April 4th.
‘After the turn of the year I took the best advice I could and studied every 
aspect of our position. I also scanned through the recent history of our currency 
policy including the undignified devaluation and the 1947 debacle. I also looked 
back further.
‘I came to the conclusion that as a result of measures taken we were on an 
improving trend and that if I could take action on the lines of the External Sterling 
Plan, I would reduce the tight liabilities of the Sterling Balances, and reopen the 
Gold Market.’58
That Butler saw the plan as an integral part of his economic strategy is also 
clear from his second letter ‘Unfinished Symphony’ although this had a more 
conciliatory tone. He explained that his view during the crisis was ‘that if we did not 
take the plunge early into the freedom of the price mechanism and in the external 
field - we would go on without the benefits of full planning or the discipline of the 
Rate.’ He had little sympathy for the idea of preceding with a watered down version 
of Labour’s economic policy and wanted a systematic return to a market economy. 
He concluded that without this the Government’s policy ‘has been between two 
stools.’ In the event, it would appear that neither of these letters were sent 
because Bridges communicated Butler’s feelings on this subject to Churchill 
personally and then reported back.59
The differences between the coalition of interests promoting ROBOT can 
clearly be seen in the issue of floating. Cobbold was alarmed by the advocacy of 
the wider virtues of floating. He told Butler that ‘the wider limits (2.80-3.20, but not 
publicly announced) must be supported by every possible measure to strengthen 
the real and psychological position of the currency.’60 Although Butler accepted 
Cobbold’s line his and Lyttelton’s arguments continued to place great importance 
on a floating pound.
Butler himself played a central role in the ministerial battle over ROBOT. He 
was not in any way the passive figure suggested by his official biographer who 
writes that Butler ‘does not appear to have pressed his case with any great fire or 
conviction.’61 Donald MacDougall’s diary of the crisis shows that at this level there
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was a battle for the hearts and minds of ministers waged between Butler and 
Cherwell, each seeing colleagues in private. Butler managed to persuade the 
Minister of Materials, Lord Swinton, to back the plan even though he had been one 
of its early opponents. MacDougall also noted that ‘Butler thought he had sold the 
plan to Leathers [Secretary of State for the Co-ordination of Transport, Fuel and 
Power] and was upset at the next meeting when he opposed it.’62 However, the 
Cabinet as a whole was not informed of the plan until 28 February and were asked 
to come to an almost immediate decision. In these circumstances Butler was 
dependent on the support of the Prime Minister to get the Cabinet’s agreement. 
Without this support no degree of fire or conviction would have been sufficient for 
him to get his way.
That Butler was committed to the ROBOT plan is revealed by the fact that 
he had little time for the further restrictive measures that were proposed to him by 
Hall and Plowden. Their alternative measures included the notion that sterling area 
members ‘with large dollar deficits, i.e. Australia, India, and the United Kingdom, 
should be put on a dollar ration by agreement if possible but if not by unilateral 
action on our part.’ This received the response from Butler that it was ‘a vague and 
unworkable proposition.’ He was also unimpressed by the proposal that ‘further 
import cuts of about £200 m. should be imposed .’ He understood these cuts to be 
‘designed to avoid the political odium of the B-plan’ but thought them ‘politically 
and in every way more onerous.’63
Butler’s advocacy of the plan did not end with its initial postponement. Alec 
Cairncross has often referred to the point that Bridges later got the impression 
from Butler that he thought he had been wrong about ROBOT.64 However, Butler 
was an excellent manipulator of his officials, and told them many different and 
sometimes contradictory things as it suited him. If judged by his actions it is clear 
that Butler never deserted the basic principles of ROBOT.
The fact that the reserves were rising after the Budget led the Overseas 
Finance Division and the Bank to argue in a joint submission to the Chancellor that 
the way the plan was presented should be changed. The memo stated that ‘the 
original case for ROBOT was based on the expectation that some drastic act of 
external financial policy would become inevitable and probably sooner rather than
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later... ROBOT was therefore presented as a forced operation, the only real 
element of choice being in the timing - i.e. whether we should do it as part of the 
Budget, or whether we should wait until we were nearer the precipice. The Cabinet 
decided against doing it as part of the Budget.’ It was argued in the submission 
that the improved reserves position ‘should not blind us to the constructive 
possibilities of the plan.’ Butler noted on this: ‘a very good paper.’65 These 
constructive possibilities included the familiar arguments about enlisting the price 
mechanism but also the idea that with the plan it would be possible to maintain ‘an 
independent internal policy in a US recession.’ In conclusion, the paper argued 
that ROBOT should be presented in a more positive manner as ‘a constructive 
initiative in the world situation’ and that it ‘would be possible to present ROBOT as 
follow up action completing the new economic situation at which the Government 
is aiming.’66 _
The openness of this submission’s argument that the supporters of ROBOT 
should change their tactics casts even more doubt on the idea that Butler was 
scared into supporting ROBOT by the emergency situation. If the Treasury and the 
Bank could openly discuss with him the notion that the change in circumstances 
meant that there was a need to change the method of presentation then Butler’s 
role in the crisis needs to be looked at in a different light. MacDougall has argued 
that the initial presentation of ROBOT ‘was a very clever gamble that nearly came 
off. The psychological appeal was to the masochistic instincts of ministers... They 
also appealed to some ministers sense of duty and patriotism, even to the extent 
of putting country before party.’67 Although MacDougall only had officials in mind 
when he wrote that their method of presentation was ‘a clever gamble’ the fact that 
Butler discussed tactics after the initial Cabinet rejection suggests that he saw it 
in a similar way.
In the event it was Anthony Eden’s opposition to the scheme that lead to its 
postponement. During most of the crisis he had been in Lisbon attending a NATO 
meeting. Herbert Brittain, a Third Secretary in the Treasury, and Eric Berthoud, 
Assistant Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, were sent to explain the proposals 
to Eden. Edwin Plowden was already in Lisbon with Eden. Both Alec Cairncross 
and Edmond Dell stress the importance of Plowden in persuading Eden to press
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for a postponement of a decision until his return. In fact, the diary of Eden’s 
Principal Private Secretary Evelyn Shuckburgh makes it clear that Eden had 
doubts about the plan after it had been explained to him by Berthoud and before 
Plowden had see him.
Shuckburgh recorded that Eden found ROBOT to be ‘a banker’s plan: 
logically unassailable, perhaps, but open to the very gravest political objections.’ 
Shuckburgh suggested to Eden that ‘the only possible way of putting it across 
would be for the Government to announce the plan and go to the country on it.’ 
Eden agreed with this but ‘had little doubt the Government would lose the election 
but at least then they would have told the people the truth and prescribed the 
honest remedy.’ However, the more Eden thought about the plan ‘the more 
A.E.[Eden] became doubtful about the premises on which it was based.’68 This 
entry reveals that Eden was persuaded by the political rather than the economic 
case against ROBOT. That Eden objections to the plan were political is confirmed 
by the arguments he used during the crisis. Macmillan recorded in his diary that 
‘after the morning meeting yesterday [Feb. 29] Eden walked with me from No. 10. 
He was strongly against the plan, on political grounds. “The country are not ready”, 
according to him, “to cast away the whole effort of years to return to ‘Montagu 
Normanism’ without a struggle.’”69 As Churchill’s anointed successor, Eden did not 
want to inherit the leadership of a politically damaged party, perhaps one even out 
of office.
In their accounts of the crisis both Cairncross and Edmund Dell have 
overlooked the importance of Eden’s opposition in leading to ROBOT’S 
postponement. Cairncross stresses the persuasiveness of Cherwell’s mix of 
economic and political objections. The latter included the likely Commonwealth 
and European response. He also mentions that the Cabinet was ‘advised that the 
economists in government service who had been consulted were against the plan 
and their arguments were outlined: in particular it was pointed out that immediate 
convertibility would lead to a general restriction of world trade and induce other 
countries to discriminate against the United Kingdom.’70
Dell puts more emphasis than Cairncross on the political arguments which 
might have been ‘felt to be so strong that they carried the economic arguments
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which were more debatable.’71 To back this assertion he quotes in full a Cabinet 
conclusion, in reality a speech by Salisbury, which stated: ‘Under democratic 
government with universal suffrage such violent reversals of policy were hardly 
practicable. Even if the case for this change were abundantly clear on the merits, 
there would be very great difficulty in persuading the public to accept it. Moreover, 
the adoption of this policy would create an unbridgeable gap between the 
Government and the Opposition; and, if it were ever thought possible that an even 
more grave economic crisis might develop later in the year, it would be unjustifiable 
to take at this stage a step which might exclude all possibility of forming a National 
Government to handle that situation.’72
However, though Cairncross and Dell put the emphasis in different places 
both agree that the Cabinet was persuaded that a major change in economic 
policy was neither necessary nor desirable. As Cairncross puts it: ‘instead of a 
radical new plan to make sterling convertible the Cabinet accepted quite a 
traditional package of measures focussing on import restrictions.’73 Their view of 
the ROBOT crisis therefore sustains the idea of a postwar consensus on economic 
policy. The Cabinet rejection, it could be argued, is evidence of the Conservatives 
unwillingness to break from the policies of their Labour predecessors.
The problem with both Cairncross’ and Dell’s version of events is that it 
does not account for the fact that until Eden returned to London and came out 
against ROBOT its proponents were clearly heading towards victory. Eden’s 
opposition is crucial to understanding ROBOT’S rejection because it persuaded the 
Prime Minister to change his own position, something that both Cherwell and 
Salter had failed to do. At a meeting of ministers on February 27 only Cherwell, 
Salter, and Woolton were prepared to speak out against the scheme. At the time 
Robert Hall was under the impression that the supporters of the scheme were 
winning the battle. On February 29 he recorded in his diary that ‘on the whole the 
party in favour of the Bank and O.F.[Overseas Finance] scheme is in the 
ascendent.’ Unbeknown to Hall, Eden had attended Cabinet the previous evening 
and had weighed in against the scheme. It was at this meeting that Cherwell first 
received ‘some support from Churchill’ and was ‘very much more cheerful.’74 The 
following morning the Cabinet met again. The whole balance of the debate had
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changed. MacDougall recorded that Cherwell told him that Butler had only the 
support of Lyttelton, Swinton and possibly Crookshank. The Prime Minister, whose 
acceptance of the plan at a meeting on February 19 had set the ball rolling now 
came out against the plan.75
It is important to note that the decision made in Cabinet was not to reject 
the plan but only to postpone it. The Chancellor had wanted the plan to be 
reconsidered in March but the Prime Minister overruled him and the Cabinet 
decided to wait until April to see what happened. It was only then that Salisbury 
made the speech to which Dell assigns such importance. It is more than probable 
that Salisbury made this speech in an attempt to reinforce the temporary 
advantage held by ROBOT’S opponents.76
Without Churchill’s support Butler stood no chance of getting the plan 
rushed through Cabinet. As Macmillan noted in his diary, the Chancellor already 
looked ‘very exhausted’ by the Cabinet meeting on February 28 when he and 
many other ministers first heard about the plan. From his vantage point it was clear 
to Macmillan that ‘Rab [Butler] thought that with Churchill’s support (which he had 
at the start) he could ride over his colleagues. Thus C.[Churchill] has changed his 
ground, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer cannot appeal to his colleagues 
whom he has (too late) to woo.’77
For Macmillan, and probably for other ministers in his position ‘the mystery 
in all this is Churchill. He seems to have almost fathered the plan a few days ago, 
and then killed it yesterday.’ The only possible explanation for Churchill’s 
mysterious behaviour is Eden’s opposition to the plan. Churchill had been aware 
of Cherwell’s arguments from February 22. It was only after Eden returned and 
came out against ROBOT that Churchill changed his mind. In fact, Macmillan was 
told by Woolton, after the meeting on February 29, that ‘Eden had threatened 
resignation on this issue. If this is really so it would explain Churchill’s sudden 
change of front and abandonment of Butler.’78 However, even if Eden didn’t 
actually threaten to resign, his opposition was probably enough to persuade 
Churchill. Eden was in effect Prime Minister in waiting in this period. Churchill had 
told Colville, his Private Secretary, shortly after the 1951 election victory that he 
‘intended to remain Prime Minister for one year only, and then hand over to his
invariably loyal lieutenant, Anthony Eden, whose courage, energy and integrity, 
though not always his judgement, Churchill consistently respected.’79 Given this 
position Eden’s views were of particular importance, probably leading Churchill to 
conclude that he should not tie the hands of his successor.
Butler was forced to put before his colleagues an alternative plan that was 
broadly in line with that Hall and Plowden had suggested. Butler stressed his own 
distaste for this alternative and warned that it involved 'action which in some 
respects might prove quite as unpalatable to public opinion as the consequences 
which might have followed from the adoption of the original plan. Political 
difficulties could certainly not be escaped by preferring the alternative line of policy 
and the economic consequences might prove to be equally unpleasant.1
Most of these alternative measures, such as the reduction in food subsidies 
and in Government spending on housing would have been introduced as part of 
the ROBOT plan in any case. Butler’s argument against the alternative measures 
was that they were not part of a coherent strategy. He later reiterated this point in 
the letter he drafted in August entitled ‘Unfinished symphony’ in this he argued that 
the Government’s policy was between ‘two stools’. He told the Cabinet that, on the 
one hand an increase of the Bank rate to 4% 'would certainly evoke the familiar cry 
that the Conservative Party had put themselves in the hands of the bankers'. While 
on the other hand, the postponement of convertibility at a floating rate meant that 
the Government had to continue to rely on controls. He stated that 'if the Cabinet 
were unwilling to allow the price mechanism to operate automatically to reduce 
consumption further use would have to be made of physical controls and the 
mechanisms of economic planning. In particular, a further cut of £3,200 million 
would have to made in import programmes.'80
The clear implication of Butler’s remarks was that it would be politically more 
astute for the Cabinet to take the plunge and accept ROBOT. If they were to do 
so the Government would be seen to be acting decisively and to be taking policy 
towards a clear objective of decontrol and liberalisation. Within this framework, 
measures such as a rise in the Bank Rate could be more easily justified. If the 
Government failed to take the plunge its policy would appear to be neither fish nor 
fowl and would be open to attack from both left and right.
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The fact that ROBOT had been postponed in February for political reasons 
meant that the battle for its implementation continued. It was Macmillan’s 
perception that all that was really settled on the February 29 was that the plan 
‘cannot be rushed to coincide with our Budget.’81 It was clear that Churchill had not 
been persuaded by the economic arguments against the plan, the following week 
he remarked that he still looked forward to the day when it was possible to ‘free the 
pound’.82 Churchill’s sympathy towards the economic arguments for ROBOT 
meant that Butler still had the upper hand in the long-term battle over the plan and 
he continued to press for its implementation.
Robert Hall decided that the most effective way to deflect Butler from the 
ROBOT plan was to propose an alternative. He did so in a memorandum entitled 
The Future of Sterling'.83 Butler made extensive annotations on his own copy of 
this memo. These annotations are important not only because they indicate 
Butler’s continued commitment to the principles of ROBOT but also because they 
indicate the line that Butler took in the discussions of this issue which have not 
found their way into the public record. In the first part of the memo Hall outlined his 
arguments against ROBOT. Butler noted his own objections to Hall’s line. Hall’s 
suggestion that speculation in favour of a free-floating pound 'could not long offset 
the depressing effect on the rate of the Sterling Area's current deficit with the dollar 
area' earned the rebuttal that 'this omits all reference to the economic actions 
which I have been advised will help to put things right.'84
As for the claim that 'the loss of gold involved in holding the lower rate 
would be greater than needed to hold the present rate', Butler simply responded 
'No'. Butler also doubted that 'the cuts in imports would be far greater than those 
needed to eliminate the dollar deficit at the present exchange rate.' Hall tried to win 
Butler over by arguing that, rather than dispensing with direct control, ROBOT 
would increase the need for its use. However, Butler found this statement to be 
'too dogmatic'. Finally, Hall claimed that the plan 'would go against our chances of 
borrowing from international institutions.' Butler responded that 'this is not the 
confidential advice I have had.'85
Hall's alternative proposals combined those of Nina Watts and Robert Neild 
from the Economic Section and worked on the assumption that radical change was
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necessary.86 He argued in favour of developing a two-world international economy. 
There would be a 'Dollar world' and a 'Sterling world'. The plan involved the 
ceasing of automatic gold payments between non-dollar countries and the 
transformation of the E.P.U. in to an extension of the Sterling Area. Eventually, 
reconciliation would be possible between these two worlds. Hall's plan had much 
in common with other proposals for a two-world economy put forward in the same 
period such as Macmillan’s plan, which is considered in the next chapter, and 
Gaitskell’s, although Hall put much more emphasis on Europe. Butler was 
unimpressed by these ideas, he agreed with the Bank and the Overseas Finance 
Division that the creation of a ‘Sterling world' ‘would create an isolated 
uncompetitive trading group built around sterling. As such it was likely to 
perpetuate rather than eliminate the dollar shortage.'87
The proponents of ROBOT were boosted by a change in the international 
climate to convertibility. An informal discussion with French representatives on May 
6 revealed that 'the French Treasury and Bank had clearly been thinking on much 
the same lines as the UK.'88 Specifically what the French had in mind 'was a 
fluctuating rate of exchange' with only tentative moves towards convertibility. The 
French seemed relatively unconcerned about the impact of this move on the EPU 
and 'did not even mention the Schuman Plan...in this connection.' The French 
response might have had a significant effect on the timing of the second attempt 
to implement ROBOT. Hall noted in his diary that the French had 'hinted darkly 
that they were going to do great things but not till the end of June, and they didn't 
want us to do anything till then either, and especially that we should consult them 
before a major move.'89
Butler was sufficiently encouraged by this to ask Rowan to consider the 
impact upon the UK and the EPU of several possible courses of action, these were 
'(a) French devaluation to a fixed rate (b) French adopting a fluctuation rate and 
remaining inconvertible (c) The adoption by one or more countries in Europe of a 
fluctuating rate with convertibility.' Rowan assumed that this meant either '(i) 
action by the UK alone' or '(ii) action by the UK and France, with possible results 
that others e.g. Belgium would follow.'90
Rowan's response to option (c) was positive. On June 20 he reported that
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'there are indications that a move to convertibility on the basis of floating rates 
would be followed not only by France but by, at least Belgium, Western Germany 
is a possible, Switzerland is already for practical purposes, convertible. Italy is also 
a possibility... There is a distinct possibility that a large proportion of European 
trade would sooner or later, be on the basis of floating, convertible currencies. This 
would be in our interest.'91 This would also mean the end of the E.P.U., but Rowan 
argues that the UK would not 'be expected to stand in a white sheet on that 
account. The move to a system of freer convertible currencies in Europe would 
have advantages which would compensate for the disappearance of E.P.U. as we 
know it.'92
The following day Cobbold informed Butler that the situation required the 
adoption of ROBOT. In a note covering Cobbold's letter Rowan reminded the 
Chancellor that 'the important new factor' was the desirability of consolation with 
leading European countries before the plan was announced. However, there was 
danger that if Western Germany was informed about the move 'the information 
would get back to the Americans, and our previous idea was not to tell the 
Americans until a few days before the announcement.'93
Bolstered by the reaction to his Budget, Butler tried to get the ROBOT plan 
adopted at the end of June. Robert Hall's reaction to this second coming of 
ROBOT was to advocate more of the same measures as were included in the 
Budget. Although he agreed that it was 'very unfortunate that the import cuts which 
were supposed to turn us from a deficit to a surplus position in EPU have not been 
effective' he still thought that 'further action here [was]... much less objectionable 
than the drastic action of ROBOT.'94 However, by this time Butler had lost patience 
with these measures. He wrote back to Hall pointing out 'how disturbing it is for me 
to find that I take.physical decisions on cuts and then find in the result that they 
have not the result I hoped.' He added that on physical measures he had 'been led 
to doubt whether they will operate in time.'95
Butler circulated another memorandum advocating ROBOT on June 28. 
The new proposal no longer contained a 'provision for the formal funding of the 
sterling balances of sterling area countries', this meant that the plan would create 
less difficulties in the Commonwealth. Also 'the different treatment of sterling
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balances would be very helpful to Commonwealth countries.'96
The other main difference from the first version of ROBOT was the attitude 
in Europe. Butler acknowledged that 'our immediate withdrawal from the European 
Payments Union has always been one of the most difficult implications of any 
move to provide convertibility.' However, the position had changed 'and the ideas 
both of an early step towards convertibility and a floating rate had been ventilated 
much more fully than they had been previously. I think it is very likely that France 
and Belgium at any rate, and perhaps others, would follow any lead given by us. 
there may be indeed a possibility of concerted action over quite a wide field in 
Europe, and if the plan were adopted by us, it would be possible to have prior 
consultation with the French, Belgians and Scandinavians in time to permit them 
to concert with us.' Butler had taken on board Rowan's concerns by noting that 
'prior consultation with the German's would also be desirable after the United 
States Government has been informed.' He concluded that 'it would, of course be 
very much in our interests that all these countries should act at the same time, 
and it would greatly reduce the danger of loss of trade through discrimination 
against us.'97
Butler was unsuccessful in his second attempt to get ROBOT adopted 
largely because of the decision taken by a Cabinet meeting on June 17 attended 
by the Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies, to hold a Commonwealth 
Conference in November. This decision shifted the focus from unilateral to 
collective action.98 At the end of July 1952 responsibility for external financial policy 
was transferred to a Cabinet Committee on preparations for the Commonwealth 
Conference chaired by Eden. The fact that inter-departmental cooperation would 
now be necessary on convertibility forced Butler and the Treasury to compromise 
on the issue. The preparations for the Conference lead to the adoption, against 
Cherwell’s wishes, of the Collective Approach.
The Collective Approach
Cherwell saw the new arrangements for deciding convertibility policy to be 
to his advantage. Policy was now in the hands of a committee chaired by Eden 
who had opposed the ROBOT plan. At the first meeting of the Committee on
preparations for the Commonwealth Conference Cherwell outlined his idea for an 
Atlantic Payments Union. This proposal had come out of a meeting three months 
earlier between Robert Marjolin and Harry Linlott from the O.E.E.C, MacDougall 
and Cherwell at the House of Lords. The idea was for the United States and 
Canada to join the E.P.U. which would, therefore, become an Atlantic Union. 
MacDougall was attracted to this idea 'as a possible half-way house between the 
extremes of ROBOT and “two-worlds."'99
Cherwell's proposal was considered by a Convertibility Working party set 
up under the Chairmanship of Herbert Brittain and composed of representatives 
of the Treasury, the Economic Section, the Board of Trade, Cherwell's Office, The 
Foreign Office, The Commonwealth Relations Office and the Bank of England. The 
majority of the Working Party, lead by the Treasury and the Bank, considered that 
the A.P.U. proposal, advocated by Hall as well as MacDougall, suffered from a 
number of technical difficulties resulting from the inclusion of United States whose 
currency was already convertible and was also a persistent creditor. It was also 
concluded that the scheme provided 'no move forward towards convertibility.'100
Brittain recorded that the majority also rejected Hall and MacDougall's 
position that the inconvertibility of sterling should be maintained until the world 
dollar problem was solved. On the other hand, the working party could not be 
persuaded by the Treasury and the Bank to support 'as an immediate policy 
independent action by the U.K. to make sterling convertible.' The Foreign Office 
feared 'that such independent action would have an unfortunate political effect in 
Europe'. The Board of Trade considered it unwise 'so long as European countries 
retain import restrictions on each others goods' because 'we should be exposed, 
if sterling were convertible, to attacks on our trade designed to build up surpluses 
in convertible sterling.'101
Out of this impasse, and by the time the final report of the Working Party 
was already being written, emerged the Collective Approach. This appeared to be 
a workable solution to the problems envisaged by the Foreign Office and the Board 
of Trade. It was probably suggested by Figgures, an Assistant Secretary at the 
Treasury and the drafter of the Working Party’s report, who had recently returned 
from the O.E.E.C. The Collective Approach had its origins in the 'key currency'
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ideas favoured by the Bank during the war as an alternative to Bretton Woods.102
The idea was 'to form a nucleus of countries the convertibility of whose 
currencies is of particular importance to the maintenance of a multilateral trade 
and payments system throughout the free world.' The currencies of those countries 
which were not already convertible would become so and simultaneously, probably 
in the second half of 1953. While each member would be 'free to adopt a fixed or 
floating rate of exchange, the United Kingdom would adopt a floating rate.' The 
Working Party suggested that the group of countries that would satisfy this 
definition would be the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, France, Germany, 
and Benelux.
Amongst these countries discrimination would be ended, accept against a 
persistent creditor, in practice this would mean the United States. Otherwise import 
restrictions could only be reinstated at times of extreme balance of payments 
difficulties, the other key proposal was that the United States would be asked to 
make available a 'very substantial fund for any member of the small group which 
found itself in balance of payments difficulties.'103
The acceptance by the Working Party of the Collective Approach 
demonstrated that the Treasury and the Bank of England were still in the driving 
seat in the making of convertibility policy. The Collective Approach was a 
development of the ROBOT plan which conceded that progress was dependent 
on collective action. Donald MacDougall has argued that it was A.P.U. that forced 
'the Treasury off a crude ROBOT scheme and on to a considerably less dangerous 
set of proposals called the “Collective Approach” to convertibility.'104 However, the 
Treasury would have to have supported collective rather unilateral action in order 
to secure the agreement of the Board of Trade and the Foreign Office in any case. 
The fundamental policy disagreement between the advocates of the Collective 
Approach on one hand and of the A.P.U. on the other concerned the desirability 
of introducing convertibility at a floating rate in the short-run because it would 
actually help to bring the balance of payments back into equilibrium. On this crucial 
point the Treasury and the Bank clearly won the argument. The Working Party 
rejected the position taken by Hall and MacDougall that further moves to 
convertibility should only be made from a position of strength.
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Butler supported the Collective Approach proposals at the fourth meeting 
of the Commonwealth Conference Committee on September 4. His position was 
consistent with that he had taken during the ROBOT discussions. He said that ‘the 
United Kingdom must work towards a multilateral system, we could not afford to 
carry on with our present policies- to run an inconvertible currency on inadequate 
reserves was damaging to sterling as a currency and to the reputation of the 
United Kingdom’. For Butler the attraction of the Collective Approach was that it 
retained the objective of convertibility at a floating rate and that it represented a 
way of getting the Foreign office and the Board of Trade to agree to these 
objectives. The problem was to get other countries to agree to collective action. In 
Committee, his arguments were tinged with a certain reluctance to move away 
from the option of independent action. While he conceded that the Collective 
Approach would solve the problem of other countries discriminating against 
sterling goods and causing a 'descending spiral of trade' he foresaw two problems 
with the new approach.
The first problem highlighted by Butler concerned the position of Canada 
'who might find herself in the delicate situation vis-a-vis the United States, if the 
latter were discriminated against as a persistent creditor, while she herself was 
not...' The second problem was with the prospect of the negotiations and the 
necessary announcements causing embarrassment. Although he had been 
advised by the Bank that confidence in sterling was not likely to be impaired, he 
made it clear that 'for his part he would like to see the discussions with the United 
States and Europe... well advanced at the time of the next budget.'105
Despite Butler's conditional advocacy of the Collective Approach all the 
ministers present at the meeting expressed doubts about it. Maxwell Fyfe was 
alarmed by the effect on the internal economy envisaged in the official report. The 
President of the’ Board of Trade, Peter Thorneycroft, felt that 'it would be 
necessary to take many other measures before we could proceed to convertibility', 
Macmillan registered his agreement with Thorneycroft. Salisbury feared 'that the 
proposals would not be accepted favourably by other members of the 
Commonwealth'.
Only Lyttelton, who was not present, was in favour of the plan, although as
218
Eden informed the meeting, his written statement stressed that 'if the approach 
broke down, it would be necessary to reconsider whether independent action 
should not be taken by the United Kingdom as suggested in paragraph 115 of the 
same memorandum.' For his own part Eden lined up with Cherwell in supporting 
the A.P.U. proposals He felt 'that a leakage of information might lead to a 
dangerous run on sterling. This danger would be less if a more gradual approach- 
as in the Atlantic Payments Union were made.'106
The ministerial reception of the Collective Approach could hardly have been 
less favourable. Robert Hall recorded in his diary that after the meeting 
MacDougall was waiting for him 'in a highly excited state to say that ministers had 
more or less turned down the 'collective approach' to convertibility and only the 
Chancellor and Lyttelton were for it. The others seemed almost to prefer APU!' Hall 
himself had come to see even the APU as too rash an approach, he noted that it 
was 'a serious embarrassment to me. The fact is that I feel suspicious of all great 
new plans to set the world right- not that we don't need them but they each need 
six months examination.'107
Cherwell was inspired by the ministerial reaction to the Collective Approach 
to produce a further memorandum arguing in favour of the A.P.U. proposals which 
he submitted on 10 September. He saw it as being to his advantage to equate the 
Collective Approach proposals with those of ROBOT and to argue that the 
difference between himself and Butler was essentially the same as it had been 
over these proposals. The 'fundamental difference', he wrote, 'is that some think 
that we should plunge into convertibility at a floating rate even though our balance 
of trade and reserves are weak, while others consider that this would lead to 
disastrous results.' Cherwell repeated his objection to the idea of using the price 
mechanism to support the policy and to the reliance on 'hot money' to support the 
rate of sterling. He also doubted the possibility of the United States agreeing to a 
plan which entailed it being the only country against which discrimination would be 
allowed and the expectation that it would approve the abolition of the 'no-new- 
preference' rule of the G.A.T.T. 'And on top off all this', he added, 'the United 
States is to provide $5,000 million to help members of the group who get into 
balance of payments difficulties... Will the United States really do all this merely
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in order to make it possible to allow foreigners to convert their holdings of sterling 
or other currencies?'108
Butler himself doubted whether the American’s would agree to the 
proposals. He had been sent a note by Hall who thought it 'very doubtful whether 
the U.S.A. would join a sort of inner group like this, or whether a substantial 
number of countries would agree to forswear quantitative restrictions, except 
against the United States.' Butler wrote 'V. Sensible' in the margin next to this 
remark.109 However, though Butler still hankered after independent action he had 
little choice but to accept the conclusions of the working party and advocate the 
Collective Approach, even if he suspected that it might be fatally flawed. The 
Approach still represented a step forward and embodied the principles of the 
ROBOT plan.
Butler was able to overcome the hostile response the Collective Approach 
initially received from Eden and other Committee members. His victory was due 
primarily to his skill in persuading the Committee that the Collective Approach 
represented the only possible way forward. In spite of his own doubts, Butler made 
the convincing argument that progress on revision of the no-new-preference rule 
of GATT was only possible if these proposals were tied in with the Collective 
Approach. He ‘felt that once the United Kingdom was shown to be ready to discard 
quota restrictions and discrimination, the United States and the other 
Commonwealth countries as well would agree’ with the government’s tariff 
proposals. ‘Without this, however, he doubted if it would be possible to make 
progress.’110
Although Butler persuaded the Committee to support the Collective 
Approach, he was faced by a further difficulty. While the officials who had 
prepared a time table for the introduction of convertibility had envisaged revision 
of the I.M.F. and G.A.T.T. taking place after convertibility, ministers insisted that 
this revision should take place before or concurrently with convertibility.111 It was 
noted that 'if we plunged into convertibility before the G.A.T.T. was revised, we 
should not be able to persuade other countries to agree to essential changes to 
it.' On the basis of these new conditions Eden felt able to recommend that the 
Collective Approach should be suggested as a possible course of action at the
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Conference of officials.112
Butler was faced with predictable differences of opinion amongst his main 
economic advisers. While Rowan and Brittain were strongly in favour of the new 
approach, Bridges reported to Butler that Edwin Plowden remained cautious. Like 
many ministers Plowden felt it 'essential that we should not be committed to a 
time-table, i.e. that we do not move to convertibility until the necessary conditions 
have been fulfilled. Their fulfilment will involve hard bargaining with other countries, 
particularly the U.S.A.'
Plowden also feared that ministers would not accept the internal measures 
necessary to adopt convertibility, although he did accept 'the necessity for strong 
internal measures' - in present circumstances - whether we go convertible or not.' 
Hall went much further than Plowden and objected to the very direction in which 
Government policy was heading. He doubted 'whether it would be right to commit 
ourselves to a policy which would involve taking such severe internal measures - 
measures which he thinks would probably set up severe social stresses because 
they would be so deflationary, he wants to reach convertibility, but does not think 
we can move so quickly as he thinks would be required by the collective approach.'
Bridges himself expressed no doubts, he pointed out to Butler that cut 
backs in Government spending would be necessary if he were to meet only his 
objectives for the internal economy, let alone his external ones. He argued that 'we 
are bogged down in a vicious circle of too high expenditure which leads in turn to 
crushing taxation, which again makes it impossible for individuals or companies to 
save, and for the economic life blood of the country to flow freely. Hence too, the 
shortages which lead to the maintenance of controls and the burdening of the 
administrative machine and to the lack of opportunity for individual initiative.' he 
concluded that 'we cannot do so many of the things which your Party was returned 
to office to do, until we lighten the burden on the economy.'113
Although Butler was faced by a hardening of opinion amongst his advisers 
he was still able to secure the outcome he wanted without having to confront those 
who opposed him. The way he did so was illustrated by what Robert Hall wrote in 
his diary with regards to the new conditions. He noted that 'a good deal of trouble 
has since come on the interpretation of this stipulation, which O.F. want to whittle
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down and MacDougall to stiffen. It seems likely that the Chancellor gave a different 
interpretation of what was meant by this to Rowan and Plowden.'114 This 
deviousness on Butler’s part had a certainty of purpose. When the memorandum 
recommending, in the light of the meeting of Commonwealth Officials, that the 
Collective Approach should be put forward at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
Conference was introduced to Cabinet by Eden it envisaged convertibility being 
introduced before rather than after the policy for the removal of quantitative 
restriction on trade and 'the progressive removal of discrimination as the world 
dollar problem is solved.'
The Cabinet discussion turned on the fundamental difference of opinion 
between Cherwell and Butler. While Cherwell did not dissent from the view that the 
'ultimate objective must be a system of multilateral trade involving convertibly of 
sterling.' He felt that 'before this objective could be attained, the economic position 
of the United Kingdom must be strong...' On the other hand, Butler believed 'that 
convertibility was not an end in itself. It was simply one of the methods by which 
we might advance to a multilateral trade and payments system which would 
support our own economic position and extend the scope of our trade.'115
While several ministers shared Cherwell's apprehension about a premature 
move to convertibility and a multilateral system, Churchill summed up the meeting 
in favour of Butler. The decision represented a final victory for Butler over his 
Cabinet opponents. The government was now committed to convertibility at a 
floating rate. The losers took the decision badly. Cherwell, who is often thought to 
have had the ear of the Prime Minister on these issues, regarded the decision ‘as 
a put up job between Butler and Churchill.'116 In his despondency, Robert Hall 
recorded that Norman Brook felt that Ministers had accepted the Collective 
Approach 'without belief let alone enthusiasm, only because they cannot think of 
anything else.'117 .
At the Prime Minister's Conference itself the main difficulty arose over the 
proposal that Sterling Area countries should maintain fixed rates with sterling after 
sterling had become convertible at a flexible rate. The delegations of India, 
Pakistan and Ceylon all foresaw difficulties in committing themselves to such a link 
after convertibility. All of these countries wanted to reserve the right to peg their
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currencies against the dollar rather than the pound. Although the India Finance 
Minister Deshmuch had declared that 'there was a 95 per cent likelihood of India 
linking her currency with sterling.'118 The Cabinet decided that the Collective 
Approach could not proceed without agreement by these countries. Eventually 
Butler and Deshmuch put together a compromise allowing a switch of allegiance 
to the dollar if the pound were floated in an emergency when heavy depreciation 
was expected.
Butler went to Washington in March 1953 to secure American agreement 
to the proposals. As he had feared, such agreement was not forthcoming. Frank 
Lee reported back in London on March 10. Fie told a meeting at the Treasury that 
Butler had made a good impression on the new American administration. Both by 
his mastery of the facts and 'his ability to use words like 'moral' and 'right' which 
the Americans thought quite proper though British civil servants could not bring 
themselves to use in a business deal.' Despite this the American's made no 
commitment whatsoever, they believed the approach to be premature. Lee also 
reported that the new administration was 'unduly afraid of Congress' and would not 
ask for the large loan of five million dollars the British wanted or for the lowering 
of tariffs.119
The failure of the Anglo-American talks marked the end of the Collective 
Approach as a policy for action rather than a collection of aspirations. Such failure 
had been predictable. The Approach had emerged as a last minute compromise 
when the Treasury and the Bank had failed to convince other Ministries, 
particularly the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade that unilateral action was the 
best way forward. The Collective approach was essentially Operation ROBOT 
without the sting of presenting other nations with a fait accompli. For Butler, the 
failure to get American agreement meant that his external financial policy had 
reached an impasse. He could not get his colleagues to agree to unilateral action, 
at least as long as a crisis was not imminent. An international solution to the 
problem, which had been difficult enough to secure Cabinet agreement to was now 
also impossible, at least for the time being. The irony was that the Collective 
Approach had been a response to tensions within the British Government rather 
than outside and had, in many ways, made international cooperation less rather
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than more likely. It was hardly surprising that Butler came back from Washington 
with, as Hall reported, a belief 'that he had been misinformed about the probable 
U.S. reaction.' There was also 'an undercurrent among some of his colleagues that 
his policy had received a severe set-back and should be abandoned.'120 However, 
only a year later Butler again began to make progress towards his objective of 
floating rate convertibility.
Butler and De-Facto Convertibility
The American reaction to the Collective Approach forced Butler to change 
tack in his external policy. It has been suggested by Samuel Brittan that the 
Treasury should have pushed through the ROBOT plans in the more favourable 
conditions of 1954.121 However, Butler’s hands were tied by the commitment to the 
Collective Approach. While the acceptance of the Approach by the Cabinet had 
been a notable victory for Butler it also meant that important conditions were 
supposed to be fulfilled before the pound could be made convertible. Butler told 
the first meeting of the short-lived Cabinet Committee on External Economic Policy 
on July 9 1954 that 'over the last year or so sterling had in fact been sufficiently 
strong to have been made convertible. But the progress of the United States 
towards good creditor policies had so far been disappointing.' There were also 
political considerations, ministers agreed 'that there were strong political and 
economic arguments against attempting convertibility shortly before a General 
Election.'122
In spite of these hindrances Butler still wanted to make progress towards 
convertibility. He was supported by the Bank of England which argued that 
unilateral action was still possible. On November 4 1953 Cobbold sent Butler a 
long letter, skilfully couched in words intended to appeal to the Chancellor's 
thinking on economic policy, outlining a possible approach over the next two years. 
Butler's intention was to unite the objectives of internal and external economic 
policy, but as Cobbold pointed out, they were becoming increasingly separate. 'I 
think that H.M. Governments policy of freeing things up, removing controls and 
allowing the price system to work has now (perhaps just in the last months) 
crossed the Rubicon. Our exchange control arrangements are still geared to a
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controlled economy and are running behind our commercial and commodity 
arrangements.' For the Governor this meant 'getting the worst of both worlds' and 
he warned that if conditions deteriorated it might mean a return to physical controls 
and rationing. Since it was difficult to believe that any progress would be made in 
getting the Americans to agree to the commitments of the Collective Approach, 
Cobbold suggested finding some 'technical means of speeding up the time table'. 
As a first step he suggested that 'consideration might be given to a general 
simplification of exchange control practice towards non-resident sterling other than 
on American account, with a view to allowing a regular market alongside official 
sterling... This would bring us nearer to but would still leave to be faced, the next 
step of free transferability between American and other non-resident sterling.'123
The reaction in the Treasury to the first part of Cobbold's plan was largely 
favourable although it had two formidable opponents in Robert Hall and William 
Strath of the C.E.P.S. In August 1953 the Economic Section was moved to the 
Treasury from the Cabinet Office and Hall felt himself to be in a much stronger 
position. Both Hall and Strath believed that the scheme represented a risk to 
sterling's defences and argued that the operation should be put on hold.124 Despite 
these objections Butler made a provisional decision to adopt the proposal after the 
Commonwealth Finance Ministers meeting in Sydney.125
At the beginning of 1954 Strath and Hall stepped up the pressure to stop 
the unification of sterling going ahead. Hall wrote to Gilbert asking 'whether in this 
period of increasing uncertainty in the balance of payments front there is any real 
need to press forward with the unification of non-resident sterling... I should have 
thought that this-was hardly the moment to throw away yet another of our 
defences, limited though it may be.'126 Both Rowan and Bridges argued that these 
controls were ineffective and not worth keeping. On March 2 Butler agreed to the 
reopening of the London Gold Market but took a further day to think over his 
decision before agreeing to the unification of non-resident sterling.127
Stage two of Cobbold’s plan was for the coalescence of the official and 
transferable rates of sterling followed by a move to wider dealing spreads of $2.70- 
$2.90. In substance, as Robert Hall noted in his diary, these proposals were ‘the 
same old ones he had brought nearly 3 years before' namely, the ROBOT plan.128
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Butler was naturally attracted to these proposals, but the Treasury argued that 
such a move could not be presented as anything other than the introduction of 
convertibility without the conditions of the Collective Approach having been 
satisfied. Furthermore, the Government was now faced with the political 
uncertainty surrounding the timing of Churchill’s retirement and the next General 
Election. The risks surrounding an early move to convertibility were too great for 
Butler to agree to it in a probable Election year.
Cobbold recommended the introduction of stage two on January 20 1955. 
On the same day Butler was presented with a report by the Programmes 
Committee which predicted a slight deficit in the balance of payments for the first 
half of 1954 and a substantial one for 1955.129 As a move to stage two was not 
immediately possible for political reasons the Bank recommended the intervention 
to support the rate of transferable sterling, which amounted to de facto restoration 
of external convertibility, as part of a package to deal with the balance of payments 
problems and the weakness of the pound.
Both Rowan and Hall argued against the proposal which they thought was 
both unnecessary and premature. But Butler was minded to accept the advice of 
the Bank. Hall noted in his diary that Butler ‘always feels that the Bank have to do 
the job and are his principal advisers on exchange rate and monetary questions, 
and he doesn’t seem to be worried by inconsistencies unless it suits him to point 
them out, i.e. unless they appear in the case of people who want to do things he 
dislikes having to do.’130
Butler made the decision to support transferable sterling on 23 February. 
It was accepted by the Bank that any further moves would have to wait until after 
a general election; they did not have long to wait. In early April Churchill finally 
retired and was replaced by Eden who discussed the timing of the Election with 
Butler. It would appear that the issue of convertibility proved to be the decisive 
factor. In a note dated April 6 Robert Hall wrote ‘I think that the general economic 
situation is much better than it was in 1952. Production has increased and we have 
absorbed the increased defence burden. The reserves are better and our overseas 
debts not so awkwardly held. Thus I think that the dangers of convertibility are 
much less now than they were then. But our policy of ending controls and rationing
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has made it much more desirable to have a floating rate as a means of 
adjustment, and I think that on economic grounds it is very desirable that we 
should take the remaining steps to convertibility very soon.’131
The Conservative’s were returned with an increased majority and the Bank 
resumed its pressure for stage two. Butler himself approved of the Bank’s plan 
which he called the ‘January 20th proposals’. The plan included wider dealing 
spreads for sterling which would have been a good interim move towards floating. 
Hall noted in his diary that Butler thought ‘he must have some freedom to balance 
his exchange now he has given up controls.’ Further, Butler believed that the 
proposals represented the best chance of making progress. He argued that the 
proposal represented ‘a “halfway house” which his colleagues might accept - he 
thinks they won’t take the full Collective Approach now because of the 
consequences on the trade side.’132
However, all of Butler’s senior advisers were against the move. Hall, who 
had favoured an early move to convertibility before the Election now appeared to 
have cold feet. He noted in his diary that ‘none of us can see any difference 
between the Collective Approach and Jan 20th except that under the latter we 
would be acting alone... and all the fine words we have used about consultation 
would be shown to have been hollow... none of us feel that we ought to do 
something the world will recognize for what it is, and pretend that it is a good deal 
less than that (us=Treasury officials).’133
While discussions over stage two between the Bank and the Treasury 
continued, Bank representatives openly muted wider dealing spreads for sterling 
in the discussions over the future of E.P.U. held at Basle and Paris. Consequently, 
speculation against the pound increased as market operators assumed that it 
would soon be made convertible, and given the inflationary situation, open at the 
bottom of any spread. On July 19 Butler was pressured by Gaitskell and Roy 
Jenkins in the Commons on the question of whether he planned convertibility at 
a floating rate.134 Butler parried these questions but the continued run on the 
pound forced him to deny that he planned to float the pound in a debate on the 
economic situation on July 26. This statement was motivated primarily by the need 
to reassure public opinion. Robert Hall recorded that the decision to deny the
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possibility of floating was ‘taken more or less by chance’ and without the Cabinet 
having been consulted. Rowan’s comment that ‘he did not believe that if we had 
to choose between fairly full employment and a fixed rate we would choose the 
latter’ indicated that the decision was not intended to be final.135
Given the currency position Butler was forced to reject the Bank’s proposal 
to announce a version of the stage two proposals at the Istanbul meeting of the 
IMF in September. Instead, the immediate task, as Butler later wrote in his 
memoirs, was ‘to steady the pound, and this I did at Istanbul in September at the 
IMF meeting. With Sir George Bolton beside me, excitedly whispering into my 
ears, I repeated to the domes and minarets several times the incantation that the 
pound would not float but would remain within fixed margins and be steadily 
defended by our resources combined with still anti-inflationary measures. I felt that 
in the exigencies of the moment the Robot vision with which I begun my tenure of 
the Treasury was clearly inappropriate.’136
Conclusion
The ROBOT episode is often written about as if it were an aberration on the 
long road to the objective of fixed rate convertibility that was finally reached in 
1958. In Years of Recovery Alec Cairncross writes that ‘the alarms and excursions 
of 1952 were soon forgotten and when convertibility de facto came in February 
1955 - only two and half years later - it took the form of support, at a fixed rate of 
exchange, for transferable sterling without the blocking or funding of any sterling 
balances.’137 More recently, Edmund Dell has argued that the episode did lasting 
damage to Butler’s reputation within the Government and that by 1953 ‘Butler had 
no policy’ and ‘the upshot was a divided Treasury under a weak Chancellor.’138 
Neither of these conclusions can be justified.
Butler pursued the objective of convertibility at a floating rate throughout his 
time as Chancellor. His decision to support de facto convertibility in February 1955 
was intended as a move towards this objective. It was only the run on sterling that 
persuaded Butler to publicly deny that his objective was floating rate convertibility 
for reasons of short-term expediency. Dell’s contention that ‘the regrets that Butler 
expressed in The Art of the Possible about ROBOT’S rejection ‘do not seem to
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have been present in 1953 or after’ is also incorrect.139 Butler was still advocating 
the objectives of the plan when the pound was finally made convertible at a fixed 
rate in 1958. Robert Hall noted in his diary at the time that Butler felt ‘betrayed by 
the Bank and O.F.’ both of which were by then against floating..140
The postponement of ROBOT did no lasting damage to Butler’s reputation. 
The fact that the Cabinet was to endorse Butler’s policy in the form of the 
Collective Approach would indicate that Butler was quickly able to reestablish 
control over this area of policy. During his time at the Treasury Butler saw his 
public reputation grow enormously and by 1955 he was seen as the only serious 
rival to Eden for the succession to Churchill.
Butler made the running in the making of external financial policy during his 
Chancellorship to the same extent as Gaitskell had during his. It would be fair to 
conclude that they had taken policy in opposite directions. Gaitskell was motivated 
by the belief that the objective of convertibility was incompatible with that of a 
socialist economic policy. Butler saw convertibility at a floating rate as being central 
to the fulfilment of his objective of a free economy in which market forces were 
given greater play. The decision to go for fixed rate convertibility in 1958 was an 
outcome neither had wanted.
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Chapter 8
‘One-World’ or ‘Two-World’?
Discord and International Trade Agreements
Although the ‘Proposals for Consideration by an International Conference 
on Trade and Employment ‘ were published in December 1945, at the same time 
as the American loan agreement, the negotiations had been conducted separately. 
The ‘Proposals’ were the culmination of negotiations between the wartime coalition 
Government and the American administration on the issue of postwar trade.1 The 
‘Proposals’ envisaged the establishment of a commercial world order of free trade 
based on multilateral agreement under the aegis of an International Trade 
Organisation.
During the negotiations the most critical issue had been the relationship 
between the reduction of American tariffs and British imperial preference. Although 
the Americans refused to agree to automatic across-the-board reductions in their 
tariff and would continue to negotiate by individual tariff, they insisted on the end 
of imperial preference. The eventual agreement committed the British Government 
to the elimination of imperial preference, although this was linked to progress in 
the reduction of American tariffs. It stated that ‘In the light of the principles set forth 
in Article VII of the Mutual Aid [lend-lease] Agreement [1942], members should 
enter into arrangements for the substantial reduction of tariffs and for the 
elimination of tariffs preferences, action for the elimination of tariff preferences 
being taken in conjunction with adequate measures for the substantial reduction 
of barriers to world trade, as part of the mutually advantageous arrangements 
contemplated in this document.’2
As well as the ‘Proposals concerning an International Trade Organisation’, 
the agreement also included ‘Proposals concerning Employment’. These proposals 
were only added to the agreement after it had been fully drafted at the insistence 
of the Australian negotiators.3 The employment proposals pledged the signatory 
states to take action to achieve full employment within its own jurisdiction, through
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measures appropriate to its political and economic institutions.’4 No consideration 
was given to how the goal of full employment was to be achieved and the 
agreement put severe qualifications on how it could be brought about. The 
agreement stated that ‘no nation will seek to maintain employment through 
measures which are likely to create unemployment in other countries or which are 
incompatible with international undertakings designed to promote an expanding 
volume of international trade and investment in accordance with comparative 
efficiencies of production.’5
Over the next five years the Labour Government was to move away from 
the provisions it was pledged to support under the ‘Proposals’. It became 
increasingly concerned that a one-world economy would lead to high 
unemployment and sought to include within international agreements guarantees 
of full employment abroad and of its protection at home. These concerns 
contributed to the eventual failure of the International Trade Organisation 
negotiations and to international agreement hanging by the thread of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which had originally been intended only 
as an interim measure.
As President of the Board of Trade Harold Wilson became sceptical about 
the desirability of a one-world economy based on multilateral trade agreements as 
a policy objective. He argued that as the worlds greatest creditor, the Americans 
should be prepared to make greater concessions and agree to unequal trade 
relationships. Wilson came to see Britain’s future lying in increasing bilateral trade 
with Commonwealth countries through the strengthening of imperial preference.
The Conservatives came to power in 1951 pledged to extend imperial 
preference. The next four years saw the Party move to open support of a one- 
world trading system based on free trade. This remarkable turn-around was largely 
the work of Peter Thorneycroft, the President of the Board of Trade, and of Butler 
himself, with the tacit support of Churchill. While Wilson and Gaitskell continued 
to call for the extension of trade discrimination, by 1954 the Conservatives had 
become committed to the no-new-preference rule of the GATT.
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The London Conference 1946
By the time the Preparatory Committee gathered to begin work on the 
Charter of the International Trade Organization (I.T.O.) in October 1946 the British 
Government had become worried about the prospects of an American slump. The 
proposals it made to deal with such an eventuality revealed a fundamentally 
different approach to the issues of international trade to that favoured by the 
Americans. For Cripps and his colleagues the prime objective of the conference 
was to 'achieve an agreement as to the manner in which the nations can co­
operate for the promotion of the highest level of employment and the maintenance 
of demand and can bring some degree of regulation into world trade and 
commerce.'6 For Clair Wilcox, the head of the American delegation, the prime 
objective was to achieve an agreement so 'the existing barriers to international 
trade should be substantially reduced, so that the volume of trade may be large.'7
The position taken by the British Government at the London conference 
seems to have taken informed opinion by surprise. The Economist had expected 
the main controversy to be 'between the "free trade" conception of the Americans 
with its goal of a maximum volume of trade in good years and the "full 
employment" conception of the Australian and other critics.' What it had not 
expected was 'the British Government, which is pledged to give support in principle 
to the American proposals and has hitherto seemed to be rather more than half 
converted to them giving strong support to the "full employment" school and 
emphasising the fact that it is not committed to a single clause of the American 
charter.'8
The proposals showed that the British Government did not believe an 
increasing volume of trade would be enough to maintain full employment. The 
correct internal policies would have to be adopted by member countries if a slump 
was to be avoided. The classical conception was that free trade led to greater 
demand, Hugh Gaitskell said at the time of the conference that for the British 
government the equation was the other way round: 'if you can maintain full 
employment in America, the prospects for freedom from trade restrictions are 
bright.'9
The British proposals were laid out in an annex to a memorandum by the
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United Kingdom delegation. This memo began by stating that 'the maintenance of 
full employment is' a vital element in the policy of His Majesty's Government in the 
United Kingdom. The objective of maintaining full employment in any one country 
may well be frustrated unless all other nations are likewise maintaining full 
employment. His Majesty's Government therefore fully support the proposition that 
this subject is one on which international action is necessary.' It continued with the 
warning 'that unless adequate steps are taken to this end, the results hoped for 
from the reduction of trade barriers will not be fulfilled.'10 It was suggested that 
'there should be convention covering International Employment policy which might 
either take the form of a separate convention or form part of a general convention 
which would also establish the International Trade Organization.'11
The British proposals could be broken down into three main components. 
The first was 'to take action designed to achieve and maintain full employment 
within each country.' The second was 'to correct a fundamental disequilibrium in 
the balance of payments, which by creating balance of payment difficulties for 
other countries prejudices them in the maintenance of full employment' and the 
third was 'to participate in appropriate international action of a positive character 
to promote full employment.'12 The final proposal included 'an invitation to the 
Economic and Social Council and the various specialist agencies to consider what 
positive contributions they can make to the maintenance of full employment 
internationally.'
The justification offered for the first proposal by the British government was 
that the maintenance of full employment was 'a duty which each government owes 
not merely to each own nationals, but to the world as a whole.' The British argued 
that the fulfilment of this goal could not be brought about simply through the right 
international conditions, in fact, 'the adoption of effective domestic measures for 
the maintenance of full employment is the essential basis. If all important countries 
adopted effective policies of this kind, no international depression need ever 
develop.'13 Despite American objections, the draft of the Charter prepared for the 
Geneva negotiations did include the statement that 'each member shall take action 
designed to achieve and maintain full and productive employment and large and 
steady growing demand within its own territory.'14
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The second British proposal entailed the obligation on member states to 
'take action... to correct a fundamental disequilibrium in its balance of payments 
which persistently creates balance of payments difficulties for other countries and 
so prejudices them in the maintenance of full employment.'15 This put the onus 
squarely on creditor countries, principally the United States, to do something about 
its surplus. 'A country may be persistently buying from aboard or investing abroad 
appreciably less than it is selling abroad. Indeed, the excess of its sales of exports 
may be the means whereby it is maintaining its own employment. This is, however, 
likely to exercise and to intensify their problem of maintaining their own 
employment.'16 The Americans also gave way on this issue and the draft charter 
contained a commitment on the part of surplus countries to make 'their full 
contribution to action designed to correct the maladjustment.'17
The British Government also contemplated the idea of an 'escape clause' 
which would release the United Kingdom and other countries from the multilateral 
obligations in the event of a slump in order to protect full employment. In the end 
it turned out that such a safety clause was not necessary as the draft charter 
allowed 'members to take action within the provisions of this charter to safeguard 
their economies against deflationary pressure in the event of a serious decline in 
the effective demand of other countries.'18
The Overseas Economic Policy Committee of the Cabinet declared itself to 
be happy with the outcome of the London conference. The Committee recognised 
'that there were limits to the extent to which it would be possible to ensure the 
carrying out of these provisions. It was difficult to imagine, for instance that the 
United States, with an economy geared to export, would be able to devise fully 
effective means to ensure full employment at home at a time of international 
depression,' However, it was still considered 'an considerable advance to have 
secured international recognition that the maintenance of full and productive 
employment and of high and stable demand should be a matter of concern to all 
nations and the responsibility which they owed to each other.'19
The London Conference had accepted the British proposal that the 
Economic and Social Council of the United nations (ECOSOC) should consider 
ways to maintain full employment internationally. The focus of British attempts to
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secure international full employment now shifted to ECOSOC as practical methods 
were sought for fulfilling this objective.
ECOSOC
In March 1948 ECOSOC asked the British Government to fill out a 
questionnaire on employment policy. The Economic Section was given the task of 
preparing draft answers to these questions. In response to the questionnaire’s 
seventh question: 'Should unemployment develop as a result of a deficiency in 
effective demand, what programmes and provisions are available to off set it?' the 
Economic Section's reply included various explicit commitments. These included 
the variation of Government orders of consumer goods; the expansion of public 
investment if private investment should fall off and the exercise of a wide influence 
over building and civil engineering.20
Asked to comment on the draft, Bernard Gilbert complained that the 
Economic Section’s response went much further than stated government policy. 
He wrote that the answer gave 'much more substance to proposals for off-setting 
a deficiency in effective demand than was given in the White Paper on 
Employment Policy, or so far as I can recall, in any subsequent ministerial 
speeches. If the subject is now to be written up ministers would no doubt have to 
give careful and detailed consideration to what was said, and move over anything 
that was to said to Parliament here before it is said to the United Nations.'21 All of 
the explicit commitments were written out of the final reply to the questionnaire to 
the satisfaction of Gilbert who wrote that it went 'no further than what is said in the 
White Paper on Employment Policy in 1944.' He added that even the suggestions 
of 1944 'may not prove to be as effective as we then thought.'22 However, the 
answers to the questionnaire did represent a detailed expression of British 
employment policy. The idea that Governments should give information on there 
employment policies was institutionalised in the form of semi-annual reports.
To help combat the balance of payments problems inherent in the I.T.O the 
British Government initiated the idea of an experts committee on 'national and 
international measures to achieve full employment.' The committee included two 
American economists, J.M.Clark and A.Smithies; one British, Nicholas Kaldor; one
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French, P.Uri; and one Australian, E.R.Walker. The committee's report made a 
number of radical suggestions for government action. It proposed that 
governments should:
'(i) announce a full employment target;
(ii) announce a programme for directing all relevant aspects of policy to the 
continuous achievement of full employment;
(iii) adopt and announce a system of automatic and compensatory measures to 
operate in case of failure to maintain employment;
(iv) announce its anti-inflation policies;
(v) adapt its legislative, administrative, and statistical procedures to the 
implementation of full employment.'23
On the international side the committee recommended moves to: '(i) 
establish a programme involving statistical exercises, conferences, and a 
permanent expert advisory commission, to eliminate the present structure 
disequilibrium in world trade;
(ii) stabilise the flow of international investment;
(iii) stabilise external disbursements in the face of internal fluctuations in effective 
demand.'24
On receiving the expert committee’s report Douglas Jay immediately 
expressed his enthusiasm. He wrote to Cripps, now Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
declaring that it was 'a really outstanding contribution to the basic - sterling dollar - 
and in fact world economic problem.' He felt that the chances of the report's 
recommendations being put into practice were helped by the 'support of the two 
distinguished and fairly orthodox American experts.'25
In a further letter to Cripps Jay expressed his hopes for the committees 
recommendations. Jay argued that the presence of the two Americans on the 
Committee was a 'great tactical advantage...which may not recur' therefore the 
Government had to push the recommendations to the hilt. 'It may then be - one 
cannot tell - that these proposals might assume later on really major importance, 
comparable with Marshall Aid. As Marshall Aid dwindles, the sections of U.S. 
opinion which support it are likely to be looking around for some method of aiding 
the rest of the world economy.'26
An inter-departmental working party was set up to advise on the report. 
While praising the ideas behind the report the inter-departmental committee saw 
many obstacles in the way of its implementation. On the seemingly straight forward 
suggestion of fixing a full employment target the committee concluded that there 
were significant difficulties, 'unemployment figures and percentages are not 
internationally comparable. The scope and definition of unemployment differ 
considerably between countries.' The working party advised that the Government 
should say that 'the recommendation has obvious attractions if it is possible but 
that it raises a number of practical questions that require further considerations.'27 
The working party found similar problems with all the expert committee 
suggestions.
Jay was dismayed by the tone of the working party’s report. Although he 
was 'in general agreement with the report' he stressed that 'it is vital that we take 
a positive attitude in ECOSOC and avoid even the suspicion of using detailed 
criticism to cold-shoulder the proposal.'28 Gaitskell went further than Jay in 
criticising the working party, he wrote that he 'did not agree with the working party's 
anxieties on the technical difficulties.' Gaitskell believed that the British 
Government had to be positive for there to be any hope of international action. 
The real difficulty’ Gaitskell agued, 'is political - to persuade the other 
Governments to intervene by direct controls to prevent inflation, and in the case 
of the U.S., to take the necessary action to offset the surplus in their balance of 
payments.'29
At the ECOSOC meeting in August 1950 the British delegation supported 
the principles of the Experts Committee while not advocating the explicit schemes 
for international action. However there was strong American opposition and little 
support for the British position from other delegates. The only aspects of the 
scheme to survive were the employment standard and the idea of annual reports 
on economic plans and prospects. The Americans were not committed to any 
plans to restore equilibrium to their balance of payments.
The Economic Steering Committee under the Chairmanship of Edward 
Bridges decided that the employment standard should be in the form of a ceiling 
figure, above which 'it would be a "continuing objective of policy" to prevent
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unemployment rising.' The figure suggested was 4%, The logic behind this 
suggestion revealed a certain disregard by the committee for what ministers 
wanted the employment standard to achieve. The figure was based on an estimate 
of the effects of a decline in exports and drew on the experience of the pre-war 
American recession of 1937-38. This example was deemed to be useful partly 
because of the 'rapid recovery, due to a large extent to prompt change in the 
United States government's monetary and fiscal policy.' However the use of this 
example in setting the standard meant that officials had assumed that American 
policy would not change. Officials even allowed for a fall in exports of 12%, 2% 
higher than in 1937/8.30
Gaitskell, by now Chancellor, did not agree with the thinking behind a figure 
of 4% for the unemployment standard. He decided that the ceiling should be 3% 
as this was more likely to perform the function intended by ministers. Gaitskell 
argued that 'the main practical advantage of the publication of national standards 
will be to encourage the United States to publish and (when the time comes) to 
observe a reasonable standard and for this purpose... the lower we can put our 
standard the better.'31 Gaitskell was successful in getting the ceiling figure for the 
standard lowered to 3%. The figure was officially announced in March 1951. It was 
the first time the Government had made a public commitment to an unemployment 
standard.
The Geneva Conference 1947 and the Havana Conference 1948
The American negotiator, Will Clayton, and his colleagues badly needed 
success at the Geneva conference of 1947. This conference was held to negotiate 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), intended as an interim 
measure while the International Trade Organisation agreement was finalised. The 
concessions granted to the British at the London conference meant that Congress 
had to be appeased. They entered the negotiations with authority for a 50% 
reduction in tariffs. In return they thought the conference would be a success 'only 
if the Imperial Preference system is thoroughly wrecked beyond hope of repair.'32 
However, Cripps and his Cabinet colleagues were unwilling to give the kind of 
concessions Clayton was looking for. Cripps told the Cabinet that Clayton
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'regarded the concessions offered as inadequate...[Clayton] felt it a matter of 
personal prestige to obtain a much wider elimination of preferences.'33
To achieve this objective Clayton had suggested the process of reduction 
could be spread over ten years and would not begin until 1950. On the other hand, 
Cripps felt that the British had already conceded enough. It had been estimated 
that British offers already made covered a volume of trade of $160 million a year, 
as compared with United States offers covering only $81 million a year. On top of 
this Clayton's offer was not viable because Cripps felt 'it would be wrong for His 
Majesty's Government to pledge a wider field in 1950, since it was impossible to 
foresee what conditions would be at that date. Moreover, the tariff reductions 
offered by the United States Government would last for a period of three years 
only, and it seemed only fair that His Majesty's Government should retain the right 
to consider in 1950 what further eliminations of preferences they were willing to 
offer in the light of the proposals of the United Stated Government with regard to 
tariff levels after 1950.134
At the Geneva Conference Harold Wilson served notice that rather than 
agreeing to the elimination of preferences Britain was looking at ways to 
strengthen trading links with the Commonwealth. He also argued that 
Multilateralism was a distant goal: 'The methods we may have to use in the 
intervening months and years may appear to be opposed to the principles of the 
Draft [I.T.O] Charter. Many of us will certainly have to assist our position by 
agreements with particular countries, some of whom are represented here... in our 
case we shall find it necessary and desirable to have ever closer economic co­
operation with other countries in the Commonwealth.'35
Wilson echoed these sentiments in the Commons debate on the G.A.T.T. 
agreement. He argued that it was 'essentially a long-term scheme' and that in 
Empire development; bilateral trade agreements and co-cooperation with western 
Europe 'this country has set its programme for the immediate future.'36
In the Commons debate Peter Thorneycroft was the only member of the 
Conservative ranks to offer open support for the agreement. He argued that 
international trading rules were a necessary development. 'The issue here is not 
free trade of discrimination, but whether we are to have a limit to nations imposing
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quotas and discriminating just as they will, and whether we are to trade with our 
Dominions and the United States according to the same rules of the game. We 
ought to lay down the rules of the game.'37 Thorneycroft also pointed to what he 
saw as the ‘strange inconsistency in the Government asking for relatively free 
world economics and wanting an over-planned economy at home. I cannot see 
how the two stand together. It is blatant hypocrisy to talk about a system based on 
price mechanism to govern the export trade, and then talk about planned economy 
at home. The Geneva Agreement is only a machine, but it is a machine which has 
to be used. I support the main principle of it, but I want to see the Government take 
steps which will make it possible for manufactures in this country to use that 
machinery....We want steps taken to restore the price mechanism. What is the 
good of adopting a trading system when there is inflation in the domestic 
economy? How are we going to find exports when we have that amount of 
inflation? Those are the kind of things that want to be done. We criticise the 
Government not for signing the Agreement, but for failing to take steps which will 
enable manufactures and adventures in this country to put their plan into full 
effect.’38
Thorneycroft's open support for the objectives of the Geneva agreement is 
notable given the fact that Churchill was to appoint him President of the Board of 
Trade three years later. His enthusiasm stood out so much in the debate that when 
the Labour M.P. J.S.C. Reid argued that there had been no unqualified support 'in 
any part of the House except perhaps in the Liberal Party.' His Labour colleague 
lain Mikardo interrupted to ask: 'what about the hon. member for Monmouth (Mr 
P. Thorneycroft)?'39
At the final drafting sessions of the I.T.O. Charter British negotiators sought 
to modify the rules applying to non-discrimination. It was feared that the planned 
review of discrimination after 31 December 1951 would be far too early. The British 
delegate, Sir James Helmore, argued that 'for the countries advancing this Charter 
to take it upon themselves to say that by 31st December 1951 all discriminations 
will be wrong when we have admitted that throughout 1948-49-50 some of them 
may be right, seems to me to be attaching to ourselves altogether too much 
importance.'40
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The United States was forced to accept more flexible rules governing 
discrimination, known as the 'Geneva Option'. This meant that countries no longer 
had to discriminate in the use of quantitative restrictions in a manner equivalent to 
the exchange restrictions permitted under the International Monetary Fund.
At the Havana Conference of 1948 the British Government, hardened by 
the dollar crisis, proposed the extension of the period of suspension to the end of 
1952 and also attempted to remove from the final version of the Charter the 
principle that discrimination was only a transitional device. Although it failed in both 
these objectives the final rules on discrimination were a mess. The date for the 
review of discrimination was set at 1 March 1952. However, the scope for 
discrimination during the transitional period was much wider than before. This 
made it even more difficult to bring discrimination to an end.
The position the British government had taken at the Geneva and Havana 
conferences had revealed increasing doubts about the feasibility of the trade 
provisions of the I.T.O. and about the desirability of multilaterlism as a policy 
objective. The government declared that it would ratify the agreement only after 
the Americans had done so. Wilson expressed his own doubts about the I.T.O in 
a memorandum he submitted to Cabinet in September 1949. He posed the 
question:'Why is it that the results of this postwar economic planning have been 
so relatively disappointing?' Although he admitted that the main cause was the size 
of the task he still thought that 'an important contributory factor... has been the 
consistent tendency of the United States to expect too large or too quick a return 
for the contribution they have felt able to make, and which has in fact proved 
unattainable.'41 Wilson wrote that throughout the I.T.O. discussions 'there has been 
a the greatest difficulty in reconciling United Kingdom and United States points of 
view - United States pressure for tight control over discrimination and United 
Kingdom desire for latitude.' Wilson argued that the Americans would have to 
make further concessions if Parliament was to ratify the Charter. They would have 
to agree to 'a suspension of non-discrimination rules for a period of, say, two or 
three years, with provision for subsequent extension if need be.' However Wilson 
admitted that getting this would be 'a tall order.'42
Richard N. Gardner has given a clear and concise explanation as to why the
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I.T.O. was 'still-born': 'The two major sponsors of the I.T.O. sought to incorporate 
in the Charter a detailed statement of their favourite economic doctrines. The 
United Stated pressed formal undertakings for the elimination of Imperial 
Preference, quantitative restrictions and discrimination of all kinds. The United 
Kingdom pressed equally detailed undertakings to protect domestic policies of full 
employment. The result was an elaborate set of rules and counter-rules that 
offered imperfect standards for nation policy. These rules and counter-rules 
satisfied nobody and alienated nearly everybody. They grew into a mountain of 
complexity that the I.T.O. finally collapsed of its own weight.'43 When the American 
administration quietly announced on 6 December 1950 that it would not ask 
Congress to ratify the I.T.O. the future of International trade rested on the G.A.T.T. 
agreement. This had only been intended as an interim agreement and was still 
perceived as such.
The Torquay Round 1950
The Torquay Round of G.A.T.T. negotiations was the first to be held after 
the American decision not to ratify the I.T.O. Charter. Wilson told the Cabinet 
Economic Policy Committee that in the light of 'the United States Administration's 
statement of intention to support the continuation and strengthening of the 
G.A.T.T.' in the I.T.O.’s stead, he would 'probably be recommending to my 
colleagues in the near future that we seek to get a substantial easement of the 
"no-new-preference rule" in the G.A.T.T. or any permanent organisation we are 
asked to join.'44 The no-new-preference rule prevented the granting of any new 
preferences to Dominions and Commonwealth countries. In his speech to the 
Torquay conference Wilson echoed his words in Geneva, arguing that in the 
Commonwealth trading system 'there lay a measure of stability and a potential for 
expansion which would benefit the entire world.'45
However, Wilson’s main concern during the Torquay round itself was with 
ongoing bilateral negotiations. In these he planned to continue to put pressure on 
the Americans to play an unequal part because of the balance of payments 
situation. He wrote that the objective was 'to make further inroads into the United 
States tariffs to increase the competitive power of our dollar export drive.' This
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meant securing 'an agreement "unbalanced" in our favour.' In return Wilson felt 
able to recommend 'as part of the final settlement, concessions on some items of 
major preferential interest to other Commonwealth countries.'46
Wilson was only willing to give ground on this matter if the Americans were 
prepared, as he later put it 'to recognise her position as the worlds creditor' and 'be 
prepared to offer more than it gets from debtor countries.'47 Otherwise he did 
everything in his power to protect Britain's preferences. A prime example of this 
was his attitude to the negotiations between Canada and America during the 
Torquay round. In return for the further opening up of the United States market to 
Canadian goods the Americans were putting pressure on the Canadians to reduce 
their tariff. Wilson told the Economic Policy Committee that the Canadians were 
'actually offering or actively considering... reductions in the preference enjoyed on 
some of our most important exports to the Canadian market.'48
Wilson became preoccupied by this issue during the Torquay round even 
though Robert Hall stressed that preferences were only part of the picture. 
'Devaluation', he argued, ‘did us far more good in the Canadian market than the 
preferences... I don't think the situation need cause us much alarm.' Hall also 
thought that it was ‘doubtful whether a protest would do us any good.’49 Even so, 
representations were made to the Canadian Government via the High 
Commissioner but, as Hall had predicted, these had no effect. This outcome only 
increased Wilson's anger. In a letter to the Prime Minister he described the 
situation in some detail. While the Canadian Government had promised to inform 
their representative in Torquay of the British Government's position it had, Wilson 
wrote, 'merely told him that the United Kingdom High Commissioner had been 
seen by the Canadian Minister of Finance.' While virtually accusing the Canadians 
of deceit he did concede that it was doubtful 'whether any useful purpose is to be 
served in asking the High Commissioner to pursue this matter with the Canadian 
Government- at least at the present.'50
One Board of Trade official at the Torquay negotiations felt that Wilson was 
going too far in his attitude towards the talks between the Canadians and the 
Americans and suspected that the letter to the Prime Minister was 'altered at the 
last moment, perhaps by the President himself. The only comment I have is that
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it might slightly mislead Ministers into thinking, wrongly that the Canadian's are 
buying concessions from the U.S. entirely at our expense in the form of reductions 
in our (non-contractual) margins in Canada. This is, of course, by no means the 
case.'51
The row over Canadian preferences was only the most prominent indication 
of the impasse that had been reached at Torquay. The Americans were not 
prepared to accept Wilson's demand that they should not get full reciprocity for a 
reduction in their tariff. Although the Americans had suggested that the British 'put 
pressure on Australia and New Zealand to agree to a reduction of the preferences 
they enjoyed in the United Kingdom market' imperial preference was not the main 
stumbling block. Wilson told the Economic Policy Committee that the United States 
negotiators had also suggested that agreement might be secured if there was 'a 
sufficient relaxation of the United Kingdom tariff on United States goods.'52 Wilson 
had not been willing to accept this compromise either.
There was a certain amount of foreboding in the conclusion drawn by the 
Board of Trade Journal from the Torquay negotiations. It stated that 'the 
significance of tariffs as instruments of national economic policy is increasing and 
the difficulties encountered in lowering rates of duty are probably greater than at 
any time since the war.'53 This was an official indication that the British 
Government did not expect any real progress in the foreseeable future. The 
Economist was in no doubt that it was Wilson who was to blame for this impasse: 
'it seems still to be British policy to pull down the shutters, to seek the cosy security 
of exchange control and import licensing. It seems to be too readily forgotten that 
Britain's signature is appended to a succession of solemn undertakings to work 
with like-minded nations for a reduction of tariffs and the elimination of 
discrimination in international trade.' Given the British government’s position the 
Economist thought it would be reasonable for the American's to ask in what 
circumstances 'Britain would consider it safe to implement those agreements. It 
might then at least be easier to judge how far Mr Harold Wilson carries his new 
economic nationalism.'54
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The Conservatives and External Commercial Policy 1951-3
The Conservative Party was openly committed to Imperial Preference when 
it won the 1951 election. The election manifesto contained a implicit commitment 
to repeal the no-new-preference rule in its promise to 'retain Imperial Preference 
and uphold the Right to grant and receive such preferences as are mutually 
agreed with Empire countries.'55
Imperial preference continued to occupy an important place in Conservative 
ideology. An appeal to imperial sentiment had been central to the Conservative 
cause since the establishment of a mass electorate.56 An important charge made 
against the Labour Government while the Conservatives were in Opposition was 
that it had neglected the opportunities for developing Commonwealth and 
Dominion markets and this had resulted in the continued dollar gap. At the 1949 
Conservative Party Conference Julian Amery accused the Government of not 
exploiting these opportunities, ‘Instead of developing new wealth and new 
resources in the Empire the socialists have preferred to import borrowed goods 
which we could not possibly earn and to pay for them with borrowed money which 
we could not possibly repay. The result is that we find ourselves today on the 
verge of bankruptcy.’57
In fact, there was a good deal of agreement between the imperialists in the 
Conservative Party and the Labour leadership that increased trade discrimination 
was crucial to national survival. In The Awakening, published in 1948, Leo Amery, 
the leading intellectual force amongst the imperialists, wrote that ‘we shall, in fact, 
very soon find ourselves back in the position in which we shall be compelled to 
jettison all mid-Victorian conceptions of holding our own on the basis of mere price 
competition, and to revert to the historic policy of national power and policy 
economics by which our prosperity was originally built up. Whether we actually 
conduct our trade through individuals or through the State we shall only be able 
to keep in existence by unreservedly using the controlling and bargaining power 
of the State in order to protect our standard of life and pay our way in the world.’58 
Although Amery preferred the use of indirect guidance through inducement and 
discouragements to direct state control of imports and exports, he concluded that 
direct state control was better than no discrimination at all, ‘Socialism is preferable
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to starvation.’59
Once in Government the balance of payments crisis of 1951-2 led some 
Conservative ministers to question whether the establishment of a one-world 
economy as envisaged by the G.A.T.T. was feasible. In particular, Peter 
Thorneycroft, the President of the Board of Trade, argued that ministers should 
consider the possibility that Britain may have to break with the agreement.
On March 26 1952 the Economic Policy Committee of the Cabinet 
considered a memorandum presented by Thorneycroft which questioned the 
tenets of British external financial policy since the war. The original draft of the 
memorandum, prepared for Thorneycroft by Board of Trade officials, had focussed 
on advantages and disadvantages of staying in the G.A.T.T., with particular 
reference to the 'No-New-Preference' rule. However, Thorneycroft saw this 
question extending to 'even wider and more general issues.160 In his notes on the 
draft he outlined what he saw as the wider issue: 'Are we likely to move towards 
a world in which dollar and non- dollar world balance. For it is that equilibrium 
which is the key assumption of G.A.T.T. and all that goes with G.A.T.T. If that 
assumption is false then clearly the case for retaining G.A.T.T. in its existing form 
will fall and attention must be directed to alternative policies.'61 He instructed his 
officials that 'he wished any paper which he might submit to his colleagues to be 
drafted on broader lines than a mere proposal for a review of the G.A.T.T. He 
thought that he would have to refer to some of the fundamental assumptions upon 
which international activity in the fields covered by the Havana Charter, G.A.T.T. 
and the I.M.F. agreement had hitherto been based, and to suggest that these 
assumptions needed thorough re-examination in the light of our experience of the 
way in which international trade and payments have developed since the war.'62
The memorandum Thorneycroft submitted to the Economic Policy 
Committee did examine the fundamental assumptions of trade policy. After an 
initial discussion of the pros and cons of the G.A.T.T. the memorandum went on 
to deal with the assumptions on which it was based. 'The I.T.O. and G.A.T.T 
project', Thorneycroft explained, 'was worked out, first with the U.S. and then in 
international conferences in the wartime and immediate postwar years, when it 
was assumed that the ideal of "one-world" must and could be brought into being
in the economic sphere as in other spheres, and the magnitude of postwar world 
economic problems was much underrated.' With regard to G.A.T.T. 'it was 
assumed that the U.S. would participate in a generous rather than a hard- 
bargaining spirit in postwar efforts to reduce trade barriers and that a stable 
payments equilibrium between the dollar area and the rest of the world and a "one- 
world" system of trade and payments- characterised by convertibility under a 
modified form of gold standard, by non-discrimination in import restrictions, and by 
rapid progress towards the removal of such restrictions- could be attained, by 
strenuous but not impossible efforts, within a few years. These assumptions, the 
falsity of which is now evident are implicit throughout the G.A.T.T.'
This fundamental change in circumstance meant that Thorneycroft now 
believed that 'we should consider carefully whether it is wise to go on working in 
an economic world which is and may necessarily remain divided in two by a ring- 
fence of discriminatory restrictions against dollar goods, within a framework of an 
international agreement based on the "one-world" idea.'63
Since the G.A.T.T. envisaged completely free multilateral trade within a 
short space of time, Thorneycroft argued, it ruled out 'various forms of policy which 
might possibly play a valuable role in creating conditions for, and enabling a 
smoother passage to, an ultimate stable equilibrium in the world balance of 
payments.' He gave two examples of such policies, firstly, 'the G.A.T.T. does not 
recognise that if balance of payments crises resulting from the disproportionate 
economic strength of the U.S. are not to be endemic, a new pattern of world trade 
must be created, and that preferential trade groups (such as have been suggested 
at the Council of Europe) might conceivably contribute to this end.' Secondly, 
G.A.T.T 'recognises no possible intermediate stage between that on the one hand 
of a country using the rigid means of import licensing and exchange control to 
cope with balance of payments difficulties, and on the other of a country which was 
completely emerged from these difficulties... It appears to me that it would be well 
in this connection to examine the question whether the means used to regulate the 
flow of imports in periods of balance of payments difficulties must always take the 
form... of rigid import licensing systems. There might for example be some more 
flexible means- possible through fiscal as opposed to licensing techniques, and not
necessarily consistent with the terms of G.A.T.T.- whereby, when faced with a 
situation such as .the current deficit with E.P.U., we could slow down the flow of 
imports without dislocation, arbitrariness and administrative burden of screening 
all proposed transactions and dividing them into the permitted and the 
forbidden...'64
Although Thorneycroft considered the preferable course of action was to 
amend the G.A.T.T. to take the change in the international situation into account, 
he did think that leaving G.A.T.T. was an option that should be considered. He 
proposed that a small committee should be set up to consider the United 
Kingdom's commercial policy and chose from the alternatives 'those best 
calculated to promote the national interest.' The committee would report on '(i) 
whether or not considerations of long term policy call for the adherence of the 
United Kingdom to an international instrument of the character of G.A.T.T.,
(ii) if so, what amendments in the terms of the G.A.T.T. it would be desirable to 
seek to make it an acceptable instrument; and
(iii) if not, what is the form of commercial policy we can most advantageously 
pursue.'65
As Robert Hall noted in his diary, Thorneycroft's review would tread 
'completely on the Robot toes'66 Butler was keen to prevent the review from 
compromising his own plans for external economic policy. At the Economic Policy 
Committee meeting Butler agreed to Thorneycroft's review going ahead but he 
made one crucial amendment. Butler told the committee that he would arrange for 
a committee of officials being set up 'in the first instance' to prepare the agenda 
for the meeting of ministers 'focusing attention on the issues on which decisions 
of policy were required.'67 This procedure, which was agreed by the committee, 
was designed to narrow the scope of the review. Even so, the next few weeks 
were marked by a turf fight between the Board of Trade and the Overseas Finance 
Division of the Treasury over control of external economic policy. The Overseas 
Finance Division wanted to keep control of external economic policy, not only to 
maintain its own power, but also to ensure that convertibility and multilateralism 
remained the objectives of British policy.
The Overseas Finance Division wanted to confine the scope of the review
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to external commercial policy only and keep it away from the broader issues of 
external economic policy such as convertibility. However, Frank Lee, Permanent 
Secretary at the Board of Trade 'urged that the enquiry would have to be a 
comprehensive one, in the sense that it was quite illusory to suppose that one 
could detach something called "Commercial Policy" and reach conclusions about 
that without involving much wider issues affecting the whole of our external political 
and financial relationships with overseas countries.'68
Leslie Rowan, head of the Overseas Finance Division, was not about to 
allow the Board of Trade to investigate what he called 'our business and not theirs'. 
Instead he asked 'Otto' Clarke to come up with several different hypotheses for the 
review to work from.69 Clarke produced these hypotheses but he remained 
'extremely dubious about the possibility in practice of confining Sir Frank Lee's 
review to an analysis of the commercial policy implications of these various 
hypotheses.' Clarke discerned that the divisions on these issues went much 
deeper than most would care to admit, he wrote that the 'truth is, of course, that 
there is an almost total disagreement within Whitehall on the nature and causes 
of the present situation.' He expected 'the review of commercial policy to be 
deadlocked on the first day between those who think that it is all the fault of the 
Americans and those who think that the real trouble is the failure of the United 
Kingdom and the Sterling Area to look the facts in the face.'70
Clarke came up with only four hypotheses for the review to consider. These 
hypotheses were heavily skewed in favour of the adoption of ROBOT and the 
objective of a one-world economy. The conclusion Clarke clearly intended to be 
drawn was that the only alternative to ROBOT was long-term inconvertibility. The 
first hypothesis, A, envisaged the system continuing as it existed at the time with 
a fixed rate and inconvertibility. Clarke felt it necessary to point out that it was 
improbable that this situation could continue. Hypothesis B saw a narrowing of 
claimants on the reserves but with everything else remaining the same. Hypothesis 
C involved the 'extension of pooling and integration within the non-dollar world. 
This holds [sic] fixed rate, but in extreme form would extend [sic] sterling area to 
cover e.g. whole of O.E.E.C. and some countries outside...' This was another form 
of permanent inconvertibility, although one working in the opposite direction to
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hypothesis B.
Hypothesis D was a short outline of operation ROBOT including a floating 
exchange rate and convertibility. Clarke added that 'the full-fledged "one-world" 
system of fixed-rate convertibility can best been envisaged as an extreme case of 
this, in which, after renewal of import and exchange restrictions, the rate could 
ultimately be stabilised.'71
Although Rowan endorsed the use of these hypotheses he wanted it 'to be 
made quite clear that some, at any rate, of them are not assumptions that O.F. for 
its part would regard as being either reasonable or workable. They are merely 
hypotheses which provided a groundwork, and not considered alternatives which 
we in O.F. would be prepared in any sense to recommend.'72
Despite the efforts of O.F. to confine the scope of Thorneycroft's review it 
soon became clear that this would be as difficult as Clarke had anticipated. Clarke 
was alarmed at the inclusion of Cherwell’s economic adviser Donald MacDougall 
and John Leckie of the Board of Trade on the Official Committee and by the fact 
that the Secretariat was drawn from the Board of Trade. He thought that it would 
be necessary at the outset for him to say that the Treasury favoured a 'floating rate 
and convertibility as [sic] system.'73
Thorneycroft asked for graphs and other background material illustrating the 
course of the United Kingdom's balance of payments to be provided for the first 
meeting of the ministerial committee. In theory, Clarke felt that this might be quite 
useful but he was aware of a deeper motive. 'It is quite clear', he told Rowan, 'that 
the President of the Board of Trade, at any rate, visualises this whole exercise as 
a major Governmental examination of external economic policy, conducted in 
effect by the President of the Board of Trade.' In these circumstances Clarke 
thought that it would have to be made clear that it was for the Treasury to decide 
what background material should be selected for this exercise. In doing this he 
suggested 'that we give them background material in a suitable form which would 
set the stuff out in a way which pointed towards "one-world" concepts, rather than 
away from them.' Clarke felt increasingly uneasy about the whole exercise since 
he felt it was bound to develop into a major review of external economic policy as 
a whole, outside the Chancellor's immediate purview.'74
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Indeed, the official committee decided not to follow Butler's instructions that 
it should prepare an agenda which focused attention on issues where decisions 
of policy were required. Frank Lee was under considerable pressure from 
Thorneycroft to follow his instructions.75 He wrote that the committee doubted 
'whether it would be profitable to proceed by way of drawing up a list of separate 
issues to be discussed independently of one another and on which, at any rate in 
theory, separate and unrelated decisions might be taken. In fact, as we see the 
position, all the main issues involved in a consideration of our future external 
commercial policy are closely inter-related and could only be considered 
satisfactorily against the background of a general review of the whole field.'76
At the first meeting of the official committee on April 30 the Economic 
Section was asked to prepare some preliminary papers for the committee to 
consider.77 These .turned out to be pessimistic about the prospects of the postwar 
economic institutions ever working. One, presented on June 16 concluded that 'the 
kind of world in which the basic arrangements of the new organisations would 
operate has never emerged. We cannot really tell whether they would have worked 
or not because they never really had a chance.'78 The Section saw the 
fundamental problem as being the instability of the dollar supply. Another paper 
argued that 'in the absence of substantial changes in international policies an 
equilibrium in the United States balance of payments will not be achieved in the 
next few years which would permit a removal of controls and a return to non­
discrimination. Moreover, even if by concerted policies to increase United States 
imports and replace United States exports, an equilibrium were reached which 
would permit a relaxation of controls, the system could not be expected to endure 
unless there were a far more adequate system of stabilisation than exists now.'79
On July 1.0 1952 the Cabinet Committee on Commercial Policy was 
superseded by the Commonwealth Conference Committee by order of the Prime 
Minister. The new Committee was chaired by Eden and its membership included 
Butler, Thorneycroft, Maxwell Fyfe, Cherwell, Swinton, Macmillan, Sailsbury and 
Lyttelton. A memorandum by a group of officials was circulated to committee 
members arguing that the United Kingdom's policy should be based upon a 
reaffirmation as a long-term objective of the establishment of a multilateral trading
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and financial system covering the free world.80
Thorneycroft objected to the tone of this memorandum which he considered 
too abstract. In his own memorandum Thorneycroft expressed his 'fear that if we 
talk of these abstractions as long-term objectives we shall be in real danger of 
becoming deluded into thinking of them as ends desirable in themselves.'81 In 
Committee he made it clear that such abstract objectives were of little value and 
that 'survival was only possible on the basis of a considerable amount of 
discrimination, and our problems could best be solved and discussed with the 
other Commonwealth countries, empirically, and without committing ourselves to 
theories with which our actions were not likely to correspond.' Thorneycroft only 
accepted the conclusion of the officials report when it was pointed in discussion 
that it 'had been compiled as the basis for a decision about United Kingdom policy, 
and not for communication to other members of the Commonwealth.'82
Thorneycroft now concentrated his efforts on reform of the G.A.T.T. 
specifically, of the 'No-New-Preference' rule. In a memorandum to the 
Commonwealth Conference Committee Thorneycroft outlined the three main 
disadvantages of the present arrangements. Firstly he argued that 'preference is 
to the Empire in some sense what a tariff is to the nation, namely one of the 
methods whereby production and trade within the group is encouraged at the 
expense of imports from outside it.' He also referred, in this context, to the 
'considerable criticism, not least from within the Conservative Party that no 
Government which believes in the development of the Commonwealth should bind 
itself not to increase preferences.'83
The second disadvantage was that, in conjunction with the obligations 
under the Ottawa Agreements to admit most Commonwealth goods duty-free the 
'no-new-preference' rule effectively bound the U.K. tariff to its present rate. The 
third disadvantage came from the Japanese application to join the G.A.T.T.: 'any 
Commonwealth country according most-favoured nation treatment to Japan which 
wished in the interests of its own industries to take protective measures against 
cheap Japanese imports would be compelled by the No-New-Preference rule to 
apply pari passu correspondingly measures against our goods.'84
Thorneycroft's conclusion was that 'the best solution to these problems is
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to get rid of the No-New-Preference rule.' However, he admitted that 'this will not 
be easy.' The Commonwealth now attached far less value to preferences since the 
demand for raw materials had increased. Indeed Thorneycroft told the Committee 
'that it was very likely that we should fail to get the agreement of the other 
Commonwealth countries to the policies which we thought necessary.' There was, 
however, the political dimension which made it imperative to be able to say that the 
government had discussed the question with the other Commonwealth countries 
and show that they had taken all possible measures to secure acceptance of 
them.'85
In the likely event of the Commonwealth not agreeing to a concerted 
approach to the Americans to remove the No-New-Preference rule, Thorneycroft 
did not think that a unilateral approach should be made as 'the chances of 
success' would 'be greatly reduced in these circumstances.' Instead he 
recommended that 'we should take the opportunity of the Commonwealth 
Economic Conference to explore the possibility of a second and compromise 
course. This would be to get Commonwealth concurrence to our seeking a limited 
relaxation of the No-New-Preference rule so as to permit the United Kingdom to 
increase duties on foreign goods.' Although this would not solve the problems of 
the Colonies it would solve the domestic tariff problem.86
The reactipn of the Committee to Thorneycroft's proposals was mostly 
favourable although Salisbury, the Commonwealth Secretary, thought that 'in view 
of the known Commonwealth reactions it would not make any difference what was 
said in the course of the preparatory meeting.'87
Butler persuaded the committee that it would be easier to get American and 
Commonwealth agreement to Thorneycroft's proposals if they were tied to his own 
for the Collective Approach as 'the United Kingdom was shown to be ready to 
discard quota restrictions and discrimination.' Without this linkage, however, 'he 
doubted if it would be possible to make progress.'88 Thorneycroft had originally 
opposed the adoption of the Collective Approach, arguing that 'it would be 
necessary to take many other measures before we could proceed to 
convertibility.'89 Now he saw his plans for G.A.T.T. reform tied in to what was 
essentially an extension of Operation ROBOT and involved the speedy restoration
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of a one-world economy.
While Thorneycroft had thought it necessary to consider alternatives to the 
G.A.T.T. given the continued dollar deficit, Macmillan saw the situation as 
providing an opportunity to put forward a positive vision of a two-world commercial 
system. In June 1952 he presented a memorandum to Cabinet arguing that the 
solution was not to increase exports to the dollar area, as Butler thought, but rather 
to find substitutes for dollar goods. Macmillan argued that substitutes for dollar 
goods could be found from domestic supply and from the Sterling Area. He wrote 
that 'the whole list of dollar imports must be re-examined and considerable 
hardships accepted in the short-term, American films are not necessary. American 
tobacco must be replaced.' Apart from these specific items he generally thought 
that control by tariff would not be enough and 'in our present critical circumstances, 
we shall also have to resort to more drastic forms of control by discriminatory 
quota and licence. Nor can we overlook the strong attachment of many raw 
material producers in the Commonwealth to long term contracts.' But the precise 
methods, Macmillan argued, were not the issue. What he stressed was that 
strengthening Sterling Area trade should not be viewed as a temporary measure 
to deal with the dollar gap but as a permanent arrangement. 'What matters’, 
Macmillan wrote, ‘is that priority should be given to sterling produce as a declared 
permanent policy. This, of course, involves exercising our right to free ourselves 
from the limitations imposed by G.A.T.T.'90
In his memoirs Macmillan recalled that the strengthening of the Sterling 
Area was 'only one aspect of the policy.' He also asked 'could we not now take the 
lead in Europe? If .reciprocal trade and currency arrangements could be made with 
European countries, by the creation of something like a merger, or at any rate a 
close co-operation between European currencies and sterling, could we not take 
the first steps to build a vast new market, in which we would develop our strength 
and assert our independence?'91 In his memorandum Macmillan argued that the 
‘emphasis should be less upon exports, and more upon balanced production and 
investment’ and that this should be ‘concentrated on Britain herself, on the sterling 
area and on any other areas which we can attract into our sphere of influence.’
It was clear that Macmillan saw this vision as having the same potential as
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a rallying cry for the Conservatives as tariff reform had in the past. The rest of his 
memorandum was filled with arguments reminiscent of Leo Amery. He wrote that 
'We are faced at home with a steady intensification of class divisions and that 
sense of frustration which leads to the rejection of all established institutions; we 
may have to face at the same time the break-up of the Commonwealth and our 
becoming a second-rate power. I see no escape from these dangers except by the 
fearless proclamation of a policy which will reinspire the masses and restore their 
pride and confidence.' Macmillan went as far as describing his vision as 'the march 
to the third British Empire.'92
The importance of imperial policy was stressed again by Macmillan in a 
further memorandum on July 4 which he produced as a reaction to Butler's second 
attempt to secure agreement to ROBOT. Macmillan argued that 'convertibility 
should be the culminating point of the grand design when Britain is set upon a new 
and upward path. It should not be risked at a moment of apparent decline.' The 
rhetorical flair with which his policy was presented would be part of the solution to 
sterling's continued problems. 'Our Imperial policy should not be hidden under a 
bushel, it should be widely proclaimed in England and overseas. The knowledge 
that Britain is setting about this constructive and ambitious plan will, I think, give 
more security to sterling then a policy confined to cuts and restrictions of 
productivity to artificially planned limits.'93
Macmillan laid out more of the details of his plan when discussion of 
external commercial policy was more to the Cabinet Committee on Preparation for 
the Commonwealth Economic Conference at the end of July. On top of the 
abandonment of G.A.T.T. and the building up of preferences Macmillan proposed 
an ambitious investment programme to be supported by the launch of a 
'Commonwealth Development Trust.' This would not be 'organised on the old basis 
of loan capital only (at fixed interest rates), but as an equity investment (in part or 
in whole).' He also proposed that the loan element would be guaranteed by all 
Commonwealth governments. He also wanted the Bank of England to become the 
'Bank of the Commonwealth and Empire.'
It was only if progress was made on these issues at the Commonwealth 
Economic Conference that he felt that the relationship between the O.E.E.C. and
the Sterling Area should be discussed. However, he did add that 'the ultimate 
participation of European countries in the development of all the overseas areas 
(sterling or non-sterling) may have great political as well as economic 
significance.'94
Macmillan's proposals received a cool reception in Committee. As he 
himself recalled he was accused of trying to set up 'an artificial system of 
exchanging high-priced goods in a new form of autarchy.'95 In discussion, 
members of the committee specifically rejected the idea of a Commonwealth 
Development trust, ‘doubts were expressed whether other Commonwealth 
countries would be likely to welcome a proposal on these lines, and whether the 
establishment of such a trust would not act as a deterrent to foreign investment in 
the sterling area.'96
The doubts expressed in committee about the possible Commonwealth 
reaction to Macmillan’s proposals could have been extended to the British 
proposals concerning imperial preference. The attempt to gain agreement for a 
concerted attack on the 'No-New-Preference' rule found 'no support' in the course 
of a preparatory meeting of the Commonwealth Economic Conference. In his 
report to Cabinet Butler argued that the Government should press on and put its 
plans forward at the Conference to be held in November 1952. Although the 
proposals were unlikely to be accepted he stressed that 'the United Kingdom 
Government should not be the first to turn their backs on the system of Imperial 
Preference.'97
At the conference only Australia and Southern Rhodesia were willing to 
support the British proposals for a general extension of Imperial Preference. It was 
pointed out in Cabinet that 'this meant that Imperial Preference was no longer to 
be regarded as an effective instrument of Commonwealth economic policy.'98
Even with the further extension of Imperial Preference effectively ruled out 
the no-new-preference rule still caused considerable problems for the 
Government. As Thorneycroft told the Cabinet the operation of this rule, in concert 
with the Ottawa agreement on preferences, had 'the effect of freezing the United 
Kingdom tariff.'99 This was particularly important because it was the Government's 
policy to replace the blunt control of quotas with tariffs. Thorneycroft was
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particularly opposed to quotas. He later told the Conservative Party Conference 
that 'there is something worse for an exporter than a tariff, it is a quota, a quota 
which is an absolute barrier to his goods.'100 At the Commonwealth Economic 
Conference in 1952 the Government had persuaded the other Commonwealth 
powers to support a move in the G.A.T.T. to permit 'the United Kingdom to raise 
tariffs against foreign countries and at the same time to give freedom of entry to 
Commonwealth goods.' It was argued that this 'could be represented as an 
interpretation of the G.A.T.T. rules.'101
If such a freedom was not granted to the British Government Thorneycroft 
was prepared to break the rules. He told the Cabinet that 'it would be politically 
impracticable to carry legislation to raise duties on imports from Commonwealth 
countries as the provisions of the G.A.T.T. would require us to do.' The course he 
favoured was 'to remove the quota restrictions and to make the necessary tariff 
increases without making the corresponding increases in the rates of duty on 
Commonwealth products which would be required by the "no-new-preference" 
rule.' He argued that 'almost all the members of the G.A.T.T. had at one time or 
another committed breaches of the Agreement and the United States Government, 
in particular, were following certain policies which violated it flagrantly.'102 On this 
issue Thorneycroft was opposed by Anthony Eden who favoured the negotiation 
of waivers of the rule in respect to individual commodities. Thorneycroft argued 
'there was no real prospect that any such individual waivers would, in fact, be 
obtainable.'103
In the event Britain did secure a general waiver 'which gave us a general 
dispensation from the obligation to impose duties on Commonwealth goods in 
cases where we imposed or raised most-favoured-nation duties on foreign goods 
to protect United Kingdom industries.'104 Thorneycroft pointed out that this waiver 
was 'limited by conditions more stringent than those which we had proposed.' 
However, he did admit that 'it conceded the substance of our claim.'105
The Collective Approach and the G.A.T.T. Review
The Conservative Government’s position on the no-new-preference rule 
reflected the impasse in the G.A.T.T. that had been reached at the Torquay round
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of negotiations in 1950. However, the G.A.T.T. acquired new significance with the 
adoption of the Collective Approach to convertibility in the Autumn of 1952. In this 
plan a nucleus of countries moving together towards convertibility would be linked 
through the I.M.F. and G.A.T.T. The plan was first publicly mooted by Butler at the 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference at the end of 1952. Its significance 
was not lost on Eric Wyndham White, the Executive Secretary of the G.A.T.T.. He 
suggested that Britain could inject some positive ideas in to the eighth session of 
the G.A.T.T 'by giving an outline of its proposals and the role that G.A.T.T. would 
be called on to play.'106 Officials within the Board of Trade advised the 
postponement of such a discussion 'until we have decided exactly how far we are 
prepared to go to secure freedom from the no-new-preference rule in order that 
our tactics on the two matters can be brought into accord.'107
Ministers were faced with a dilemma, the use of the G.A.T.T. as an 
instrument for convertibility meant that it had to be accepted as a permanent 
institution. If this was to be the case then a final solution to the issue of the no- 
new-preference rule and the future of Empire trade had to be agreed.
This was the first time policy on the G.A.T.T. agreement had been linked 
directly with that on convertibility. This conjunction fitted in perfectly with the view 
Thorneycroft had put forward in the Commons back in January 1948, that 
international agreements ought to provide 'the rules of the game.'108 The meeting 
of the contracting parties in 1953 agreed to a comprehensive review of the 
G.A.T.T. and this provided Thorneycroft with the opportunity of resolving the no- 
new-preference issue once and for all.
In a memorandum to Cabinet in April 1954 Thorneycroft outlined why he 
thought that a review was necessary. 'If we are to accept and defend the G.A.T.T. 
as a more or less permanent instrument which will bind us and other nations, we 
shall have to satisfy ourselves, by a through examination of its provisions and of 
the policy implicit in them, that it is as satisfactory as we can make it.'109
Thorneycroft was mainly concerned that the review should strengthen the 
rules of the G.A.T.T. especially with regard to quantitative restrictions, 
discrimination and the use of export subsidies. Such changes were necessary 
precisely because G.A.T.T. was now seen to be 'crucial to our commercial policy
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in relation to convertibility - as the Chancellor has put it succinctly, progress 
towards freer currencies must go hand in hand with progress towards freer 
trade.'110 An official committee and a Cabinet committee were set up to prepare for 
the G.A.T.T. review. The Home Secretary, Maxwell Fyfe chaired the Cabinet 
committee, which also included the Commonwealth Secretary, Swinton; the 
Colonial Secretary, Lyttelton; and the Economic Secretary, Maudling.
The first meeting got off to a very bad start for Thorneycroft. He had 
circulated a memorandum setting out the details of a report on 'certain studies 
which I had arranged to have made within my Department of the situation from the 
general limitation of the G.A.T.T. of the extension of existing, or the creation of 
new tariff preferences.' The purpose of the report, Thorneycroft continued, was 'to 
provide an objective analysis' of the situation. He argued that the report provided 
'a comprehensive and detailed analysis of this important topic such as has never 
before been attempted in Whitehall or, so far as I am aware, outside, and will I 
think, be of interest to my colleagues.'111
The report was against any further attempts to circumvent the no-new- 
preference rule and argued that 'any further consideration within the 
Commonwealth of extending Imperial Preference would seem bound to lead to the 
same negative conclusions as those reached at the Commonwealth Economic 
Conference in December 1952.' It also ruled out 'the concept of widening the 
existing system of Imperial Preference to include Western European countries 
through the creation of secondary preferences, as advocated by Sir Robert 
Boothby, Mr Amery and some others.' Such a move would entail granting 
important concessions to the Europeans 'for the sake of sharing in new European 
Preferences of doubtful value to our trade and probably no value to the rest of the 
Commonwealth.'112
Despite Thorneycroft's assertion that this report was fully objective it was 
regarded as anything but by Maxwell Fyffe, who was a supporter of the European 
movement. Although Maxwell Fyffe conceded that the report 'contained powerful 
arguments against trying to make major extensions of Imperial Preference.' In 
order to get a wider picture he thought 'that the Committee should also be 
presented with the opposite point of view, favouring Empire Free Trade.'113
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Such strong opposition from the Committee Chairman put Thorneycroft 
firmly back to square one. He also had to face more reasoned dissent from 
Swinton and Lyttelton. Swinton, who had been President of the Board of Trade in 
the 1930s and a supporter of tariff reform, suggested that 'the line to be taken in 
the Commonwealth discussions, and the line subsequently to be taken in the 
G.A.T.T. review should be considered separately.' He felt there might be a change 
from the 1952 position at the Commonwealth discussions. 'India and Pakistan 
might feel disappointed with the slowness of the United States Government to 
adopt better trading policies, and might be anxious to consider an alternative 
policy.’ Swinton argued that a general waiver of the no-new-preference rule was 
a definite possibility, citing 'the countries in the European Coal and Steel 
Community' who 'had secured a waiver from the G.A.T.T.'114 Lyttelton added to the 
pressure on Thorneycroft by agreeing with Swinton and adding that 'to appear to 
favour supporting the G.A.T.T. in its present form could cause serious difficulties 
with the Colonies.'115
However, Thorneycroft was not willing to give any ground to his colleagues. 
He made it clear that he thought that they were being unrealistic and that a clear 
choice had to be made. 'Either we could continue with arrangements similar to 
those existing at the present under the G.A.T.T., or we could decide to leave the 
G.A.T.T. and to adopt a policy of Empire Free Trade. There was very little room 
for manoeuvre to obtain additional freedom within the G.A.T.T. because we could 
not hope to get enough support to allow us to extend Imperial Preference.' As for 
the comparison between the Commonwealth and the Coal and Steel Community 
it did not hold because the Commonwealth was not a customs union. 'If the 
Colonies were prepared, or able, to enter into a customs union with the United 
Kingdom then we should be in a position to put forward a similar case to the 
G.A.T.T.'116
Fortunately for Thorneycroft the Cabinet Committee on the G.A.T.T. review 
met only once, although, in response to Maxwell Fyfe's request, Thorneycroft had 
circulated a paper by the Empire Industries Association and British Empire League 
by the time it was dissolved.117The Committee functions were transferred to a new 
Cabinet Committee on External Economic Policy under the Chairmanship of the
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more sympathetic Butler.
At the second meeting of the new committee Swinton and Lyttelton 
repeated their attack and were backed up by Macmillan who argued that 'some 
freedom on Imperial Preference is necessary.' In summing up, Butler appeared to 
steer a middle course, rejecting Swinton's request for a wholesale attack on the 
no-new-preference rule but arguing 'some freedom on Imperial Preference was 
desirable... in Colonial trade and trade which would be effected by the accession 
of Japan to the G.A.T.T.' He decided that Lyttelton and Thorneycroft should 
'circulate memorandum dealing with these cases.' He also made sure that the 
Committee didn't get bogged down in the issue of Imperial Preference. He pointed 
out that 'there were at least two other important issues... the use of quantitative 
restrictions, both for the balance of payments and protective reasons and the 
question of subsidies.'118
Both of these issues had to be clarified if the G.A.T.T. was to provide the 
rules for convertibility On subsidies the committee decided that the rules needed 
to be strengthened, Thorneycroft said, 'to get as near as we could to the 
prohibition of export subsidies. The United States would certainly refuse to allow 
complete prohibition.' On the issue of quantitative import restrictions it was with 
future arrangements that the committee was most concerned. Thorneycroft said 
'In our present economic circumstances the existing quantitative restrictions were 
adequate. But at the review we would have to try to establish permanent rules to 
cover the period after convertibility of the major currencies.. For that period we had 
two objectives, first, stricter rules to govern the use of restrictions for balance of 
payments purposed, and secondly, the elimination of discrimination. Both of these 
would be necessary to prevent restrictions or discrimination being imposed against 
sterling after convertibility.' This meant the establishment of a new rule so that 
'from a fixed date balance of payments restrictions could only be imposed or 
retained for a period of one year, with a possible extension in particularly difficult 
cases for a further year. It would be agreed informally that this rule would take 
effect one year after convertibility.'119
The committee also managed to agree a bargaining position over Imperial 
Preference. Lyttelton argued that since there could be no frontal attack on the no-
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new-preference rule 'we should continue to rely on our existing right to seek 
specific waivers to increase preferences on selected colonial commodities.' 
Although Thorneycroft objected, arguing that 'it would be difficult to negotiate 
waivers for all the commodities', Butler summed up in favour of negotiating 'case 
by case the particular concessions we required.'120
Butler thought that preserving a degree on discrimination may be a 
necessary weapon. The prospect of Japan becoming a signatory of G.A.T.T. had 
set alarm bells ringing in Whitehall. Butler recognised that Japanese competition 
could be very damaging to British interests in the Commonwealth. He pointed out 
that Australia, New Zealand and South African were all 'heavily discriminating 
against Japan by tariffs and quotas to our advantage. We should want them to 
have the right to continue existing tariff discrimination in order to protect injury to 
our trade from disruptive Japanese competition.' He also feared Japanese 
competition in the British market itself: 'we... want the right to take emergency 
action if Japanese trade practices or Japanese competition become intolerable.'121
Butler was also more concerned by the Empire Free Trade supporters in the 
Conservative Party than Thorneycroft. When he returned from a meeting with the 
other Commonwealth Finance Ministers in October 1954 he reported that there 
was still no support for an attack on the no-new-preference rule. In spite this he still 
reminded the Cabinet that ‘a number of Government supporters were undoubtedly 
sincere in their belief that the present provisions of the G.A.T.T. and its restraints 
upon Imperial Preference operated to our disadvantage’. Having discussed the 
matter with Thorneycroft he decided that 'it should be the Governments aim, so far 
as possible, to steer a middle course.'122
However, Thorneycroft was in no mood to compromise. Back in April 1954 
he had told the Cabinet that once the Government's position over preferences had 
been established, they could begin 'the important and difficult task of securing a 
better public understanding of the position.'123 This meant taking on the Empire 
Free Traders within the Party. Although the Cabinet had expressed the view, on 
October 1, that Thorneycroft would never be able to defeat the Imperial Preference 
supporters at the forthcoming Conservative Party Conference, Churchill had 
insisted that they should 'let him try.'124 Butler had been so certain that
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Thorneycroft would fail that he prepared his own speech in this expectation and 
then 'had to adjust at the last minute.'125
At the Conference Thorneycroft spelt out the hard realities of the position 
to the delegates by pointing to the results of the Commonwealth Finance Ministers 
meeting in Washington. He told them 'that at Washington there was not one 
Finance Minister from a Commonwealth country who was prepared to pledge 
support for an attack on Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade.'126 Thorneycroft scored a major triumph by defeating an amendment by Sir 
Victor Raikes, a long-serving Conservative backbencher, calling for the restoration 
of 'freedom of action in respect of Imperial Preference.'127
Butler remained cautious in spite of Thorneycroft’s victory. Robert Hall 
recorded that when The Economist attacked him for moving too slowly towards 
convertibility he 'was very much annoyed and wanted to cancel his subscription but 
as he had cancelled it about 6 months ago he was not able to - however he goes 
round telling everyone he has.' Hall recognised that 'the Chancellor is in a difficult 
position and needs all the help he can get... he now has to carry the country along 
to something like a free trade world when neither of the great parties is 
temperamentally in favour of it. No one quite realises the implication of the 
commitment made in 1944/45 to I.T.O. and now G.A.T.T. However I think it can 
be done. The Chancellor said yesterday that he got a vote for free trade from the 
Conservative Party Conference at Blackpool, although no one knew what they 
were doing. Now he wanted to play it quietly and that is why he dislikes The 
Economist so much since it is trying to exacerbate the troubles.'128
The leadership of the Labour Party made it perfectly clear that it was more 
than just temperamentally against any further moves to free trade. Harold Wilson 
maintained his opposition to the no-new-preference rule even after the 
Commonwealth Economic Conference had made it clear that there was very little 
support for the extension of Imperial Preference. In the Commons in October 1954 
he asked Thorneycroft to instruct the British delegation to the G.A.T.T. review 'to 
ensure that no steps will be taken to make the agreement permanent until the 
provisions banning new or additional Commonwealth preferences are removed 
therefrom.'129
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Gaitskell also continued to voice opposition to the government’s trade 
policy, although he accepted that Commonwealth opposition meant that a 
wholesale widening of preference was not possible, in the debate following Butler’s 
return from the Commonwealth Finance Ministers meeting in Washington, 
Gaitskell argued that faced with a dollar shortage 'the essential thing is to 
discriminate and frankly to discriminate.'130 In explaining how this was possible, 
Gaitskell turned to the issues raised by the Australian wheat surplus. He quoted 
with approval a spokesman for the Finance Ministers Conference who had said 
that although '"they were limited by the provisions of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, preferential trade of another kind was feasible not by tariff 
preferences but by commodity agreements, under which members of the 
Commonwealth would buy more from one another.'131
Gaitskell concluded that the problem was caused by the insistence of the 
Government to hand back the importation of wheat to private firms. His point was 
that the use of quantitative controls was the only way to bring about the necessary 
degree of discrimination and that the Government was planning to scrap these 
controls. 'It is clear that what the Government intend to do... is to get rid of import 
licensing throughout the whole of the Sterling Area - what we call quantitative 
controls and restrictions - and to retain Imperial Preference as it is today.'132
Gaitskell had given a fairly accurate summary of Thorneycroft's position by 
this time. Thorneycroft felt that this policy was necessary if convertibility was to be 
brought about. However, Gaitskell also cast doubt on the desirability of 
convertibility as an objective. He expressed his belief that 'our economic future is 
closely bound up with the Sterling Area. We do not think it would be a good thing 
to bring the Sterling Area to an end. Although convertibility does mean that.'133
When the G.A.T.T. negotiations opened in November 1954 The Economist 
noticed the change in the British Government's stance, it reported that 
Thorneycroft had 'stressed at the outset that the British Government was not only 
"for the General Agreement," but for a stronger version that exists today. "We want 
it both for its direct advantages and as the necessary basis for any move in the 
direction of convertibility." The President's speech went well beyond the 
generalities that usually pass muster in the opening stages of a meeting of this
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kind.'134
In his speech, Thorneycroft was blunt in his rejection of further exemptions 
to the G.A.T.T. agreement and firm in his support for further moves towards free 
trade. There is’, he said, ’I suppose, not a country here that is not under pressure 
to take some step to protect some industry in a manner inconsistent with the 
G.A.T.T. But if we attempt to legitimise any breach of the agreement extant or 
intended we shall create great difficulties for all. Always at any time there must be 
a number of countries faced with problems of this kind, but we would do better to 
seek their reduction and elimination rather than to torture the agreement in order 
to accommodate them. We should be trying to stop gaps rather than to open 
loopholes... the exceptions will not be limited to one country or to one commodity 
and any country which starts us on this road will bear a very heavy burden of 
responsibility.’135
By December 11 The Economist reported an 'extraordinary narrowing, 
amounting to virtual elimination, of the gap which has on previous meetings of this 
character separated the views of the United Kingdom on the one hand and those 
of the United States and Canada on the other. On the general philosophy of 
multilateral trade, the expressed abhorrence of quantitative restrictions and 
abomination of discriminatory devices, there is now little to choose between the 
three countries... Indeed, the leader of the American delegation has confessed to 
a feeling of genuine embarrassment at the number of occasions on which he has 
had to express his "entire agreement with what has just been said by my colleague 
from the United Kingdom.'"136
However, the negotiations were not going as well as Thorneycroft had 
hoped. He had found the low tariff countries of Scandinavia and Benelux unwilling 
to renounce the use of protective quotas 'unless other countries accept some 
satisfactory commitments to negotiate for the reduction of tariffs which, they argue, 
as so high in some cases as to restrict trade in the same way as quotas.' 
Thorneycroft was willing to see embodied in the G.A.T.T. grounds on which the low 
tariff countries could 'seek authority to use retaliatory quotas in case other 
countries refused to negotiate on tariffs [emphasis in original].'137
Even this move towards accepting the case of the low tariff countries was
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not enough for Thorneycroft to secure the outcome he desired. He reported that 
although 'the rules against the abuse of quantitative restrictions were rather tighter 
than before, though not as tight as we had originally judged necessary for 
conditions of convertibility. However, sterling was not yet convertible, and there 
would be opportunities in the future to review the rules further [emphasis in 
original].' On the question of export subsidies he reported that 'the slightly 
improved rules' were 'as much as could at present be hoped for.'138
His overall assessment was that 'the revised G.A.T.T. was not very different 
from the former Agreement, but was a little stricter on quantitative restrictions, and 
a little easier on tariffs, which was in accordance with the United Kingdom policy.' 
Britain also managed to secure, under the colonial waiver, the right to 'impose 
countervailing and anti-dumping duties, grant subsidies, and apply quantitative 
restrictions on commodities produced in the Colonies as if they had been produced 
in the United Kingdom. We could also increase the preference for Colonial 
products by getting the consent of a simple majority of the Contracting Parties 
instead of getting a waiver from Article I which required a two-thirds majority.' 
Thorneycroft had originally protested that no progress could be made on this issue, 
he now conceded that 'this represented a substantial advance.'139
Conclusion
Although politicians on both sides of the debate wanted to protect the 
existing system of Imperial Preference from American attack, the battle over 
G.A.T.T. exposed a division at the heart of British politics over the desirability of 
establishing a one-world economic order. The speed with which the Conservatives 
were converted from the Party of Imperial Preference to that of free trade 
represented a crucial victory for those in the Cabinet who saw the establishment 
of a liberal world economic order as essential to Britain’s future.
Gaitskell’s and Wilson’s arguments against multilateralism had much in 
common with those of Leo Amery and other supporters of an imperial trading 
system in the Conservative Party. Both groups agreed that the only way to deal 
with the imbalance in world trade was to extend trade discrimination either by 
preferences or quotas. Within the Conservative Cabinet only Macmillan had
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articulated a similar position.
Having fought for the acceptance of a one-world economic order by the 
Cabinet and the Conservative party it is not surprising that neither Butler nor 
Thorneycroft supported the idea of Britain taking part in the negotiations, which 
came out of the Messina Conference of 1955, which led to the establishment of 
the EEC. Included amongst the proposals were plans for the imposition of a 
common external tariff. While Butler was dismissive about the significance of these 
negotiations, Thorneycroft was behind the development of the British proposal for 
a European free-trade area.140
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Chapter 9 
The Expanding Role of Budgetary Policy
It has been argued that the process by which the Budget became central 
to general economic management was on the way to completion by the time Butler 
replaced Gaitskell as Chancellor in the autumn of 1951. Alec Cairncross has 
written that ‘From '1947 onwards the Budget was seen increasingly as a governing 
element in the pressure of demand. The view gained currency that if the pressure 
were reduced the need for most controls retained by the government would 
disappear. The pressure did in fact subside from 1946 to 1950 as various 
measures of excess demand testify; and the controls did eventually disappear. But 
the changeover to economic management was a very gradual one and was not 
completed when the Labour government lost office.'1
During his time at the Exchequer Cripps had certainly put the emphasis on 
fiscal policy in his overall economic strategy. During his 1950 Budget speech 
Cripps argued that Budgetary policy was ‘the most powerful instrument for 
influencing economic policy which is available to the Government.’2 However, it 
has already been seen that the scale of decontrol during the Labour Government 
has been greatly exaggerated. Decontrol had been limited mainly to the consumer 
goods market and it was only here that the Budget had taken on the role of 
balancing demand with supply. Although Cripps stressed the importance of indirect 
methods of economic management, the debate over the Full Employment Bill 
revealed that the Labour government had no intention of dispensing with controls 
over such areas as building and imports, so there was no need to widen the scope 
of fiscal policy.
The replacement of Cripps by Gaitskell as Chancellor resulted in an 
important change in the emphasis given to fiscal policy. Gaitskell wanted to use 
his 1951 Budget speech to restate the limited role of fiscal policy in economic 
planning.
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Gaitskell saw the Budget as only one of a whole range of measures to influence 
the economy. He conceived of it having a highly specific purpose, to ensure that 
the demand for consumer goods equalled the supply.
Gaitskell’s conception of Budgetary policy created tensions within the 
Treasury. He disagreed with Robert Hall and the Economic Section’s view that 
price rises should be allowed to feed through in order to deflate the economy in 
preference to tax rises. Gaitskell also had a more fundamental disagreement with 
the official Treasury’s views on taxation and subsidy. The Treasury was conscious 
of the need to reduce public expenditure and direct taxation and saw a reduction 
in food subsidies as the best way to ensure this. Gaitskell and other Labour 
ministers saw direct tax payers as the best able to pay for the government’s social 
programme and believed that subsidies had a social purpose.
It was only when the decontrol programme pursued by Butler began to take 
effect that Budgetary policy become central to economic management. As the 
Budget became more important the tensions between the financial concerns of 
Treasury officials and the wider economic concerns of the Economic Section 
became apparent. The deficiencies of economic forecasting were also highlighted 
as Butler became the first Chancellor to attempt to steer the economy by indirect 
methods.
Within this context of advice from the official Treasury and the Economic 
Section, Butler pursued a fiscal policy of which he was the principal author. He 
sought to reduce the burden of taxation on the economy by making reductions in 
public expenditure. The active use of interest rates allowed him to pursue a fiscal 
policy which put the emphasis on the encouragement of productive investment and 
economic growth.
The 1951 Budget: Gaitskell and the limitations of fiscal policy
The role of fiscal policy in the 1951 Budget was surprisingly limited. The 
retention of important physical controls, most notably over imports and building, 
meant that fiscal policy was essentially restricted to the control of consumer
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spending. Gaitskell made this remit clear in his Budget speech. The role of the 
Budget, he stated-, was to ensure that ‘after taking into account any rise in money 
incomes, including that automatically generated by the rise in production, that what 
is spent at home is enough, but no more than enough, to buy at prices which cover 
their costs, the goods and services we can afford to consume at home.’ In a 
controlled economy this amount could be calculated by finding out ‘what is left over 
after adding what is to be imported and taking away what is required for exports, 
home investment and defence.’3
Another aspect of Gaitskell’s attitude to fiscal policy discernible from his 
speech was its short-term nature. I.M.D.Little noted that ‘it appears that he was 
concerned with equalizing supply and demand for the current year - already three 
months old when he introduced his Budget.’4
Gaitskell rejected an early draft of the part of the Budget speech concerning 
the role of Budgetary policy by the Economic Section. This draft stated that given 
the urgent need to transfer production from consumption to rearmament ‘the task 
for fiscal policy is to ensure that this reduction in the claims of current production 
is effected in an orderly and equitable way.’5 The passage Gaitskell substituted for 
the Economic Section’s draft harked back to a speech he had made in the 
Defence Debate. Gaitskell wanted to emphasise the role of physical controls in the 
process of transferring production. In the final Budget speech Gaitskell stated that 
‘fiscal and monetary policy alone is not sufficient to achieve this transfer and 
physical controls are also needed.’6
One of the major bones of contention during the preparation of the 1951 
Budget was how the Government should react to the inflationary pressure that 
would be caused by the worsening terms of trade. Robert Hall and the Economic 
Section saw a rise in prices having a deflationary effect as the terms of trade 
moved against the UK. It was therefore important to allow these prices rises to 
feed through into the economy. In its first note to the 1951 Budget Committee on 
The Internal Financial Situation’ in July 1950, the Economic Section pointed out 
that a deterioration in the terms of trade was likely and that this would indicate that 
further expansion of exports was needed if the balance of payments were to
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‘remain healthy.’ The Section did not recommend any further intervention by 
Government. The note stated that ‘Given no change in fiscal policy a continued 
rise in import prices will itself create the internal conditions necessary to permit a 
further growth of exports.’ As if to drive the point home the note continued ‘It is 
important that we should do nothing to interfere with this process.’7 This view was 
later embodied in the Economic Survey for 1951.8
The need for inflationary pressure was part of the doctrine that Gaitskell and 
Jay laid out in their memorandum ‘Economic Planning and Liberalisation’.9 They 
saw inflationary pressure as necessary to maintain full employment but argued that 
controls should be used to contain it. Their view had its roots in the policy Dalton 
had pursued as Chancellor. After Gaitskell and Jay had presented their 
memorandum Dalton himself summed their doctrine up. He wrote that in order to 
maintain full employment it was necessary to ‘always have a bit of inflationary 
pressure, but use physical controls to prevent it breaking through.’10 However, the 
kind of inflationary pressure Gaitskell encountered was of a different kind to that 
Dalton had used physical controls to contain. It was cost-push rather than demand- 
pull inflation. Nevertheless Gaitskell and Harold Wilson wanted to use price 
controls to contain it.
In a paper to the Economic Policy Committee in October 1950 Wilson called 
for a subsidy on utility clothing and other goods that would add up to £100 million 
in extra expenditure. He also argued for the extension and tightening up of price 
controls.11 Wilson’s agenda flew in the face of what the Economic Section had 
recommended in July. But Wilson was not alone in calling for further price controls. 
In a note to the Budget Committee at the end of October Gaitskell, now 
Chancellor, set out his thoughts on inflation. He put price control above controlling 
public expenditure and further taxation as a way of controlling inflation. Gaitskell 
thought that ‘the first step should be... a letter to the President [of the Board of 
Trade] asking him to survey as a matter of urgency the whole field of price control 
with a view to deciding what commodities controls should be reimposed.’ He 
continued to place great faith in this instrument stating that ‘Past experience leads 
me to the view that these controls - difficult as they are to administer and enforce-
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did have a very valuable effect in the war in keeping prices down...’12
The inflationary pressure caused by the worsening of the terms of trade was 
added to by inflationary wage increases which resulted from the breakdown of the 
Crippsian policy of wage restraint in the Autumn of 1950. By June 1951 the 
Government decided to act by extending price control. At a press conference that 
month Norman Macrae of The Economist asked Gaitskell about the ‘contradiction 
between the policy embodied in the Economic Survey- of allowing increases in 
prices to mop up increases in purchasing power- and the present evident trend 
towards price control.’ Macrae later recalled that Gaitskell, ‘who saw the point 
alright, wriggled most interestingly in his reply.’ He suspected that Gaitskell thought 
that price controls were not an appropriate weapon to use against cost-push 
inflation and that his reply 'made it fairly clear that price control was coming, and 
equally clear (or so it seemed to me) that he personally did not like it.’13
Although Macrae was correct in spotting the contradiction between the 
policy outlined in the Economic Survey and the imposition of price controls he was 
wrong to conclude that Gaitskell was against the imposition of controls. Gaitskell 
anticipated the contradiction in a memorandum to the Cabinet Economic Policy 
Committee dated June 22 1951. Although he acknowledged that ‘the rise in costs 
is probably having some effect on export prices and therefore improving the terms 
of trade’ he also feared that the rise in prices caused ‘a tendency on the part of the 
public to expect prices to go on rising- which in turn induces them, at least in some 
cases, to forestall this by spending more quickly. There is little doubt therefore that 
saving is diminishing, dis-saving increasing, and there is some danger of the whole 
process being accelerated.’ This meant that ‘rising prices at home may well retard 
the volume of exports of consumer goods. In short, the “costs” inflation seems to 
be accompanied by some “demand” inflation as well.’14
Gaitskell also anticipated the argument that wage-push inflation would be 
cancelled out by the rise in the price of consumer goods. He argued that such a 
view did not take into account ‘the rapid worsening of the position of those with 
fixed incomes’ which caused ‘a great deal of social friction and adverse criticism.’
2 B 4
For Gaitskell price control had the extra benefit of pushing firms towards efficiency. 
The role of government in weeding out inefficiency in a controlled economy was 
that much greater than in one where the price mechanism is allowed to operate. 
He suggested ‘that in present circumstances we should be prepared to use the 
weapon of price control to squeeze out inefficient firms. Only in this way can we 
keep down the high profits made by luckier or more efficient firms.’ Seeming to act 
on profits was an important part of the process of encouraging wage restraint and 
as such Gaitskell suggested that ‘some serious rows with some industries would 
probably do no harm.’15
Gaitskell’s views about price control differed from those of Jay who shared 
the view of Dalton and Keynes that a small amount of inflation was to be desired 
as its principal victim was the rentier. During the discussion of the 1950 Budget Jay 
told Cripps that ‘we should be striving after an impossible objective, and therefore 
getting ourselves into artificial difficulties, if we interpreted our disinflationary policy 
as designed to prevent any rise at all in the cost of living over these years. It is 
quite probable that a rise of perhaps 1 point or 2 points per year is a necessary 
implication of full employment, and does no serious harm. Such a gradual rise 
really means a slight transfer of national income is being made from the non-active 
to the active sections of the community; and that the dead weight internal war debt 
is being gradually diminished.’16
The other main cause of disagreement during the preparation of the 1951 
Budget was over whether the final gap between projected revenue and the 
required Budgetary surplus of £50 million, which remained after the imposition of 
additional taxation, should be filled by even more taxation or by a cut in spending. 
At a meeting of the Budget Committee on February 6 1951 officials came to the 
conclusion ‘that taxation was stretched to the upmost, and the only way to obtain 
the objective was by reducing Government expenditure.’17
Gaitskell inherited from Cripps Treasury concerns about the level of 
expenditure. In February 1950 the Budget Committee presented Cripps with a 
gloomy prediction of the Budgetary position for 1951-52. It stated that ‘the 
economy is over-loaded. We are attempting to do more things than we can do with
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the resources at our disposal - The result is the continuance of inflationary 
pressure and a rigidity in the whole economic structure which makes it extremely 
difficult if not impossible to have any flexibility in planning.’18
The Treasury’s traditional concerns about the level of government 
expenditure and taxation was dressed up in Keynesian language about the 
inflationary effect of dis-saving. The committee argued that increases in taxation 
would increase inflation. On direct taxation the committee warned Cripps that ‘the 
present very high level of taxation is not only a deterrent against taking risks. It is 
also a deterrent against saving. Indeed from the point of view of inflation, we are 
in a vicious circle: and it is clear that an increase in taxation would lead private 
individuals to draw more on their capital, and business to save less.’ Indirect 
taxation was also judged to be stretched to its limit. The Committee argued that the 
‘right way to counter the inflationary pressure and to restore a balance to our 
economy is by a reduction in Government expenditure and we recommend that the 
most strenuous and determined efforts should be made to this end.’19
As in previous years officials concentrated on food subsidies as the most 
likely source for cuts during discussions on the 1951 Budget. At the Treasury 
gathering at Roffey on 17 and 18 February great pressure was put on Gaitskell to 
agree to a cut. Gaitskell’s reaction to this pressure sheds some light on how his 
attitude towards fiscal policy differed to that of his predecessor. Gaitskell had 
thought at the time that the cut in food subsidies, which Cripps announced in the 
1949 Budget, coupled with a reduction in tax on beer had been Cripps’ ‘first 
serious political blunder for some time.’ He wrote in his diary that at a dinner held 
the day after the Budget he had agreed with Bevan that the reduction in taxation 
on beer as well as that on petrol should not have been made. Instead the money 
should have been used to limit the reduction in the food subsidy to meat only. 
‘This’, Gaitskell noted, ‘would have been linked in people’s minds with Peron and 
the Argentine negotiations [over meat supplies], and I think fairly easily 
accepted.’20
What emerged from Gaitskell and Bevan’s discussion with Cripps at the 
dinner was that ‘Stafford undoubtedly had been won over by Plowden and Co. into
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thinking that the food subsidies were a bad thing.’ When Gaitskell and Bevan 
explained their alternative policy to Cripps ‘his only objection was that this would 
not have shown that we were really opposed to going on with the subsidies.’21 As 
Chancellor, Gaitskell showed that, unlike Cripps, he intended to support the 
continuation of subsidies and was not persuaded by the Treasury’s arguments 
against them.
In the 1951 Budget discussions the arguments o f‘Plowden and Co.’ against 
subsidies were voiced by the Economic Secretary, John Edwards. He argued that 
the original purpose of food subsidies had been ‘to stabilise the cost of living in 
order to help hold the wages front.’ He thought that ‘it was beyond doubt that this 
original purpose was not now served.’ Given this, there were sufficient grounds for 
examining the apparatus of food subsidies ‘quite apart from the Budgetary 
context.’ ‘Many people’, he continued, ‘shared the view that the food subsidies 
were an inefficient form of social service, in that they benefited equally and without 
regard to need, rich and poor alike.’22 Edwards argued that food subsidies should 
be reduced by about £200 million. Because he anticipated a hostile public reaction 
regardless of the size of the saving, he argued that £150m of this £200m should 
be redistributed in the form of family allowances, with an overall saving of £50m.
Jay, the Financial Secretary, was clearly disturbed by Edwards’ suggestion. 
He saw food subsidies in a completely different light, arguing that they were ‘part 
of the long-term policy of the Government for the permanent redistribution of 
current income and they were therefore desirable in themselves.’ Consequently ‘it 
was not up to the proponents of the food subsidies to demonstrate that their 
existence was necessary, but up to the opponents to prove that a change should 
be made.’ However, he did make a case against a change, arguing that it ‘was 
beyond dispute ‘ that it would provoke wage claims. Jay shared the belief 
expressed by Gaitskell and Bevan in 1949 that tax cuts could not offset a reduction 
in the level of subsidies. He argued that the proposed compensations through 
taxation ‘would benefit those better able to bear the burden, whereas the 
consequent increases in food prices would have to be paid for by, inter alia, people 
who did not pay taxes and would therefore receive a worsening of their financial
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position.’ His main objection remained that food subsidies were part of a long-term 
Government policy of universal benefits and that therefore ‘even if some of the 
reduction in expenditure thereby secured was given away in the form of other 
social benefits, etc, he would regard the proposal as wrong and would be 
opposed.’23
Jay faced a wall of official opinion in favour of a cut. Bernard Gilbert 
supported the Economic Secretary’s call for a big reduction in subsidies. Edward 
Bridges ‘thought that due to the distortion of the price structure the Government 
would be forced to consider some such step in the future.’ Edwin Plowden thought 
that Jay’s arguments on the redistribution of wealth ‘were without serious 
foundation’ while Robert Hall also agreed that a big reduction should be made. 
Wilfrid Eady added that ‘the argument about the dangers of provoking wage 
increases might have been over-stated.’ Of the officials and advisers present only 
Trend expressed any misgivings about cutting subsidies at that moment, he 
‘thought it was a rather doubtful operation at present.’24
The language Gaitskell employed when talking about the subsidies 
indicated that he shared Jay’s view that they were a fundamental part of a social 
programme based on universality and that his thoughts on the subject had not 
changed since the 1949 Budget. He was ‘not impressed’ by Bridges’ distortion of 
price argument and also ‘thought it was quite right and proper that milk should be 
drunk by all classes of the community to as great a degree, within limits, as they 
wished, and any suggestion that the price of milk should be increased so that, for 
example, purchase tax could be decreased would seem to him quite 
unacceptable.’25
Although Gaitskell ‘did not rule out of court some change’ he concluded at 
the end of the meeting that ‘it had not been demonstrated to him that the people 
who would “pay” the £50m., if food subsidies were reduced, were better able to do 
so than the people affected by the increase in income tax that had been proposed.' 
In addition he thought that the argument being put forward for a cut ‘was the same 
as the argument which urged indirect rather than direct taxation.’26
In spite of Gaitskell’s assurance that in making his final decision he ‘would
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bear in mind the importance of not letting income tax rise in this year - a year of 
peace’ it was clear that he preferred an income tax rise to a cut in government 
expenditure. In the end he put 6d on income tax at a time when many in the 
Treasury had argued that the burden of taxation was already greater than the 
economy could bear.
The debate surrounding the 1951 Budget brought out the main features of 
Gaitskell’s attitude towards fiscal policy. The Budget speech, which he prepared, 
demonstrated that he saw the annual Budget as only having a limited role in 
economic planning. Earlier chapters have revealed the extent to which Gaitskell 
stressed the importance of direct controls, his fiscal policy should be seen in this 
context. Gaitskell’s disagreement with the Economic Section’s argument that price 
rises should be allowed to deflate the economy is also revealing. He was sceptical 
of the idea that allowing market changes to feed through into the economy could 
have a wholly beneficial effect. He was concerned about the knock-on effects of 
a rise in prices and turned to direct price controls to contain them. His clash with 
the official Treasury over food subsidies revealed an even greater tension. The 
Treasury remained essentially liberal in its economics. It wanted to remove 
subsidies because they increased the burden of public expenditure and distorted 
markets. For Gaitskell and other Labour ministers these arguments were 
anathema. The principle of universality in social benefits was an important one. 
When faced with a decision between cutting subsidies and increasing direct 
taxation, Gaitskell was naturally inclined towards the later course of action.
The 1952 Budget: ‘Restriction and Austerity are not Enough’
Because of the systematic removal of physical controls the role fiscal policy 
played in general economic management increased markedly during the Butler 
Chancellorship. As I.M.D. Little succinctly put it in 1962: ‘one may say that the 
internal problem is now to reduce general business fluctuations (if possible to the 
point of elimination), whereas formerly it was a matter of balancing supply and 
demand in a particular market with a variety of controls to limit the consequences
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of overshooting the mark.’27
The removal of physical controls increased the inter-relationship of markets. 
In a controlled economy it was possible to restrict the role of the Budget to the 
equalisation of the supply and demand for consumer goods, as Gaitskell did in 
1951. However, the removal of controls, particularly those operating on investment 
and imports, meant that a change in the level of demand had wider repercussions. 
While controls could at least in part suppress the knock-on effects on investment 
and on the balance of payments, in a free economy this was not possible. These 
knock-on effects on investment and the balance of payments have a further knock- 
on effect on demand. With the removal of each control the significance of 
Budgetary policy increased and by 1954, when most of the controls had been 
lifted, the Budget had moved to the centre of Butler’s economic strategy.
Discussion during the preparation of Butler’s first Budget was naturally 
dominated by the sterling crisis. It might therefore appear surprising that in March 
1952 Butler introduced a Budget that was mildly expansionary. Butler chose to 
follow the advice of the Economic Section’s paper on the economic outlook 
produced at the beginning of the year. This paper argued that the rise in import 
prices was already causing mild disinflation and that this would continue.28
In the Budget Committee Robert Hall argued that ‘the position facing the 
Chancellor in 1952 was very difficult.’ The overall picture was a patchy one, 
despite the weakening demand for consumer goods which was causing a rise in 
unemployment ‘home demand for investment and metal goods remained high.’ 
However, he warned against planning for a larger surplus to help the balance of 
payments position. He argued that ‘action to produce a larger surplus would 
increase unemployment, and was unlikely to help engineering exports.’29
Although the Budget Committee as a whole accepted Hall’s conclusions 
some of its members were taken aback by the suggestion that the Budget should 
not be deflationary. In particular, Leslie Rowan and Frank Lee told the Chancellor 
at a meeting on 6 February ‘that since the object of the Budget was to help the 
balance of payments, and in particular to improve confidence in the currency, it 
must be severe.’30 Frank Lee had already put his concerns about the Budget
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Committee’s decision in a letter to Edward Bridges. He questioned the Economic 
Section’s conclusions about the level of demand in the coming year. He argued 
that ‘it is fundamental tha t, however regrettable it may be, investment must be 
curtailed if resources are to be freed for exports.’ As a first step in this direction he 
thought that depreciation allowances should be deferred.31
What was implied in the arguments of Rowan and Lee was later stated 
explicitly by Peter Thorneycroft in a letter to Butler. It was clear to him that a choice 
had to be made between unemployment and the balance of payments. He argued 
that given this choice the Government should opt for the balance of payments. He 
noted Robert Hall’s conclusion that “‘there is no evidence of any general pressure 
on our resources - rather the contrary.” If this is meant to apply to the current 
situation’, Thorneycroft wrote, ‘I find it a bit disturbing. I cannot forget that it was 
this conviction which led our predecessors from one disaster to another. It certainly 
deserves careful examination before we accept it too readily. An attempt to run the 
economy at full pressure may produce satisfactory employment figures but may 
hamper exports.’32
Butler did not agree with Thorneycroft’s analysis; rather he agreed with Hall 
that a deflationary Budget would not be of any benefit to helping exports and would 
only result in increased unemployment. In his Budget speech Butler stated that 
‘many industries producing consumer goods are already faced with a slack 
demand at home. They now face further very severe cuts in their exports to the 
Sterling Area. They will have to increase substantially their exports to the non­
sterling world - in difficult selling conditions - if they are to keep up their production 
and employment. To add to the difficulties of these industries by depressing home 
demand even further would result not in still higher exports, but in a further 
reduction of activity and employment, which we would all deplore.’33
As part of an alternative to deflation Butler did introduce some further import 
cuts. However, he argued in his Budget speech that ‘this is not enough. We have 
felt the first rush of the storm and to lighten the ship we have had to throw a good 
deal overboard. We must now look to our rig and take in some sail. In other worlds 
we must divert some resources from use at home.’34 Butler’s alternative to the use
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of either controls or deflation for diverting resources to exports was to increase the 
Bank Rate. It was significant that Butler used his Budget speech to announce an 
increase in the Bank Rate from 2 1/4 to 4%. In the speech Butler argued that ‘this 
rise to a comparatively high level of money rates is, I believe, in present 
circumstances, an essential part of our campaign to fortify the currency. It will play 
an important part in our effort to improve our balance of payments... The use of the 
Bank Rate - and I must remind the Committee of the position in which our country 
is in regard to our resources - can make an important contribution towards the right 
economic climate, particularly towards the diversion of resources from investment, 
above all, to export.’35
As in 1951, the main proposal put forward by the Treasury for a cut in 
spending in the 1952 Budget was a cut in the food subsidies. The big difference 
between 1951 and 1952 was that there was now a Chancellor sympathetic to this 
aim, despite Lord Woolton’s pledge during the 1951 election that food subsidies 
would not be cut.36 Conservatives were not only attracted to the idea of cutting 
food subsidies because of the potential revenue saving, cutting subsidies also 
represented a more fundamental shift to liberal economics and selectivity in 
welfare. Subsidies created price distortions which accentuated the need for 
physical controls, cutting subsidies fitted in with Butler’s general policy of decontrol 
and the return to free markets. Whereas Labour ministers had seen subsidies in 
the light of the idea of universality in welfare, Conservatives believed in moving 
towards a more selective benefits system.
The arguments in favour of cutting subsidies were made by Customs and 
Excise in a paper submitted in January 1952. The paper put forward the argument 
that a cut of £200 million would ‘be a long step towards the abolition of the general 
‘‘cost of living subsidies” and the end of the artificial arrangements under which a 
large amount of revenue has to be collected and then repaid to much the same 
people.’ However, the paper argued that the costs of the scheme were not merely 
administrative. ‘It seems probable... that the indirect consequences in the 
economic field resulting from such a serious distortion of relative prices are very 
far-reaching.’ Or put simply, the artificial stimulus to demand caused by the
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subsidies ‘must tend to postpone the possibility sooner or later of terminating the 
rationing system wholly or in part, and abolishing the expensive administrative 
machinery that it involves.’37
The operation to reduce the food subsidies was given the code name 
‘Operation Diogenes’ and that to give compensation in certain cases was called 
‘Operation Senegoid.’ At the end of February Butler had agreed to only a £110 
million cut in the subsidies. The Financial Secretary, John Boyd-Carpenter, played 
the same role as John Edwards had in the 1951 Budget of voicing the arguments 
of ‘Plowden and Co.’ at the ministerial level. He called for a larger cut as the 
political reaction was unlikely to be affected by the size of the cut because ‘there 
will be a tremendous row anyway.’38 Both Boyd-Carpenter and Plowden himself 
called for an extra £50 million to be added to the cut so that food subsidies were 
reduced to £250 million. Plowden argued that ‘this Budget has in large measure 
to achieve a psychological objective and this is to impress people at home and 
abroad with the Government’s determination to be tough with the British 
economy.’39 In the end Butler did decide to take £160 million from food subsidies.40 
His major concern was to limit the rise in the price of bread and he was also under 
pressure from the Prime Minister to limit the cut.
Butler concluded his Budget speech by arguing that ‘restriction and austerity 
are not enough. We want a system which offers us both more realism and more 
hope. These are underlying purposes of the measures I have proposed, the 
deeper explanation of their character. We must now set forth, braced and resolute, 
to show the world that we shall regain our solvency and, with it our national 
greatness.’41
The drafting of the Budget speech continued until the very last moment 
because of the shift in the ideological purpose of the Budget which marked Butler’s 
arrival at the Treasury. William Armstrong explained to Hall ‘that all this re-writing 
and cutting out was due to the Tory belief that it was “Socialist Planning” to make 
forecasts at all: and that Salter had been working away at the Chancellor on this 
line. Hence all the troubles.’42
The day before the Budget the speech was re-drafted by Salter to take out
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nearly all the calculations. Robert Hall then ‘re-drafted it again and put them back.’ 
On the day of the Budget itself Butler asked for ‘the calculations about the effect 
of keeping taxation unchanged (net) on the inflationary position to be reduced 
almost to nothing.’ Bridges and Hall carried out Butler’s wishes, Hall later noted 
that ‘I expect it will baffle the critics as it is hardly a calculation at all.’43
Butler explicitly presented his first Budget as an ‘act of judgement’. Salter 
wanted this approach to be extended to the Economic Survey which was to be 
issued after the Budget as this had been brought forward. On his copy of Salter’s 
paper Butler highlighted Section V which he noted was ‘most useful’. In this section 
Salter argued that ‘as we are now proceeding to an economy in which the price 
mechanism and competitive private enterprise play a larger part in determining 
economic adjustments, the old method of guessing economic developments and 
purporting to base policy on arithmetic conclusion from them become fantastically 
inappropriate.’ Salter continued that ‘to forecast economic developments under 
present and prospective conditions and then to base policy, or to purport to base 
policy on the arithmetical totting up of a number of quite uncertain items, will result 
in our deceiving both ourselves and the public and destroy confidence in our policy 
[emphasis in original].’ Butler asked Salter to ‘carefully renew the Economic Survey 
in the light of the note.’44
William Strath wrote to Plowden to object to the proposed changes. 
Although he conceded that ‘quantitative forecasting is extremely difficult, and that 
it become the more difficult the less the control which the Government has on the 
economy’ he argued that ‘to deduce from this that we should abandon any attempt 
at quantitative forecasting is to mistake its true purpose. Quantitative forecasting 
is an aid to and not a substitute for judgement... The basic idea of the employment 
policy which was set out in the 1944 White Paper was that the Government would 
take appropriate action whenever the sum total of business decision was likely to 
be such as to produce either unemployment or inflation. Since Government action 
takes time to be effective, this means that the Government has to form some 
advance view on how it is going to behave and what scale of Government action 
is necessary is a matter of judgement but judgement cannot be based on pure
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intuition alone.’45
Although no changes were made to the Economic Survey the general tide 
of economic policy under Butler was turning against quantitative planning in any 
case. As I.M.D. Little has noted ‘1952 saw the first of the Conservative Budgets, 
and the first of the series of Conservative Economic Surveys in both of which the 
amount of prediction explicitly given rapidly declined, so that it soon became very 
hard to judge how closely events followed the Chancellor’s thoughts.’46 This 
change was not merely a superficial one of presentation as J.C.R Dow has 
suggested.47 Although Butler did state in his concluding speech to the debate on 
his first Budget ‘that my conclusions were reached after making full use of the 
whole machinery of economic forecasting that is available to any Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and was indeed, available to my predecessors when they were in 
office’, the nature of these forecasts changed.48 During the Budget Committee 
meetings leading up to the 1953 Budget Robert Hall estimated that ‘as an act of 
judgement’ the margin in the economy could be assessed at around £150 million. 
But ‘he stressed that this figure was not one that would be reached by the semi 
precise mathematical processes by which the Economic Section had worked in 
previous years. If such processes were used this year, the margin would be 
considerably larger.’49
The new approach to forecasting was reflected in the Economic Survey. 
The Economist noted that the ‘Economic Survey for 1953' marked ‘the beginnings 
of a new approach to policy-making. In its final pages the economic prospect is 
discussed - not indeed fully and decisively, but with some attempt to set out the 
conflicting influences at work. There is more sign of Government policy being 
consciously shaped to the prospect. As the functioning of the economy is left in 
greater measure to market forces, the Government finds itself more, rather than 
less, able to “take a view” of its own. To set out this view, with evidence and 
explanation, should become increasingly the purpose of the annual survey; it is the 
foundation of a new technique of planning that could be considerably more 
effective than the old.’50
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In the Commons the Labour Party attacked Butler’s first Budget primarily 
on two fronts. The first of these involved describing the measures as being both 
deflationary and inflationary at the same time, to the bemusement of the 
Government benches. Douglas Jay echoed the fear Gaitskell had expressed while 
in Government that wage rates would rise in response to the cut in food subsidies. 
Jay argued that the ‘whole spiral is being given a twist upwards without restraint, 
when restraint at this point is just what the United Kingdom’s economic problem 
needs. Thus the Chancellor is abandoning all attempt to tackle the most serious 
of our internal economic problems. There is to be no dividend limitation, no 
restraint on prices, no restraint on wage and salary rates. For the first time since 
the war the Chancellor in his Budget actively encourages a cost inflation.’ Jay 
found it ‘really terrifying’ that Conservative members did not realise that inflation 
and deflation could operate at the same time since ‘that is precisely the classical 
cause of depressions and unemployment... The Bank rate operates by deflating 
demand, and this Budget is pushing up costs.’51
On this crucial point the Government and the Opposition seemed to talk 
passed each other in debate. Neither side accepted the other’s economic 
assumptions. This was made clear during Oliver Lyttelton’s contribution. He noted 
that Gaitskell had called the rise in the Bank rate ‘a severe measure,’ and then 
agreed with this opinion: ‘I admit that it is a most drastic measure. But what 
becomes of the right hon. Gentlemen’s argument that the Budget does not 
acknowledge the severity of the crisis?...’52 To this Gaitskell responded: ‘It is such 
an obvious point that I should not have thought that the right hon. Gentleman 
needed to be told. The Bank Rate could have been put up without the Budget. It 
is not part of the Budget.’ Lyttleton felt that Gaitskell was differentiating in a 
‘peculiar way.’53
Labour’s other line of attack was to argue that the Budget would increase 
social inequality. Both lines of attack would continue to be used throughout the 
Butler Chancellorship. In his speech Jay dwelt on one of the fundamental 
differences between the two parties recalling that ‘the present Prime Minister, in 
one of these debates, described our policy of controls and fair-shares as being one
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of “equality of misery”. If the right hon. Gentleman likes the word “misery”, what his 
Government now offers is inequality of misery. If that is to be the economic choice 
we are on the side of equality. And if that is the Chancellor’s political challenge, I 
can assure him that we are happy to accept it...’54
Jay defended food subsidies on the basis that ‘they automatically assist 
every poor family just in proportion to its poverty. For the poorer the family, the 
larger the part of its income it spends on food. No other service can do that 
precisely because by any other method you have to define classes of needy 
person - old age pensioners, war pensioners, the industrially injured, and so forth - 
and no amount of administrative ingenuity can do that all over the field.’55
The 1953 Budget: ‘A New Direction’
The 1953 Budget saw taxation reduced more substantially than in any 
previous postwar Budget. This reduction was possible even though a forecast the 
previous October had found that rather than the predicted Budget surplus for 
1952/3, the Exchequer would go into a deficit of £250 million. On the note Bernard 
Gilbert had sent to the Chancellor containing this forecast Butler wrote that ‘this is 
a dreadful position.’56 Butler’s immediate response was to consult the Prime 
Minister on the situation. Churchill recommended expenditure cuts rather than 
increases in taxation. He thought that ‘we might try hard for no increase in civil 
expenditure’ and did not ‘see any case for increased taxation.’57
A preliminary Budget paper presented by Robert Hall in January warned 
that the economy was operating well below full employment and that there was 
considerable slack in the system.58 Edward Bridges and other Treasury officials 
were dismayed by Hall’s assessment given the Budgetary position. Hall noted that 
Bridges wanted him to take a less optimistic view about the possibility of relaxing 
fiscal policy and tried to prevent him ‘from saying that I think there is a margin in 
hand.’59 Hall himself found it ‘a curious trend’ that while in the past there had been 
horror at the Economic Section’s recommendations that tax should be increased 
there now ‘seems to be nearly as much horror at the idea of giving anything away,
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especially on the part of B. Gilbert who propounded the doctrine that we should 
either accept the Section target, or aim at a substantial surplus above the line, 
whichever was the bigger.’60
Bridges’ reaction shows that Treasury officials were not prepared to allow 
the Budget to go into deficit above the line. Their main objection was the expected 
psychological impact. Hall’s answer to this objection was that the public needed 
to be educated. He wrote to Bridges to tell him that he knew there was ‘a good 
deal of anxiety about the expected failure of the Exchequer to get the surplus 
forecast last March. It will need a certain amount of education to persuade the 
experts that we need a less austere Budget next year even though our experience 
with this one has been worse than expected [emphasis in original].’61
Bridges, like the Chancellor himself, was torn between the fear of a Budget 
deficit and a desire to reduce the burden of taxation. On a note covering Hall’s 
paper he wrote that The heavy burden of Government expenditure has resulted 
in the continuance over many years of high levels of taxation which have 
hampered initiative and constricted our productive industry. It is the Government’s 
duty to use whatever elbow room it has in 1953 to lessen this crushing burden on 
industry and to take further steps towards removing the distortions from the 
economy.’62
The Budget Committee therefore accepted Hall’s estimate that £150 million 
was available for tax cuts, although this meant an overall deficit a surplus of just 
under £100 million was maintained above the line. On top of a 6d. reduction in 
income tax Butler decided to give concessions that would encourage private 
investment, as Hall had recommended. These concessions were the restoration 
of initial allowances and the abolition of the Excess Profits Levy. Abolition of the 
levy had been more than officials had even hoped for, Bridges had only 
recommended a concession on E.P.L. One of the benefits of both these measures 
was that the cost would not be felt until the following tax year.
Butler presented his second Budget as one with a new look. He pointed out 
that on taxation ‘this Budget moves for the first time for many years in a new 
direction. It does so because the economic circumstances show this to be the right
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course. The path of restriction has been so firmly fixed in people’s minds that it 
now tends to be regarded as the inevitable line of conduct. But we can now look 
to a more hopeful way. We can lighten our load and liberate our energies. The fact 
that we have not been getting the best out of our productive capacity springs in 
part from our terrible burden of taxation, which is about the highest in the world. 
Even after this Budget we shall not have “let up” to a level which can be called 
moderate.’63
The Economist characterised this new look as ‘not an exercise in national 
income accounting - in reckoning how money consumers need in order to promote 
full employment; it is an exercise in psychology. It expresses a belief that if the 
Chancellor is optimistic and encourages industry to be optimistic, production will 
rise and the optimistic assumptions of the Budget will thereby be justified.’ 
Although the Economist conceded that this was an ‘attractively expansionist’ 
doctrine, it also noted that ‘by its very nature Mr Butler’s policy is risky.’64
In the Commons Gaitskell again centred his attack on the use of monetary 
policy which he thought ‘was deliberately intended to create an atmosphere of 
pessimism and uncertainty.’65 However, he also spoke at length on the subject of 
profits taxation. He welcomed the removal of the Excess Profits Levy, which he 
called ‘absurd and bad’ but also noted that ‘when the Chancellor brought in the 
Excess Profits Levy,’ the previous year ‘he reduced the Profits Tax. He has not 
said anything about replacing this Profits Tax when he takes off the Excess Profits 
Levy. I ask straight away: Does this mean there is to be no replacement at all; that, 
in fact, not only are we to have the removal of the E.P.L. but a lower level of Profits 
Tax than existed before it was imposed?’66 Later in his speech he linked this 
question to that of dividend limitation: The first striking feature of the Income Tax 
concessions is, of course, the great benefits which are to accrue to shareholders; 
£45 million of the £117 million will go to undistributed profits... The right thing 
would have been to sweep away the Excess Profits Levy, reimpose the Profits Tax 
and introduce dividend limitation at the same time.’67
In reply John Boyd-Carpenter said that Gaitskell showed ‘how
fundamentally different was his approach to the subject of taxation.’ His wish to 
increase Profits Tax and impose dividend limitation was ‘very revealing... because 
it seemed to indicate that the right hon-Gentleman regarded high taxation upon 
industry not as the necessary means of raising the national revenue, but as 
something that was good in itself and that it was wrong even though it might be 
financially possible, to lighten the burden on industry.’68
Reginald Maudling gave a more considered response to Gaitskell’s 
opposition to using monetary policy to deal with inflation. He argued that it was 
preferable to rely primarily on monetary policy rather than fiscal policy to deal with 
this problem. The truth is that in the changing condition we have had to meet, with 
the disappearance of the world seller market, a more flexible economy has been 
essential. The policy of the Labour Party was to tackle inflation by a Budgetary 
surplus based on high and excessive levels of expenditure while ignoring the 
efficacy of the monetary weapon. There was no doubt that it was a courageous 
move particularly the move by Sir Stafford Cripps in maintaining the Budget 
surplus, but it was the wrong thing to do... Not only is the monetary weapon more 
flexible, but the point is that the cost of dear money is a great deal less than the 
cost of a vast surplus... Surely it is only sense if we want to restrict monetary 
demand in the country that we should restrict spending of borrowed money by 
tighter credit policy rather than by restricting the amount of money available by 
taking it away from our people in the form of higher taxation...’69
The 1954 Budget and expenditure cuts
Discussion of the 1954 Budget highlighted the Conservatives belief that the 
burden of taxation on the economy was too great. As Butler agreed with the 
Treasury that a Budget deficit was undesirable he launched a concerted campaign 
to reduce the level of government expenditure. The 1954 Budget was also the first 
in which economic growth became a major concern of fiscal policy. Robert Hall, in 
his first assessment of the Budgetary problem in 1954 warned that ‘even if there 
is no recession in the United States, we cannot expect any large expansion in the
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United Kingdom next year.’70
In general the Budget Committee was more concerned with the 
Government’s Budgetary position than with the problem of growth. In the 
discussion of Hall’s paper Bernard Gilbert argued that it could not yet be said, as 
Hall’s paper said, that ‘there was little likelihood that further taxation would be 
required in next year’s Budget. One could only say at present that the Budget 
might have to preserve the same impact on the economy, which was a different 
question.’ In general the Committee felt that ‘any change in the forthcoming year 
should if anything be restrictive rather than expansive.’71
Butler came to his meeting with his officials on 5 February clearly worried 
by Hall’s assessment. He remarked that ‘the forward look was far more pessimistic 
than he had hitherto believed.’ Officials argued that ‘the only possibility of securing 
a margin for remissions in taxation would be by reductions in expenditure. And the 
only fields in which immediate reductions of significance could be sought appeared 
to be Food and Agricultural subsidies.’ Butler assured the committee that 
reductions could be made in this area.72
Nevertheless the committee advised against tax cuts. Edward Bridges was 
still primarily concerned to avoid a deficit and told the Chancellor that tax cuts were 
not possible primarily because ‘there was no money to give away.’ Butler was also 
discouraged from making tax cuts by Hall. Although Hall argued that ‘it was 
important to judge the aim of a budget by reference to the general state of the 
economy and not necessarily by looking at the figures’ he advised against 
concessions ‘not on the grounds that they would produce a deficit above the line, 
but because he thought that the present budgetary position was about right from 
the economic standpoint.’ He went on to say ‘that nothing he had said detracted 
from his view that taxes were too high and that it was economically desirable to 
reduce them.’73
The official Treasury line continued to be that allowing a Budget deficit 
would have disastrous results. When the latest figures in March showed a deficit 
above the line of £57m., a Budget meeting with the Chancellor concluded that ‘it 
was generally agreed that the aim in planning the Budget should be to get rid of
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this deficit. The psychological effect of any departure from the policy of a balanced 
Budget might well be disastrous; it would be taken by Spending Departments as 
a sign that the Treasury was prepared to relax, and through its effect on overseas 
opinion it might well react on the balance of payments.’ The Treasury continued 
to argue that the weight of public expenditure was too great for the economy to 
bear and ‘that any attempt to reduce the deficit in 1955/56 ought to follow the line 
not of increasing taxation but of another assault on expenditure. The policy should 
in fact be to break away from the position under which the yield of increased 
productivity in the U.K. was mortgaged in advance, year by year.’74
Robert Hall did not dissent from the view that a deficit was not appropriate 
that year because he thought investment was the main area that required stimulus. 
He argued that ‘a Chancellor who encouraged a deficit in the hope of stimulating 
investment would come under heavy pressure from his colleagues and from the 
public also to incur deficits from all sorts of other reasons.’ However he defended 
the idea of deficit finance in the appropriate circumstances of recession. He 
pointed out that this was contemplated in ‘the Employment policy White paper and 
the speeches of Sir Stafford Cripps.’ He dismissed ‘any psychological effect’ as 
really being ‘due to ignorance of what was the economic reality.’75
Butler’s decision not to cut taxation in the 1954 Budget added to the 
mounting concern of his Cabinet colleagues about the burden of taxation on the 
economy. In a memorandum submitted to the Cabinet in March 1954 Woolton 
argued that if capital projects, whose benefit accrued over a period of years, were 
financed by loan, money could be found to cut taxes. In Cabinet Woolton added 
‘that it should be a main object of Government policy to reduce the current level 
of taxation. This would bring political and social, as well as economy advantages. 
National prosperity depended on a comparatively small number of people who 
could exploit inventions, open up new markets and devise means to increase 
production. The present level of taxation was curbing their initiative and their 
willingness to take risks. It was also denying industry the opportunity to accumulate 
reserves for new ventures. And, by the pressures which it exercised towards tax 
evasion of various forms, it was tending to undermine business morality. If the
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present level of taxation were to continue indefinitely, the prospects for our 
commercial and industrial prosperity would be bleak. He therefore suggested that 
the Government should set themselves the aim of reducing taxation to a point at 
which no one would be required to pay more than 15s. In the £.’76
The Cabinet rejected Woolton’s specific suggestion, Butler told his 
colleagues that ‘although he had not closed his mind to the possibility of financing 
certain services by borrowing, the present would not be an appropriate moment at 
which to resort to this device. There was no economic advantage in having 
recourse to it in a period of relative prosperity: indeed, it would then have the 
positive disadvantage of encouraging inflationary tendencies.’77
Butler presented the Cabinet with a stark choice between cutting 
expenditure or raising taxation. He argued that ‘the level of public expenditure 
would shortly become a major political problem for the Government. The combined 
cost of current policies on defence, social services, agriculture and housing was 
more than the national economy could bear. If these policies continued unchanged 
he would be faced, when framing the 1955 Budget, with a choice between 
reducing expenditure or increasing taxation. Of these alternatives he would wish 
to choose the first, and he would welcome opportunities for a dramatic reduction 
in public expenditure. If, however, he was to avoid increasing the level of taxation 
in 1955, early consideration would have to be given to policy changes designed to 
secure substantial reductions in public expenditure, particularly on the services he 
had mentioned.’78
The Cabinet agreed that a way must be found to reduce public expenditure, 
political advantage was not the only consideration behind the move. In discussion 
it was argued that ‘British industry was likely to find it increasingly difficult to 
maintain current earnings from exports, and the high level of taxation was one of 
the main obstacles in the way of an expansion of our exports.’79
Butler was invited by the Cabinet to submit proposals to the Prime Minister 
on the procedure to be followed in discussing the policy changes needed to bring 
about the necessary expenditure cuts. By the end of March Butler had brought 
forward plans to set up two Cabinet Committees, one to review civil expenditure
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and one to review defence expenditure. He proposed that the Committee on Civil 
Expenditure should be instructed to formulate recommendations for a £100 million 
saving in expenditure and that the Committee on Defence Expenditure should 
have a corresponding target of £150 million. Butler’s proposal was accepted by the 
Cabinet.80
In the light of increases in expenditure forecasts, the Committee on Civil 
Expenditure, chaired by the Commonwealth Secretary Swinton, actually 
recommended reductions in expenditure amounting to £113 million. However, 
there was Cabinet opposition to some of the recommendations, in particular, the 
suggestion of a levy on flour which would increase the price of 3 14 lb. loaf of 
bread by 1d. Monckton, The Minister of Labour, argued that this would increase 
the pressure on wage claims. Crookshank suggested that an increase in the price 
of sugar would be preferable.81
Butler fought hard to get the Cabinet to accept the levy. He argued that The 
tax-payer would not accept indefinitely the continuance of agricultural subsidies on 
their present scale.’ In contrast to his Labour predecessors position on subsidies 
Butler argued that it was not, ‘in his view, good social policy to continue to keep 
down the price of bread and milk at a time of full employment and high wages.’82 
In spite of the force of Butler’s arguments, Churchill felt that the issue required 
further consideration. A week later the Cabinet decided to put the plans for a flour 
levy, as well those to raise the charge for school meals and to increase 
prescription charges on ice. As an alternative the Cabinet agreed to an increase 
in the price of sugar.83
In response to Butler’s call for economies in defence expenditure, The Lord 
President, Salisbury, told the Cabinet on July 27, that the Defence Policy 
Committee had reviewed existing expenditure in the light of the ‘new strategic 
appreciation by the Chiefs of Staff taking account of recent developments in the 
evolution of thermo-nuclear weapons.’84 The service Departments revised their 
programmes to take into account the new emphasis on a policy of nuclear 
deterrence. These changes represented a highly significant saving for the 
Exchequer, leaving expenditure only £50 million above Butler’s target for defence.
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Faced with a stand-still Budget for 1954 Butler still wanted to find a way to 
encourage investment. The most important measure included in the Budget was 
the introduction of investment allowances. The idea of using tax allowances 
specifically in this way was initiated by the Chancellor himself, and not by Robert 
Hall as Cairncross and Watts have suggested.85 Butler told a Budget meeting in 
December 1953 that ‘the important task in the forthcoming year would be to 
provide some impetus for the expansion of home productive investment.’ Later on 
in the same meeting he speculated that ‘it might be possible to step up productive 
investment at home by increasing initial allowances and thought that this might be 
done selectively.’86
In response to Butler’s suggestion Robert Hall brought forward a scheme 
proposed by John Jukes for an investment allowance, which was a tax credit for 
investment outlays.87 The plan received general approval from within the Treasury 
but strong opposition from the Board of the Inland Revenue. Although the Board 
did raise economic objections to the proposed allowance, specifically that it was 
an expensive way of encouraging investment, its main objection was that it would 
change the role of the Inland Revenue. A note to the Budget Committee dwelt on 
this objection. It pointed out that other allowances were ‘designed to write off 
against profits no more that the actual expenditure incurred.’ However the effect 
of the new allowance would be that a trader could ‘deduct from his net profits more 
than the amount he had spent.’ This feature ‘distinguishes the investment 
allowance from the initial allowance and from all other taxation allowances ever 
granted in this country in respect of capital expenditure... In essence, the 
investment allowance would be a subsidy paid through the tax machine, [emphasis 
in original]’88
Butler skilfully avoided direct confrontation on the issue, telling a Budget 
meeting attended by Sir Eric Banford from the Inland Revenue that ‘he could see 
that there were disadvantages in the scheme but he leant towards supporting it 
and he would keep an open mind on the subject.’ He put the pressure back on 
Banford by concluding that ‘it seemed relevant to him that Inland Revenue seemed 
unable to suggest any other variant or any other scheme to help investment.’89
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As Samuel Brittan has noted, the decision to include the investment 
allowance in the Budget was ‘one of the few really severe defeats that the 
Revenue has suffered.’90 It could also be said that it was a defeat that would not 
have been possible if Butler had not been a forceful Chancellor.
The April 1955 Budget: ‘Invest in Success’
The introduction of the investment allowance in the 1954 Budget did not 
dispel Robert Hall’s concerns about the level of private investment. In July 1954 
he presented a paper on The Problem of Economic Expansion’. In the paper he 
argued that the ‘problem is in part one of psychology. The rate of progress we can 
achieve depends, in the end, on the initiative of business itself. If industry has 
confidence in the future it will invest more. If it is confident it can expand, it will also 
be quicker to improve efficiency and cut prices, and thus realise an increase in 
sales which justifies this confidence. Probably the main reason for the United 
States economy being more progressive than ours is that the American business 
man’s expectations are geared to an expanding economy. The way in which 
Budgetary policy is presented could do much to create a working faith that our 
economy is on a rising trend.’ Hall added that ‘it seems unlikely that consumption 
or investment will increase at an adequate rate without some positive stimulus.’91 
The same thinking lay behind Butler’s call at the Conservative Party Conference 
that year to ‘Invest in Success.’92
Debate during the preparation of the April 1955 Budget was influenced by 
the perception that a high level of confidence in the economy had to be maintained 
and by the feeling that this would have its own reward. However, the Economic 
Section’s initial assessment of the economic situation was that it did not justify a 
reduction in tax.93 On the other hand, Edward Bridges felt that taxes should be cut. 
He told a meeting in December 1954 that ‘the rare opportunity provided by the 
surplus should be used to reduce the standard rate of income tax by 6d.’94
The significance of this opportunity to cut taxation was heightened by the 
likelihood that the 1955 Budget would be the last before a General Election.
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Treasury officials believed that the burden of taxation on the economy remained 
too high and the possibility of the return of a Labour Government meant that the 
opportunity to reduce this burden could not be wasted. Bridges was certainly 
conscious of this factor and it played an important role in his thinking.95
By February the economy was running into balance of payments difficulties. 
In response the Chancellor raised the Bank Rate and imposed restrictions on hire- 
purchase transactions to constrain consumer spending. Budget discussions 
following this move centred on the question of whether or not the measures were 
working. The effectiveness of the measures was still unclear when senior officials 
met at the beginning of March. It was agreed at the first meeting on 8 March, 
attended by Edward Bridges, Bernard Gilbert and Robert Hall that ‘In general the 
deflationary measures have not been taken as seriously by the City as has been 
intended.’ However, when the meeting resumed the following day it was 
speculated that, on the assumption ‘that recent measures were not failing, a 
standstill Budget would have a strong disincentive effect.’ Again the key factor was 
seen to be confidence. The meeting concluded that ‘It should not be forgotten that 
the gold and dollar reserves existed to be used. It would be a mistake to do 
anything which would impair the long term effects on confidence of the present 
high level of economic activity in the U.K.’96
At the beginning of April a Budget meeting with the Chancellor also 
concluded ‘that it would not be possible to have a completely standstill Budget.’ It 
was also decided ‘that the Income Tax proposals now favoured were the best 
concession to make.’ Only Leslie Rowan objected, pointing to the inflationary effect 
of reduction in the standard rate.97 However, Rowan had objected to the tax 
concessions in previous Budgets. Butler must have felt that he could proceed with 
tax cuts with the same confidence as in previous years.
Although the decision to give £140 million of the surplus back was not a 
political one, the decision to do so in the form of a 6d cut in Income Tax was. In 
December 1954 Butler received a paper from the Conservative Research 
Department by Michael Fraser and David Dean entitled ‘Some tax suggestions.’ 
On the first sheet of the paper Butler wrote This is first class stuff from my old
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chosen advisers.’ On the third page he marked a particular paragraph with an ‘X’ 
to bring it to Bridges’ attention. The passage read: ‘For what it is worth the 
confidential report of the British Institute of Public Opinion for September 1954, 
showed that the reduction of income tax received more approval than any other 
thing the Government had done since it took office - even including derationing.’ 
It was also argued that a reduction in income tax for the middle classes ‘fits in with 
our general themes. Invest in success means not only investment in capital 
equipment, it must also be investment in the man behind it.’98 Butler also 
corresponded with Ralph Assheton and received submissions from the 
Conservative Finance Trade and Industry Committee which recommended a 
reduction in Income Tax for the middle classes who were seen as having been 
badly hit in recent years.
However, there was nothing underhand in Butler’s choice of concession. He 
saw its popularity to be its own justification. In the speech that closed the Budget 
debate Butler pointed out that a poll for the News Chronicle had found that voters 
of all parties thought that income tax should be the first tax to be reduced. He 
concluded that ‘I therefore seem to have done something which is very sensible.’99
For Butler the April 1955 Budget was the crowning moment of his economic 
strategy. By raising interest rates at the same time as cutting taxation he believed 
that he could encourage saving and dampen down consumer demand at the same 
time as encouraging expansion and exports. In his Budget speech Butler argued 
that the action he had taken in February represented one of two choices. ‘The first 
is to limit and control the supply of goods which the consumer at home can buy. 
But there is an alternative, namely, to check spending at home by more flexible 
methods. The former course would involve a return to controls on consumer 
choice, even perhaps a return to rationing. We do not believe in a policy of this 
kind.
‘It is only by looking forward and outward, by expansion, by liberating the 
human spirit to give and do of its best, that our island people can survive. This is 
the road we prefer- an adjustment of fiscal and monetary policy which without
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cramping or distorting the natural vigour of the economy, maintains the disciplines 
which are essential to an expanding community.’100
In the Budget debate Ralph Assheton suggested that ‘this Budget blows up 
the idea which has been propagated in certain parts of the press that there is such 
a thing as Butskellism... Both the measures taken by the Chancellor, first on 24th 
February... and secondly, in the Budget are sound Conservative policy and they 
both fit in together. The dearer money policy does two things. In the first place, it 
damps down excessive consumption and, secondly, it encourages more saving 
because the rate of interest is higher... The reduction of Income Tax gives 
encouragement to people to produce more and it also encourages saving. We 
know what Socialist Chancellors would have done under the same 
circumstances... They would have clamped down on imports and they would have 
increased taxation in the classical Socialist style.’101
Butler, Eden and the Autumn Budget 1955
The events of the summer of 1955 were to leave Butler badly isolated within 
the Government. In response to the continuing rise in bank advances Butler 
announced a package of restrictions in the House of Commons on July 26. The 
package included a thirty percent rise in hire-purchase deposits and a formal 
request to the banks themselves to cut advances. Butler had also proposed cuts 
in public investment and in bread and milk subsidies but these had been ruled out 
by Eden who was now Prime Minister.102
Butler believed the run on the pound, which continued through the summer, 
was primarily the result of rumours that convertibility at a floating rate was 
imminent. He believed that he could restore overseas confidence in the pound by 
pushing through the expenditure cuts he had proposed in July. These would also 
assist the measures to restrict credit which Butler told the Cabinet on 26 August 
were ‘now working effectively.’ He argued that ‘the government could not expect 
the public to accept the need for credit restrictions unless it could be shown that 
these would also be applied to the nationalised industries and to Government
expenditure generally.’ It is therefore clear that he believed that his economic 
strategy was working and all that was required was a psychological boost to his 
package of credit restriction. He told the Cabinet that the loss to the reserves ‘had 
been due largely to an outflow of short-term capital caused by the expectation that 
some change was likely to be made in the exchange rate.’103
Butler proposed a substantial reduction in local authority expenditure though 
a reduction in housing subsidies, and reductions in central Government 
expenditure by reductions in the defence programme, road building and 
maintenance, railway modernisation and school building. He also proposed the 
abolition of the bread subsidy. On the basis of cut in government expenditure, 
Butler agued that he would be able to ‘appeal to industry to do their utmost to 
avoid increases in dividends, profit margins and prices.’104 His measures also had 
the advantage of not involving any fiscal measures and therefore not requiring 
legislation, thus avoiding the embarrassment of an autumn Budget.
However, Butler did not receive the support he needed from the Prime 
Minister to force his measures through the Cabinet. Eden called for ‘a balanced 
plan and should included measures to show that the Government were prepared 
to restrain profits. Politically, the Government were now in a position to pursue 
whatever policy was in the best interest of the country, and it was likely that firm 
action would command a large measure of public support.’ In practice this meant 
fiscal measures requiring legislation and therefore a Budget. The Cabinet minutes 
concluded that ‘th.e Government’s plan for remedying the situation must hold the 
balance fairly between the various classes of the community. The view was 
expressed, and commanded support, that the Chancellor’s present plan was not 
sufficiently balanced. If house rents were increased and the bread subsidy were 
abolished and if, in addition, a reduction were to be made in the subsidy on school 
meals, further restraints should be imposed on profits and dividends.’105 Butler was 
therefore forced into an Autumn Budget by the Cabinet.
Butler had recommended only expenditure cuts even though Bridges had 
warned him in late July that if things continued to go badly the introduction of 
measures which did not require the authority of Parliament ‘would not prove
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sufficient. It would be fatal if the third attempt to cut inflation failed by reason of 
inadequacy. We therefore come to the conclusion - and it is a very serious 
conclusion - that in the contingency envisaged, the proper course would be to have 
an autumn Budget even if it should mean bringing Parliament back in the 
Recess.’106
However Bridges and the Treasury provided Butler with no economic 
justification for fiscal measures. In the same memorandum Bridges wrote ‘we are 
all agreed that if the position continues to deteriorate, the fundamental reason will 
be that opinion abroad has not been satisfied that we have got our internal position 
under control and that more is needed to get inflation out of our system.’107 Policy 
was therefore being formed in response to market opinion. Bridges did not argue 
that Butler’s policy was not working, rather that it was not seen to be working. His 
argument in favour of an autumn Budget was based purely upon this perception.
Butler also had Cobbold’s assurance that The “credit squeeze” is working, 
in the somewhat limited field where it can operate.’108 Cobbold felt let down by the 
size of the expenditure cuts introduced in July, he rather indignantly insisted that 
‘I do not think that the “credit policy” medicine will prove adequate unless at some 
time, pressure is effectively taken off the economy at the “public” end. In the 
second place, I am quite sure that H.M. Government, H.M. Treasury and the Bank 
of England will come in for a great deal of criticism if “private enterprise” sees itself 
increasingly squeezed with no evidence that the same thing is happening in the 
“public” field.’109
Butler had therefore been given no reason to believe that his economic 
policy could not be kept on course as long as expenditure cuts were made to 
reassure overseas opinion and to assist in the credit squeeze. It was not until 
September that Robert Hall warned that the internal situation was getting worse 
and required significant deflation. On 2 September Hall wrote that The pressure 
on resources has been increasing since the Budget: unemployment has fallen 
further, the number of unfilled vacancies has increased, prices have been rising 
and the balance of payment has been unsatisfactory. The causes of this pressure 
are difficult to diagnose, but there is as yet no evidence that the trend is changing.
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It is possible that the intensification of credit policy will check demand. But with so 
much evidence of strain in the economy, it would be unwise to rely on this. The 
economy requires a decisive measure of disinflation. If we do not take action, we 
shall be running considerable risks. If we disinflate too sharply, we shall have 
ample opportunity to correct the situation later on.’ Butler’s dismay at the reversal 
of Hall’s advice so late in the day was evident, he wrote on his copy of the memo 
‘As far as I am aware historically this is the first such warning I have had from 
Econ. Section [emphasis in original].’110
Butler was the first Chancellor to attempt to manipulate a free economy by 
the use of fiscal policy. Given the novelty of the policy it is hardly surprising that his 
advisers were still learning how the economy worked as they went along. The 
information that formed the basis for the forecasts made by the Economic Section 
was often inaccurate or outdated, Macmillan compared forecasts in his first Budget 
speech as Chancellor to ‘last years Bradshaw.’111 Butler was probably right to treat 
these forecasts with a degree of scepticism and keep in mind his overall objectives 
of cutting taxes and public expenditure and encouraging investment and economic 
growth.
Cairncross’ and Watt’s defence of Hall in The Economic Section does not 
hold water. Although they accept that Hall had been ‘too slow’ in ‘grasping the full 
momentum behind economic expansion in 1954' they also argue that the April 
Budget of 1955 ‘is generally agreed to have been a blunder’ and that ‘The 
Economic Section was not the architect of that Budget.’112 However, Hall had still 
been arguing that the economy needed further expansion in July 1954. Even if the 
assumption made by J.C.R. Dow and others is correct - that the crisis of the 
summer of 1955 was caused by the economy over-heating - Dow himself has 
pointed out that Butler would have to have moderated the whole pace of 
expansion since 1953 to avoid it.113 The measures of the 1955 Budget would not 
have even fed into the economy by the summer of that year.
Hall was also inconsistent in his advice. In the paper The Problem of 
Economic Expansion’ which he had presented in July 1954 Hall argued that faster 
economic growth was only possible if the Government could engender in business
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the confidence to invest more. He wrote that ‘the way in which Budgetary policy is 
presented could do much to create a working faith that economy is on a rising 
trend.’114 However, by September 1955 he was arguing that even ‘if we disinflate 
too sharply, we shall have ample opportunity to correct the situation later on.’115 He 
concerns about business confidence and the long-term problem of investment 
seemed to have been forgotten. Butler was clearly dismayed when he received 
this paper from Hall, he had every right to feel let down by his advisers.
Butler was unable to persuade Eden to allow him the abolish the bread 
subsidy as part of his package of measures. Eden thought that abolishing the 
bread subsidy would actually have an inflationary effect. At the beginning of 
September Butler told his private secretary Petch that ‘there is still quite a job of 
education to be done with the P.M.’ on this subject. Eden also ‘put forward the idea 
of making th6 "package” a mixed one by putting in something to reduce the cost 
of living. The proposal he mentioned was a reduction in the duty on beer.’116
Butler sent Eden a commentary by Hall on his suggestions that explained, 
in the simplest terms possible, why a reduction in the bread subsidy would actually 
be deflationary. Hall explained that ‘the reason for increasing taxes or reducing 
subsidies, is that this takes away some of the inflated incomes and thus reduces 
the amount people can buy and the excess demand for resources. But if we lower 
taxes, or increase-subsidies, it certainly reduces prices and the cost of living: but 
at the same time it gives people more money to spend and thus increases the 
underlying causes of inflation [emphasis in original].’117 In spite of Hall’s arguments 
Eden continued to refuse to allow Butler to take any action over bread subsidies. 
As a result Butler was forced to take back through profits and purchase tax roughly 
the amount he had given away in April.
Butler continued to believe that the primary reason for his Autumn Budget 
was to placate overseas opinion. It is significant that Butler kept amongst his own 
papers an unsigned memo from a senior official, possibly Bridges, dealing with 
Butler’s own draft of the Budget Speech. Butler did not keep many official Treasury 
documents amongst his own papers and the retention of this one suggests that he 
wanted to preserve proof that the form of the Budget was being forced on him. The
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official asked Butler if he would ‘consider an alteration of the order in the first 
section of the speech as drafted it over the weekend? I have discussed this 
section with Sir Robert Hall and we both feel that it is a pity that the balance of 
payments considerations are dealt with twice over - once on pages 2-6 (mainly in 
terms of the strength of Sterling and the confidence factors), and a second time 
on pages 16-20 (mainly in factual and statistical terms).’ It was argued by the 
official that one major disadvantage of this draft was that it appeared as if it was 
primarily ‘because we are frightened of the confidence factor, that we are taking 
further measures.’ Butler underlined this passage and wrote in the margin ‘This is 
the truth’. It was suggested in the note that the passage on confidence should be 
removed from the beginning of the speech and amalgamated with the other 
passage ‘towards the end of the section as a whole.’ Butler wrote at the end of the 
note ‘I am v. worried about this’ and that it ‘doesn’t tell the truth.’118
In the end the Budget speech was structured in the way Butler wanted. 
Considered in the light of what was going on behind the scenes, the speech 
appears to declare to those in the know that Butler was introducing fiscal 
measures he believed were unnecessary. He started his speech by stating: ‘As 
has been announced, our first business must be to deal with the economic 
situation, and as we are in the Committee of Ways and Means it will be clear to 
hon. Members that I have a variety of measures, including fiscal proposals, to put 
before the Committee. These Her Majesty’s Government judge essential if we are 
to tackle the present situation throughly and effectively. The fact that my speech 
will include budgetary matters may lead hon. Members to think that things are 
more difficult than they had imagined. Actually, there has been a distinct 
improvement during the past month. Since I spoke at Istanbul at the meeting of the 
International Bank and Fund in the middle of last month, Sterling, I am glad to say, 
has strengthened; the loss of reserves has been effectively halted, and our current 
deficit in the European Payments Union has been greatly reduced.’119 On previous 
occasions Butler had spoken of his Budget judgement, on this occasion he spoke 
of that of ‘Her Majesty’s Government.’
The Budget provoked Gaitskell’s most virulent attack on Butler’s economic
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policy. The Observer noted that ‘there is a sense in which Mr Gaitskell’s speech 
might have been composed by two people. The first part is by the man we all 
knew- playful, ironic and admonitory. The second is in quite a different key- 
vituperative, angry and relentless. The impression that most people carried away 
was that he was determined not merely to wound but also to kill.’120
Brian Brivati, Gaitskell’s most recent biographer, has argued that the attack 
was the result of Gaitskell having learnt that ‘the release of unexpected passion 
into speeches could have a profound impact.’121 However, the intensity of the 
attack can be explained by the fact that for the first time Gaitskell could argue that 
the situation bore out his criticisms of Butler’s policy and, by extension, justified his 
own economic thinking. As well as attacking the April Budget for being an 
electioneering one Gaitskell also attacked Butler’s policy of liberalisation in 
general. He described this as the ‘rash and reckless implementation of free-for-all 
Conservative policy.’122
Gaitskell pointed out that the whole of Britain’s trade deficit had arisen in 
non-sterling and predominantly non-dollar trade. This, he argued, was ‘a very 
serious consideration. It means that the proportion of our trade with the 
Commonwealth is falling, and falling fast. It suggests, to my mind at least, this 
consideration that the Chancellor may be making a grave mistake if he puts this 
down simply to inflation at home. Does it not also suggest that the liberalisation of 
dollar and O.E.E.C. imports may have had something to do with it?... I Think that 
this situation should have made the Chancellor pause, but it made him do nothing 
of the kind. He proceeded to advance further to convertibility last winter at a time 
when our dollar reserves were running down and at a time when the world dollar 
situation was changing unfavourably.’123
Gaitskell also attacked Butler’s monetary policy: ‘if one considers credit 
policy, surely it must have been clear to the Chancellor that the key to any success 
in this direction- assuming that it is, after all the main policy, as it is, on which the 
Government have been relying- must have been a reduction in bank advances. I 
made this point in the Budget debate and again in the summer... They have come
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down since then, but why did he not take action earlier and say to the banks 
straight away- “what we want you to do is bring down the advances?’”124
Conclusion
Jim Tomlinson has written at length on the way in which the role of the 
Budget as an economic weapon was superimposed upon a pre-existing annual 
Budgetary process during the war and in the postwar period. There is no economic 
reason why decisions affecting the economic management of the economy should 
be made at this time. As Tomlinson notes There is clearly no a priori logic in this, 
no reason to suppose that the rhythms of whatever private sector forces 
determined fluctuation in aggregate would match the rhythms of the annual 
Budgets.’125 The reason why decisions were taken at the time of the Budget was 
because it fitted in with the administrative arrangements that already existed within 
the Treasury.
The experience of the Butler Chancellorship shows how little integration 
there was between these two roles of the Budget. The tensions between the two 
roles grew stronger as Budgetary policy began to play a greater role in overall 
economic management with the disappearance of controls. Treasury Mandarins 
still wanted to balance the annual Budget. They accepted Keynesian demand 
management in so far as it involved fine tuning of the economy around a high level 
of demand. They continued to refuse to contemplate a deficit.
Robert Hall and the Economic Section fought for the principle of deficit 
financing to be accepted. However, Hall did not force matters to a head, probably 
because he wanted to build up his influence within the Treasury so that he could 
persuade officials and ministers to pursue a policy of deficit financing when it was 
absolutely necessary. In 1954 Hall accepted the Treasury’s case against incurring 
a deficit when only private investment needed to be encouraged. Later that year 
he did state the case for a deficit in circumstances short of a general depression. 
In his paper on the ‘Problem of Economic Expansion’ he argued that it might be 
desirable to incur a deficit in order to maintain expansion: ‘a period of Budget
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deficits, after the heavy Budget surpluses of recent years, should not create 
unmanageable problems.’126
One issue about which Hall and the Treasury could agree was that the 
burden of taxation needed to be reduced. However, they reached the same 
conclusion from different viewpoints. Hall was concerned about the Budget purely 
as a method of macro-economic management while the Treasury was concerned 
primarily by the need to keep public expenditure under control and by the fear that 
government was doing too much.
Within this advice structure Butler pursued a very consistent strategy. He 
believed that he could achieve expansion without inflation or Balance of Payments 
problems by cutting taxation at the same time as allowing interest rates to rise to 
something like their market level. Butler was able to follow this strategy by 
accepting advice from various sources as and when it suited his purposes. The 
advice he received was pluralistic enough for him to be able to find intellectual 
support for his policy. The Economic Section’s annual assessments of the 
economic situation were influential on Butler because they generally 
recommended an expansionist fiscal policy even though they were based on a 
pessimistic appraisal of the effectiveness of his monetary policy. The expansionist 
policy recommended by the Section fitted in with Butler’s vision and he therefore 
chose to follow their advice. In 1952 powerful voices within the Treasury had called 
for a deflationary Budget but Butler ignored them because he had a more 
palatable alternative. Butler no more believed in Budget deficits than Bridges but 
he allowed a deficit above-the-line in 1954 because it fitted in with his general 
policy of expansion and greater economic freedom. When, in 1955, the Section’s 
appraisal recommended some deflation Butler turned to Bridges who did not want 
to miss the opportunity to cut taxation. Butler was therefore not dependent on the 
advice the Economic Section and only accepted it when it suited him.
The content of the 1955 autumn Budget went against everything Butler’s 
fiscal policy had stood for. It was a reversal forced on Butler by Eden and the 
Cabinet and went against his own judgement. He had wanted the abolition of the 
bread subsidy to be at the centre of a package of expenditure measures to deal
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with what he saw as a crisis of confidence. Abolishing the subsidy would have 
been consistent with his policy of reducing market distortions and cutting 
expenditure by moving towards selectivity in social benefits.
In his dislike of subsidies, as in so much of his fiscal policy, Butler differed 
from Gaiskell. Whereas Gaitskell conceived of the Budget as having a highly 
specific purpose within the context of a controlled economy, Butler saw fiscal and 
monetary policy as the two main ways of managing the economy. Both of these 
methods had the advantage of being indirect forms of manipulation that could be 
used within a free economy.
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Chapter 10 
A Difference of Faith in Monetary Policy
Until recently monetary policy was one area of policy in which it was 
generally agreed by historians of the postwar period that the replacement of a 
Labour Government by a Conservative one led to a significant change in direction. 
Alec Cairncross is fairly representative in arguing that ‘within a few months of the 
change of government monetary policy had been transformed. Bank Rate had 
been revived and a new emphasis put on control of the money supply.’1
More recent contributions to the literature have played down the importance 
of the reactivation of Bank Rate policy in November 1951. In particular, Susan 
Howson has argued that the change in policy might have occurred even if the 
Labour Party had won the 1951 election.2 John Fforde has also questioned the 
significance of the move and has described it 'as the overdue removal of an 
absurd anomaly within the existing framework of monetary policy rather than as 
the inauguration of an entirely new approach.'3
The evidence suggests that Howson and Fforde’s argument that the 
reactivation of the Bank Rate was an inevitable development cannot be justified. 
The extent of the disagreement between the Conservative and Labour Parties on 
the issue of monetary policy was greater than even Cairncross has recognised. By 
neglecting Gaitskell’s attempts to introduce direct credit controls when he was 
Chancellor, Cairncross is able to argue that there was continuity in the policy of 
applying ‘moral pressure on the banks.’4 In fact, Gaitskell only resorted to 
persuasion because he was advised that he could not force the Bank of England 
to introduce direct credit controls.
As Chancellor Gaitskell rejected the Bank of England’s requests to raise 
short-term interest rates. He saw interest rate policy as a blunt and antiquated 
instrument and doubted the psychological case that the Bank used in favour of 
reactivating the Bank Rate. Along with other Labour ministers Gaitskell also 
opposed to the Bank’s request because it would lead to an increase in the Debt 
charge which had both economic and political implications. Gaitskell favoured the
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use of direct monetary controls which could be used in a more selective way and 
fitted in with his general policy of using direct controls on the economy. Gaitskell’s 
views on monetary policy did not change and he continued to make the same 
arguments in Opposition.
In contrast to Gaitskell, Butler saw the reactivation of the Bank Rate as a 
central part of his economic strategy and consciously emphasised this fact. His 
moves to restore interest rates to something like their market level facilitated his 
policy of decontrol and allowed him to pursue an expansionist fiscal policy. 
Although interest rates remained at a relatively low level during his Chancellorship, 
Butler did pursue an active monetary policy. He was hampered by the Treasury, 
which was uncertain about the impact of interest rate changes on the economy, 
and by the Bank of England, which was more concerned with the status of sterling 
than with the domestic effects of interest rates. Butler only failed to raise interest 
rates during the 1955 sterling crisis because the Bank of England rejected such 
a move.
Background
In the 1930s John Maynard Keynes revolutionised thinking about interest 
rates. His monetary theory was centred around liquidity preference, the idea that 
interest rates were ‘the reward for parting with liquidity’, the rate of interest ‘a 
measure of the unwillingness of those who possess money to part with their liquid 
control over it.’5 Since a major determinate of the desire to hold money is future 
expectations, Keynes argued that it was pointless to use high interest rates to 
control a boom: The boom which is destined to end in a slump is caused... by the 
combination of a rate of interest, which in a correct state of expectation would be 
too high for full employment, with a misguided state of expectation which, so long 
as it lasts, prevents this rate of interest from being in fact deterrent.’ He concluded 
from this argument that ‘the remedy for the boom is not a higher rate of interest but 
a lower rate of interest.’ For ‘that may enable the so-called boom to last. The right 
remedy for the trade cycle is not to be found in abolishing booms and thus keeping 
us permanently in a semi-slump; but in abolishing slumps and thus keeping us 
permanently in a quasi-boom.’6
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The collapse of the Gold Standard and the devaluation of the pound in 1931 
allowed the Chancellor to initiate the era of cheap money in 1932. Although cheap 
money was attractive to the Treasury as a way of reducing national debt, Susan 
Howson has found evidence suggesting that the main reason for the introduction 
of the policy was that the Treasury was convinced by the argument that it would 
aid economic recovery.7
At first the outbreak of the Second World War appeared to signal the end 
of cheap money. At the end of August 1939 the Bank Rate was raised above 2%. 
However the rise proved to be a temporary aberration. By November the Treasury 
had reverted to a policy of cheap money. Although the policy stayed the same its 
context and economic rationale had changed. The problem now was not to 
stimulate demand but to curtail it. It was held, however, that this task could be 
performed more effectively by methods other than the raising of interest rates. So 
long as the expenditure of the private sector was limited by rationing and other 
controls, income recipients would have little else to do with a large part of their 
earnings but to lend it to the Government.’ 8
At the end of the war the National Debt Enquiry, chaired by the outgoing 
Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, Sir Richard Hopkins, considered what 
interest rate policy would be appropriate to the transition to peacetime conditions. 
Keynes himself sat on the committee as did James Meade and Lionel Robbins 
from the Economic Section. Keynes presented the case for the retention of cheap 
money. He believed that ‘it could be difficult for the authorities to set long-term 
interest rates at appropriate levels to encourage investment and economic growth 
in the longer term if variation in interest rates were used as an instrument of short- 
run demand management.’9 However, both Meade and Robbins did not want to 
give up the possibility of short-term variations in interest rates. They attempted ‘to 
counter some of Keynes’ more extreme remarks... such that “productivity of capital 
and thrift have got nothing to do with the rate of interest” and his view that the rate 
of interest should no longer be used to control inflation or deflation.’10
However, Hopkins’ report generally reflected Keynes advice which remained 
attractive to the Treasury. Although the final report did not rule out the possibility 
of interest rate flexibility it argued that in fixing nominal interest rates attention
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should be placed ‘perhaps especially to the burden of interest charges on the 
Exchequer and other State funds and on Local Authorities.’11
From the election of a Labour Government in 1945 to the convertibility crisis 
of 1947 Hugh Dalton pursued a policy of cheaper money. This policy reflected the 
idea ‘already current before the war, that monetary management was of relatively 
little importance in the control of the total demand for good and services, especially 
when more direct methods of regulating the expenditure of the public were 
available. Many of these controls on expenditure could in any case be made to 
play a useful part in the maintenance of full employment when the time came for 
that to be a problem. In particular, the limitation of investment expenditure in the 
private sector would effectively keep in resen/e a number of unrealized investment 
opportunities so that a well-judged relaxation of controls would bring about the 
release of a substantial volume of investment demand whenever it should be 
required.’ For Dalton the policy also had an additional benefit it that a ‘lower rate 
of interest would in time have a quite considerable effect on the distribution of 
income... any redistribution would be at the expense of the rentier.’12
The economic crisis of 1947 and Dalton’s resignation over budget leaks in 
November signalled the end of one aspect of the monetary policy he had pursued. 
For the rest of the Labour Government the yield on government securities was 
allowed to rise, however, both Cripps and Gaitskell refused to agree to the Bank 
of England’s demand to reactivate short-term interest rate policy. To put it simply, 
policy had reverted from cheaper money back to cheap money.
Gaitskell and Monetary Policy
Although Gaitskell strongly supported a policy of cheap money he believed 
that it was only the foundation of a distinctly socialist monetary policy, not an end 
in itself. He also believed that direct credit controls were a necessary weapon. As 
has been seen, in the 1930s Durbin and Gaitskell’s economic philosophy was 
influenced by Hayek’s business cycle theory. Both men were to use Hayek’s 
arguments to point to inadequacies in Keynes’ monetary theory.
Following the publication of the General Theory in 1936 Durbin wrote to 
Keynes arguing that cheap money could not cure the problems of the trade
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cycle:’let us imagine the Trade Cycle boom to be sufficiently strong to reduce 
general unemployment to zero... Now you may have good reasons for believing 
that the trade cycle movement is quite different in kind from the larger inflations 
that accompanied the war. We know that it is possible for upward movement in 
monetary expenditure to proceed through the condition of full employment to a rise 
in prices. Unless there are such reasons- and I do not find them in the ‘General 
Theory’ you have given no reason for supposing that your ‘cure’ would not simply 
lead to an accelerated inflation, and ultimately rise in prices, and the continuous 
dilemma between allowing the movement to gain further impetus or checking it. 
And if the movement is checked the disappointment of expectations is the crisis 
and produces the depression... I fail to see how you propose to stabilize the boom 
without allowing the expansion of money to go on after full employment has been 
reached.’13
Durbin and Gaitskell were both members of XYZ, a dining club founded in 
1932 by Labour sympathisers in the City, which became an important influence of 
future Labour Government policy.14 To counter the deficiencies of a cheap money 
policy XYZ worked on a specifically socialistic monetary policy which involved a far 
greater degree of government control than envisaged by Keynes. In 1939 Durbin 
published the conclusions reached by XYZ’s War Finance group, of which both he 
and Gaitskell were members, in a book entitled How to pay for the War. Durbin 
argued that large-scale borrowing to pay for the war was inevitable and that this 
should be 'directly from the only source of new credit - the ordinary banks.1 This 
large-scale borrowing should be at a very low rate of interest and there 'was no 
good reason why the banks should make large profits from the Government.' To 
deal with the problem of cheap money leading to undesirable inflationary pressure 
in the economy Durbin argued that 'It is therefore of the first importance to control 
advances made to the public by the banks and the deposits resulting therefrom. 
It will in all probability be necessary to limit them to their present volume, if the 
velocity of their circulation increases. To do so is vitally necessary if the expansion 
is to be limited and controlled.'15
Therefore, both Durbin and Gaitskell believed that a cheap money policy 
could only work as part of a wider socialistic monetary policy which also involved
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the control of advances. Gaitskell thought that the policy of cheaper money that 
Dalton had pursued as Chancellor had been mistaken. He blamed Treasury advice 
for misleading Dalton. In a letter to the financial journalist Nicholas Davenport, who 
had been a close friend of Dalton’s, written long after the events described, 
Gaitskell expressed his feelings on the subject. ‘Dear Nicholas, I entirely agree 
with what you say, In particular, that Hugh [Dalton] was absolutely right to go out 
for cheap money, that he went too far but that was definitely on the advice of the 
Treasury experts. It is perhaps worth pointing out that even by 1951 interest rates 
were still comparatively low although I was prepared to let the long-term rate go 
up to 4%. The really crucial change came with the removal of the peg which the 
Bank wanted to do, which I had refused to do, and which the Tories did almost 
immediately after they came into power.’16
As Chancellor, Gaitskell stood by the policy of cheap money he inherited 
from Cripps and withstood increasing pressure from the Bank of England to raise 
the Bank Rate. Gaitskell own plans to deal with the inflationary problem by 
introducing selective credit controls were, in turn, blocked by the Bank.
Gaitskell first faced pressure from the Bank of England to raise the Bank 
Rate in September 1949, after the devaluation of the pound. The Bank argued that 
such a move would reinforce control of advances, and since long-term interest 
rates were rising, the Treasury Bill rate would have to follow. Gaitskell, Jay and 
Harold Wilson advised Stafford Cripps against allowing such an operation. Jay 
argued that not only was the case for a rise nonsensical on economic grounds but 
also that 'the underlying political assumption is surely intolerable- that we should 
at this moment, at the cost of adding £25m. to Government expenditure, admit the 
principle that following devaluation, banks have to be paid a higher price to fall in 
with the national needs, whilst we are most firmly and loudly refusing to admit this 
argument in the case of labour, industry and others.'17
Jay’s argument against a rise in interest rates had several dimensions. It 
was partly influenced by what Burke Trend, in the Home Finance Division, noted 
as 'the probable reactions of the TUC, the effect on wages policy etc, etc.'18 
However, It was also the result of a concern about the cost of social expenditure 
on the capital side and a moral argument that a certain privileged group should not
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benefit from the cost of this expenditure. It represented a fundamental objection 
to the idea that Bank Rate policy should be revived.
Gaitskell made these points again when the Governor approached him as 
Chancellor for a rise in short-term interest rates in January 1951. At the meeting 
on January 5 Gaitskell said that 'he could not forget that an increase in short-term 
rates would impose a heavy additional charge on the Exchequer, the benefit of 
which would inure to big banks, foreign Governments, etc. i.e. to a small and 
restricted body of people which had not even asked for the increase.'19
In November 1950 Gaitskell asked his officials to review the whole field of 
credit policy, his objective was to introduce some measure of selective credit 
control. However, discussion within the Treasury became concentrated on the 
proposal made by the Bank at the same time for a Vz%  rise in short-term interest 
rates as a counter-inflationary measure. Opinion within the Treasury was divided. 
Trend had found the Bank's memorandum to be 'a very disappointing document.'20 
The Head of the Home Finance Division, Wilfrid Eady, wrote to Sir Kenneth 
Peppiat at the Bank to suggest a change in emphasis. He argued that the 'major 
part of your case rests on the psychological importance of creating a little 
uncertainty in the minds of people who have taken too much for granted easy 
money in all circumstances.'21
With the emphasis placed on this psychological effect of a change in the 
rate Eady became convinced by the Banks case and joined with Hall, Plowden and 
Bridges in recommending the move to Gaitskell. In his note to Gaitskell, Bridges 
stressed that the recommendation could be seen as the conclusion of the review 
of credit policy that Gaitskell had requested. Any other ways of tightening credit 
were listed as 'possible alternatives' to this recommended course.
Gaitskell did not agree with his advisers. At a meeting on January 5 1951 
with Bank and Treasury officials, he argued against using interest rates and moved 
attention back to the kind of credit controls he had wanted the review to 
concentrate on in the first place. He attacked what he called the 'indiscriminate' 
nature of the interest rate weapon in dealing with the problems of inflation. He was 
particularly worried about the disincentive effect on stockpiling in the private sector 
that a rise in interest rates might have.22
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As an alternative Jay recommended an intensification of the techniques of 
credit control which had been employed over the last two or three years. 'What', 
he asked 'for example, would be the result if we asked the banks to put up their 
rate for advances or to discriminate in other ways between different types of 
borrowing?' In reply Cobbold stated that 'the distinction between borrowing for 
essential purposes and borrowing for less essential purposes had already been 
pushed to the limit as a matter of administrative practicability at the Branch 
Manager level.'23
In the light of Cobbold’s response Gaitskell wondered 'what the purpose or 
effect of the Bank's proposals would be.1 The distinction between essential and 
non-essential or luxury goods was fundamental to his economic thinking. Since 
control of the importation of non-essential goods was available elsewhere the 
'difficulty which remained was the difficulty of preventing traders from buying 
internally, the supplies which the Government felt they should not acquire but to 
allow them to buy those supplies which they ought to have in order to co-operate 
with Government’s policy on, e.g., rearmament, the problem was, therefore, 
essentially one of differentiation between one type of borrower and another.'24
At this point in the meeting Robert Hall tried to help the Governor out by 
arguing that the increase in Interest Rates would 'supplement and reinforce, the 
direct powers of control and therefore help the Chancellor in his rearmament 
objectives’. After further pressure from Cobbold and Sir Wilfrid Eady, Gaitskell 
conceded that ‘leaving on one side the question of the additional cost to the 
Exchequer... the other arguments were nicely balanced, and he had not yet finally 
made up his mind.’25
Susan Howson has used Gaitskell’s comment as one important piece of 
evidence to back up her suggestion that he would have eventually allowed the 
Bank Rate to be made effective if Labour had won the General Election of October 
1951. However, Howson’s interpretation of Gaitskell’s comment cannot be 
sustained. Later in the same meeting Gaitskell flatly refused to confirm that the 
short-term rate was not frozen indefinitely. He argued that ‘no Chancellor could, 
so far as the future was foreseeable, be willing to increase the Debt Charge.’ As 
has been seen, the question of the additional charge to the Exchequer was a
fundamental one for Labour ministers and was unacceptable for both economic 
and political reasons.
While Gaitskell might have thought that the arguments for an interest rate 
rise were ‘nicely balanced’, he clearly agreed with Jay that if credit control was 
needed the case for using more direct credit controls was overwhelming. He 
doubted whether the Bank Rate ‘was as suitable an instrument as it used to be’ 
and wondered whether ‘even if a restriction of credit were necessary, there was no 
way of achieving it other than by the Bank's proposal.’ By this he meant that the 
Treasury should consider Jay's suggestion ‘that the rate for advances should be 
stepped up.’
Other comments Gaitskell made at the meeting show that he that he viewed 
interest rate policy as a blunt instrument and favoured a more selective form of 
credit control. He said that ‘he believed that a great deal of investment ought not 
to be curtailed, and that in so far as some restrictions might be desirable, a 
combination of physical factors- e.g. raw material shortages, new controls, etc. 
was working in the Governments favour.[emphasis in original]’ He went on to say 
‘that he felt that there had been a much stronger case for the proposed increase 
in interest rates three or four years ago, when controls were being relaxed, then 
there was now, at a time when there were being re-introduced.’ In other words, 
physical controls were the front line of investment restriction.26
The pressure brought to bear on Gaitskell to accept Cobbold’s proposal at 
the meeting on January 5 forced him to be at his most diplomatic. In his diary 
Gaitskell described the meeting as having been ‘rather sticky.’ Only the night 
before the meeting Gaitskell had told Dalton that ‘he despised the Bank and 
thought the Treasury did too.’27 In his own diary Gaitskell wrote that ‘because he 
[Cobbold] resists other direct methods of credit control he presses for what I am 
personally convinced is a completely antiquated instrument.’ He described 
Cobbold as ‘simply not a very intelligent man.’28
The use of the word ‘antiquated’ in describing Bank Rate policy reveals 
Gaitskell’s true feelings on the matter. He believed that using the Bank Rate to 
manipulate the economy had been superceded by more direct methods in a 
modern socialist state. Direct forms of credit control should be used if the
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Government was to maintain full employment and fulfil socialist objectives.
The other aspects of Howson’s argument also fall apart under closer 
examination. She points to the fact that Gaitskell agreed to the Banks suggestion 
of a new funding loan at 3% ‘without discussion’. In fact at the time Gaitskell 
argued that the authorities could accept the slight risk of long-term interest rates 
from rising as ‘we do not want any decline in interest rates at present.’29 In practice 
Gaitskell’s policy on long-term interest rates was a continuation of Stafford Cripps’ 
cheap monetary policy in which ‘the yields on government securities were to be 
allowed, in the main, to look after themselves.’ The failure of Dalton’s cheaper 
money policy, had been confined to that part of the policy concerning the forcing 
down of long-term rates. The reduction in short-term rates, which was so smoothly 
carried out in 1945, continued to give benefit to the Exchequer in the servicing of 
the floating debt right up to the fall of the Labour Government in October 1951.’30 
The final part of Howson’s argument concerns the intellectual climate of the 
times. In the introduction to British Monetary Policy 1945-51 she writes that ‘By the 
time Gaitskell became Chancellor of the Exchequer outside opinion on the utility 
of monetary policy, in Britain as in many other countries on both sides of the 
Atlantic, had swung away from the attachment to cheap money of the immediate 
post-war years. Several other countries made major changes in their conduct of 
monetary policy at the beginning of the 1950s. Gaitskell was a professional 
economist (the second to have become Chancellor of the Exchequer, Dalton 
having been the first); one wonders whether and to what extent his views on 
macroeconomic policy in an inflationary world would have changed in the same 
direction as those of other British economists including his friends and colleagues 
in the Labour party. Since the return to a “flexible” monetary policy took place 
immediately after the 1951 general election would it have taken place anyway if 
Labour had been re-elected?’31
The simple answer to this question is no. There is no evidence to suggest 
that Gaitskell changed his mind on monetary policy during his time as Chancellor. 
In fact, as will be shown, he carried his views on short-term interest rate policy into 
Opposition. To argue as Howson does that the general intellectual climate over 
monetary policy had changed says nothing about Gaitskell in particular. In
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addition, it is not clear that the intellectual climate had changed in the way Howson 
suggests. Although newspapers attacked the Government’s financial policy the 
evidence suggests that Gaitskell’s ‘friends and colleagues in the Labour party’ 
were not moving away from cheap money.
At the beginning of 1950 Anthony Crosland wrote an attack in Tribune on 
what he called The Mumbo-Jumbo of the Orthodox Economists’32 Rather than 
arguing that the Government should reactivate the Bank Rate in response to 
inflationary pressure, Crosland argued that inflation was not the cause of the 
balance of payments difficulties and that the best way to deal with these problems 
was through controls rather than an increased use of market mechanisms. 
Crosland began his article by noting that ‘every week in such papers as the 
Economist, The Times, the Manchester Guardian and the News Chronicle, a flood 
of criticism against the Governments financial policy pours forth... The main charge 
usually is that in some way or other, inflation is responsible for the continuing 
balance of payments crisis. No greater gibberish was ever talked, and the reason 
is that most of the so-called orthodox economists don’t want to understand the 
economics of a controlled, full employment society. In short, they don’t and won’t 
think, [emphasis in original]’
Crosland argued that deflation would not help the balance of payments 
position and would only lead to unemployment. On the subject of the volume of 
imports he wrote that ‘this was already held so low by controls that to restrict it still 
further by lowering incomes would have involved a degree of deflation and 
unemployment at least equal to that which prevailed in an average pre-war year.’ 
Devaluation, argued Crosland, had not proved necessary because of inflation but 
because of the changing structure of world trade. ‘This’, he wrote, ‘essentially, was 
the reason for devaluation - not that inflation had caused our prices to move out 
of line with dollar prices, but that as soon as conditions returned to normal in the 
dollar countries it became only too clear that to have kept our prices in line was not 
enough in the changed conditions of the post-war world; a sharp reduction relative 
to dollar prices became urgently necessary - and a reduction on such a scale was 
the only alternative to deflation of the most brutal kind.’33
The strength of Gaitskell's own feelings on interest rates was demonstrated
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in the draft letter to Cobbold he prepared after the meeting on January 5. Although 
it is not clear who wrote the first draft of the letter, Gaitskell was clearly unhappy 
with it. He crossed out much of it and replaced it with sections written in his own 
hand. Gaitskell argued that ‘the main, indeed almost only argument for the change 
in Bank Rate was the psychological effect which you are convinced it would have. 
In this you may be right, but I cannot feel sure myself how lasting this effect could 
be. Nor am I satisfied that very much the same, and perhaps more striking results, 
could not be achieved in other ways.’ Gaitskell suggested first seeking ‘the co­
operation of the Banks in restricting the increase in advances...’ However, he was 
not even entirely happy with this proposal because it suffered from the 
disadvantage of being indiscriminate in its effect.
In the rest'of the letter, which he wrote out himself, Gaitskell suggested 
other possible courses of action. He thought 'that we should also re-examine the 
possibility of selective credit controls- on the lines adopted in the last war. In this 
connection it is, I believe quite likely that the government will shortly be obliged to 
reintroduce certain physical controls which would of course operate in a selective 
manner, it is important that our credit policy should fit in with and not run counter 
to these.'34
Gaitskell's officials were not pleased with this last paragraph, not only 
because it was not entirely clear but also because its tone would further 
antagonise the Bank. Trend told Bridges that he was not happy with the 
paragraph, ‘partly because I am not sure what the Chancellor has in mind when 
he speaks of “selective credit controls on the lines adopted in the last war” and 
partly because, if these controls include (as I think they must) selective Bank 
Advances they ought to be more closely linked with what is said earlier in the letter 
about restricting the increase in Advances.’35 Eady suggested an alternative 
paragraph, noticeably softer in tone, which took the matter to the level of an official 
investigation. This alternative stated that ‘I should like to have examined between 
the Bank and the Treasury the question whether any further directions should be 
given to the Capital Issues Committee, the principles which might be applied by 
the Banks. These directions would be as before, guidance on certain principles by 
which applications should be considered, and these principles could be made to
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fit with the discriminatory policy which will have to be applied in the establishment 
of the certain physical controls.’36
Edwin Plowden also objected to the last line of Gaitskell's original paragraph 
which stated, with regards to physical controls, that ‘it is important that our credit 
policy should fit in with and not run counter to these.’ Plowden thought that ‘this by 
itself is a truism, but in the context if this paragraph I do not think it is relevant. A 
general restriction of credit surely does not run counter to a more selective 
administrative control; it would in fact support it.’37
After consulting Jay, Gaitskell agreed to the change suggested by Eady but 
refused to take out the last sentence as Plowden had suggested. Clearly, Plowden 
had missed, or pretended to miss, the point Gaitskell was making, that credit policy 
should be designed to fit the policy on physical controls. The relationship should 
not be the other way round.
Robert Hall became increasingly frustrated by the line Gaitskell was taking 
and his reliance on wartime techniques. In December 1950 he noted in his diary 
that Gaitskell was ‘as out of date in his beliefs about how the money system is 
controlled as I was two years ago, and talks glibly of changing reserve ratios, 
directing the banks to put up overdraft rates etc.’38 Straight after the meeting on 
January 5 1951 he wrote to Gaitskell, outlining what he saw as the problems with 
his policy. He wrote that it was his ‘own strong feeling ...that we should need a very 
large increase in the staff of Government departments if we were to make effective 
use of either raw material control or of building or machinery licensing to stop 
expansion of fixed investment goods.’ That was not the only problem, even if such 
an increase in staff was possible ‘it would take quite a long time before they were 
operating at all smoothly. It would be a very large undertaking in order to deal with 
the size of the problem with which we shall be faced, since it is not at present a 
question of a major diversion of engineering output to the war effort.’ There was, 
therefore a clear suggestion in Hall's argument that the kind of economic 
management that Gaitskell envisaged might have been right at the time of the last 
war but was in no way suitable at the present, even with the war in Korea.
Hall also criticised Gaitskell's plans for selective credit control. The Bank of 
England had always argued that 'banks can only operate this if they are given plain
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instructions, capable of being interpreted by branch mangers.' Hall added that it 
was 'impossible to lay down general principles about whole groups of economic 
activities without causing intolerable hardships' and, therefore, in order to make it 
operate effectively 'we should need nearly as big an official staff as to operate 
direct controls effectively thought material allocation or machinery licensing.'39
The division between the Bank of England’s insistence on the reactivation 
of the Bank Rate to fight inflation and Gaitskell’s insistence on selective credit 
controls hardened over the next few months. When Cobbold again requested a 
rise in short-term interest rates as a matter of urgency on May 31, Gaitskell firmly 
rejected the proposal.40 The tone of Gaitskell’s reply suggested that his decision 
was intended to be final. He argued that tightening of credit, over which the 
Treasury and the Bank were agreed was ‘...only a means to an end. The end is a 
fall, or at least, a check to the increase in deposits, accompanied by a fall in some, 
at least of the clearing banks assets.’ To meet this objective he doubted that a 
small rise in short-term interest rates would be any use at all and dismissed the 
psychological effect claimed for it. He argued that 'it is no means clear why this 
very slight change in the present procedure would necessarily lead to a reduction 
in advances.'41 Instead he suggested a 'simpler and more effective way ' of 
achieving the same objective. This would be to tell the banks to take up an 
increased quantity of Treasury bills or T.D.Rs at the current rate of interest. This 
would have the effect of reducing the reserve base. Another alternative would be 
to give the banks 'direct instructions about the level of advances... and adjust their 
cash reserves accordingly.'42
Eady wrote in a letter to Bridges about Gaitskell's note that 'Trend agrees 
substantially with the note, except the implication on page 4 that the Bank should 
be told that they had to provide whatever T.D.Rs the Government may need.'43 For 
his own part the Governor reacted angrily to Gaitskell's suggestion that he should 
issue direct instructions to the banks. He told Bridges that 'his Court would never 
stand' for such directions 'and that if this policy was pursued it could only be 
through a first class row.'44
Eady did enquire with the Treasury Solicitor if the Bank could be ordered, 
under Section 4 of the Bank of England Act 1946, to issue such instructions. The
3 37
Treasury Solicitor replied that, in his opinion, there was no such power. He added 
that such a power was not intended at the time of the Act, and that the evidence 
Dalton was prepared to give at the time before the Select Committee indicated no 
such power. Dalton had concluded that in giving instructions to the banks 'the 
initiative [will] rest with the Bank throughout.'45 However, it is far from clear that 
Dalton did not intend the Treasury to have such a power over the Bank. In July 
1949, during the devaluation crisis, Gaitskell, Jay and Dalton agreed that the 
banks should be told to reduce personal advances. When Jay said that Eady was 
obstructing such an instruction, Dalton replied that it could be done ‘if necessary 
under my Bank of England Act.’46 The fact that the Treasury had inquired about 
these powers suggests that either Gaitskell was under the impression that it might 
have them or that his officials wanted to inform him that he did not.
As Gaitskell was advised that he could not force the Governor to issue 
direct instructions to the banks he had to resort to persuasion. In July Gaitskell told 
Cobbold that he was ‘most anxious to have a tighter credit policy without the 
Government paying any more for short term borrowing.1 However the Governor 
'seemed doubtful whether credit should be much tighter than it was.' Gaitskell 
made the suggestion that he should meet the Chairmen of the clearing banks and 
'both give them my views and listen to what they have to say on the general credit 
situation.' After 'some resistance' Cobbold agreed to this request but thought that 
the meeting should be put off until the Autumn. Gaitskell agreed to this and added 
that the second half of September would be a good time, after his return from 
Washington.47 However, the General Election campaign intervened and Gaitskell 
never got to meet the bankers.
Gaitskell continued to take the same line on monetary policy in opposition. 
Butler reactivated short-term interest rate policy as part of a series of emergency 
measures in November 1951. Although Gaitskell welcomed some of these 
measures, especially the imposition of certain physical controls, he reserved most 
of his criticism for the raising of the Bank Rate. He said that Butler had 'simply 
accepted the mumbo-jumbo idea that if you have higher short money rates 
somehow or other it will keep credit down.' He concluded that he was 'sorry that 
so early in his career the right hon. Gentleman should have made such a serious
mistake.'48
When Butler put interest rates up again in his first Budget of March 1952 
Gaitskell followed through his own logic to assert that speculation against the 
pound was unlikely to be effected by the putting up of the cost of short-term 
borrowing by 1 or 1.5 per cent. He argued that speculators would be more 
influenced by the expectations and would conclude that 'the gains to be obtained 
from not holding sterling and from holding dollars will far exceed any extra cost in 
the rise in interest rates.' Instead of using interest rates he recommended more 
direct methods to control speculation against the pound. He argued that 'it would 
be a good thing if the six months during which British exporters may collect and 
convert their dollars earnings should now be reduced to four months.'49
Gaitskell's opposition to the raising of short-term interest rates continued to 
be only one aspect of his position on monetary policy. He continued to argue that 
monetary weapons, whether direct or not, could only be effective in conjunction 
with physical controls. In his Commons speech on Butler's emergency measures 
of November 1951 Gaitskell criticised the reliance on monetary measures. In the 
debate on the economic situation in January 1952 he argued that 'in dealing with 
the balance of payments situation and in preventing inflation it was necessary to 
adopt both physical and monetary controls.' The use of monetary policy alone was 
not enough and 'if we were to rely on that there might be a real danger of 
unemployment developing.'50
Gaitskell outlined his position in more detail during the Budget debate in 
April 1955, by which time the Conservative Government’s decontrol programme 
was already well advanced. He argued that the Chancellor, in abandoning direct 
controls, was faced with a very real dilemma: 'If he turns the credit screw hard 
enough to slow down the demand for imports, he damps down production and 
creates unemployment. If he keeps full employment he risks a balance of 
payments crisis. If he imposes direct control of the less essential imports he eats 
a whole mouthful of words. So, in this situation, he asks his right hon. Friend the 
Prime Minister to have an early General Election.'51
It is quite clear that Gaitskell sincerely believed that monetary policy could 
not be relied upon if the objective of economic policy was to maintain full
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employment, the use of physical controls was essential. Without these controls the 
Government was faced with a choice between unemployment on the one hand 
and inflation coupled with a balance of payments crisis on the other. Gaitskell 
supported the restriction of credit by the imposition of selective controls, not by the 
use of the bank rate. This policy fitted in well with his general economic approach 
that emphasised the importance of selective physical controls to economic 
planning. Throughout Butler's period as Chancellor Gaitskell retained a position on 
monetary policy which Robert Hall had dismissed as long ago as 1951 as being 
out of date and only suited to a war time economy.
Butler and Monetary Policy
Butler’s decision to sanction an increase in the Bank Rate from 2% to 2 1/4% 
in October 19&1 signalled a significant change in the direction of economic policy. 
The Conservatives had decided to make use of the interest rate weapon and 
return monetary policy back to the heart of macro-economic management. As 
John Fforde has noted it was ‘part of the Conservative Government's alternative 
to a policy of planning and controls..’52 As such it is difficult to see how Fforde can 
also argue that the reactivation of interest rate flexibility is best seen 'as the 
overdue removal of an absurd anomaly within the existing framework of monetary 
policy rather than as the inauguration of an entirely new approach.' Fforde’s view 
that the reactivation of the Bank Rate was inevitable accurately reflects how 
officials in the Bank of England believed policy should evolve but it is simply not 
borne out by the evidence. If Labour had won the 1951 election the evidence 
suggests that the Bank Rate would not have been raised and controls would have 
continued to play a central role in economic policy. Indeed, the reactivation of the 
Bank Rate can only seen as the ‘removal of absurd anomaly’ because the Bank 
had consistently blocked Gaitskell’s attempts to introduce selective controls. 
Fforde’s conclusion reflects the view from Threadneedle Street rather than the 
overall picture.
The Conservatives had attacked Gaitskell's refusal to harness interest rate 
policy while they were in Opposition, particularly during the 1951 Budget debate. 
For example, Ralph Assheton, had put the issue of monetary policy in the context
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of a more general attack on the policy of economic planning. He argued that ‘We 
are trying to do too much at the same time. The planners are now finding out what 
a lot of sensible people knew before, that we cannot fully plan the economy of this 
country because we cannot plan the economy of the rest of the world upon which 
we depend. For instance, we are suffering from the inflation of credit not only in 
this country but in the United States of America. The Council of the O.E.E.C. 
passed a resolutipn on 10th March urging the adoption “of such credit and other 
measures as may be necessary to keep demand within the limits set by available 
resources.” This can be done in two ways, either by the wartime method of 
widespread physical control or by a more stringent fiscal and monetary policy 
coupled with a minimum of direct controls... If we are to be driven back to the first 
method it would be disastrous, And I do not think it would work... We must aim at 
a more natural system. We must reform our monetary policy. Artificially cheap 
money is a short-sighted policy. The discipline of the rate of interest is essential 
in the end.’53
A lecture by Professor Lionel Robbins, who was close to the Conservative 
party, given in November 1951 reflected the criticisms of Labour's policy and gave 
added weight to the Conservative attack. Robbins argued that the continued 
occurrence of periodic balance of payments crises was due to the failure of the 
government to ensure that internal economic policy was compatible with the 
requirements of external equilibrium. Robbins was not saying that the 
administration had been completely blind to this but it was 'clear that there had 
been more than one objective and that, when considerations of external 
equilibrium have clashed with domestic policy they have usually had to go by the 
board.' In its attempts to secure harmony between internal and external condition 
the government had relied completely on the budget and the direct control of 
investment. 'The mechanism of monetary control has been out of action, the 
supply of money and credit has been almost completely passive to the so-called 
needs of business.' Robbins recommended the revival of 'a monetary policy which 
was conducted with full regard to the external balance.'54
Seen in this light it is clear that the revival of interest rate policy heralded a 
return to financial orthodoxy. As such it also saw a move from full employment to
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external equilibrium as being the primary goal of economic policy. Robbins had 
pointed out how external equilibrium had been seen as secondary to the 
maintenance of full employment by the Labour Government, under the Butler the 
relationship reversed.
What the revival of interest rate flexibility would mean in practice was the 
subject of much uncertainty at the time, and it was not clear that it would 'allow 
greater freedom while maintaining the bipartisan commitment to full employment 
in a free society' as Fforde argues. Fears that higher interest rates would lead to 
unemployment were not confined to the labour benches in the House of 
Commons, but found expression in the Treasury as well.
Of the measures announced by the new government in October 1951 to 
deal with the sterling crisis the decision to raise the Bank Rate was the most 
politically significant. The other remedies used, such as import cuts, would have 
been used by the former Labour Government. Eady appears to have been more 
sensitive to the political difficulties involved in reactivating the Bank Rate than 
Butler himself. Eady’s concerns were a product of the high degree of political 
consciousness civil servants tend to develop as a result of protecting their 
ministers. Although he thought that on its 'merits' the rise 'should come first, 
because of its healthy shock at home and abroad', Eady argued in a memo to 
Bridges that this would be ‘politically’ difficult for three reasons. First, he observed 
that 'the Prime Minister has no love for the Bank of England and may not like to 
see them so ostentatiously in the front line.' Second, 'Gaitskell will attack some 
parts of the story, and the reply, in the nature of the business, cannot be 
immediately destructive.' He also feared that the 'extreme Trade Unions (Miners, 
NUR, Electricians, etc) will shout deflation and slump and Bankers Ramp.' Eady 
concluded that it might, therefore, be advisable to mention other measures, such 
as the import cuts, first so as to make Churchill and Trade Unions less difficult. 
Opposition from Gaitskell was clearly unavoidable.55
Butler was advised about the political implications of the interest rate rise 
by Trend, who was now finally convinced of the necessity of the move. He argued 
that the raising of the treasury bill rate from V2 per cent to a level fluctuating 
between 3/4 and 1.5 or even 2 per cent was bound to create political difficulties
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because of the increased cost of Government borrowing. He explained to Butler 
that the 'policy of the previous Government was to rely on advice and exhortation 
to the banks, urging them to observe restraint and discrimination in their advances 
policy; but to place no obstacle in the way of their financing Government borrowing 
as cheaply as possible.' He also informed the new Chancellor that his predecessor 
had 'envisaged that, if more stringent measures became unavoidable, it would be 
necessary to isolate the short-term sector of the monetary field, to inform the 
banks and the discount house to continue to take up whatever Bills the 
Government offered at .5%, and then to operate credit restriction on the rest of the 
banks assets.'
In answer to Gaitskell's alternative policy Trend advised that 'it is not, in fact 
possible to isolate one sector of the monetary field in this way, unless some 
measure of compulsion is used.' As Gaitskell had been advised under the Bank 
of England Act of 1946 the power to do this was conferred to the Bank of England 
only.
In fact this issue did come up in the Debate on the Address on November 
7 1951.56 Gaitskell argued that Butler should be prepared to go to the clearing 
banks and 'say to them "you have to control the level of advances and not allow 
them to go beyond a certain figure; they must not go beyond that.'" Butler, in 
return, reminded him about his powers under the Bank of England act by asking 
him if he thought 'that the dictatorial language he uses fits into that picture?'57 
Trend also included a section in his memorandum on 'External effects' which noted 
that the main effect would be on confidence since the change marked 'the dawn 
of a new era' Butler underlined this last remark and wrote at the end of his copy 
that it had been 'a most valuable note.'58
Butler wanted to stress that the rise in the Bank Rate represented a major 
departure in economic policy. He told Eady to change his draft statement to the 
House so that the rise was not 'presented just as a technical modification, but, as 
a change in direction.'59 Robert Hall also argued that a Vz per cent rise in interest 
rates was 'likely to be criticised by informed observers because it may well be 
represented as the act of a Government "willing to wound, but not to strike.'"60 
Given Butler’s position Eady advised that the Treasury should urgently consider
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a rise in the rate to 3%. Butler added in a separate note to Bridges that Eady had 
written 'a convincing note' and that he 'did not want to slip by 1A% raised towards 
a higher rate.'61 However, in the Bank’s opinion there was no point in a rise greater 
than 1/ 2% since the real change was in breaking away from the concept of a fixed 
2 %. If the Chancellor wanted a rate which would have an effect over and above 
this a minimum of 4% would be required.
By February 1952 the Bank had changed its mind on this crucial issue. On 
February 23 the Governor asked for a rise in the rate to 4%, principally because 
the reactivation of Bank Rate policy had not had the anticipated psychological 
effect on borrowers that had been anticipated. Cobbold argued that the rise to 
2.5% had 'made the banks much more careful about lending, but have not had 
much effect on the attitude of industrial borrowers. A further increase in rates on 
thee lines proposed is likely to do some shaking out of the inefficient firms and to 
discourage borrowing for less remunerative development.' But he assessed that 
it was unlikely 'to have violent deflationary effects on essential activity or 
employment.'62
The change in the Bank’s argument reopened the debate in the Home 
Finance Division about the merits of the new monetary policy. In particular, Trend 
found many faults with the Bank's reasoning. In a memorandum circulated to both 
Eady and Bridges, Trend pointed out that the rise would mean a considerable cost 
to the Exchequer in interest payments. He also compared the Bank's argument to 
that it had used the previous November when it had asked for the 1/2% rise. Then 
it had argued that the rise would have more effect on borrowers than on lenders 
since it could no longer be assumed that the rate would remain static. Now the 
Bank was conceding that the rise had little effect on borrowers but that clearing 
Banks had become much more careful about lending money. The Bank, therefore, 
proposed a new rise primarily to discourage borrowing, but the 1/4% rise had led the 
Banks to raise their own rates 'to a greater extent then was justified by the actual 
rise in Bank Rate.' The Bank was arguing that because of this a further rise to 4% 
'will mean only a pretty moderate increase in the Bank's rate', but, Trend argued 
'in that case is there any reason to suppose that the new increase would have any 
more deterrent effect on potential borrowers than last November's increase?'63
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In short, Trend felt that 'the Governor's memorandum could be clearer and 
more convincing on this fundamental question of Bank credit.' However, Trend's 
criticism went much further than this. He also questioned the relationship between 
the rise and the proposed contents of the Budget with which it was suggested the 
rise should coincide. The Budget was going to put costs up, particularly through 
the removal of food subsidies. As a result it was 'almost certain to touch off a new 
round of wage claims as a result. It is, therefore, potentially a cost inflationary 
Budget; and even if the effects are mitigated in many cases by increased social 
benefits and remissions of Income tax, a good many people are going to be hurt.'
If a rise in the Bank Rate were on top of this, and if it was effective it would 
'offer considerable resistance both to wage claims and to the increase in costs 
generally.' Although manufacturers would probably survive 'something will have to 
give way somewhere.' this meant that' a good many more people will get hurt, and 
they will probably be people in the lower income ranges.' It would mean 
unemployment and although from an 'abstract economic point of view' a 'moderate 
degree of unemployment would be welcome provided that it were moderate and 
provided that it were transitional' this could not be guaranteed.
Trend’s arguments were reminiscent of those used by Gaitskell both in 
office and in Opposition. He pointed out that a rise in the Bank Rate was 
'essentially indiscriminate in effect' and it could not be used in such a way as to 
produce unemployment in those places and industries from which labour could be 
easily switched to arms and exports. If it could not be guaranteed then, he 
concluded that 'abstract economics will I think, find themselves at odds with 
politics.' If it were decided that the rise in the Bank Rate was unavoidable then 'the 
rest of our planning of the internal economy, including the Budget, must be 
coherent with it.'64
Eady took issue with much of Trend’s argument. On the question of the cost 
to the Exchequer Eady retorted that 'in the context, both of this years Budgetary 
policy, and the expected surplus for 1952/3, an extra charge of £100 million gross 
is not more than an inconvenience.' The rise would effect industry and discourage 
investment and lead to resistance to wage claims but that was entirely a good 
thing. Saving on investment would let some resources free for work on exports and
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also lead to resistance to wage claims which 'had been entirely lacking since 
1946.' The shock of the combined effect of the Budget and the rise in Bank rate 
would 'not be one of dismay but of encouragement.' Eady put this in to the context 
of the O.F. paper on 'Emergency Action' and the danger to the reserves. With this 
background it was important to take action 'while we are still in control, and as an 
act of control.'65
Butler did announce a rise in the Bank Rate to 4% as part of a Budget 
which was in substance the same as Trend had anticipated. The policy appeared 
to be a success. A balance of payments surplus was achieved in 1952, the drain 
on the reserves was halted and confidence in sterling was restored.
Douglas Jay tabled an amendment to the 1953 Finance Bill concerning the 
effect of the Government’s monetary policy on the debt charge. Butler decided 
against taking part in this debate and left the responsibility to John Boyd- 
Carpenter, the Financial Secretary. Boyd-Carpenter was briefed by Edmund 
Compton, who had succeeded Eady as Head of the Home Finance Division. 
Compton argued that monetary policy should not be judged in isolation 'but as part 
of our economic strategy.' This was to check inflation and improve the balance of 
payments. 'The new decision', he continued, 'taken by this Government was to use 
the instrument of monetary policy in support of economic and fiscal measures.' 
Although Compton conceded that 'there can be argument in the event of how 
much of the success was due to the monetary weapon.' He nevertheless stated 
that 'there can be no doubt that monetary policy made an essential contribution.'
Compton also advised Boyd-Carpenter to attack the Labour Party's 
alternative policy which had been recently laid out in the pamphlet Challenge to 
Britain. This pamphlet stated that "'Labour's Budgets were planned to keep down 
spending so that enough investment could take place without inflation."' Compton's 
commented that the 'experience of the years before 1951 is that they might plan 
this, but without the support of the monetary weapon they could not do it.' The 
mistake of not using interest rates would be compounded, Compton argued, by 
what the pamphlet described as "Budget savings" and which interpreted as 
'increased taxation' and also by 'direct control which means that they will try to give 
orders to investors.'66
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In the Commons debate Jay argued that the rise in interest rates had put 
a totally unnecessary strain on the Exchequer. A rise in the interest charges on 
public borrowing could not be justified as it 'can hardly be argued that the 
Chancellor had to restrain himself by charging himself higher interest rates in order 
that he should spend less.' Jay argued that only private borrowing needed to be 
restrained.67
In replying to Jay, Boyd-Carpenter relied heavily on Compton’s arguments. 
He stated that the difference between the two parties on monetary policy 
amounted 'almost to a difference in doctrine or faith' and that Labour’s attachment 
to cheap money amounted to 'faith in the Shavian sense of believing in what one 
knows is not true rather than relying on reason.' While the Conservative 
Government used interest rates as a 'flexible instrument' the Labour party 
remained fixed on a policy of low interest rates. Boyd-Carpenter likened Labour’s 
policy to 'the gentleman who went for a walk without a mackintosh and got caught 
in the rain, and then walked about in a mackintosh through a long heat wave so 
that he should not be caught again to the detriment of his health and comfort.'68
Gaitskell was not impressed by Boyd-Carpenter's speech. He correctly 
surmised that the Financial Secretary was 'speaking from a prepared brief and 
also accused him of 'making no attempt to answer the arguments put forward by 
this side.' He went further than just criticising the monetary weapon for its 
bluntness and its cost to the Exchequer, he also doubted the effectiveness of 
raising short-term interest rates. He could see 'that there may have been some 
influence through these policies on the level of stock which firms hold.' But he 
added that it was 'extremely likely that firms would have ceased building up stocks 
for the simple reason that world commodity prices were already falling. After all, 
there is a point at which people do not want to hold any more stocks in any case.'69
Boyd-Carpenter had been correct to describe the difference between the 
two parties as a fundamental one of faith. Gaitskell had no faith in short-tern 
interest rate policy and said as much on numerous occasions. While Compton was 
advising ministers that raising interest rates had made an 'essential contribution' 
to holding down inflation and improving the balance of payments, Gaitskell clearly 
doubted that this was the case. Such doubts were also being expressed in the
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Treasury itself. As background for the preparation of the 1953 Budget J.C.R. Dow 
of the Economic Section prepared a paper which attempted to assess the results 
of a year's operation of the new monetary policy. The difficulty inherent in this 
operation was separating the effect of monetary policy from the other factors that 
had operated on the British economy in 1952. However, Dow's outline concluded 
that the effect of the new monetary policy was limited and 'was not the main cause 
of the improvement in the balance of payments.' Although monetary policy 
probably 'exaggerated the stock decline' Dow agreed with Gaitskell that this would 
have happened in any case with the fall in consumption and export demand.' He 
also concluded that this 'was probably the main effect on the economy.' The 
Investment Programmes Committee had 'found little reason to suppose that the 
demand for fixed investment had been reduced by monetary policy.' Dow also 
noted that 'personal consumption can have been little affected.' With regards to 
the psychological effect on foreign capital he did concede that 'higher interest rates 
and the confidence engendered by the new monetary policy may have led to some 
reflux of capital from other countries.' However 'such a reflux would probably 
anyhow have occurred and the improvement in the balance of payments was 
probably a more important permanent cause for confidence.'70
Trend wrote to Humphrey Mynors to get the Bank's opinion of what he 
described as 'a fairly reasoned paper.' In reply Mynors's explained that the matter 
was no longer his responsibility but he had read the draft and had the general 
impression that 'the policy had had more effect than this suggests...' In particular 
he pointed to the problems of separating the effect of the rise in interest rates from 
the other factors involved. For example, he questioned Dow's assumption that the 
reflux in capital was not due for the most part to the rise in rates. 'If the world 
distrusted the level of rates here, would the reflux have occurred anyway? If the 
policy helped to strengthen the balance of payments, must it not get some credit 
by that channel?'71
Within the Treasury Samuel Goldman also questioned Dow's conclusions. 
He pointed out that the stability in investment that Dow had alluded to as evidence 
that monetary policy had little effect had to be seen in the light of a steady increase 
in the nationalised sector. 'The case in favour of the new monetary policy', he
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wrote, 'is therefore stronger than is suggested.' Also, on personal consumption 
Goldman noted that 'a drop of £40 million in personal and professional advances 
is quite significant and cannot be dismissed so easily.' On the balance of payments 
there was 'a distinct under-estimate of the significance of the new monetary policy. 
The Budget and the rise of bank rate to 4% had an almost overnight effect on our 
gold and dollar position.' On the point both Dow and Gaitskell had made about the 
effect on stocks, Goldman noted that monetary policy 'had a larger potential effect 
on reducing imports than in fact was manifested in 1952, while old contracts were 
being worked off [emphasis in original].'72
Dow wrote to Goldman to say that many of his points had been taken on 
board by the first draft of the paper which attached to the note.73 However, 
Goldman still thought that Dow did the new monetary Policy 'less than justice .' But 
they were in agreement on one point, that 1952 had been unique since monetary 
policy was 'pulling in the same direction as events' and therefore 'it becomes very 
difficult to draw any conclusions about the way the economy will react to monetary 
policy in a different situation.' This comment, and the whole debate inside the 
Treasury about the effectiveness of the new monetary policy reveal how little 
interest rate policy was understood and how much the decision to revive it and give 
it prominence had been a leap in the dark. As Goldman concluded, it would be 
'difficult to say what will happen if the screw had to be put on during a period of 
active inflation.[emphasis in original]'74
It was not until February 1955 that the Treasury began to gain experience 
of using interest rates in the conditions that had concerned Goldman. The Bank 
Rate had been reduced by half a point in September 1953 and again in May 1954 
but these moves were made to keep rates in touch with market levels.75 Bank 
advances expanded throughout 1954, encouraged by the decision in July to 
remove hire-purchase controls. In February 1955 the Bank Rate was raised twice 
to 4V2%. In his Budget speech that April Butler made specific mention of the use 
of ‘a flexible monetary policy’ to control expansion. However, Butler’s reaction to 
the continued expansion in advances was to introduce a package of measures in 
July that included a rise in hire-purchase deposits of 33%, a cut in the investment 
programmes of the nationalised industries and a formal request from the Governor
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to the banks to cut their advances, but no rise in the Bank Rate.
That summer the Exchequer was hit by a run on the pound. Butler 
attempted to persuade the Cabinet to save the situation by introducing a package 
of spending cuts. However, as has been seen, Eden insisted on fiscal measures 
being included in the package and Butler was forced to introduce an emergency 
Budget in the Autumn. Given the emphasis Butler placed on monetary policy it 
appears odd that the Bank Rate was not raised to help deal with the sterling 
problem. The rate still stood at a relatively low figure and Butler believed that the 
run on the pound was caused by speculation trigged by rumours that it would soon 
be made convertible at a floating rate. It would have been consistent with his policy 
to raise interest rates further. In fact, Butler did try to get the Bank Rate out of 
‘baulk’, as he put it, but he was resisted in these efforts by the Governor. Although 
Cobbold could not prevent him from raising rates, Butler wanted his agreement 
before making any move.
Cobbold had two main reasons for rejecting an increase in rates. The first 
was that the Bank, in representing commercial interests, thought that through the 
credit squeeze the private sector was doing more than its fair share in combatting 
inflation. This argument formed the basis of an angry letter Cobbold wrote to 
Bridges on 3 August 1955. Cobbold wrote about ‘the widespread feeling in the City 
that, whilst the credit squeeze has had considerable effect, and will now have 
more, on private enterprise, little has been done to cut back public spending where 
the “credit squeeze" cannot bite... I am quite sure that H.M. Government, H.M. 
Treasury and the Bank of England will come in for a great deal of criticism if 
“private enterprise” sees itself increasingly squeezed with no evidence that the 
same thing is happening in the “public” field.’76
The second, and probably decisive, reason for Cobbold’s resistance was 
that he wanted any further move in this direction tied to a further move towards 
convertibility. The Bank’s enthusiasm for the restoration of a flexible Bank Rate 
policy had been primarily a product of its desire to see internal and external policy 
brought back into harmony and thus facilitate convertibility. By the summer of 1955 
the Bank had become obsessed by the need to make progress towards 
convertibility within a wide band and saw everything in this context. When Butler
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tried to get the Bank Rate out of ‘baulk’ in the middle of August 1955, the Governor 
argued that from ‘his own point of view... it would be a great mistake to touch the 
Bank Rate until we were ready to move on the exchange front... he thought we 
must keep the Bank Rate for this occasion. To use it now would leave us without 
further shots in the locker.’77
Cobbold brought all his objections together in a formal recommendation not 
to raise rates two days later. He argued that ‘a sharp rise in Bank Rate without a 
sharp effect on exchanges would be most unfortunate. A rise in August or 
September without previous action on public expenditure and investment and 
without tidying up the exchange rate position would be most unlikely to have any 
real effect on the exchange. Financial opinion at home and abroad is now 
focussed on wages and the “public sector”. It is here that the next round of attack 
should be directed and seen to be directed. Bank Rate should be kept in reserve 
for a moment when it can have some real effect or is needed as an “umbrella for 
an exchange move.’78
Conclusion
Butler's failure to raise interest rates to help restore confidence in pound in 
1955 could be considered to be one of the most important mistakes of his 
Chancellorship. However, Butler was operating within the context of advice from 
the Treasury and the Bank of England, both of which were cautious about raising 
rates above the relatively low figure of 4 or 41A%. In particular, the Bank was more 
concerned about its own agenda of attaining convertibility than about the effect of 
the Bank Rate on the domestic economy. The Bank’s opposition to raising the 
Bank Rate was the decisive factor in persuading Butler not to act. He made it clear 
in his evidence to the Radcliffe Committee that he had not been willing to force the 
Bank to make a move that went against its own judgement. Butler told the 
Committee that he came to this conclusion ‘because you see you are dealing with 
matters of common concern, and it is essential that there should be understanding 
and agreement before they are carried out.’79 Instead Butler resorted to appeals 
to the banks to cut advances and the imposition of hire purchase controls as part 
of his July measures. Both the cuts in public investment, which he was allowed to
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make, and the cuts in subsidies which Eden prevented, were designed to restore 
confidence and were therefore a substitute for a rise in the Bank Rate.
Although there were impediments to Butler’s use of the Bank Rate, the 
Treasury, as evidenced by an internal history prepared by Gowling, considered 
that he had 'a very active monetary policy.'80 Butler’s policy should be seen in the 
context of his overall economic strategy which was based on decontrol and fiscal 
expansion. He saw the restoration of the interest rate weapon as necessary if 
these objectives were to be fulfilled. There was an element of feeling his way in the 
conduct of his monetary policy as cheap money had been the order of the day for 
as long as Butler had been in government. But the conversion of the Conservative 
Party to the use of the Bank Rate in postwar conditions had been genuine and not 
a matter of adversarial politics.
In supporting the restoration of Bank Rate flexibility Butler and his 
colleagues not only differed from Dalton, but from the younger economists within 
the Labour party such as Gaitskell and Crosland. While in Government Gaitskell 
had abstained from the use of the Bank Rate because he believed it to be an 
‘antiquated instrument.’81 Instead he favoured the use of selective credit controls 
as part of his general strategy of using physical controls to plan the economy.
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Chapter 11 
Conclusion
The Man Who Never Was: Mr Butskell
The figure of Mr Butskell is central to consensualist historiography. He 
represents the idea that during the Gaitskell and Butler Chancellorships economic 
policy centred on the use of Keynesian demand management to combat business 
fluctuations and maintain full employment.1 This thesis has shown that Mr Butskell 
never really existed. Gaitskell and Butler were different men who had little in 
common in terms of political and economic doctrine, both had clear economic 
strategies and played a leading role in the formation of policy. In fact, the 
divergence between Gaitskell’s vision of a controlled economy and Butler’s of a 
free one represented a fundamental disagreement over the aims and methods of 
economic policy.
Crucial to the concept of the postwar consensus is the contention that the 
economic agenda was set by Keynesian ideas of economic management. Paul 
Addison argues that as Keynes’ ideas were liberal rather than conservative or 
socialist, the dominance of these ideas had the effect of containing economic 
debate and excluding from it both the Labour left and the Conservative right. 
However, it has been shown that not only has the importance of Keynesian ideas 
in setting the economic agenda been greatly exaggerated, but also that these 
ideas were not necessarily seen as offering a mutually exclusive alternative to 
either socialist or conservative conceptions of a planned or free economy. The 
acceptance of Keynesian ideas did not contain economic debate in the way that 
Addison suggests, rather Keynesian instruments were seen by both Gaitskell and 
Butler as being complementary to their differing economic doctrines.
The use of Keynesian methods to manage the economy should therefore 
be seen in a wider context. It was entirely consistent for Butler to write in his 
memoirs that both he and Gaitskell ‘spoke the language of Keynesianism’ while 
denying the existence of a consensus. This was because, as he continued, they
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spoke the language ‘with different accents and with a differing emphasis.’2 They 
both used Keynesian techniques but they did so within wholly different contexts 
and with different purposes. Gaitskell saw Keynesian methods as a necessary 
adjunct to physical planning; Butler saw them as a substitute.
Gaitskell developed firm beliefs about economic policy prior to the 
publication of Keynes’ General Theory in 1936. Gaitskell’s economic doctrine was 
essentially socialist in character. It centred on the use of both internal and external 
controls to plan the economy. Keynesian methods had a place within this 
framework, particularly in the consumer goods market, but Gaitskell believed they 
could only be effective within the context of physical planning. He argued that if 
controls were removed then in the long-run the government would face a choice 
between deflation and unemployment on one hand or inflation and a balance of 
payments crisis on the other. With controls in place fiscal planning could be used 
to maintain a consistently high level of demand.
Gaitskell believed Keynesian methods were also not sufficient to combat 
the injustices and inefficiencies that adhered to the capitalist system. The policy 
of ‘fair shares’ involved the subsidisation and control of the prices of what were 
classified as essential goods. Unlike Cripps, Gaitskell was not persuaded by the 
Treasury’s case against subsidies. He perceived subsidies as being an important 
part of the Government’s universalist benefits policy and therefore saw no reason 
why they should be removed in the long-run. The maintenance of subsidies meant 
that the demand for certain goods would continue to be controlled through 
rationing rather than through the price mechanism.
In marked contrast to Gaitskell the main theme of Butler’s Chancellorship 
was economic expansion through the extension of individual freedom. In his 
memoirs Butler wrote that ‘Norman Macrae of The Economist paid me the 
compliment in an article he wrote describing my work at the Treasury as 
representing (1a puissance d ’une idee en marche". This idee could be summed up 
in a single word: expansion - an expansion I believed capable of achievement only 
if the fresh winds of freedom and opportunity were allowed to blow vigorously 
through the economy.’3
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Butler believed the main economic effect of physical economic planning 
was to constrain economic activity and distort markets. Not allowing the price 
mechanism to play its proper role in the economy created excesses of demand for 
controlled goods. In a free economy, with these factors brought back into 
equilibrium, the Government would be able to pursue a more expansionist 
economic policy which would in turn create economic confidence which would 
stimulate investment and allow further economic expansion. Therefore the focus 
of Butler’s Chancellorship was on dismantling the controls he had inherited from 
his Labour predecessors.
Butler’s use of Keynesian methods can only be properly understood within 
the context of his decontrol programme. For Butler the attraction of these methods 
was that they were indirect in their application and could therefore be used to 
manipulate a free economy. Where Keynesian policy did not facilitate a return to 
free markets Butler looked for alternative methods. His decision to reactivate the 
Bank Rate and to use it to manipulate the economy went against one of the central 
tenets of Keynes’ economic theory. However, allowing interest rates to rise not 
only helped to bring the internal and external economy back to equilibrium but it 
also represented an indirect method of regulating demand and encouraging saving 
and investment.
Bringing the Politics Back In
A major theme of this thesis has been that both Gaitskell and Butler took 
the lead in making economic policy during their Chancellorships. They were able 
to do so because they both had remarkably clear and consistent economic 
strategies. The differences in their personalities and, more importantly, in the 
receptiveness of the institutional framework to their ideas accounts for the different 
ways in which they went about playing the leading role.
The enormous divergence between Gaitskell’s views and those of his 
advisers meant that he not only dictated the general lines of policy but also its 
details. Gaitskell’s dictatorial style applied to all the main areas of economic policy. 
For example, in external economic policy Gaitskell was responsible for both setting
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the general framework of convertibility policy and for negotiating the details of the 
European Payments Union. Gaitskell was clear about the direction that external 
economic policy should take. He believed full convertibility and a one-world 
economy should not be the objectives of British policy because they were 
incompatible with the maintenance of a socialist economy at home. Gaitskell’s 
view was not derived from a short-term perspective formed in response to the 
dollar gap; rather he believed that liberalisation would open the British economy 
up to the effects of America’s free market economy and an international slump. He 
also argued that currency liberalisation would give financial markets the power to 
prevent a Labour government from fulfilling its economic and social objectives.
Gaitskell therefore developed a long-term strategy that was in accord with 
his own economic thinking. Gaitskell wanted Britain's external economic policy to 
concentrate on strengthening ties with the Sterling Area. Essentially, he thought 
that economic planning should be extended and protected throughout the Sterling 
Area; this meant setting up new institutions to co-ordinate common economic 
policies. Gaitskell did not just have trade policy in mind, he also wanted to co­
ordinate internal economic policy and thus maintain full employment and 
production. Gaitskell accepted that strengthening the Sterling Area would mean 
a permanent system of trade discrimination.
Gaitkell’s views had an enormous impact on policy outcomes. In particular, 
he countered the forces driving towards multilateralism within the E.P.U. 
negotiations and agreed generous credit margins with the American 
representatives. Had these negotiations had been left to officials from the 
Overseas Finance Division then the resulting agreement would have looked very 
different. The Divisional view was much closer to that of the American 
administration than it was to its own ministerial masters. The actual content of the 
agreement can only be understood if proper consideration is given to GaitskelPs 
part in the negotiations.
Gaitskell’s impact can be seen in all the other main areas of economic 
policy. He became the principal author of the Full Employment Bill, which would 
have put many physical controls on the statute book on a permanent basis. Of the
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ministers involved in the discussions over the content of the Bill it was Gaitskell 
who had the clearest vision of what the role of controls in economic planning 
should be in the long-run. He was able to think systematically about how those 
controls which were essential to economic planning could be differentiated from 
those which might be required on a short-term basis. He was also responsible for 
providing the Bill with a title that made an explicit connection between the 
continuance of economic planning and the maintenance of full employment. This 
revealed his ability to look at controls in the wider context of the Government’s 
overall policy. The bias against and sometimes outright hostility of Treasury 
officials towards physical controls and their belief that they would eventually be 
phased out contributed to Gaitskell’s suspicion of officials and encouraged him to 
get involved in day-to-day policy. He insisted that no control could be removed 
without prior approval.
It has also been seen that Gaitskell took the lead in both fiscal and 
monetary policy. In his 1951 Budget Speech he re-emphasised the importance of 
physical planning and the restricted nature of Budgetary policy. He also blocked 
the Bank of England’s attempts to reactivate the Bank Rate and thereby end the 
policy of cheap money. As was the case with most of the major policy decisions 
of his Chancellorship, Gaitskell went against the advice of all his senior advisers 
in making this decision.
Like Gaitskell, Butler had a clear economic strategy. The chapters dealing 
with the main aspects of economic policy have revealed how remarkably 
consistent Butler was in all the objectives he pursued. This might appear surprising 
given that Butler did not share Gaitskell’s economic training. In consequence 
Butler had less confidence in his own opinions and required some kind of official 
confirmation of his policy. Butler did not share Gaitskell’s ability to impose policy 
or provide the framework within which discussion took place. However, he did not 
face the same wall of official opposition that Gaitskell had and was therefore better 
able to work within the framework of official policy advice and still get his way. This 
was not simply because his views correlated with official opinion. If one looks at 
Butler’s economic policy as a whole it is clear that he was its principal author not
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only because of its consistency but also because it does not accord with the 
advice he was getting from any one part of the policy-making machinery. There 
was a sufficient plurality of opinions within the Treasury for Butler to generally get 
his way. He was also adept at manipulating his advisers and pushing them in the 
direction he wanted to go. As a consequence he did not have to impose policy 
from above or get heavily involved in the details.
Butler’s method of operating can be observed in the area of external 
economic policy. As was generally the case, Butler’s policy was moulded by his 
free market objectives. He pursued a policy of convertibility at a floating rate 
believing that this would bring into play market forces that would bring the 
economy back into balance. Decontrol of the economy would be facilitated and 
progress towards a multilateral trade and payments system would be advanced. 
Although the Overseas Finance Division saw convertibility as the eventual goal 
of policy it was Butler who pushed it into considering convertibility at a floating rate 
as an immediate policy objective. Once Butler had the support of Leslie Rowan 
and his Division he had the confidence to dismiss the arguments against his policy 
voiced by Edwin Plowden and Robert Hall. Later on in his Chancellorship, when 
Rowan argued against any further unilateral moves towards convertibility, Butler 
switched to taking advice primarily from the Bank of England which supported 
further progress. Although the goal of floating rate convertibility was not reached 
by the time Butler left the Treasury, it had remained the overall objective 
throughout his Chancellorship.
The same method of leading by manipulation and selection applied to the 
other aspects of Butler’s economic policy. In the area of monetary policy, for 
example, it has been seen that Butler pushed his advisers into being bolder in their 
thinking on interest rates. The reactivation of the Bank Rate allowed him to pursue 
an expansionist fiscal policy even though the Economic Section, which was the 
main supporter of a more expansionist policy, was sceptical about the impact of 
higher interest rates.
This study has shown the value of taking what politicians say in public 
seriously. The role of Gaitskell and Butler in making economic policy could not be
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fully understood if one concentrated solely on the files of the Public Record Office. 
There is an enormous temptation for historians to rely too much on official records. 
The aura of former secrecy gives these documents an air of authority that others 
do not possess. Official records are obviously important but they do not tell the 
whole story for two reasons. First, the higher you look in the policy-making 
machinery the less you find that has been recorded for posterity. The simple 
explanation for this anomaly is that policy formulation is at its least formalised at 
the highest levels. More is decided personally on a one-to-one basis rather than 
through the dissemination of notes and memoranda. One consequence of this is 
that historians have tended to put too much emphasis on the role of officials.
Second, even if everything said in Whitehall was recorded in the Public 
Record Office it is still unlikely that it would provide an adequate guide. 
Government policy has to be placed within the wider context of political and 
ideological debate. For example, policy on economic controls is only explicable if 
it is looked at in the light of differing Conservative and Socialist beliefs about the 
relationship between the individual and the State. It would be unrealistic to expect 
these concepts to be constantly raised in day-to-day discussions concerning 
particular controls even though they provided a more general motivation for action. 
In order to understand the respective policies of Gaitskell and Butler one has to 
recognise that the former genuinely believed that he was working to create a more 
equitable society and the latter that he was freeing the public from the overbearing 
hand of the State.'Public speeches and parliamentary debates recorded in private 
papers, Hansard and the media, provide this context. Seen within it, the different 
economic polices pursued by Gaitskeil and Butler have come sharply into focus.
The Ideological Ascendency
A general conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence provided in this 
thesis is that party conflict and ideology played a central role in the making of 
economic policy in the postwar period. The conditions of the period did not lead 
to a Whig ascendancy, as Addison and Seldon have argued. In fact the 
countervailing factors listed by Addison which restrict the impact of party and
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ideology, such as ‘the influence of the civil service, the electoral imperatives of a 
party system in which the two parties were evenly balanced, the pragmatism of 
party leaders, and the practical value of maintaining a large measure of continuity 
between one administration and the next’, operated with less force than would 
normally have been the case.4
The existence of a coalition Government during the War did not have the 
effect of creating a consensus on economic policy between the two parties as 
Addison has suggested. Addison himself has effectively conceded this point in the 
revised edition of The Road to 1945 in which he accepts that the Labour Party had 
not been converted to Keynesian economics by 1945.5 However, the wartime 
coalition did have the effect of creating a highly experienced political elite which 
lessened the impact of the countervailing force of a permanent civil service.
To talk of the civil service as a monolithic force in favour of Keynesian 
economic policy is also wholly inaccurate. It has been seen that their was both a 
generation gap between the pre- and post-1945 intake of Treasury civil servants 
in terms of their conversion to Keynesianism and clear division between senior 
Treasury officials who still thought primarily in terms of balanced budgets and 
financial control and advisers in the Economic Section who were far more 
Keynesian in their thinking. As a consequence the Treasury rarely spoke with one 
voice.
The plurality of views within the Treasury was also symptomatic of the fact 
that the postwar period was one of great uncertainty and transition. The process 
of postwar reconstruction meant that politicians were making fundamental choices 
about what the new world would be like. These choices not only applied to the 
structure of the domestic economy but also to that of the international economy 
and the world trading system. It is hardly surprising that ideology played a central 
role in this process; continuity was not a highly valued commodity in these 
circumstances. The options created by postwar reconstruction opened up the 
spectrum of political debate; it meant that the parties could realistically present 
conflicting visions of a controlled and a free market economy to the electorate. If 
the mythical figure of Mr Butskell has come to embody a consensus on economic
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policy that never existed then perhaps the actual historical figures of Mr Gaitskell 
and Mr Butler should be seen as embodying these two fundamentally different 
ideologies.
Notes:
1. According to Paul Addison the two central pillars of the postwar 
settlement were the acceptance of Keynesian demand management and the 
principle of universal social benefits. See Paul Addison: The Road to
1945: British Politics and the Second World War, Jonathan Cape, London, 
1975 .
2. Lord Butler: The Art of the Possible: The Memoirs of Lord Butler, 
Hamish Hamilton, London, 1971, p.160.
3. Ibid. pp 160-161.
4. Paul Addison: The Road to 1945, revised edition, Pimlico, London, 
p.283.
5. Ibid.
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